People v. Cummings , 2016 IL 115769 ( 2016 )

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Supreme Court Date: 2016.02.29 10:41:35
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People v. Cummings, 2016 IL 115769
Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
Court: DERRICK A. CUMMINGS, Appellee.
Docket No. 115769
Filed January 22, 2016
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District, heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, the Hon.
John Hauptman, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Trish Joyce,
Appeal State’s Attorney, of Morrison (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General,
and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys
General, of Chicago, and Richard T. Leonard, of the Office of the
State Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona,
Deputy Defender, and Sean Conley, Assistant Appellate Defender, of
the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.
Justices CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated this court’s judgment in
People v. Cummings, 2014 IL 115769 (Cummings I), and remanded the cause for consideration
in light of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). Illinois v.
Cummings, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015). This court directed the State and defendant
to file additional briefs regarding the impact of Rodriguez on this case.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The facts surrounding defendant’s arrest are described in detail in our earlier opinion.
Cummings I, 2014 IL 115769, ¶¶ 3-10. To summarize, defendant was driving a van registered
to a woman named Pearlene Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Shane Bland
pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic’s arrest. Bland was unable to
see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland
saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a
driver’s license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant
responded that he did not have a driver’s license, and Bland cited him for driving while his
license was suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2010).
¶4 The circuit court of Whiteside County granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence,
and the appellate court affirmed. People v. Cummings, 2013 IL App (3d) 120128. This court
affirmed, with two justices dissenting, finding that Bland’s license request impermissibly
prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. Cummings I, 2014 IL 115769. This court was
in unanimous agreement that the initial stop was lawful because of Bland’s reasonable
suspicion “the driver was subject to seizure.” Id. ¶ 20. This court also unanimously concluded
Bland’s reasonable suspicion that the driver was subject to arrest disappeared when he saw that
the driver was a man and not Chattic, a woman. Likewise, defendant’s production of a license
was compelled and not consensual. The case thus presented a fairly narrow issue: whether
asking for a driver’s license in a lawfully initiated stop, without reasonable suspicion of a
traffic violation or that the driver is subject to arrest, violates the fourth amendment by
impermissibly prolonging the stop.
¶5 The majority concluded that, once Bland’s reasonable suspicion evaporated, the request for
identification was unrelated to the reason for the stop, and it impermissibly extended the stop.
Id. ¶ 26. The dissent concluded the request for a driver’s license was one of the “ordinary
inquir[ies] incident to such a stop” permitted under Illinois v. Caballes, such that it did not
impermissibly extend the stop. Id. ¶ 44 (Garman, C.J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); see
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). The court entered judgment on March 20, 2014.
On April 22, the court granted the State’s motion to stay the mandate pending its filing of a
petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which the State filed on
August 18, 2014.
¶6 While the State’s petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). In Rodriguez, the Court
considered whether an eight-minute delay after a completed traffic stop, in order to conduct a
drug-detecting dog sniff, violates the fourth amendment by impermissibly prolonging the stop.
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The Court had previously upheld a dog sniff conducted contemporaneously with a traffic stop,
so long as it did not prolong the stop “beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the]
mission” of the traffic stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. It had also upheld unrelated questioning
contemporaneous with a traffic stop, so long as it did not “measurably extend the duration of
the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). The Rodriguez Court also noted that
some lower courts had given officers leeway to conduct a dog sniff at an unrelated traffic stop
where the prolonging of the stop was “de minimis.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1615 (allowing two additional minutes for a dog sniff (citing United States v. $404,905.00 in
U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999))). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Rodriguez had concluded the eight-minute delay was only a de minimis intrusion on the
defendant’s fourth amendment rights.
¶7 The Supreme Court rejected that rule allowing de minimis prolonging of a stop and held
that the dog sniff, as “a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing,’ ” was not part of the officer’s “mission” for the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___,
135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000)). The Court
defined the mission of the stop as “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop” and
to “attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The safety concerns of the
stop include “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly” (id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615) and maintaining officer safety, as “[t]raffic stops are especially fraught
with danger to police officers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1616 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330). The mission’s safety concerns permit officers to
make “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615
(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting
the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Actions
undertaken outside the mission would cause the stop to become unlawful if they “ ‘measurably
extend the duration of the stop’ ” without “the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at
333). Thus, the United States Supreme Court drew a bright line against prolonging a stop with
inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop, unless an officer has reasonable suspicion for
those inquiries. It also provided firmer guidance as to which inquiries fall within that mission.
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 Our question on remand is limited to the impact of Rodriguez on our decision in
Cummings I. Defendant has not raised any arguments relating to any distinct protection under
article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 that would require a departure from
general fourth amendment analysis. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; see generally People v.
Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 289-314 (2006) (describing this court’s limited lockstep approach to
synchronizing Illinois’s search and seizure protections with the fourth amendment). The sole
question is whether, in light of Rodriguez, Officer Bland’s request for a driver’s license after
concluding defendant was not Pearlene Chattic impermissibly prolonged the stop, violating the
fourth amendment.
¶ 10 The parties’ arguments focus on the Supreme Court’s descriptions of the ordinary inquiries
of a traffic stop. The State’s position is that asking for a driver’s license is an ordinary inquiry
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incident to every lawful vehicle stop and that Rodriguez thus abrogated our prior holding in
Cummings I. Because the stop was otherwise reasonable in accordance with fourth amendment
precedent, the driver’s license request did not involve the sort of stop-prolonging unrelated
criminal investigation prohibited by Rodriguez.
¶ 11 Defendant, focusing on the Rodriguez Court’s statement that an officer’s mission in a
traffic stop “typically” includes checking the driver’s license, argues the reason for the stop
informs which inquiries would be ordinary for that type of stop. In defendant’s view, because
Bland pulled him over solely to seek Chattic’s arrest, his driver’s license would not be part of
any ordinary inquiry. Defendant notes the Rodriguez Court’s repeated references to
enforcement of traffic laws. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (noting
that license checks, registration inspection, and checking for outstanding warrants “serve the
same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly”); id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have
been—completed.”). In defendant’s view, this was a highly atypical traffic stop, having no
origin in enforcing traffic laws. The State counters by arguing the only atypical element of this
stop was its brevity, and by pointing out that, in practical terms, defendant argues no inquiries
could be ordinary inquiries in this stop.
¶ 12 The State additionally notes the danger presented to officers in carrying out traffic stops,
noting that the ordinary inquiries incident to a stop have a role in promoting the government’s
officer safety interest. Defendant argues the State has never demonstrated how the request for a
license promotes those interests when the initial stop was not traffic-related.
¶ 13 We believe Rodriguez supports the State’s interpretation. A traffic stop is analogous to a
Terry stop, and its permissible duration is determined by the seizure’s mission. Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1614. The seizure’s mission consists of the purpose of the stop—in Rodriguez, traffic
enforcement—and “related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Those related
safety concerns include “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,’ ” and typically
“involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). Those checks serve also to enforce
the traffic code. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
¶ 14 Ordinary inquiries within the traffic stop’s mission clearly do not offend the fourth
amendment. Defendant would require a more limited set of ordinary inquiries where the stop
did not have its genesis in traffic enforcement. That view, however, disregards the Court’s
discussion of the government’s officer safety interest in Rodriguez. Contrasting the parallel
criminal investigation of a dog sniff with the ordinary inquiries, the Rodriguez Court made
clear that the ordinary inquiries serve officer safety as well as traffic enforcement:
“Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the government’s
officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are
‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’ Johnson, 555 U.S., at 330 (internal
quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
Rodriguez then cited with approval United States v. Holt, which recognized the officer safety
justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616
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(citing United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that
officers asking about weapons in a traffic stop were not limited to asking about loaded ones)).
Notably, the Holt court approved criminal record and warrant checks “even though the purpose
of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history.” Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. The
Tenth Circuit held that criminal record and warrant checks were justified because “an officer
will be better appri[s]ed of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent activity
during the stop.” Id. at 1222.
¶ 15 Defendant’s view of the ordinary inquiries, that they must relate to the initial purpose of the
stop, would be in direct conflict with Holt’s officer safety justifications as favorably cited in
Rodriguez. Rodriguez makes clear that unrelated inquiries impermissibly prolong the stop
beyond its original mission when those inquiries are not precipitated by reasonable suspicion.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15 (discussing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407,
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, and Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005)). Ordinary inquiries
incident to the stop do not prolong the stop beyond its original mission, because those inquiries
are a part of that mission. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15. Indeed, defendant’s view would
collapse the two parts of the mission—the initial purpose of the stop and ordinary inquiries of
the stop—into just the purpose of the stop. Nothing in Rodriguez suggests that license requests
might be withdrawn from the list of ordinary inquiries for a nontraffic enforcement stop.
¶ 16 To the extent the ordinary inquiries are justified by the officer safety interest, defendant’s
view would also require a conclusion that it is the type of stop, and not the occurrence of the
stop itself, that generates danger for officers. The relevant authorities instead reveal it is the
stop itself that poses danger. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (“[t]raffic stops are ‘especially
fraught with danger to police officers’ ” (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330)); id. at ___, 135 S.
Ct. at 1616, (noting “the government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop
itself”).
¶ 17 Defendant’s argument that the State must show how driver’s license checks advance the
interest in officer safety in this case, likewise, is foreclosed by Rodriguez’s favorable citation
of Holt. Warrant checks and criminal history checks without reasonable suspicion were
deemed permissible as “certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete [the
officer’s] mission safely.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. Thus, where a traffic stop is lawfully
initiated, the interest in officer safety entitles the officer to know the identity of a driver with
whom he is interacting. If the permissible inquiries include warrant and criminal history
checks, as the Rodriguez Court found, they necessarily include less invasive driver’s license
requests. Accordingly, the State need not make any special showing that driver’s license
requests, as a less invasive precursor to already-permissible criminal history checks, achieve
some additional safety goal.
¶ 18 Officer Bland’s stop of defendant was lawfully initiated. Though his reasonable suspicion
the driver was subject to arrest vanished upon seeing defendant, Bland could still make the
ordinary inquiries incident to a stop. The interest in officer safety permits a driver’s license
request of a driver lawfully stopped. Such ordinary inquiries are part of the stop’s mission and
do not prolong the stop for fourth amendment purposes.
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¶ 19 CONCLUSION
¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez makes clear that a driver’s
license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request
directly relates to the purpose for the stop. As a result, Officer Bland’s request for defendant’s
license did not violate the fourth amendment by prolonging the stop.
¶ 21 The judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, is
reversed. The circuit court judgment, suppressing evidence for prolonging the stop in violation
of the fourth amendment, is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
¶ 22 Reversed and remanded.
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