People v. Abdullah , 2019 IL 123492 ( 2019 )

2019 IL 123492IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 123492)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
MUHAMMAD S. ABDULLAH, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 21, 2019.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Burke and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Theis, and
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal is brought by Muhammad S. Abdullah 1 from the appellate court
judgment affirming the order of the circuit court of Lake County denying his
petition for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of
1
The indictment and mittimus in this case list petitioner’s name as Abdullah S. Muhammad.
The appellate court opinion, however, captions the case as Muhammad S. Abdullah, and petitioner
represents that his name is Muhammad S. Abdullah.
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)). 2018 IL App (2d) 150840. We
allowed Abdullah’s petition for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
315(a) (eff. Apr. 1, 2018). We reverse and remand with directions.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2004, Abdullah was charged by indictment with, among other crimes, first
degree murder in the shooting death of Marco Wilson and attempted first degree
murder in the nonfatal shooting of Luis Melendez on March 15, 2004. The
indictment did not charge firearm enhancements for any offense. 2 On June 9, 2005,
following a jury trial, Abdullah was convicted of the first degree murder of Wilson
and the attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm of
Melendez. On August 17, 2005, the trial court sentenced Abdullah to concurrent
prison terms of 40 years for first degree murder and 20 years for attempted first
degree murder.
¶4 On September 2, 2005, the State filed a “Motion to Impose Mandatory
Minimum and Mandatory Consecutive Sentence.” The State argued that
consecutive sentences were mandatory under section 5-8-4(a)(i) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(i) (West 2004)) when “one of the
offenses for which the defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class
X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” Further, the
State sought a prison term of at least 45 years on the first degree murder conviction,
representing the 20-year minimum prison term for that offense plus an additional
25-year firearm enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004))
because, in committing the offense, Abdullah personally discharged a firearm,
causing Wilson’s death.
¶5 On September 8, 2005, Abdullah filed a notice of appeal. The State then moved
to dismiss the notice of appeal as untimely. The State argued that the original
sentences imposed on August 17, 2005, were invalid. According to the State,
2
In 2003, this court held the statute creating firearm enhancements for attempted murder
unconstitutional as a violation of the Illinois proportionate penalty clause. People v. Morgan, 203
Ill. 2d 470, 489-92 (2003).
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Abdullah could not bring an appeal until valid sentences were imposed. On October
13, 2005, the trial court struck Abdullah’s notice of appeal.
¶6 The trial court resentenced Abdullah on November 17, 2005, imposing
consecutive prison terms of 50 years for first degree murder and 31 years for
attempted first degree murder, including a 25-year firearm enhancement for both
offenses. 3 Abdullah moved for reconsideration and argued, among other things,
that once his notice of appeal was filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
and increase his sentences. The trial court rejected Abdullah’s argument. On
January 20, 2006, on Abdullah’s motion to reconsider the new sentence, the trial
court reduced the prison term for attempted first degree murder to 26 years,
representing the 6-year minimum prison term for that offense plus an additional 20-
year firearm enhancement (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2004)), consecutive to
the 50-year sentence for first degree murder, for an aggregate term of 76 years of
imprisonment.
¶7 Abdullah then refiled his notice of appeal. On direct appeal, the appellate court
affirmed the convictions and sentences. People v. Muhammad, 4 No. 2-06-0086
(2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). The trial court
subsequently summarily dismissed Abdullah’s petition filed under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)).
¶8 On January 27, 2014, Abdullah filed the pro se petition under section 2-1401
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)) that is the subject of this appeal. Abdullah argued
that the addition of the 25-year and 20-year firearm enhancements to his sentences
violated ex post facto laws because it was unconstitutional at the time of his offense
under People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470 (2003) (holding that the firearm
enhancement to the attempt statute violated the proportionate penalties clause of
our state constitution), and also deprived him of due process because the
enhancements were based on facts not alleged in the charging instrument and not
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Abdullah later filed a
pro se “Supplemental Argument,” contending the imposition of consecutive
3
On October 6, 2005, this court filed People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005), overruling
Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, and reviving the firearm enhancements for attempted first degree murder.
4
Again, we note that although the record gave his name as Abdullah Muhammad, he represents
himself as Muhammad Abdullah.
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sentences deprived him of due process, as well as a “motion for ‘Additional § 2-
1401 Relief from Void Judgment,’ ” contending that a fraudulent instruction was
given to the jury.
¶9 Subsequently, trial counsel appeared on Abdullah’s behalf and, after the State
moved to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition, filed an amended motion to vacate
both firearm enhancements, arguing again that the facts underlying the
modifications to Abdullah’s sentences were not submitted to the jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. On May 20, 2015, the trial court found it had erred by
imposing firearm enhancements without the State charging them or presenting them
to the jury but found this error harmless and denied the petition. After the court
denied Abdullah’s motion to reconsider, he appealed.
¶ 10 On appeal, Abdullah contended his increased sentences were void for two
reasons. First, he argued that, because he timely filed a notice of appeal, the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him on both counts and increase his
sentences to consecutive terms with firearm enhancements. Second, Abdullah
argued that, because Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, was controlling law at the time of his
offense and original sentencing, the firearm enhancement for attempted murder was
void ab initio and could not be applied to him even after Morgan was overruled in
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005).
¶ 11 The appellate court rejected Abdullah’s arguments and affirmed his modified
sentences. 2018 IL App (2d) 150840. The appellate court held that, although Rule
606(b) directs the trial court to strike a notice of appeal when a timely postjudgment
motion has been filed “by counsel or by defendant, if not represented by counsel”
(Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 1, 1999)), the term “counsel” is ambiguous. 2018 IL
App (2d) 150840, ¶¶ 14-15. The appellate court construed that term to include the
prosecutor and, therefore, determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to modify
Abdullah’s sentence. 2018 IL App (2d) 150840, ¶¶ 16-17. The appellate court also
held that, despite Morgan, “the firearm enhancement factor for attempted murder
was not unconstitutional prior to Sharpe; it was erroneously held to be
unconstitutional” and thus was properly applied to Abdullah’s 2004 offense. The
appellate court denied Abdullah’s petition for rehearing. 2018 IL App (2d) 150840,
¶ 20. We granted Abdullah’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
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Apr. 1, 2018).
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The issue in this appeal concerns whether the circuit court properly denied
Abdullah’s petition filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)). Section 2-1401 provides a comprehensive statutory
procedure authorizing a trial court to vacate or modify a final order or judgment
older than 30 days. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007). Section 2-1401
provides a civil remedy that extends to criminal cases as well as to civil cases.
Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8. Although a section 2-1401 petition must be filed in the
same proceeding that the order or judgment was entered, it is not a continuation of
the original action. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2014); Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 7.
Rather, “[a] section 2-1401 proceeding is a new and separate cause of action that is
subject to the usual rules of civil procedure.” People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162,
¶ 8. A petition filed pursuant to section 2-1401 must normally “be filed not later
than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West
2014). An exception to the two-year limitations period, however, exists when the
petition challenges a void judgment. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 29.
This court recognizes only two circumstances when a judgment will be deemed
void: (1) when the judgment was entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction or
(2) when the judgment was based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional and
void ab initio. People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶ 31. We review de novo a section
2-1401 petition that was denied or dismissed on legal grounds. Thompson, 2015 IL
118151, ¶ 25.
¶ 14 Here, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Abdullah’s section
2-1401 petition, rejecting his argument that the orders modifying his original
sentences are void because they were entered while an appeal was pending and,
therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. The appellate court
reasoned that, under Rule 606(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. Dec. 1, 1999)), a notice of
appeal filed before the trial court ruled on the State’s motion would be premature
and would not vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. The appellate court also
rejected Abdullah’s claim that his firearm enhancement for attempted murder was
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void ab initio and could not be applied to him even after Morgan was overruled in
Sharpe.
¶ 15 Before this court, Abdullah argues that, because Rule 606(b) only directs trial
courts to strike notices of appeal when the defense files a timely postjudgment
motion, his timely filed notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the appellate
court despite the State’s pending motion seeking a sentence increase. Abdullah
contends that, therefore, the subsequent sentencing orders are void because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to modify his sentences. In the alternative, Abdullah
argues that, because the statute creating the firearm enhancements for attempted
murder was unconstitutional under Morgan at the time of his offense, his firearm
enhancement for attempted murder is void.
¶ 16 The State counters that no statute or rule prohibits it from filing a posttrial
motion to correct a defendant’s sentence and that, therefore, Rule 606(b) requires
the trial court to strike a defendant’s notice of appeal when the prosecution files a
postjudgment motion to increase a defendant’s sentence. The State also argues that
the firearm enhancement added to Abdullah’s attempted murder sentence was not
void when he was sentenced in November 2005. See Sharp, 216 Ill. 2d 481.
Nevertheless, the State concedes that Abdullah’s 20-year firearm enhancement for
attempted murder should be vacated, though for a different reason: it violates
ex post facto principles.
¶ 17 Despite the State’s concession, an unresolved issue remains as to what
Abdullah’s sentence should be. Abdullah asks that this court vacate the sentences
entered on November 17, 2005, and modified on January 20, 2006, and reinstate
his original concurrent sentences of 40 years for first degree murder and 20 years
for attempted murder. The State asks this court to affirm the appellate court
judgment and orders modifying Abdullah’s sentence but to exercise our supervisory
authority to impose a sentence that complies with ex post facto principles by
vacating the 20-year firearm enhancement to Abdullah’s attempted murder
sentence or remanding the case to the circuit court with orders to resentence
Abdullah in compliance with section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004) (adding 25-year firearm enhancement for murder
conviction)) and imposing consecutive terms for Abdullah’s first degree murder
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and attempted murder convictions pursuant to section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 2004)).
¶ 18 Thus, the proper sentence depends upon whether the subsequent sentencing
orders are void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We begin our analysis by
addressing the trial court’s postjudgment jurisdiction. Issues of jurisdiction and
interpretation of a supreme court rule are both subject to de novo review. See In re
A.H., 207 Ill. 2d 590, 593 (2003) (applying de novo review to jurisdiction issue);
People v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000) (applying de novo review to
interpretation of Rule 604(a)(1) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992))).
¶ 19 Criminal defendants in Illinois have a fundamental right to appeal their
convictions and sentences after a final judgment. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255,
268 (2008) (“A criminal defendant has no federal constitutional right to a direct
appeal, but under the Illinois Constitution the right to appeal a criminal conviction
is fundamental ***.”); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. “The final judgment in a
criminal case is the sentence.” People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 51 (1984). To
exercise the right to a direct appeal, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within
30 days after the final judgment appealed from or within 30 days after the entry of
the order disposing of a postjudgment motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 1,
1999).
¶ 20 The State, on the other hand, has a limited right to appeal in criminal cases.
Rule 604(a) sets forth the specific instances when the State may appeal. Rule 604(a)
provides, in relevant part:
“(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only
from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing
a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114-1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective
indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or
suppressing evidence.
(2) Leave to appeal by State. The State may petition for leave to appeal
under Rule 315(a).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2000).
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¶ 21 A timely filed notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step required to confer
jurisdiction upon the appellate court. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (2009).
“When the notice of appeal is filed, the appellate court’s jurisdiction attaches
instanter, and the cause is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.” People v.
Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998).
¶ 22 Rule 606(a) governs perfection of appeal in criminal cases, and subsection (b)
creates an exception to the jurisdictional effect of a notice of appeal. The version
of Rule 606(b) in effect when Abdullah was sentenced stated, in relevant part:
“(b) Time. Except as provided in Rule 604(d), the notice of appeal must be
filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final
judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely
filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. When
a timely post-trial or post-sentencing motion directed against the judgment has
been filed by counsel or by defendant, if not represented by counsel, any notice
of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of all pending post-
judgment motions shall have no effect and shall be stricken by the trial court.
*** This rule applies whether the timely post-judgment motion was filed before
or after the date on which the notice of appeal was filed. A new notice of appeal
must be filed within 30 days following the entry of the order disposing of all
timely post-judgment motions.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff.
Dec. 1, 1999).
¶ 23 Here, Abdullah filed his notice of appeal after the State filed a motion to
increase his sentences but before the trial court ruled on the State’s motion. As the
appellate court recognized, “[w]hether the trial court retained jurisdiction depends
on whether the State’s motion rendered defendant’s notice of appeal ineffective.”
2018 IL App (2d) 150840, ¶ 11. In other words, the issue depends on whether the
State could rely on Rule 606(b)’s exception to the jurisdictional effect of filing a
notice of appeal.
¶ 24 According to Abdullah, under the plain language of Rule 606(b), only a posttrial
or postsentencing motion filed by the defense renders a notice of appeal ineffective.
Abdullah submits that, once he timely filed his notice of appeal, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to take any further action and the State could not rely on Rule
606(b) to render his appeal ineffective. We must, therefore, interpret Rule 606(b)
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to determine whether Abdullah’s appeal was rendered ineffective by the State’s
pending posttrial motion to modify or correct the sentences.
¶ 25 Principles of statutory construction apply to interpretation of our supreme court
rules. People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 17. In construing a statute or a supreme
court rule, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters’
intent. In re Q.P., 2015 IL 118569, ¶ 14. We look to the plain language of a statute
or rule as the best indication of the drafters’ intent. People v. Salem, 2016 IL
118693, ¶ 11. We must review the rule, as a whole, construing words and phrases
in light of other relevant provisions and not in isolation. People v. Clark, 2019 IL
122891, ¶ 20. “Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute [or rule] must be given
a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous.” Clark,
2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. We may consider the reason for the rule, “the problems
sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of
construing the statute [or rule] one way or another.” Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20.
“[W]hen interpreting a rule, we must presume that the drafters did not intend to
produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results.” People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d 158,
167 (2009).
¶ 26 The plain language of Rule 606(b) directs a trial court to strike a notice of appeal
“when a timely post-trial or post-sentencing motion directed against the judgment
has been filed by counsel or by defendant, if not represented by counsel.”
(Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 1, 1999). Initially, then, we must
determine whether the State’s motion to modify Abdullah’s sentences was a
permissible “post-trial or post-sentencing motion directed against the judgment.”
For the following reasons, we determine that the State’s motion was not permitted
and, therefore, did not qualify as an exception to the jurisdictional change effected
by Abdullah’s timely filed notice of appeal.
¶ 27 Article 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for certain posttrial
motions. Article 116, titled “Post-Trial Motions,” includes defense motions seeking
a new trial (725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 2004)), defense motions in arrest of judgment
(725 ILCS 5/116-2 (West 2004)), defense motions to vacate prostitution
convictions for sex trafficking victims (725 ILCS 5/116-2.1) (West 2014)), defense
motions for forensic testing (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2004)), motions concerning
preservation of evidence for forensic testing (725 ILCS 5/116-4 (West 2004)
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(allowing law enforcement agency to petition for order allowing it to dispose of
evidence)), and motions by the defense for a DNA database search (725 ILCS
5/116-5 (West 2004)). Nothing in article 116 permits the State to file a posttrial
motion to increase a defendant’s sentence.
¶ 28 In contrast, section 5-4.5-50 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-
4.5-50(d) (West 2010)) authorizes postsentencing challenges by defendants seeking
sentence reductions. Subsection (d) provides:
“MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE. A motion to reduce a sentence may be
made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after
the sentence is imposed. A defendant’s challenge to the correctness of a
sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written
motion filed with the circuit court clerk within 30 days following the imposition
of sentence. A motion not filed within that 30-day period is not timely. The
court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed. ***
***
If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed, then for purposes
of perfecting an appeal, a final judgment is not considered to have been entered
until the motion to reduce the sentence has been decided by order entered by
the trial court.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2010).
¶ 29 Although section 5-4.5-50 was not effective at the time of Abdullah’s
sentencing, subsection (d) is consistent with Abdullah’s argument that the State is
not authorized to file a posttrial motion to increase a defendant’s sentence and
trigger the striking of a defendant’s timely filed notice of appeal. The State has cited
no statute, rule, or case law that would allow it to file such a motion and simply
argues that no statute, rule, or case law expressly prohibits the State from filing a
posttrial motion to increase a defendant’s sentence. We do not find the State’s
argument persuasive.
¶ 30 “Rule 604(a) sets forth with specificity those instances where the State may
appeal in a criminal case. The rule does not permit the State to appeal a sentencing
order.” People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 21. Because the rule does not
authorize the State to appeal sentencing orders, it follows that the State could not
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have filed a motion to modify Abdullah’s sentencing order to circumvent that rule.
This court has held that the State may seek the remedy of mandamus to challenge
criminal sentencing orders when it alleges the trial court violated a mandatory
sentencing requirement. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 27; see also Price, 2016
IL 118613, ¶ 17 (“After Castleberry, a reviewing court may no longer, sua sponte,
correct a statutorily nonconforming sentence [citation], the State may no longer
seek to correct such a sentence on direct review but must seek a writ of mandamus
to do so [citation] ***.”). The State may seek mandamus relief even while a
defendant’s direct appeal is pending. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 27.
¶ 31 This was not a new rule created by Castleberry. Rather, it was clear in 2005
when the trial court sentenced Abdullah in this case that the State could move for
imposition of mandatory sentences via mandamus. See People ex rel. Waller v.
McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 401-02 (2001) (issuing writ of mandamus directing trial
court to impose mandatory consecutive sentences).
¶ 32 The State’s postsentencing filing of a motion to modify and increase Abdullah’s
sentences was not authorized by statute or by rule. Moreover, because the State
could not have filed a posttrial or postsentencing motion directed at the judgment,
the term “counsel” as used in Rule 606(b) necessarily refers only to defense
counsel, not the State.
¶ 33 Accordingly, the State could not rely on Rule 606(b) to delay or circumvent
Abdullah’s right to a direct appeal. The State may not file motions seeking
unauthorized relief from orders it cannot appeal. The State chose the wrong remedy
to challenge the trial court’s sentencing order in this case.
¶ 34 We hold that the State’s unauthorized motion to reconsider the sentence had no
effect on the jurisdictional impact of Abdullah’s perfected appeal. The trial court’s
subsequent orders entered after Abdullah timely filed his notice of appeal are,
therefore, void. A judgment entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction is one of the
circumstances when a judgment will be deemed void. See Price, 2016 IL 118613,
¶ 31. We find that the circuit court erroneously dismissed Abdullah’s section 2-
1401 petition and the appellate court erroneously affirmed that decision.
¶ 35 Accordingly, the sentence entered on November 17, 2005, and modified on
January 20, 2006, must be vacated, and Abdullah’s original concurrent sentences
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of 40 years for first degree murder and 20 years for attempted murder, entered
August 17, 2005, must be reinstated. See Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 14 (when a
judgment has been vacated and set aside, “the prior judgment is eliminated, and the
case thereby returns to its status before the judgment was made”); see also People
v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996) (when a motion to vacate a judgment is
granted, the parties are returned to the status quo).
¶ 36 We deny the State’s request to exercise our supervisory authority and order the
trial court to resentence Abdullah. This court grants supervisory orders only in
limited circumstances. People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510, 512 (2001).
“Their predominate use is to address issues which are brought to our attention in
the context of petitions for leave to appeal, but which do not warrant full briefing,
oral argument and issuance of an opinion.” Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d at 512. Beyond the
leave to appeal docket, supervisory orders are disfavored, and “[a]s a general rule,
we will not issue a supervisory order unless the normal appellate process will not
afford adequate relief and the dispute involves a matter important to the
administration of justice [citation] or intervention is necessary to keep an inferior
tribunal from acting beyond the scope of its authority [citation].” Bakalis, 196 Ill.
2d at 513. The State has not argued that this is such a case. We therefore decline to
exercise our supervisory authority.
¶ 37 We reverse and remand to the circuit court with directions to grant Abdullah’s
section 2-1401 petition, vacate the void sentencing orders, and reinstate Abdullah’s
original sentencing order. The State has not moved for leave in this court to file a
petition for a writ of mandamus. Nothing in this opinion should be read as
preventing the State from seeking mandamus. See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916,
¶ 27 (noting that where the State has not moved for leave to file mandamus, nothing
prevented the State from filing such a request).
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Abdullah’s section 2-1401 petition. We
also reverse the order of the circuit court denying Abdullah’s section 2-1401
petition. We remand the case to the circuit court with directions to grant that
petition, vacate the void sentencing orders, and reinstate Abdullah’s original
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sentencing order.
¶ 40 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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