Turcios v. The DeBruler Company , 32 N.E.3d 1117 ( 2015 )

2015 IL 117962
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 117962)
MARIA TURCIOS et al., Appellees, v. THE DeBRULER COMPANY, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 21, 2015.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal involves an action for wrongful death predicated on a suicide,
allegedly brought about by the defendant’s intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The circuit court of Lake County granted defendant’s motion to dismiss
the wrongful death action, along with the related survival action, with prejudice,
finding that “wrongful death via suicide” is not cognizable in Illinois. The appellate
court vacated the trial court’s dismissal order and remanded for further
proceedings. 2014 IL App (2d) 130331.
¶2 For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 15, 2011, Nelsyn Caceras, also known as Ricardo Ortiz, allegedly
committed suicide in the apartment he and his wife, Maria Turcios, rented in a
development known as the Colonial Park Apartments, located in Park City, Illinois.
Approximately six months later, Turcios filed a complaint in the Lake County
circuit court against defendant, The DeBruler Company, the agent for Colonial
Park Apartments. Turcios filed the complaint on behalf of herself and the couple’s
two minor children. Plaintiffs sought damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (count I), wrongful eviction (count II), and breach of contract
(count III). Plaintiffs amended the complaint by adding count IV, seeking damages
under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/.01 et seq. (West 2012)), and count
V, seeking damages under the survival statute (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2012)).
Turcios was later appointed special administrator of her late husband’s estate, and
the complaint was once again amended.
¶5 At issue here are the wrongful death and survival counts in the second amended
complaint. 1 According to the complaint, Turcios and Caceras entered into a written
lease with defendant running from May 1, 2011, to April 30, 2012. 2 Plaintiffs took
possession of the apartment on May 1, and tendered the required security deposit
and first month’s rent. Just 10 days into the lease, Caceras received a letter from
Colonial Park Apartments purporting to be “an official 30 days notice” of eviction.
The letter advised that “[c]onstruction begins June 10,” and “unfortunately,”
Caceras and Turcios did not qualify for an unspecified “new program.” Three
additional letters followed. On May 20, the couple received a general reminder that
they must vacate the apartment by June 9. On May 31, the couple was advised that
the washers and dryers would be removed from the laundry room on June 13, and
that “Colonial Park has decided to allow June 1-9, 2011 to be rent free.” On June 7,
the couple received a letter advising that demolition work would begin soon, but
the family could be transferred to another unit with free rent for the month of June. 3
The couple received two telephone calls from defendant’s agents pressuring them
to move, and on June 1, 2011, the couple’s tender of the June rent was refused.
1
For ease of discussion, we will refer to the second amended complaint simply as “the
complaint.”
2
A copy of the lease is attached to the complaint.
3
The letters from Colonial Park Apartments were written in Spanish. Copies of the letters, along
with English translations, are attached to the complaint.
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¶6 The complaint further alleges that the couple sought legal advice and were told
that the lease was valid and that the landlord could not unilaterally terminate the
lease. The couple also sought assistance through Catholic Charities, which had
helped them navigate the leasing process because they did not speak English. The
case manager, Juan Barrera, allegedly called defendant’s agent, Gilena Borkoski,
on May 12 and was told that the lease could be revoked at any time and was no
longer valid. The complaint purportedly quotes portions of Barrera’s case reports.
His report from June 1 states that the couple reported “fatigue due to lack of sleep
over this matter,” and that they both expressed that they are “depressed, anxious
and angry” because “they feel that management is not willing to work with them.”
Barrera’s report from June 10, as quoted in the complaint, states:
“Ricardo and Maria met with this case manager and were extremely upset.
They mention that management called them last night and asked if the children
were born in the US. The clients were told that a possibility of qualifying for the
new subsidy program existed through the children. The clients were told to
bring birth certificates and other documentation so that they might be able to
talk about this and begin [the] application process. Both Ricardo and Maria felt
that this was a set up and were reluctant to go meet with them at 10:00 a.m. At
this point both Ricardo and Maria expressed anger and frustration at the
management office. Ricardo also mentions that at one point Gilena Borkoski[,]
the office manager[,] offered them $2000 to move out. They both felt
discriminated [sic] and harassed[.] [T]hey were confused and felt they were
given misleading information all along. They expressed that all they wanted
was for management to honor the lease and give them a new unit; they felt that
management just did not want them there anymore. Client wanted to seek legal
advice because of all the events that occurred and did not want another family
to have to go through this. Both Ricardo and Maria express that this contributed
to lack of sleep and depression and anxiety. They were upset because their
daughters were also very tense and would cry all the time. This [case manager]
provided clients with the number to Fair Housing and to the Lake County Bar
[A]ssociation for legal advice.”
¶7 According to the complaint, demolition of the building began after June 10,
2011, despite the fact that the couple and their children were still occupying their
apartment. “The demolition company tore into the outside walls of the building in
which [the couple’s] unit was located,” and then began to demolish the surrounding
units. On June 14, Caceras allegedly told his wife that he could not tolerate the
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situation any longer, but did not know what to do. The following day, Caceras
committed suicide in the apartment, leaving a note that read: “Please forgive me my
daughters, and you also Carmen. Sell the land and build the house.” Plaintiffs
subsequently vacated the apartment.
¶8 The wrongful death count states simply that, “[a]s a result of the wrongful acts
of Defendant described above, Nelson [sic] Caceras committed suicide.” This
count seeks compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages, “in light of the
intentional wrongdoing of Defendant.”
¶9 The survival count alleges that defendant’s conduct, in forcing Caceras and his
family out of their validly rented apartment by demolishing the building around
them, was extreme and outrageous which defendant knew, or should have known,
would cause severe emotional distress. According to the complaint, Caceras did, in
fact, experience severe emotional distress including, but not limited to fright, grief,
shame, worry, and insomnia, and he would have been entitled to pursue
compensation from defendant for such distress had he survived. This count also
sought punitive damages “in light of the intentional wrongdoing of Defendant.”
¶ 10 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to section 2-615 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)). As to counts
IV and V, defendant argued that under Illinois law, a plaintiff may not recover for a
decedent’s suicide following a defendant’s alleged tortious conduct because
suicide is an independent intervening act that the tortfeasor cannot be expected to
foresee. In response, plaintiffs argued that in wrongful death cases involving
intentional torts, as opposed to negligence, the trend in other jurisdictions is to
permit such claims to proceed where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant’s intentionally tortious conduct caused severe emotional distress that
was a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide.
¶ 11 The trial court granted defendant’s motion as to counts IV and V, dismissing
these counts with prejudice. 4 The trial court found that “[u]nder Illinois law, there
is no cause of action for wrongful death via suicide, or survival claims.” On
plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court made a Rule 304(a) finding of appealability. See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Plaintiffs appealed.
4
The trial court denied defendant’s motion as to counts I, II, and III.
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¶ 12 The appellate court vacated the trial court’s dismissal order. 2014 IL App (2d)
130331, ¶ 39. The appellate court recognized that, in a wrongful death action based
on the defendant’s negligence, the decedent’s suicide is considered an independent
intervening act that the tortfeasor cannot be expected to foresee and, accordingly,
such an action cannot be maintained as a matter of law. Id. ¶ 16. The appellate
court, however, declined to extend this per se bar where the wrongful death action
is based on the defendant’s intentionally tortious conduct, expressly rejecting
defendant’s argument that under Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d
33 (1994), the concept of foreseeability limits the liability of an intentional
tortfeasor. 2014 IL App (2d) 130331, ¶¶ 32-33, 38-39. The appellate court thus held
that “where a plaintiff can satisfy the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and the emotional distress is a substantial factor in causing a
decedent’s suicide, such causes of action are cognizable in this state.” Id. ¶ 39. The
appellate court believed it best to allow the trial court to reconsider its ruling on
defendant’s motion to dismiss in light of the appellate court’s holding. Id.
¶ 13 We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff.
July 1, 2013).
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code challenges only the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal
U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 22. The question presented on review is whether the
allegations of the complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 33. A cause of action will be
dismissed under section 2-615 only where it is apparent that no set of facts could be
proven that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. We review de novo the trial
court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ wrongful death and
survival claims. See id.
¶ 16 Section 1 of the Wrongful Death Act provides, in relevant part:
Ҥ 1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
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damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or
company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages ***.” 740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2012).
¶ 17 A cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act is brought by the personal
representative of the decedent. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2012). The purpose is to
provide the surviving spouse and next of kin compensation for the pecuniary losses
suffered by reason of the decedent’s death. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.,
2012 IL 113204, ¶ 32. Unlike an action under the survival statute which allows a
representative of the decedent to pursue those statutory or common law claims that
accrued prior to the decedent’s death, an action under the Wrongful Death Act does
not accrue until death. Id. ¶ 34. As this court has further explained:
“If the decedent had no right of action at the time of his or her death, the
personal representative has none under the Wrongful Death Act. Thus, the
‘injury’ that the personal representative alleges caused the decedent’s death
must be the same ‘injury’ that the decedent suffered prior to his or her death.”
Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 421 (2008).
¶ 18 In the present case, plaintiffs have been less than clear about the “injury” that
precipitated decedent’s death. Although the survival count is predicated on the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the wrongful death count itself does not
identify any injury to decedent that caused his death. Nor does that count identify
on what legal theory defendant’s conduct, described in the complaint, was
“wrongful.” In a conclusory fashion, the complaint states only that, “[a]s a result of
the wrongful acts of Defendant described above,” Caceres committed suicide.
¶ 19 In their brief before this court, plaintiffs initially identify the intentionally
wrongful conduct of defendant as “the constructive eviction of Plaintiffs and their
decedent, coupled with actual demolition of their validly rented premises.” This
conduct, plaintiffs add, “caused severe emotional distress which was a substantial
factor” in decedent’s suicide. In a later portion of their brief, plaintiffs state, “[I]t is
certainly true that the underlying tort in this case is intentional infliction of
emotional distress.” Based on these statements, we will treat the injury underlying
plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim as one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. We note that the appellate court limited its holding to cases involving this
particular tort. 2014 IL App (2d) 130331, ¶ 39. Having determined the underlying
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injury, we will proceed to consider whether plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim may
proceed where the immediate cause of death was suicide.
¶ 20 Both parties recognize the general rule, applicable in negligence actions, that
the injured party’s voluntary act of suicide is an independent intervening act which
is unforeseeable as a matter of law, and which breaks the chain of causation from
the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct. Little v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 32 Ill. 2d
156, 158-59 (1965); accord Luss v. Village of Forest Park, 377 Ill. App. 3d 318,
332 (2007); Kleen v. Homak Manufacturing Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 639, 642-44
(2001); Moss v. Meyer, 117 Ill. App. 3d 862, 864 (1983). This rule has been applied
in wrongful death actions based on conduct by the defendant amounting to
negligence, provided the defendant was under no duty to decedent to prevent the
suicide. Compare Chalhoub v. Dixon, 338 Ill. App. 3d 535, 539-40 (2003)
(assuming defendant was negligent in the handling and storage of a firearm,
defendant was not liable for decedent’s suicide which was an independent
intervening act), with Winger v. Franciscan Medical Center, 299 Ill. App. 3d 364,
375 (1998) (decedent’s suicide would not bar wrongful death action based on
psychiatric malpractice in failing to supervise decedent with known suicidal
tendencies).
¶ 21 The parties disagree as to whether this rule also applies where, as here,
plaintiffs allege that defendant’s conduct was intentionally tortious and not merely
negligent. Renewing an argument rejected by the appellate court, defendant
contends that under Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33 (1994), the
concept of foreseeability, embodied in the doctrine of proximate causation, limits
the liability of both negligent and intentional tortfeasors. Defendant contends that
because suicide is deemed an unforeseeable event as a matter of law, decedent’s
suicide in this case broke the chain of causation precluding plaintiffs’ wrongful
death claim.
¶ 22 Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s reading of Heinold is misguided, and that an
intentional tortfeasor’s liability extends beyond the limits of foreseeability. Citing
case law from other jurisdictions, plaintiffs maintain that as long as the intentional
tortfeasor’s conduct was a substantial factor, i.e., a cause in fact, of the decedent’s
suicide, liability for wrongful death will lie.
¶ 23 The term “proximate cause” embodies two distinct concepts: cause in fact and
legal cause. Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). When
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considering cause in fact, courts generally employ either the traditional “but for”
test or the “substantial factor” test. Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416, 431
(2009). Under the “but for” test, “ ‘a defendant’s conduct is not the cause of an
event if the event would have occurred without it.’ ” Id. (quoting Thacker v. UNR
Industries, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 343, 354 (1992)). Under the “substantial factor” test,
“the defendant’s conduct is said to be a cause of an event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing the event about.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 24 In contrast, legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d
at 456. Courts ask whether the injury is the type of injury that a reasonable person
would see as a “likely result” of his or her conduct, or whether the injury is so
“highly extraordinary” that imposing liability is not justified. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. See also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d
351, 395 (2004) (legal cause “is established only if the defendant’s conduct is so
closely tied to the plaintiff’s injury that he should be held legally responsible for it”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). “The question is one of policy—How far
should a defendant’s legal responsibility extend for conduct that did, in fact, cause
the harm?” Id. See also Prodromos v. Everen Securities, Inc., 389 Ill. App. 3d 157,
171 (2009) (“Because the consequences of every action stretch forward endlessly
through time and the causes of every action stretch back to the dawn of human
history, the concept of proximate cause was developed to limit the liability of a
wrongdoer to only those injuries reasonably related to the wrongdoer’s actions.”).
¶ 25 Plaintiffs’ view, under which legal cause plays no role in the liability of an
intentional tortfeasor, essentially creates open-ended and limitless liability for
injury, no matter how abnormal, extraordinary, irregular, or remote the injury may
be. In Heinold, however, this court considered and rejected the notion of liability
without limits.
¶ 26 Heinold involved claims for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979,
ch. 121½, ¶ 261 et seq.) against the defendant, a commodities firm. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant intentionally misrepresented the nature of a service fee
charged in connection with the sale of high-risk foreign options. The defendant
argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to their full investment losses because
the plaintiffs failed to establish that any misrepresentation regarding the service fee
proximately caused those losses. The plaintiffs argued, however, that in Illinois
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they need only show “but for” causation. We rejected the plaintiffs’ argument.
Heinold, 163 Ill. 2d at 58-59.
¶ 27 We framed the issue as “what type of causation plaintiffs must show to recover
for misrepresentation.” Id. at 58. At the outset, we recognized a “ ‘fundamental
principle applicable alike to breaches of contract and to torts’ ” that a right of action
requires a wrongful act by the defendant and a loss resulting from that act. Id.
(quoting Town of Thornton v. Winterhoff, 406 Ill. 113, 119 (1950)). Importantly,
“the injury suffered by the plaintiff must be the natural and not merely a remote
consequence of the defendant’s act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This
principle, we stated, “is applicable to actions for negligence as well as intentional
torts, such as fraud.” Id. at 59. We concluded that “plaintiffs must prove that a
defendant’s actions proximately caused their injuries before they can recover in
tort, even in instances of intentional torts where fiduciaries are involved.” Id. We
held that the defendant’s misrepresentations only induced the plaintiffs to pay an
additional fee, and did not induce the plaintiffs to assume the risk of the volatile
options market they entered. Id. at 64.
¶ 28 In Heinold, the plaintiffs further argued that they should recover all of their
investment losses because the defendant’s conduct was intentional, and
“intentional tortfeasors are commonly liable even for unforeseeable consequences
of their conduct.” Id. We rejected this argument, recognizing that “even intentional
tortfeasors do not become the insurers of safety for wronged plaintiffs.” Id. (citing
Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1973)). Thus, under Heinold, “but
for” causation is insufficient to establish an intentional tortfeasor’s liability for
injury to the plaintiff. Such injury must have been foreseeable, and not merely a
remote consequence of the defendant’s conduct.
¶ 29 The appellate court in the instant case read Heinold narrowly, concluding that
our discussion of intentional tortfeasors’ liability was confined to a particular tort:
fraud. 2014 IL App (2d) 130331, ¶ 33. To be sure, our discussion in Heinold
referenced “intentional torts, such as fraud,” and relied in part on appellate court
opinions also involving fraud. Heinold, 163 Ill. 2d at 59. But in rejecting the
plaintiffs’ argument in Heinold that intentional tortfeasors are liable for even
unforeseen consequences, we relied not on a fraud case, but a false imprisonment
case. Id. at 64 (citing Johnson, 477 F.2d at 106-07) (civil rights action based on
false imprisonment in a psychiatric facility)). Thus, our discussion of proximate
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cause was not animated solely by the nature of one particular tort, but by the nature
of intentional torts generally.
¶ 30 Although the appellate court here may have been reluctant to extend the reach
of Heinold beyond the tort at issue in that case, we do not believe that the Heinold
court intended such a limitation. Moreover, no reasoned basis exists to treat the
underlying tort in this case, intentional infliction of emotional distress, differently
than fraud for purposes of determining the extent of the tortfeasor’s liability.
Indeed, Illinois case law recognizes that to succeed on a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the defendant’s conduct must proximately cause
such distress. See McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 93 (1988) (observing that “a
jury could reasonably conclude that such distress proximately resulted from
defendants’ course of conduct”); Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condominium Owners’
Ass’n, 2012 IL App (1st) 113577-U, ¶ 36 (plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that “the
defendant’s conduct actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s distress”
(citing Ulm v. Memorial Medical Center, 2012 IL App (4th) 110421, ¶ 39)).
¶ 31 Because an intentional tortfeasor’s liability is limited by the concept of
foreseeability embodied in the doctrine of proximate causation, a cause of action
for wrongful death predicated on a suicide allegedly brought about by the
intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to the general rule that suicide
is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Thus, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden of
pleading and proving facts that would overcome application of the rule. See Luss,
377 Ill. App. 3d at 332-33 (wrongful death plaintiff failed to provide any factual
explanation of how the actions of Wal-Mart employees, in committing an
intentional tort (battery) against the decedent, could have caused the decedent to
become so bereft of reason as to commit suicide).
¶ 32 We recognize that courts in some jurisdictions have taken a different approach,
and have declined to allow the doctrine of foreseeability to limit an intentional
tortfeasor’s liability in a wrongful death case involving suicide. Plaintiffs urge this
court to follow this “unanimous consensus” of persuasive authority. As discussed
below, the cases on which plaintiffs rely are not unanimous in the standards they
have adopted, and apart from the occurrence of a suicide, they are factually distinct
from the case before us.
¶ 33 In Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), the earliest of
the cases that plaintiffs cite, the defendants intentionally made threats, statements
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and accusations against the decedent for the purpose of harassing, embarrassing,
and humiliating him in the presence of his friends, relatives and business
associates. The California appeals court held that, where a defendant intends to
cause serious mental distress or serious physical suffering, and does so, and the
mental distress is a substantial factor (a cause in fact) in bringing about the suicide,
a cause of action for wrongful death results. Id. at 36.
¶ 34 Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 497 A.2d 1206 (N.H. 1985), involved claims of
false imprisonment, assault and battery, and false arrest against a municipality and
three of its police officers who, without a search warrant, entered a home and
forced to the floor the 21-year-old decedent who had recently been discharged from
a mental health institution, threatening to kill him or others in the house. The man
was arrested, and released after a short investigation. Sixteen hours later he
committed suicide. The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of
Tate, but added a requirement: the conduct of the defendant must be extreme and
outrageous. Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1210-11.
¶ 35 In Rowe v. Marder, 750 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Pa. 1990), the federal district court
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would allow “some recovery” for
suicide caused by intentional torts, and would likely align itself with California and
New Hampshire. Id. at 724. The federal court, however, was not required to apply
the rules adopted in California and New Hampshire, finding that the plaintiff had
failed to articulate any underlying intentional tort. The facts revealed only that the
sickly decedent had been led astray by a malevolent and misguided sister. Id. at
727. We note that Rowe has not been cited in a single reported Pennsylvania state
court case.
¶ 36 In R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994), the decedent’s stepfather had
sexually abused her throughout her childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood,
causing her to develop psychiatric difficulties, ultimately leading to her suicide.
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that a “number of variations of the
substantial factor test seem to exist.” Id. at 30. Although R.D. followed the rule
announced in Tate, it extended the rule to encompass cases where the intentional
tort causes an emotional or psychiatric illness that is a substantial factor in bringing
about the suicide, even where the defendant does not intend to cause the emotional
or psychiatric illness. Id. at 31.
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¶ 37 In Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1994), a bomb concealed in a
gym bag abandoned in a parking lot exploded, injuring and disfiguring decedent,
who committed suicide four years later. At the time of the wrongful death action,
the perpetrator had already been found guilty in a criminal proceeding. The Indiana
Supreme Court held that a wrongful death action may be maintained where a
defendant’s willful tortious conduct was intended to cause the victim physical harm
and was a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide. Id. at 128.
¶ 38 Finally, plaintiffs cite Collins v. Village of Woodridge, 96 F. Supp. 2d 744
(N.D. Ill. 2000), in which the federal district court considered whether a police
officer’s suicide extinguished civil rights claims based on sexual harassment and
retaliation. In the absence of case law from this court, the district court looked to
case law from other states, and concluded that the decedent’s suicide would not be
considered a supervening cause, at least where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant’s intentional conduct caused severe emotional distress that was a
substantial factor in bringing about the suicide. Id. at 756. Collins, of course, is not
controlling on an issue of Illinois tort law. See Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of
Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 276 (2001).
¶ 39 Despite the clear differences among the standards adopted in the foregoing
cases, plaintiffs contend that their holdings can be distilled down into a single
principle of tort liability: If the defendant intends to harm the plaintiff, the
defendant is liable for whatever consequences follow, including suicide, whether
foreseeable or not, as long as the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor (a
cause in fact) in bringing about that harm. At oral argument, however, plaintiffs
conceded that some line drawing must be made, and that an intentional tortfeasor is
not necessarily liable for all consequences flowing from the defendant’s conduct.
¶ 40 Plaintiffs’ concession aside, the foregoing cases do not persuade us that
Heinold was wrongly decided, or that its conclusion that proximate causation is
applicable to cases alleging fraud, should not also apply to cases alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, we hold that where, as
here, a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for wrongful death based on the
decedent’s suicide allegedly brought about through the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must do more than plead facts which, if proven,
would establish that the defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the suicide. The
plaintiff must plead facts which, if proven, would overcome application of the
general rule that suicide is deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law. In other words,
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a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the suicide was foreseeable, i.e., that
it was a likely result of the defendant’s conduct.
¶ 41 We observe that intentional infliction of emotional distress, by its very nature,
appears to have a slightly closer connection to suicide than other intentional torts.
The tort requires that the distress inflicted must be so severe “that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it.” Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85,
90 (1976). Notwithstanding the ostensible connection between severe emotional
distress and suicide, we also recognize that a suicide may result from a complex
combination of psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional, and
environmental factors. Thus, we believe it is the rare case in which the decedent’s
suicide would not break the chain of causation and bar a cause of action for
wrongful death, even where the plaintiff alleges the defendant inflicted severe
emotional distress. The case before us is not one of those rare cases.
¶ 42 Plaintiffs alleged that defendant pressured Turcios and decedent to vacate their
apartment shortly after they took possession pursuant to a written lease. Although
defendant initially sent what purported to be a 30-day notice of eviction, defendant
later offered the couple free rent for the first nine days of June, and subsequently
offered them the option of transferring to another unit with free rent for the entire
month of June. Defendant also offered a $2,000 incentive to move. Defendant
advised plaintiffs that demolition of the building would commence in early June,
which it did. Decedent committed suicide after demolition began. Without regard
to whether these allegations could support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress as to decedent, an issue that was not raised in the trial court, we
conclude that these allegations are insufficient to allow plaintiffs’ wrongful death
action to proceed. As a matter of law, decedent’s suicide was not a reasonably
foreseeable result of defendant’s alleged conduct in breaking the lease and
pressuring the couple to vacate the apartment. Accordingly, the trial court properly
dismissed count IV with prejudice.
¶ 43 As to count V of plaintiffs’ complaint—a survival action predicated on
intentional infliction of emotional distress—plaintiffs make no argument that this
count may and should proceed independent of the wrongful death count. For this
reason, we also affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of count V.
¶ 44 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 45 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
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