People v. Goossens , 2015 IL 118347 ( 2015 )

2015 IL 118347IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 118347)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RAYMOND GOOSSENS,
Appellant.
Opinion filed September 24, 2015.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Raymond Goossens, a police sergeant, was convicted of
intimidation, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(6) (West 2010)), after he
threatened not to respond to 911 calls from a local auto racetrack as long as two
former police officers were employed at the facility. Following a finding of guilty
by a jury, defendant was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. The amended
order of probation contained numerous conditions, one of which required that
defendant “shall become current in his child support in case number 2002 D 528.”
Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court of Rock Island County lacked the
authority under section 5-6-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) to
include the payment of child support as a condition of probation. 730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(b) (West 2010). The appellate court affirmed. 2014 IL App (3d) 120680.
We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1,
2013); R. 612 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
¶2 PRINCIPAL STATUTE INVOLVED
¶3 Section 5-6-3 of the Code includes a list of several mandatory conditions of
probation (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a) (West 2010)) as well as other conditions that a
court may impose at its discretion (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b) (West 2010)). Specifically
at issue in this case is subsection 5-6-3(b)(6), which provides:
“(b) The Court may in addition to other reasonable conditions relating to the
nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined for
each defendant in the proper discretion of the Court require that the person:
***
(6) support his dependents[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West 2010).
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 At defendant’s sentencing hearing on July 16, 2012, the trial court imposed,
inter alia, a condition requiring defendant to “become current in his child support
in case number 2002 D 528” and “defendant shall not be released from his
probation until his child support is current.” 1 The trial court imposed the child
support condition based on a presentencing investigation report indicating that
defendant owed over three and a half years in back child support payments, totaling
$11,779.89.
¶6 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court was not authorized under section
5-6-3(b) to impose the child support condition because child support payments do not
reasonably relate to the offense of intimidation. The Appellate Court, Third District,
rejected defendant’s argument, finding that section 5-6-3(b) expressly permits a trial
court to impose any of the enumerated probation conditions, regardless of whether the
1
For purposes of simplicity, hereafter, the condition of probation at issue will be summarized as
“the child support condition.”
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condition relates to the charged offense. 2014 IL App (3d) 120680, ¶ 9. The appellate
court determined that because the child support condition falls under the scope of
section 5-6-3(b)(6), “support his dependents,” imposition of the condition was
authorized by statute. Id. The Third District noted, however, its interpretation conflicts
with an earlier Appellate Court, Fourth District, decision in People v. Campbell, which
interpreted section 5-6-3(b) to mean, “all conditions of a sentence or conditional
discharge must be related to the specific offense for which the defendant is
sentenced.” Id. (citing People v. Campbell, 325 Ill. App. 3d 569 (4th Dist. 2001)). We
granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 The issue before this court is whether the trial court had the authority to impose
a condition of probation requiring defendant to pay child support for a conviction of
intimidation. Defendant maintains that the trial court acted beyond the scope of its
sentencing authority under section 5-6-3(b) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)
(West 2010)) by imposing the probation condition that “defendant shall become
current in his child support in case number 2002 D 528.” Defendant argues a trial
court is only authorized to impose a condition of probation enumerated under
section 5-6-3(b) if it relates to the nature of defendant’s conviction. Thus,
defendant suggests that if this court conducted a linguistic examination of section
5-6-3(b), the plain language of the Code would reveal that the legislature created a
restrictive clause intending to require that all conditions, including the enumerated
conditions, must relate to the nature of the offense. The State argues the plain
language of the Code authorizes a trial court to impose any of the enumerated
conditions under section 5-6-3(b), regardless of whether the condition relates to the
nature of defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, the State concludes that subsection
5-6-3(b)(6) provides express statutory authority to impose the payment of child
support as a condition of probation. We agree with the State.
¶9 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature, presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient,
or unjust consequences. People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23. The best indicator
of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. People v. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15. In determining the
plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the
subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. People
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v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374, 378 (2011). We may also consider the resulting
consequences from construing the statute one way or the other. People v. Marshall,
242 Ill. 2d 285, 293 (2011). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo. People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 29.
¶ 10 This court has repeatedly interpreted section 5-6-3(b) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(b) (West 2010)) to mean a court may in its discretion require a probationer
to comply with any of the enumerated conditions, including “support his
dependents” 2 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West 2010)). See People v. Lampitok, 207
Ill. 2d 231, 246 (2003) (“[S]ubsection (b) provides numerous examples of
conditions that the court in its discretion may require ***.”); People v. Meyer, 176
Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997) (“Section 5-6-3(b) of the Code contains 16 permitted
conditions of probation which may be imposed ***.”). Defendant argues, however,
that there is an inherent relatedness requirement in the Code that attaches to all
enumerated conditions. Thus, a trial court would abuse its discretion by imposing
an unrelated enumerated condition. We disagree.
¶ 11 If we were to accept defendant’s argument that the legislature intended that all
conditions of probation, including those expressly enumerated, must relate to the
nature of the offense, when could a court impose electronic monitoring or home
confinement (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(10) (West 2010)) as a condition of probation?
Neither condition relates to the nature of any offense, but rather they are conditions
imposed for enforcement and the protection of the public.
¶ 12 It is well settled that when the legislature uses certain language in one instance
of a statute and different language in another part, we assume different meanings
were intended. People v. Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d 417, 431 (2010). Under the plain
language of the Code, the legislature specifically chose to limit the application of
some enumerated conditions by requiring the condition relate to the offense
charged. See, e.g., 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(12) (West 2010) (Limiting the defendant’s
financial obligations to the “offense for which the defendant was sentenced.”); 730
ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(17) (West 2010) (Limiting the condition to defendants convicted
for an offense “that would qualify the accused as a child sex offender.”). By
2
Section 5-6-3(b)(6) of the Code, “support his dependent,” is synonymous with the obligation
to make child support payments. See Black’s Law Dictionary 503 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a
“dependent” as someone “who relies on another for support”). In this case, defendant was the
noncustodial parent of his child. It was reasonable for the trial court to set the amount of support at
the amount already adjudicated in case No. 2002 D 528. The amount defendant was ordered to pay
under the child support condition is not dispositive on the issue before this court.
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contrast, in the same statute, the legislature specifically chose to exclude a
relatedness requirement for other enumerated conditions. See, e.g., 730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(b)(3) (West 2010) (Requiring a trial court to require defendant to “work or
pursue a course of study or vocational training.”); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West
2010) (Requiring defendant to “support his dependents.”); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(9)
(West 2010) (Requiring defendant to “perform some reasonable public or
community service.”). Thus, we assume that the legislature intended such
limitations to certain conditions when it expressly provided that limitation, while at
the same time, the legislature did not intend such limitations when the language is
absent from other conditions. Additionally, if the legislature had intended that all
conditions of probation must relate to the nature of the offense, then constructing
the extensive list of conditions was superfluous, because there would be no need to
include such additional, limiting language in certain parts of the statute. Instead,
these provisions clearly demonstrate that the legislature knew exactly what it was
doing when it specifically authorized a trial court to impose certain enumerated
conditions, including electronic monitoring or home confinement (730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(b)(10) (West 2010)) and supporting one’s dependent (730 ILCS
5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West 2010)), regardless of whether the condition relates to the nature
of offense.
¶ 13 Furthermore, defendant’s attempted construction contradicts our previous
interpretation of the plain language of the Code, which says, “[t]he Court may ***
require that the person *** support his dependents.” 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6) (West
2010). The enumerated conditions that may be imposed under section 5-6-3(b)
represent the legislature’s considered judgment that those conditions may be
imposed at the court’s discretion for any offense. See Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 246;
Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 378. This court, and multiple appellate court decisions, have
consistently held that any additional condition not expressly authorized by statute
“may be imposed as long as it is (1) reasonable and (2) relates to (a) the nature of
the offense or (b) the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined by the trial
court.” Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 378 (citing People v. Ferrell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79
(1995), People v. Hubble, 81 Ill. App. 3d 560 (1980), and People v. Dunn, 43 Ill.
App. 3d 94 (1976)); see also Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 246. Defendant’s relatedness
argument becomes a factor when the court fashions its own discretionary
conditions that are not enumerated under the Code. However, that is not the
situation in this case. Accordingly, the plain language of section 5-6-3(b) at the
time of defendant’s sentencing was unambiguous and provided the trial court with
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the authority pursuant to section 5-6-3(b)(6) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(6)
(West 2010)) to impose the child support condition.
¶ 14 We are aware our holding conflicts with People v. Campbell, 325 Ill. App. 3d
569 (2001). See 2014 IL App (3d) 120680, ¶ 9. The issue presented in Campbell
was whether the trial court had the authority under section 5-6-3(b) to reimpose
unpaid fees from a previous offense as a condition of a sentence of conditional
discharge for a later, unrelated offense. Campbell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 570. In
determining whether the trial court was authorized under the Code to reimpose
unpaid fees from a previous offense, the Campbell court interpreted section
5-6-3(b) to mean, “all conditions of a sentence of conditional discharge must be
related to the specific offense for which the defendant is sentenced.” (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 571. The appellate court also noted the Code revealed no express
authority for the trial court to reimpose fees from a previous offense. Therefore, the
Campbell court concluded the trial court lacked the authority to impose the
condition because the condition was not authorized by statute and did not relate to
the underlying offense. Id. at 571-72.
¶ 15 Campbell’s interpretation of section 5-6-3(b) is inconsistent with our earlier
decision in Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, which the appellate court failed to acknowledge
or follow. In Meyer, this court addressed whether the trial court had the authority to
impose an unenumerated condition of probation requiring the defendant to erect a
violent felon warning sign reading “ ‘Warning! A Violent Felon lives here. Enter at
your own Risk!’ ” Id. at 376. We interpreted section 5-6-3(b) 3 as allowing a trial
court to impose an additional, unenumerated condition of probation “as long as it is
(1) reasonable and (2) relates to (a) the nature of the offense or (b) the rehabilitation
of the defendant as determined by the trial court.” Id. at 378. This court held that the
condition of probation requiring the defendant to erect the violent felon warning
sign was unreasonable and did not serve the purposes of section 5-6-3(b). Id. at
379-80.
¶ 16 Just as in Meyer, the condition at issue in Campbell was not expressly
authorized by statute. Thus, the court in Campbell should have considered whether
the condition was reasonable and related to the nature of the offense or the
rehabilitation of the defendant as determined by the trial court. Accordingly, we
3
Although section 5-6-3(b) has been amended since Meyer, the language of the paragraph has
remained unchanged. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b) (West 1994).
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reject Campbell’s interpretation that all conditions of probation, including those
expressly enumerated, must relate to the nature of the offense. To the extent that
Campbell and its progeny contradict our holding, these cases are overruled.
¶ 17 Finally, for the first time during oral argument, defendant claimed the trial court
impermissibly created an indeterminate period of probation by requiring him to
“become current in his child support” prior to his release from probation. Because
defendant did not raise this issue in his petition for leave to appeal, the issue was
not properly preserved for our review. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell,
2014 IL 116311, ¶ 22.
¶ 18 CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the trial court had the statutory
authority to order child support payments as a condition of probation. The
judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are therefore affirmed.
¶ 20 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 21 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
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