People v. House , 2021 IL 125124 ( 2021 )


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  •                                      
    2021 IL 125124
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    (Docket No. 125124)
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTONIO HOUSE, Appellee.
    Opinion filed October 22, 2021.
    JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices Garman, Theis, and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    Chief Justice Anne M. Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with
    opinion.
    Justice Michael J. Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion,
    joined by Justice Overstreet.
    OPINION
    ¶1       On November 28, 2018, this court issued a supervisory order directing the
    appellate court to vacate its judgment in People v. House, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 110580
    . We directed the appellate court to consider the effect of this court’s opinion
    in People v. Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , on the issue of whether petitioner’s sentence
    violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
    1970, art. I, § 11). People v. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory
    order).
    ¶2       Following the issuance of our supervisory order, the appellate court determined
    that petitioner’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate
    penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court remanded the cause
    for a new sentencing hearing. 
    2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    .
    ¶3      The State appealed as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July 1,
    2017)). We now reverse in part and vacate in part the appellate court’s judgment
    and remand the cause to the circuit court for further postconviction proceedings.
    ¶4                                     BACKGROUND
    ¶5       Following a Cook County jury trial, petitioner was found guilty of two counts
    of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his
    participation in the 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of 15-year-old Stanton
    Burch and 18-year-old Michael Purham. Petitioner was allegedly among a group of
    men who kidnapped the victims after the victims attempted to sell drugs in an area
    where petitioner and his fellow gang members typically sold drugs. Petitioner was
    two months past his nineteenth birthday at the time of the crimes. The victims were
    driven to a vacant field, where they were shot and killed. Petitioner provided police
    with a handwritten statement attesting to his involvement in the crimes. He claimed
    that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted
    location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced
    petitioner to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions (730 ILCS
    5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1992)) and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping
    conviction, to run consecutively to the life term (see 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West
    1992)).
    -2-
    ¶6      Petitioner filed a direct appeal raising, inter alia, a claim that his consecutive
    and extended-term sentences violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000). The appellate court affirmed petitioner’s convictions, vacated his
    aggravated kidnapping sentences, and remanded for resentencing. People v. House,
    
    328 Ill. App. 3d 1088
     (2001) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme
    Court Rule 23). 1 On remand, petitioner’s sentence for the aggravated kidnapping
    convictions was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms.
    ¶7       While his direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed a pro se petition under the
    Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)), raising,
    inter alia, a claim that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate
    penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and a
    claim of actual innocence. The circuit court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction
    petition, finding it lacked jurisdiction while petitioner’s direct appeal remained
    pending. Petitioner appealed the dismissal, and the appellate court vacated the
    dismissal and remanded the case for second-stage postconviction proceedings on
    the State’s confession of error. People v. House, No. 1-02-0346 (Feb. 5, 2003)
    (order).
    ¶8       On remand, petitioner’s appointed counsel filed an amended postconviction
    petition raising five issues: (1) actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of
    her trial testimony; (2) his constitutional rights were violated based on newly
    discovered evidence of police misconduct; (3) the trial court erred in denying his
    postconviction counsel’s request to obtain Office of Professional Standards files on
    the detectives involved in his interrogation; (4) his constitutional rights were
    violated based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (5) his
    mandatory sentence of natural life violated the eighth amendment of the United
    States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties
    clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The circuit court
    granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition at the second stage of the
    postconviction proceedings.
    1
    This Rule 23 order was subsequently vacated and withdrawn pursuant to a supervisory order
    entered by this court (People v. House, 
    199 Ill. 2d 567
     (2002) (supervisory order)).
    -3-
    ¶9         The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s postconviction
    petition on the first four issues, vacated petitioner’s sentence after finding that his
    mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties
    provision as applied, and remanded for resentencing. House, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 110580
    . The appellate court reasoned that applying the mandatory natural life
    sentencing statute to petitioner violated the proportionate penalties provision
    because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically petitioner’s
    age, level of culpability, and criminal history. Id. ¶ 89. Citing a newspaper opinion,
    a publication from an advocacy organization, and practices of some European
    countries, the appellate court found that the United States Supreme Court’s
    “division between juvenile and adult at [age] 18” did not “create[ ] a bright line
    rule,” the designation of age 18 as an adult “appear[ed] to be somewhat arbitrary,”
    and the characteristics of juvenile offenders also applied to young adult offenders.
    Id. ¶¶ 94-96.
    ¶ 10       The appellate court concluded that petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence
    shocked the moral sense of the community. Id. ¶ 101. Accordingly, the appellate
    court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. ¶ 102. Because it
    found the mandatory natural life sentence unconstitutional as applied to petitioner
    under the proportionate penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution, the
    appellate court declined to address petitioner’s remaining constitutional challenges,
    including those under the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 103.
    ¶ 11       Both parties appealed. In November 2018, this court denied the State’s petition
    for leave to appeal as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July 1,
    2017)) and issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its
    judgment and to reconsider the effect of this court’s opinion in Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , on the issue of whether petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate
    penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018)
    (supervisory order). This court also denied petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal
    concerning the appellate court affirming the dismissal of his postconviction petition
    on the first four issues.
    ¶ 12       On remand, the parties filed an agreed motion for summary disposition asking
    the appellate court to remand the case “for further second-stage post-conviction
    proceedings, including compliance with [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 651(c).”
    -4-
    The appellate court denied the agreed motion and again affirmed the dismissal of
    petitioner’s postconviction petition on the first four issues, vacated petitioner’s
    sentence based on its conclusion that his mandatory natural life sentence violated
    the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and remanded for
    resentencing. 
    2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    .
    ¶ 13       The State appealed as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 317, 612(b)(2) (eff. July
    1, 2017). We allowed the Children and Family Justice Center; the Juvenile Law
    Center; the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior; the Civitas ChildLaw Clinic; the
    Criminal and Juvenile Justice Project; the Juvenile Justice Initiative of Illinois; the
    Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights; and Marc Kadish to file a joint
    amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
    ¶ 14                                       ANALYSIS
    ¶ 15       The procedural history of this appeal began with the dismissal of petitioner’s
    postconviction petition at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. The
    Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008))
    provides a tool for criminal defendants to assert that their convictions were the
    result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or
    the Illinois Constitution or both. 
    Id.
     § 122-1(a); People v. Coleman, 
    183 Ill. 2d 366
    ,
    378-79 (1998). Postconviction relief is limited to constitutional deprivations that
    occurred during the original trial. Coleman, 
    183 Ill. 2d at 380
    . “A proceeding
    brought under the [Act] is not an appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment.
    Rather, it is a collateral attack on the judgment.” People v. Evans, 
    186 Ill. 2d 83
    , 89
    (1999). The purpose of a proceeding under the Act “is to allow inquiry into
    constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and could
    not have been, determined on direct appeal.” People v. Barrow, 
    195 Ill. 2d 506
    , 519
    (2001).
    ¶ 16        A postconviction proceeding contains three stages under the Act. During the
    first stage of the proceeding, the circuit court must independently review the
    postconviction petition, without input from the State, and determine whether it is
    “frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008);
    People v. Johnson, 
    2018 IL 122227
    , ¶ 14. The circuit court may summarily dismiss
    the petition if it meets that standard. Johnson, 
    2018 IL 122227
    , ¶ 14. If the
    -5-
    postconviction petition is not summarily dismissed at the first stage, the
    proceedings move to the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2008);
    Johnson, 
    2018 IL 122227
    , ¶ 14.
    ¶ 17       At the second stage of postconviction proceedings, counsel may be appointed
    to represent the petitioner (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2008)), and the State may file
    responsive pleadings (id. § 122-5). Johnson, 
    2018 IL 122227
    , ¶ 15. The circuit
    court determines at this stage whether the postconviction petition and any
    accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional
    violation. 
    Id.
     “If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. If, however,
    the petition sets forth a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, it is
    advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing
    (725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2010)).” 
    Id.
    ¶ 18       The primary issue in this appeal involves a constitutional challenge to
    petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence for his murder convictions (730 ILCS
    5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1992)). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and
    petitioner must overcome that presumption by clearly establishing that the
    mandatory sentencing statute at issue is invalid when applied to him. People v.
    Coty, 
    2020 IL 123972
    , ¶ 22; People v. Rizzo, 
    2016 IL 118599
    , ¶ 23. Petitioner’s
    constitutional challenge is reviewed de novo. Coty, 
    2020 IL 123972
    , ¶ 22.
    ¶ 19       In its appeal, the State argues that the appellate court erroneously considered
    petitioner’s as-applied proportionate penalties claim. Petitioner seeks cross-relief
    on the dismissal of his actual innocence claim. We first address the State’s claim
    that the appellate court erred in ruling on petitioner’s proportionate penalties claim
    and, thereafter, discuss petitioner’s actual innocence claim.
    ¶ 20                  A. Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution
    ¶ 21       This case comes to us for review following our court’s issuance of a supervisory
    order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment in House, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 110580
    . We specifically directed the appellate court to consider the effect of
    this court’s opinion in Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , on the issue of whether petitioner’s
    sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
    -6-
    Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory
    order).
    ¶ 22       Following the issuance of our supervisory order, on remand, the parties filed an
    agreed motion for summary disposition asking the appellate court to remand the
    case “for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including compliance
    with [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 651(c).” The parties agreed that, based on
    Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , and People v. Thompson, 
    2015 IL 118151
    , this case should
    be remanded for further postconviction proceedings to give petitioner the
    opportunity to consult with counsel about his constitutional claims and to develop
    and present evidence to the trial court, with assistance of counsel, demonstrating
    how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applies to an
    emerging adult and to the petitioner’s specific circumstances.
    ¶ 23       The appellate court denied the parties’ agreed motion and again affirmed the
    dismissal of petitioner’s postconviction petition on the first four issues raised in the
    petition. The appellate court also again vacated petitioner’s sentence based on its
    conclusion that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate
    penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and remanded for resentencing. 
    2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    . The appellate court relied on the same reasoning as
    contained in its 2015 opinion and added that (1) recent legislative enactments
    supported its conclusion and (2) petitioner’s sentence was disproportionate when
    compared to that of Fred Weatherspoon, who was a juvenile at the time of the
    offenses and had been resentenced under Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012).
    
    2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    , ¶¶ 62, 76. The appellate court determined that Harris,
    
    2018 IL 121932
    , had no effect on petitioner’s claim because he raised it in a
    postconviction petition and was not the principal offender, adding that no further
    record development was necessary. 
    2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    , ¶ 32.
    ¶ 24       The State contends that, under Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , and Thompson, 
    2015 IL 118151
    , the appellate court erroneously considered petitioner’s as-applied
    constitutional claim under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause because the
    claim was not developed in the trial court. According to the State, “ ‘[b]y definition,
    an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances
    and facts of the individual defendant[.]’ Thompson, 
    2015 IL 118151
    , ¶ 37.” Thus,
    the State submits, it is “ ‘ “paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in
    -7-
    terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” ’ Harris,
    2018 IL 121 932, ¶ 39 (citation omitted).”
    ¶ 25       Petitioner argues that the appellate court properly remanded the case for a new
    sentencing hearing. Contrary to his position in the agreed motion for summary
    disposition filed in the appellate court, petitioner now argues that no further record
    development is necessary to conclude that the mandatory life sentencing statute
    shocks the conscience as applied to him.
    ¶ 26        This court’s supervisory order specifically directed the appellate court to
    consider the effect of this court’s opinion in Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , on the issue
    of whether petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the
    Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28,
    2018) (supervisory order). Our analysis, thus, begins with reviewing our decision
    in Harris.
    ¶ 27       In Harris, this court recognized that “[t]he distinction between facial and as-
    applied constitutional challenges is critical.” Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , ¶ 38. When
    making a facial challenge, the challenging party “must establish that the statute is
    unconstitutional under any possible set of facts.” 
    Id.
     An as-applied challenge, on
    the other hand, requires the challenging party to establish “that the statute is
    unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the
    challenging party.” 
    Id.
     We explained that, by definition, as-applied constitutional
    challenges are dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging
    party and, “ ‘ “[t]herefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed
    in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” ’ ” Id.
    ¶ 39 (quoting People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 
    2018 IL 121636
    ,
    ¶ 31, quoting Thompson, 
    2015 IL 118151
    , ¶ 37). We further explained and
    reiterated that
    “ ‘ “ ‘[a] court is not capable of making an “as applied” determination of
    unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings
    of fact. [Citation.] Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is
    unconstitutional “as applied” is premature.’ ” ’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting Rizzo, 
    2016 IL 118599
    , ¶ 26, quoting People v. Mosley, 
    2015 IL 115872
    , ¶ 47, quoting In re
    Parentage of John M., 
    212 Ill. 2d 253
    , 268 (2004)).
    -8-
    ¶ 28        In Harris, this court reversed the appellate court’s judgment vacating
    defendant’s sentences and remanding for resentencing based on its determination
    that, as applied to the defendant’s circumstances, his sentence violated the
    proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 63. We reasoned
    that, where the defendant did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the
    trial court, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his claim, and the trial court did
    not make any findings of fact on the defendant’s specific circumstances, the
    appellate court made its holding without a developed evidentiary record. Id. ¶ 40.
    ¶ 29       Here, as in Harris, petitioner did not provide or cite any evidence relating to
    how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applies to his
    specific facts and circumstances. As a result, no evidentiary hearing was held, and
    the trial court made no factual findings critical to determining whether the science
    concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applies equally to young
    adults, or to petitioner specifically, as he argued in the appellate court. Accordingly,
    as in Harris, the appellate court improperly found that petitioner’s sentence violated
    the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution without a developed
    evidentiary record on the as-applied constitutional challenge. Indeed, the appellate
    court’s opinion equating young adult offenders to juvenile offenders relied on
    articles from a newspaper and an advocacy group. As the State points out, no trial
    court has made factual findings concerning the scientific research cited in the
    articles, the limits of that research, or the competing scientific research, let alone
    how that research applies to petitioner’s characteristics and circumstances.
    ¶ 30      The appellate court, nonetheless, concluded that this court’s reasoning in Harris
    and Thompson is limited to cases when a defendant raises an as-applied challenge
    on direct review or when the defendant is guilty as a principal rather than as an
    accomplice. We disagree.
    ¶ 31       In Harris, this court rejected the defendant’s argument that Thompson does not
    apply because Thompson involved a collateral proceeding and Harris involved
    direct review. Id. ¶ 41. We explained that
    “[t]he critical point is not whether the claim is raised on collateral review or
    direct review, but whether the record has been developed sufficiently to address
    the defendant’s constitutional claim. As we have emphasized, a reviewing court
    is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the
    -9-
    ‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings
    of fact by the trial court.” Id.
    Thus, our analysis in Harris focused on development of the record in the trial court,
    not whether the challenge is raised in a collateral proceeding or on appeal, or
    whether the petitioner was a principal rather than an accomplice in the crime. We
    conclude that the appellate court erroneously held that petitioner’s sentence of
    natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution
    as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the
    as-applied constitutional challenge.
    ¶ 32      Because we have determined that the record in this case requires further
    development, we remand the cause to the circuit court for second-stage
    postconviction proceedings.
    ¶ 33                         B. Petitioner’s Request for Cross-Relief
    ¶ 34        Petitioner also requests cross-relief, arguing that he has made a substantial
    showing of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. According to
    petitioner, this newly discovered evidence supports his claim of actual innocence,
    as it shows that he was not present when the victims were kidnapped or killed.
    ¶ 35       In addition to his as-applied constitutional claim, petitioner’s amended
    postconviction petition alleged, inter alia, a claim for actual innocence. The claim
    was supported with an affidavit from Eunice Clark, a key state witness, recanting
    her trial testimony. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction petition at
    the second stage of the postconviction proceedings. In 2015, the appellate court
    affirmed the dismissal of four of petitioner’s claims, including his actual innocence
    claim, but granted postconviction relief on petitioner’s as-applied challenge to the
    mandatory natural life sentencing statute. Petitioner filed a petition for leave to
    appeal asking this court to review the dismissal of his other claims, including the
    second-stage dismissal of his actual innocence claim, and the State sought review
    of the appellate court’s judgment that petitioner’s mandatory natural life sentence
    was unconstitutional. This court denied both petitioner’s and the State’s petitions
    for leave to appeal, but we issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court
    - 10 -
    to vacate its judgment and consider the effect of Harris on petitioner’s sentencing
    claim.
    ¶ 36       On remand, the appellate court again granted postconviction relief on
    petitioner’s as-applied constitutional claim. The appellate court did not revisit its
    prior judgment affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s claim of actual innocence.
    Petitioner now asks this court for cross-relief on his actual innocence claim. He
    asks this court to vacate the appellate court’s judgment as to his actual innocence
    claim and remand to the appellate court for reconsideration of that claim in light of
    People v. Robinson, 
    2020 IL 123849
    , or alternatively to remand for a third-stage
    evidentiary hearing.
    ¶ 37       Before the State filed its opening brief in this appeal, this court decided
    Robinson. Robinson clarified the standards that apply when reviewing actual
    innocence claims at the leave-to-file stage for successive postconviction petitions
    (see id. ¶¶ 57-62) and explained aspects of the standards that generally apply to
    review of such claims at any stage (see id. ¶¶ 55-56).
    ¶ 38       The State agrees in part with petitioner, conceding that the cause should be
    remanded to the trial court. The State agrees that this court may review all matters
    that were properly raised and passed on in the course of litigation, even if the court
    previously denied the petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal that raised the issue.
    See Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District No. 103, 
    84 Ill. 2d 436
    , 442-43 (1981).
    ¶ 39        According to the State, not only did the appellate court issue its initial decision
    prior to Robinson but also prior to People v. Sanders, 
    2016 IL 118123
    , which
    reviewed the second-stage dismissal of an actual innocence claim premised, like
    petitioner’s, on recantation. Thus, the courts below did not have the benefit of
    Robinson or Sanders in considering Clark’s recantation, and the appellate court’s
    judgment rests in part on aspects of the actual innocence standard that Robinson
    has since clarified. In light of the intervening decisions, the State agrees that vacatur
    of the appellate court’s judgment relating to actual innocence and remand for
    reconsideration of that claim is warranted. The State asks that, to avoid piecemeal
    litigation, the court vacate that part of the appellate court’s judgment affirming the
    trial court’s second-stage dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim and
    - 11 -
    remand to the trial court to reconsider that claim at the second stage in light of
    Sanders and Robinson.
    ¶ 40       Petitioner counters that, because the State concedes that his actual innocence
    claim was wrongly dismissed, the claim should proceed to a third-stage evidentiary
    hearing and that it would be unfair to remand for second-stage proceedings. We are
    not persuaded by petitioner’s suggestion.
    ¶ 41       Here, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s postconviction petition at the second
    stage of the proceedings after determining that petitioner’s petition and
    accompanying documentation failed to make a substantial showing of a
    constitutional violation. We disagree with petitioner’s suggestion that the cause
    should be remanded to the trial court for third-stage postconviction proceedings
    because there was no prior determination that petitioner made a substantial showing
    on his actual innocence claim. The trial court did not have the benefit of this court’s
    decisions in Sanders and Robinson, and to avoid piecemeal litigation, we now
    vacate that portion of the appellate court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s
    second-stage dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim and remand the cause
    to the trial court to reconsider that claim in second-stage postconviction
    proceedings in light of Sanders and Robinson. We make no judgment on the merits
    of petitioner’s actual innocence claim.
    ¶ 42                                      CONCLUSION
    ¶ 43       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s holding that
    petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
    Constitution as applied to petitioner. We also vacate the appellate court’s holding
    affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s actual innocence claim. We remand the cause
    to the trial court for further second-stage postconviction proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    ¶ 44      Appellate court judgment reversed in part and vacated in part.
    ¶ 45      Cause remanded.
    - 12 -
    ¶ 46      CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    ¶ 47       I agree with the portion of the majority opinion that remands this cause to the
    circuit court for further consideration of petitioner’s postconviction claim of actual
    innocence. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to remand this cause
    to consider whether petitioner’s natural life sentence violates the proportionate
    penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).
    In my view, remanding on the latter issue is at odds with People v. Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    . I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.
    ¶ 48       Petitioner was convicted, inter alia, of two counts of first degree murder arising
    from his participation in the shooting deaths of two victims, Stanton Burch and
    Michael Purham. Petitioner received a mandatory natural life sentence for the
    convictions pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of
    Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998)). This provision now states
    that, for first degree murder, “the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
    natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the
    murder, had attained the age of 18, and *** is found guilty of murdering more than
    one victim.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c) (West 2020). Petitioner was 19 years old at
    the time he committed the murders and, thus, fell within the terms of the statute.
    ¶ 49       Petitioner’s murder convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. People v.
    House, 
    328 Ill. App. 3d 1088
     (2001) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
    Supreme Court Rule 23). He thereafter filed a postconviction petition that, among
    other claims, asserted that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the
    proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The petition was
    dismissed at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. On appeal, the
    appellate court agreed with petitioner that the proportionate penalties clause
    prohibits his mandatory natural life sentence. The court therefore vacated
    petitioner’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
    2018 IL App (1st) 110580-B
    . This appeal followed.
    ¶ 50       Before this court, petitioner repeats his claim that his mandatory sentence of
    natural life in prison violates the proportionate penalties clause. Petitioner’s claim
    rests largely on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama,
    
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, because of the
    characteristics of youth, the eighth amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that
    - 13 -
    mandates life in prison without possibility of parole” for defendants who were
    under the age of 18 at the time the crimes were committed. 
    Id. at 479
    . Miller did
    not categorically prohibit natural life sentences without possibility of parole for
    juvenile offenders. Rather, the Court held only that the eighth amendment requires
    “that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
    attendant characteristics—before imposing” that penalty. 
    Id. at 483
    .
    ¶ 51       Petitioner contends that, under the proportionate penalties clause, the rule
    announced in Miller should be extended to adult offenders between the ages of 18
    and 21 in Illinois. In support of this contention, petitioner asserts that “there has
    been endorsement within the scientific community” of research showing “that the
    brains of young adults continue to develop into their mid-20s.” Further, according
    to petitioner, “scientific advances in brain research” demonstrate that the
    characteristics of juvenile offenders, such as immaturity and poor impulse control,
    exist equally in adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21. Thus, petitioner
    maintains that, just as the Supreme Court held in Miller that the eighth amendment
    “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
    parole” for juvenile offenders, this court should hold that the proportionate
    penalties clause forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
    possibility of parole for adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21.
    ¶ 52       The majority declines to reach the merits of petitioner’s argument. Citing
    Harris, the majority concludes that petitioner’s proportionate penalties clause
    argument based on extending Miller is an as-applied challenge to the
    constitutionality of his sentence. Noting the rule that an as-applied constitutional
    challenge requires the development of an adequate factual record, the majority finds
    that one is lacking here. The majority observes that no evidentiary hearing was held
    in the circuit court and that petitioner did not provide any evidence to the court
    relating to brain development and research. As a result, the circuit court made no
    factual findings as to whether the science concerning juvenile maturity and brain
    development applies equally to adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 21.
    Accordingly, the majority holds that the appellate court improperly found that
    petitioner’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause in the absence of a
    sufficient evidentiary record. The majority concludes that the cause must be
    remanded to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings and the
    development of an adequate record. I disagree.
    - 14 -
    ¶ 53       I wrote separately in Harris. There, I noted that a proportionate penalties clause
    challenge based on Miller is a facial challenge, not an as-applied one. Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , ¶¶ 65-76 (Burke, J., specially concurring). I continue to believe this is
    true. Here, as in Harris, petitioner’s primary objection is that, pursuant to the
    statutory scheme enacted by the legislature in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), the
    sentencing court was precluded from considering any potentially mitigating
    circumstances when imposing sentence on petitioner. This is constitutionally
    impermissible, according to petitioner, because adult offenders between the ages of
    18 and 21 are essentially no different than juvenile offenders and, therefore, cannot
    be subject to mandatory natural life sentences. Stated otherwise, the constitutional
    flaw alleged by petitioner is that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of
    Corrections requires a mandatory life sentence for defendants who have “attained
    the age of 18,” when it should read “attained the age of 21.” The alleged
    constitutional flaw is—quite literally—apparent on the face of the statute.
    Petitioner’s proportionate penalties clause argument based on Miller is clearly a
    facial challenge. See e.g., People v. One 1998 GMC, 
    2011 IL 110236
    , ¶ 86
    (Karmeier, J., specially concurring) (a facial challenge is one in which the
    constitutional flaw is inherent “in the terms of the statute itself”).
    ¶ 54       Moreover, any question as to whether a constitutional challenge based on Miller
    is a facial challenge is eliminated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones
    v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, 
    141 S. Ct. 1307
     (2021). There, the Court expressly
    noted that a constitutional challenge to a natural life sentence without possibility of
    parole imposed under a discretionary sentencing scheme—that is, a scheme where
    the sentencing court has the discretion to consider factual circumstances and not
    impose a natural life sentence—is an “as-applied” challenge to the sentencing
    court’s decision. 
    Id.
     at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1322. In contrast, a constitutional challenge
    brought to a mandatory sentencing scheme created by the legislature, such as the
    one at issue here, is a facial challenge.
    ¶ 55       Because petitioner’s constitutional challenge is facial, the rule relied upon by
    the majority for as-applied challenges is inapplicable. There is no per se bar to
    considering petitioner’s claim now. Further, based on this court’s reasoning in
    Harris, petitioner’s claim must be rejected.
    - 15 -
    ¶ 56       In Harris, the defendant raised the same claim that petitioner raises here,
    arguing that the reasoning of Miller should be extended to adult offenders between
    the ages of 18 and 21 under both the eighth amendment and the proportionate
    penalties clause based on recent scientific research on brain development. This
    court rejected the defendant’s eighth amendment argument, noting that the
    Supreme Court had determined that the traditional line between juveniles and adults
    was set at age 18 and that scientific studies were not relevant in making this
    determination. We stated:
    “[T]he line drawn by the Supreme Court at age 18 was not based primarily on
    scientific research. The Supreme Court acknowledged its line at age 18 was an
    imprecise ‘categorical rule[ ]’ but emphasized that ‘a line must be
    drawn.’ [Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 574 (2005)]. The Court drew the line
    at age 18 because that ‘is the point where society draws the line for many
    purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ Roper, 
    543 U.S. at 574
    . New
    research findings do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults
    and juveniles.” Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , ¶ 60.
    ¶ 57       There is no reason why this rationale would not apply with equal force under
    the proportionate penalties clause. Further, there is a fundamental contradiction
    here. The majority is remanding the cause to the circuit court to provide petitioner
    the opportunity to produce scientific evidence regarding brain development, even
    though this court has already determined that new research findings “do not
    necessarily alter” the traditional line—18 years of age—between adults and
    juveniles. The remand, therefore, appears to provide petitioner with nothing more
    than the opportunity to present irrelevant evidence. This makes little sense.
    ¶ 58       In my view, in light of this court’s reasoning in Harris, petitioner’s
    proportionate penalties clause challenge fails. Accordingly, I dissent from the
    portion of the majority opinion that remands this cause to consider whether
    petitioner’s natural life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause.
    ¶ 59      JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    ¶ 60       I agree with the majority’s decision to remand the cause to the circuit court for
    further consideration of defendant’s postconviction claim of actual innocence.
    - 16 -
    However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the cause must be
    remanded for second stage postconviction proceedings to consider whether
    defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
    Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), in accordance with directives
    from People v. Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    . Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent
    in part.
    ¶ 61       I would hold that the appellate court’s judgment declaring the statute
    unconstitutional as applied on proportionate-penalties grounds (based on the notion
    that the brains of young adults are still undergoing development) should be reversed
    outright without any remand. I would also hold that the postconviction court’s
    second-stage dismissal of defendant’s penalties-clause claim should be affirmed. I
    do not believe that a remand is required per Harris.
    ¶ 62       At the second stage of a postconviction proceeding, the circuit court determines
    whether defendant’s petition and any accompanying documentation make a
    substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Johnson, 
    2018 IL 122227
    , ¶ 15. If the requisite showing is not made, the petition should be dismissed.
    Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2010). Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions and
    mere conclusions are insufficient to require a hearing under the Post-Conviction
    Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). People v. Brown, 
    236 Ill. 2d 175
    , 205 (2010). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and defendant in this case
    had to overcome that presumption by clearly showing that the sentencing scheme
    he challenged was unconstitutional as applied to him. People v. Coty, 
    2020 IL 123972
    , ¶ 22.
    ¶ 63       Here, defendant did not cite any evidence in support of his postconviction
    petition, nor did he even mention the science concerning young adult brain
    development that he now argues supports his claim. Thus, defendant failed to make
    the requisite showing and should not be given another bite at the apple. I read Harris
    to say that a direct appeal is not the appropriate forum to raise such an issue but that
    it should instead be raised in a postconviction proceeding. See Harris, 
    2018 IL 121932
    , ¶ 48 (on direct appeal, the court declined to remand the matter to the trial
    court for an evidentiary hearing but noted that defendant’s as-applied proportionate
    penalties clause claim was more appropriately raised in a postconviction
    - 17 -
    proceeding). Again, defendant had his opportunity to raise the science of brain
    development before the postconviction court in this case but failed to do so.
    ¶ 64       But beyond defendant’s failure to raise the science of brain development before
    the postconviction court, I would resolve this case on the basis that, even
    considering such evidence, the determination of a sentencing line between juveniles
    and adults for mandatory life sentencing is best set as a matter of policy by the
    legislative branch.
    ¶ 65      In that regard, I agree with the point made by Chief Justice Burke in her special
    concurrence in Harris:
    “although scientific studies regarding brain development may help in
    determining where the line between juveniles and adults should be drawn for
    purposes of criminal sentencing, the issue is not one that can be resolved with
    scientific certainty based ‘primarily on scientific research.’ [Citation.] Rather,
    determining the age at which human beings should be held fully responsible for
    their criminal conduct is ultimately a matter of social policy that rests on the
    community’s moral sense. Traditionally, 18 is the age at which the line is drawn
    between juveniles and adults.” Id. ¶ 77 (Burke, J., specially concurring).
    ¶ 66        When enacting the statute under which defendant was sentenced in the present
    case, the legislature considered both the possibility of rehabilitation and the
    seriousness of the offense of committing multiple murders and determined that, in
    the public interest, there must be a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life
    imprisonment for an adult who commits such crimes. People v. Taylor, 
    102 Ill. 2d 201
    , 206 (1984). I believe that the legislative judgment itself expresses the moral
    sense of the community relative to the penalty available for the commission of
    multiple murders. See Coty, 
    2020 IL 123972
    , ¶ 43 (The legislative judgment
    “ ‘itself says something about the “general moral ideas of the people.” ’ ”
    (Emphasis in original.) (quoting People v. Rizzo, 
    2016 IL 118599
    , ¶ 37, quoting
    People v. Miller, 
    202 Ill. 2d 328
    , 339 (2002), quoting People ex rel. Bradley v.
    Illinois State Reformatory, 
    148 Ill. 413
    , 421-22 (1894))). The legislature has further
    clearly determined that this mandatory minimum applies to 19-year-olds. In fact,
    recent legislative enactments confirm that for the purposes of criminal punishment
    a person is an adult when he turns 18 years old. In my view, these enactments
    indicate without a doubt that defendant’s mandatory life sentence is a legislative
    - 18 -
    policy determination, and one which easily passes constitutional muster under the
    proportionate penalties clause. In 2013, the legislature amended the Juvenile Court
    Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2012)) to adjust the age to be
    considered a juvenile from 17 to 18 but did not go further than that. See People v.
    Richardson, 
    2015 IL 118255
    , ¶¶ 1, 3 (comparing 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (2012), with
    705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp. 2013)). In 2015, it passed a sentencing provision
    requiring sentencing courts to consider youth-related mitigating factors for those
    under 18. See Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
    105). And most telling, in 2019, it provided parole review for certain crimes
    committed by those under 21 but excluded parole review for those like defendant
    who were subject to mandatory life sentences. See Pub. Act 100-1182, § 5 (eff.
    June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115).
    ¶ 67       I would further find that, while the courts have the ultimate responsibility to
    determine what is a constitutional sentence, nothing in this case rebuts the high
    standard of constitutionality enjoyed by the legislative determination.
    ¶ 68      Defendant asserted that his sentence should be declared invalid as applied to
    him because of his age and minimal involvement in the commission of the crimes.
    This argument should be soundly rejected.
    ¶ 69       For defendant’s argument to succeed, he would have to satisfy the “ ‘cruel and
    degrading’ ” standard. See Rizzo, 
    2016 IL 118599
    , ¶ 28. This standard would
    require him to establish that the challenged penalty is “ ‘so wholly disproportionate
    to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Coty,
    
    2020 IL 123972
    , ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 
    212 Ill. 2d 107
    , 130 (2004)).
    This court has never found a mandatory prison term cruel and degrading, or a shock
    to the moral sense of the community, when applied to an adult homicide offender.
    Moreover, the parties acknowledge that this court has found the maximum penalty
    for murder cruel and degrading just one time but that it was in respect to a 15-year-
    old juvenile with a minimal degree of participation in the crime, who had less than
    one minute to contemplate his decision to act as a lookout. See Miller, 
    202 Ill. 2d at 340
    .
    ¶ 70       Here, in contrast to Miller, defendant was a 19-year-old adult and had a motive
    to promote commission of the offenses. He distributed cocaine for the gang to
    which he belonged for most of his life, and the purpose of the murder-kidnapping
    - 19 -
    plot was to preserve his gang’s drug territory. In furtherance of that objective, he
    held the victims at gunpoint to facilitate the kidnapping, knew the victims in fact
    were going to be harmed, acted as a decoy, then threatened a witness with violence
    after the offenses.
    ¶ 71       All the cases defendant cites in support of his argument apply to juveniles. See,
    e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
     (2005); Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012). He cites no cases applying his
    argument to adults. Indeed, there is a paucity of authority nationwide holding that
    a young adult offender could ever be exempted from a mandatory life without
    parole sentencing scheme based on a proportionate-penalties argument. See In re
    Monschke, 
    482 P.3d 276
    , 289 (Wash. 2021) (Owen, J., dissenting, joined by
    Johnson, Madsen, and Stephens, JJ.) (“no legislatures or courts in the other 49 states
    have ever recognized such a protection”).
    ¶ 72       For the above reasons, I dissent from the portion of the majority’s judgment that
    remands the cause to the circuit court for consideration of defendant’s proportionate
    penalties clause claim. Instead, I would find that defendant’s sentence does not
    violate this clause of our state constitution.
    ¶ 73      JUSTICE OVERSTREET joins in this partial concurrence, partial dissent.
    - 20 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 125124

Citation Numbers: 2021 IL 125124

Filed Date: 10/22/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/20/2021

Authorities (21)

People v. Richardson , 2015 IL 118255 ( 2015 )

Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District ... , 84 Ill. 2d 436 ( 1981 )

People v. Sanders , 2016 IL 118123 ( 2016 )

Apprendi v. New Jersey , 120 S. Ct. 2348 ( 2000 )

Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct. 2455 ( 2012 )

People v. Robinson , 2020 IL 123849 ( 2020 )

People v. Barrow , 195 Ill. 2d 506 ( 2001 )

In Re Parentage of John M. , 212 Ill. 2d 253 ( 2004 )

People v. Evans , 186 Ill. 2d 83 ( 1999 )

People v. Taylor , 102 Ill. 2d 201 ( 1984 )

People v. Rizzo , 2016 IL 118599 ( 2016 )

People v. Thompson , 2015 IL 118151 ( 2016 )

People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson , 2018 IL 121636 ( 2018 )

People v. Johnson , 2018 IL 122227 ( 2019 )

People v. Coleman , 183 Ill. 2d 366 ( 1998 )

People v. Huddleston , 212 Ill. 2d 107 ( 2004 )

People v. Miller , 202 Ill. 2d 328 ( 2002 )

Roper v. Simmons , 125 S. Ct. 1183 ( 2005 )

People v. Harris , 2018 IL 121932 ( 2019 )

People v. Coty , 2020 IL 123972 ( 2020 )

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