People v. Witherspoon , 432 Ill. Dec. 665 ( 2019 )

2019 IL 123092
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 123092)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MARCELUS WITHERSPOON, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 25, 2019.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Theis, and
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this case, we must determine whether a person who enters the dwelling place
of another in violation of a court order thereby enters the dwelling “without
authority” under the home invasion statute (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a) (West 2014)). For
the following reasons, we conclude that the person does.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In early August 2014, the defendant, Marcelus Witherspoon, was charged in a
separate case with domestic battery and criminal trespass to a residence. He was
released on bond, with the court ordering as conditions of the bail bond that
defendant have no contact with the victim, S.L., and that he refrain from entering or
remaining at the victim’s residence or going on the premises located at the victim’s
residence. 1
¶4 Later that same month, in violation of his bail bond conditions, defendant
returned to and entered S.L.’s home. While there, according to S.L., defendant
battered and sexually assaulted her. As a result of this incident, defendant was
charged in the circuit court of Macon County with home invasion (id. § 19-6(a)(2)),
aggravated criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-130(a)(2)), domestic battery (id.
§ 12-3.2(a)(1)), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS
570/402(c) (West 2014)), and violation of bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10(b) (West
2014)). 2 The matter proceeded to a bench trial.
¶5 At trial, S.L. testified that she and defendant began a sexual relationship in
October 2013. The relationship became more serious in March 2014 and was an
exclusive, dating relationship through July 2014. S.L. stated that, by the end of
July, she no longer considered herself to be in a serious relationship with defendant,
although she continued to have sex with him. This sexual relationship continued
throughout August 2014, even after defendant had been ordered by the circuit court
to refrain from having contact with S.L. and to refrain from entering her residence.
S.L. testified that, during defendant’s visits in August, she would let him into her
1
Illinois law requires that
“[w]hen a person is charged with a criminal offense and the victim is a family or household
member as defined in Article 112A [(725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2014))], conditions shall be
imposed at the time of the defendant’s release on bond that restrict the defendant’s access to the
victim. Unless provided otherwise by the court, the restrictions shall include requirements that
the defendant do the following:
***
(2) refrain from entering or remaining at the victim’s residence for a minimum period
of 72 hours following the defendant’s release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-10(d)(2) (West 2014).
2
The State dropped the violation of bail bond charge prior to trial.
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home, they would have sex, and defendant would leave. S.L. stated that she knew
defendant was not supposed to be in her home at these times.
¶6 S.L. testified that on the night of August 28, 2014, at approximately 10 p.m.,
defendant entered her house. According to S.L, defendant was angry about a
Facebook post S.L. had written about another man. Defendant and S.L. argued
about the post, and S.L. told defendant to leave. S.L. then went into her bedroom to
lie down. Defendant followed her and grabbed S.L.’s house keys, car keys, and cell
phone off her dresser. Defendant then left the house, taking S.L.’s car. S.L. locked
the front door and went to bed. S.L. stated she “just went and laid back down
because I knew eventually [defendant] would just bring my stuff back.”
¶7 S.L. testified that at approximately 2 a.m. she awoke to find defendant standing
over her. He yelled at her about the Facebook post and accused her of cheating on
him. S.L. testified that she tried to leave the bedroom but defendant grabbed her by
the hair and began punching her in the head, back, and side. Defendant threatened
to kill S.L., battered her repeatedly, and then forced her to have sex with him.
Eventually, defendant fell asleep. S.L. then got dressed, removed her keys from
defendant’s pants pocket, and drove to a friend’s house where she called the police.
¶8 On the issue of whether she had granted defendant permission to enter her
home, S.L.’s testimony varied. When asked on direct examination whether
defendant had permission to enter the house when he first arrived at 10 p.m., she
answered “No.” However, on cross-examination, she stated that this first arrival
began like previous visits when defendant had entered her home with permission
and they had engaged in consensual sex. Regarding defendant’s entry into the home
at 2 a.m., S.L. again stated that he did not have her permission to do so. However,
she also testified that defendant had taken her keys and used her car in the past and
that he would “sometimes” simply enter her home when he had her keys with him.
She further stated that she was not concerned about defendant taking her car and
keys in this instance because she knew he would return them as he had done on
previous occasions.
¶9 In addition to S.L.’s testimony, the State offered testimony from various police
officers. These officers described the arrest of defendant at S.L.’s home, the extent
of S.L.’s injuries, and the recovery of cocaine from defendant’s clothing at the time
of his arrest. The State also introduced into evidence defendant’s bail bond, which
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was signed by defendant and included the conditions that he refrain from having
contact with S.L. and entering her residence.
¶ 10 Defendant testified on his own behalf. Like S.L., defendant stated that he and
S.L. began a sexual relationship in 2013 and that the relationship became more
serious in the spring of 2014. Defendant also stated that he continued to visit and
have sex with S.L. even after the bond conditions had been imposed and that he
used her car and entered her home with permission throughout most of August
2014. Defendant stated he was fully aware that the circuit court had ordered him not
to enter S.L.’s home or have contact with her and that he was violating that order
when he visited S.L.
¶ 11 Defendant testified that, on the night of August 28 and early morning of August
29, 2014, he and S.L. got into a physical fight after defendant joked that he had
been with another woman. According to defendant, once the fight was over and
things had calmed down, the two smoked marijuana and had consensual sex.
Defendant conceded that S.L. “had some bruises from the fight” and that he had
punched her, but he stated that he only struck S.L. after she first hit him with a
lamp.
¶ 12 At the conclusion of trial, the circuit court found defendant not guilty of
aggravated criminal sexual assault but guilty of domestic battery and possession of
a controlled substance. With respect to the home invasion charge, the court
observed that the offense requires the State to prove, among other things, that the
defendant entered the victim’s residence “without authority” (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)
(West 2014)). The court concluded that the State had failed to prove S.L. denied
authority to defendant to enter her home in the early hours of August 29 based on
S.L.’s acceptance of defendant’s practice of using and then returning her car and
keys. The circuit court stated:
“When it comes down to the fact that he simply did not have the authority to
enter the residence, by the alleged victim’s own testimony she said, well, he
took the keys, and he took the car and I didn’t worry about it because I knew he
was going to be back. So by her own testimony he had authority to enter the
residence.”
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¶ 13 The court also declined to apply the limited authority doctrine. This doctrine
provides that a defendant’s entry into a dwelling is unauthorized, even when
initially consented to by the occupant, if at the time of entry the defendant had an
intent to commit criminal acts within the dwelling. People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248,
257 (1993). The circuit court stated it was
“not convinced that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
entered that residence with the intent to batter her. When you are looking at that
issue it comes down to the alleged victim’s word versus the defendant’s word,
and in terms of how that occurred I simply can’t say with any degree of
certainty.”
¶ 14 Having reached these conclusions, the court noted that there still remained a
question as to whether the State could establish that defendant entered S.L’s
residence “without authority” based on the conditions set forth in defendant’s bail
bond. The circuit court explained:
“The defendant knew that there was a bail bond in place where he knew he was
not to be at that residence. So when he entered that residence he knew he was
violating that bail bond. That in and of itself is without authority. If it is, then he
is guilty of home invasion. If it is not, then he is not guilty of home invasion. I
don’t know the answer to that question at this point.”
¶ 15 The court ordered additional briefing and argument from the parties and,
thereafter, concluded that the conditions of defendant’s bail bond did deprive him
of any authority to enter S.L.’s residence. Because defendant did not challenge any
other aspect of the home invasion charge, the circuit court found defendant guilty
of that offense. The court merged the domestic battery conviction into the home
invasion conviction and sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 14 years’
imprisonment for home invasion and 3 years’ imprisonment for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.
¶ 16 On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction for home
invasion. 2017 IL App (4th) 150512. In so doing, the appellate court did not frame
the issue before it as whether the legislature, in using the phrase “without authority”
in the home invasion statute, meant to include a violation of a court order
prohibiting the defendant from going into the victim’s residence. Instead, the
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appellate court stated that “the issue in this case is whether the consent of the
resident of a dwelling place for a person to enter trumps—for purposes of the home
invasion statute—a court order that prohibited that person from entering that
dwelling place.” Id. ¶ 27. The appellate court concluded that the consent of the
resident was controlling. The court reasoned:
“People are sovereign in their homes, and the law should be loath to attempt
to regulate whom homeowners may permit to enter. This remains true even
though a court order exists directing some person to stay away from that
residence and to not enter it. The homeowner may simply change her mind or
otherwise decide that—for whatever reason—she wishes to admit into her
home a person who is otherwise under a court order not to enter. Her decision
may be unwise, but it is one that the law must respect, particularly regarding a
situation, like this case, where a person charged with a Class X offense may
have relied upon that consent.” Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 17 The appellate court determined that, because S.L. had consented to defendant’s
entry into her home and because that consent was controlling, the State had failed to
prove defendant guilty of home invasion. Id. ¶¶ 33-37. The appellate court
remanded the cause to the circuit court for sentencing on defendant’s conviction for
domestic battery. Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 18 We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Nov. 1,
2017).
¶ 19 ANALYSIS
¶ 20 The home invasion statute states, in relevant part, that a person commits home
invasion when “without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is
present *** and *** [i]ntentionally causes any injury *** to any person or persons
within the dwelling place.” 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2014). Before this court,
defendant contends that the circuit court erred in finding him guilty of home
invasion because the State failed to prove he entered S.L’s home “without
authority.” To address this argument we must first determine the meaning of the
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phrase “without authority.” This presents an issue of statutory construction, which
we consider de novo. Corbett v. County of Lake, 2017 IL 121536, ¶ 18.
¶ 21 The home invasion statute does not contain a definition of the word “authority.”
When a statutory term is undefined we assume the legislature intended the word to
have its ordinary and popularly understood meaning and that we may ascertain this
meaning through the use of contemporary dictionaries. People v. Beacham, 229 Ill.
2d 237, 244-45 (2008). At the time the home invasion statute was enacted, to have
“authority” meant, as it does today, to have “freedom granted by one in authority.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 146 (1977). Thus, when the home
invasion statute states that a person must enter the dwelling place of another
“without authority” in order to be guilty of the offense, the statute is necessarily
saying that someone must deny that person the freedom to enter. This raises the
question: For purposes of the home invasion statute, who may deny the person
authority to enter the dwelling place?
¶ 22 Defendant does not dispute that a court may, when appropriate, order a person
to refrain from entering or remaining at a certain residence. See, e.g., 725 ILCS
5/110-10(d)(2) (West 2014) (conditions of bond); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2) (West
2014) (orders of protection). Nor does he dispute that he was prohibited by the
court-ordered conditions of his bail bond from entering into S.L.’s home and that he
violated those conditions in the early morning hours of August 29. However,
defendant contends that his violation of the court order is “irrelevant to the issue of
his guilt of home invasion.”
¶ 23 According to defendant, “[i]t is the consent of the resident that must determine
if one enters ‘without authority.’ ” In other words, defendant reads the phrase
“without authority” in the home invasion statute to mean “without authority
granted by an occupant of the dwelling.” Read this way, a court order plays no role
in determining whether a person has entered the dwelling place of another “without
authority.” Rather, the inquiry focuses entirely on the actions taken by the occupant
of the dwelling, and a person can only be said to have entered a dwelling “without
authority” if the occupant has denied consent to enter. Defendant notes that, in this
case, the circuit court held that the State failed to prove S.L. denied authority to
defendant to enter her home. Therefore, according to defendant, while he remains
guilty of domestic battery, he is not guilty of home invasion. We disagree.
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¶ 24 The difficulty with defendant’s argument is that the home invasion statute is not
limited in the way he proposes. We may not depart from the plain language of a
statute by reading into it “exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature
did not express.” People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 17. Accepting defendant’s
argument would require us to do just that. The occupant of a dwelling may always
deny authority to others to enter his or her home. But nothing in the plain language
of the home invasion statute limits the phrase “without authority” solely to those
situations where authority to enter is denied by the occupant.
¶ 25 Moreover, defendant’s reading of the phrase “without authority” is at odds with
the purpose of the home invasion statute. The home invasion statute is intended “to
protect the safety of persons in their homes.” People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 549
(1998). When a court orders a defendant to refrain from entering or remaining at a
residence, as was done in this case, this means there has been a judicial
determination that the defendant poses a risk to the safety of his victims. See also,
e.g., People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 65 (noting that a defendant who has access
to a victim of domestic violence is often able to “intimidate and control the
victim”). These individuals are the ones who most clearly are in need of deterrence
and who most clearly should be kept out of the victims’ homes. Defendant’s
interpretation of the phrase “without authority” would presumptively exclude these
individuals from the reach of the home invasion statute and, in our view, cannot be
squared with the legislative purpose of protecting people in their homes.
Accordingly, because the legislature did not include any limiting language in the
home invasion statute and in order to remain consistent with the statute’s purpose,
we hold that a defendant enters the dwelling place of another “without authority”
when either the occupant has not granted consent to enter or a court order has
prohibited entry.
¶ 26 The appellate court, in reversing defendant’s conviction for home invasion, did
not provide an analysis or definition of the phrase “without authority.” Instead, the
court concluded that an occupant’s consent to a defendant’s entry “trumped” any
court order and, therefore, the only question that need be decided regarding the
“without authority” element is whether the occupant did, in fact, consent to the
defendant’s entry. 2017 IL App (4th) 150512, ¶¶ 27-37. We reject this reasoning.
The phrase “without authority” means either a violation of a court order or a denial
of consent to entry from the occupant. When a defendant’s prosecution for home
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invasion is premised on the violation of a court order, the consent of the occupant is
legally irrelevant. The occupant’s consent to a defendant’s entry does not, in some
sense, trump the court order.
¶ 27 Defendant also contends that, even if the phrase “without authority” includes
the violation of a court order, his conviction for home invasion should nevertheless
be reversed because the State failed to prove that he knew he lacked authority to
enter S.L.’s home. Defendant maintains that the “legal issue” regarding the
meaning of “without authority” was not settled at the time he entered S.L.’s home
and, therefore, it cannot be said that he knowingly violated the law.
¶ 28 In response, the State points out that, while the home invasion statute explicitly
requires proof that the defendant “knowingly” entered the dwelling place of
another (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a) (West 2014)), it does not mention a mental state
requirement for the “without authority” element. Therefore, according to the State,
the home invasion statute does not require proof that the defendant knew he acted
without authority. We disagree.
¶ 29 Section 4-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) states that, if a “statute
does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense
(other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined
in Sections 4-4 [(intent)], 4-5 [(knowledge)] or 4-6 [(recklessness)] is applicable.”
Id. § 4-3(b). Section 4-9 of the Code, in turn, addresses absolute liability offenses
and states that a person may be guilty of a criminal offense without proof of a
mental state for each of the elements thereof “if the offense is a misdemeanor which
is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute
liability for the conduct described.” Id. § 4-9.
¶ 30 This court has observed that, through section 4-9, the legislature has expressed
an intent to limit the scope of absolute liability and, therefore, a court should not
interpret a nonmisdemeanor statute as creating an absolute liability offense unless
there is a clear indication of a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability.
People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 285-86 (1991). Consequently, the “ ‘mere absence
of express language describing a mental state does not per se lead to the conclusion
that none is required.’ ” Id. at 286 (quoting People v. Valley Steel Products Co., 71
Ill. 2d 408, 424 (1978)). Further, “if at all possible, the court will infer the existence
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of a culpable mental state, even where the statute itself appears to impose absolute
liability.” People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 92 (2001).
¶ 31 In this case, we conclude that the “without authority” element must include the
mental state of knowledge. Both the criminal offense of violation of bail bond (720
ILCS 5/32-10(b) (West 2014)) and the criminal offense of violation of a protective
order (750 ILCS 60/223(a)(1), (d) (West 2014)) require proof of a knowing
violation before criminal liability may be imposed. See also, e.g., People v. Hinton,
402 Ill. App. 3d 181 (2010). If we were to hold that the “without authority” element
of the home invasion statute does not include a knowledge requirement, we would
create an anomalous situation whereby a defendant could be found guilty of home
invasion for having violated the conditions of a bail bond or a protective order, even
though he could not be found guilty of a bail bond or protective order violation
itself. We do not think the legislature could reasonably have intended such a result.
¶ 32 However, although we agree with defendant that the State was required to
prove defendant knowingly entered S.L.’s home without authority, we reject
defendant’s contention that knowledge was not proven here. Defendant contends
that the State failed to prove he knowingly entered S.L.’s home without authority
because the “legal issue” regarding the meaning of “without authority” was not
settled at that time. In other words, defendant asserts that the State failed to meet its
burden of proof because he did not know the meaning of the law. We disagree.
¶ 33 “Knowledge generally refers to an awareness of the existence of the facts which
make an individual’s conduct unlawful” (People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 125
(1989)), not to knowledge of the law (People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 115 (2001)
(“ignorance of the law does not excuse unlawful conduct”); 720 ILCS 5/4-3(c)
(West 2014) (“Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or
knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an
offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as
such.”)). Under the home invasion statute, the State is required to prove the
defendant had knowledge of the court order prohibiting him from entering the
victim’s home, not that he understood the law. In this case, defendant testified that
he knew the circuit court had ordered him not to enter S.L.’s home and that he
violated that order on August 29. Therefore, the State met its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew he entered S.L.’s home without
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authority. Consequently, the circuit court properly found defendant guilty of home
invasion.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 36 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 37 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
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