Hudson v. City of Chicago ( 2008 )


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  •                         Docket No. 100466.
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    GEORGE HUDSON, SR., Indiv. and on Behalf of the Estate of
    George Hudson, Jr., Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF
    CHICAGO et al., Appellees.
    Opinion filed January 25, 2008.
    CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court,
    with opinion.
    Justices Freeman, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the
    judgment and opinion.
    Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice
    Fitzgerald.
    Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion, upon denial of rehearing,
    joined by Justice Fitzgerald.
    Justice Burke took no part in the decision.
    OPINION
    On March 30, 1999, plaintiffs, George Hudson, Sr., on behalf of
    the estate of his deceased son, George Hudson, Jr., and Ednarine
    Hudson, individually and as mother and next friend of Ronita Milton,
    filed suit against the City of Chicago, former Chicago Fire
    Commissioner Edward P. Altman, and unknown Chicago fire
    department personnel. Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
    negligence, and count II alleged willful and wanton misconduct in
    providing emergency services to George Hudson, Jr.
    In October 1999, the circuit court of Cook County granted
    defendants’ motion to dismiss the negligence count on the ground that
    the City and its employees were immune under section 3.150 of the
    Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.150
    (West 2000)).
    On July 25, 2002, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining
    willful and wanton misconduct count pursuant to section 2–1009 of
    the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1009 (West
    2000)). On July 23, 2003, plaintiffs refiled their action, setting forth
    only one count for willful and wanton misconduct. Defendants moved
    to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619
    (West 2006)), arguing that the refiled action was barred by res
    judicata. The circuit court granted the motion, and the appellate court
    affirmed (No. 1–04–0338 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
    Rule 23)). We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal (
    210 Ill. 2d
    R. 315), and we granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association
    leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs (
    210 Ill. 2d
    R. 345).
    BACKGROUND
    In November 1998, five-year-old George Hudson, Jr., died from
    acute asthma exacerbation. On March 30, 1999, plaintiffs filed a two-
    count wrongful-death complaint (Hudson I), alleging that on
    November 25, 1998, George Jr.’s mother, Ednarine, called 911 to
    request emergency assistance and informed the operator that the child
    was having breathing problems. Despite being informed that the child
    was suffering severe breathing problems, defendants dispatched a fire
    engine. The fire engine had no advanced life support and was the
    wrong equipment under the circumstances. An advanced life support
    ambulance arrived approximately 15 minutes after Ednarine’s 911 call.
    Plaintiffs claimed that George Jr. died as a result of the delay in
    providing advanced life support. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged in count
    I that defendants were negligent and in count II that defendants had
    engaged in willful and wanton misconduct.
    -2-
    Defendants moved to dismiss the negligence count pursuant to
    section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West
    2000)), claiming immunity under section 3.150 of the EMS Act (210
    ILCS 50/3.150 (West 2000)). In October 1999, the circuit court
    dismissed plaintiffs’ negligence claim with prejudice and continued the
    cause of action as to the willful and wanton misconduct count. On
    July 25, 2002, the circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion to
    voluntarily dismiss the willful and wanton misconduct count.
    On July 23, 2003, plaintiffs refiled their wrongful-death action,
    setting forth only one count for willful and wanton misconduct
    (Hudson II). The refiled complaint additionally claimed that prior to
    November 25, 1998, defendant City of Chicago knew that George Jr.
    had previously suffered serious asthmatic episodes at his home.
    Defendants moved to dismiss Hudson II pursuant to section 2–619
    of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2000)), claiming that it was
    barred by res judicata. The circuit court agreed with defendants’
    argument that the dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim in Hudson
    I constituted an adjudication on the merits and that res judicata bars
    not only matters that were determined in the first action, but also
    matters that could have been determined in the original action. The
    circuit court therefore held that res judicata barred plaintiffs’ willful
    and wanton claim and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
    refiled action.
    Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the circuit court improperly
    dismissed Hudson II based on res judicata. The appellate court
    affirmed, relying on Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 
    172 Ill. 2d 325
    (1996), and held that res judicata barred plaintiffs from refiling their
    willful and wanton misconduct claim.
    ANALYSIS
    The central issue is whether the involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs’
    negligence claim and plaintiffs’ subsequent voluntary dismissal of their
    remaining willful and wanton misconduct claim barred the refiling of
    their willful and wanton misconduct claim under the doctrine of res
    judicata. Plaintiffs contend that the appellate court erred in concluding
    that the willful and wanton misconduct claim in Hudson II was barred
    by res judicata because there was no final adjudication on the merits
    -3-
    of their voluntarily dismissed willful and wanton misconduct claim in
    Hudson I. Defendants maintain that the dismissal of plaintiffs’
    negligence count in Hudson I was a final adjudication on the merits
    for purposes of res judicata and that, applying this court’s decision in
    Rein, res judicata bars plaintiffs’ willful and wanton misconduct claim.
    We agree with defendants and hold that plaintiffs’ refiled willful and
    wanton misconduct claim is barred by res judicata.
    “The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the
    merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any
    subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the
    same cause of action.” 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 334
    . Res judicata bars not
    only what was actually decided in the first action but also whatever
    could have been decided. La Salle National Bank v. County Board of
    School Trustees, 
    61 Ill. 2d 524
    , 529 (1975). Three requirements must
    be satisfied for res judicata to apply: (1) a final judgment on the
    merits has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an
    identity of cause of action exists; and (3) the parties or their privies are
    identical in both actions. Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
    162 Ill. 2d 70
    , 73-74 (1994).
    Plaintiffs do not dispute that the second and third requirements are
    met here. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the first element is not
    satisfied because the willful and wanton misconduct count was never
    adjudicated on the merits. Plaintiffs concede that their negligence
    claim was dismissed on the merits in Hudson I. The trial court
    dismissed the negligence count based on the defendants’ statutory
    immunity, and Supreme Court Rule 273 provides that “an involuntary
    dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
    for improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party,
    operates as an adjudication upon the merits” (134 Ill. 2d R. 273).
    Accordingly, the involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim
    in Hudson I constituted an adjudication on the merits for res judicata
    purposes.
    After their negligence count was dismissed on the merits, plaintiffs
    voluntarily dismissed their willful and wanton count pursuant to
    section 2–1009(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–1009(a) (West 2000)).
    Section 2–1009(a) provides that “[t]he plaintiff may, at any time
    before trial or hearing begins, *** dismiss his or her action or any part
    thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the
    -4-
    cause.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1009(a) (West 2000). Once the voluntary
    dismissal was entered, Hudson I was terminated in its entirety and all
    final orders became immediately appealable. See Dubina v. Mesirow
    Realty Development, Inc., 
    178 Ill. 2d 496
    , 503 (1997). Approximately
    one year later, plaintiffs refiled their willful and wanton claim in
    Hudson II, purportedly pursuant to section 13–217 of the Code. This
    section provides:
    “Reversal or dismissal. In the actions specified in Article
    XIII of this Act or any other act or contract where the time for
    commencing an action is limited, if judgment is entered for the
    plaintiff but reversed on appeal, or if there is a verdict in favor
    of the plaintiff and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the
    judgment is entered against the plaintiff, or the action is
    voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed
    for want of prosecution, or the action is dismissed by a United
    States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, or the action is
    dismissed by a United States District Court for improper
    venue, then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing
    such action expires during the pendency of such action, the
    plaintiff, his or her heirs, executors or administrators may
    commence a new action within one year or within the
    remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after such
    judgment is reversed or entered against the plaintiff, or after
    the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action
    is dismissed for want of prosecution, or the action is dismissed
    by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, or
    the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for
    improper venue.” 735 ILCS 5/13–217 (West 1994).1
    This filing by plaintiffs was not a continuation of Hudson I, but rather
    an entirely new action. See 
    Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 504
    . Plaintiffs
    contend that they were entitled to proceed with Hudson II because, as
    1
    This version of section 13–217 preceded the amendments of Public Act
    89–7, §15, eff. March 9, 1995. This court found Public Act 89–7
    unconstitutional in its entirety in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 
    179 Ill. 2d 367
    (1997). The version of section 13–217 currently in effect is, therefore,
    the version that preceded the amendments of Public Act 89–7. See Unzicker
    v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 
    203 Ill. 2d 64
    , 71 n.1 (2002).
    -5-
    far as their willful and wanton misconduct claim was concerned, there
    was no order that was both final and meritorious.
    Defendants argue, and we agree, that plaintiffs’ argument is
    defeated by this court’s decision in Rein. In Rein, the plaintiffs filed an
    eight-count complaint (Rein I) alleging that the defendants
    fraudulently misrepresented the character of certain securities that
    they had sold to the plaintiffs. In some of the counts, the plaintiffs
    sought rescission of the purchase pursuant to section 13 of the Illinois
    Securities Law of 1953 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121½, par.
    137.13(A)(1)). In other counts, the plaintiffs alleged common law
    fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed three of
    the rescission counts on statute of limitations grounds. The trial court
    denied the plaintiffs’ request for a Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a))
    finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal
    of the dismissed rescission counts. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed
    the remaining counts of their complaint pursuant to section 2–1009(a)
    of the Code. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the rescission counts,
    and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. See 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 328-30
    .
    After the unsuccessful appeal, and approximately 19 months after
    voluntarily dismissing their remaining counts, plaintiffs refiled their
    entire case, including the rescission counts that were the subject of the
    unsuccessful appeal in Rein I in a complaint that was “virtually
    identical” to the complaint filed in Rein I. 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 331
    . The
    trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint based on res judicata and
    statute of limitations grounds. The appellate court affirmed the
    dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 
    271 Ill. App. 3d 768
    (1995). The majority held that both the rescission
    counts and the common law counts were barred by res judicata. One
    justice dissented, arguing that res judicata did not bar the common
    law counts. 
    Rein, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 775-78
    (Rathje, J., dissenting).
    On appeal, this court affirmed the appellate court majority. This
    court first held that the rescission counts were clearly barred by res
    judicata. Those counts had been dismissed on statute of limitations
    grounds in Rein I, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal. 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 334
    -36.
    This court next discussed the common law counts, which had been
    voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs after the dismissal of the
    -6-
    rescission counts. This court explained that three requirements must
    be met for res judicata to apply. There must be: (1) a final judgment
    on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
    identity of cause of action; and (3) identity of parties or their privies.
    
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 337
    . The court then determined that all three of
    these requirements had been met with respect to the counts that
    plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed. 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 338-39
    . This
    court determined that there was an identity of parties (Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 338) and an identity of causes of action (Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 338-
    39). With respect to whether there was an adjudication on the merits
    of the voluntarily dismissed counts, this court held the following:
    “The first element of res judicata is met here because the
    dismissal of the rescission counts with prejudice in Rein I
    operates as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res
    judicata, as explained earlier. Although there was not an
    adjudication on the merits of the common law counts in Rein
    I, the concept of res judicata is broader than plaintiffs suggest.
    If the three elements necessary to invoke res judicata are
    present, res judicata will bar not only every matter that was
    actually determined in the first suit, but also every matter that
    might have been raised and determined in that suit. Torcasso
    v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 
    157 Ill. 2d 484
    , 490 (1993).
    Therefore, if the three requirements of res judicata are met
    and the common law counts could have been determined in
    Rein I, plaintiffs will be barred from litigating the common law
    counts in Rein II.
    ***
    Because the common law counts arise out of the same set
    of operative facts as the rescission counts, plaintiffs could
    have litigated and resolved these claims in Rein I. Having
    failed to do so, plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata from attempting to raise and litigate them in Rein II,
    even though there was no adjudication on the merits of these
    claims in the prior suit. See Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments §24 (1982).” 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 337
    -39.
    After holding that the voluntarily dismissed counts were barred by res
    judicata, this court next discussed the policy against claim-splitting.
    This court explained that the principle that res judicata prohibits a
    -7-
    party from seeking relief on the basis of issues that could have been
    resolved in a previous action serves to prevent parties from splitting
    their claims into multiple actions. Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 339-42. This
    court then adopted the exceptions to claim-splitting set forth in
    section 26(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982).
    Under this section, the rule against claim-splitting would not bar a
    second action if:
    “(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff
    may split his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; (2)
    the court in the first action expressly reserved the plaintiff's
    right to maintain the second action;[2] (3) the plaintiff was
    unable to obtain relief on his claim because of a restriction on
    the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in the first action;
    (4) the judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent
    with the equitable implementation of a statutory scheme; (5)
    the case involves a continuing or recurrent wrong; or (6) it is
    2
    The comments to section 26 of the Restatement indicate that an example
    of a court expressly maintaining a plaintiff’s right to maintain a second
    action may be when the court indicates that its judgment is without prejudice
    to the bringing of a second action. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
    §26(1), Comment b (1982). This comment further references section
    20(1)(b), and Comment f-i thereto (Restatement (Second) of Judgments
    §20(1)(b), Comments f through i (1982)), which sets forth the unremarkable
    proposition that a voluntary dismissal of an action is typically without
    prejudice to the bringing of a second action. When commenting on this
    particular exception to claim-splitting, this court explained in Rein that the
    use of “without prejudice” language is not sufficient to protect a plaintiff
    against the bar of res judicata when another part of plaintiff’s case has gone
    to final judgment in a previous action: “the trial judge’s granting plaintiffs’
    motion to voluntarily dismiss the common law counts without prejudice
    under section 2–1009 should not be interpreted as immunizing plaintiffs
    against defenses defendants may raise when the voluntarily dismissed counts
    were refiled.” Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 342. As Rein pointed out, a plaintiff could
    not file a complaint with multiple counts, take a voluntarily dismissal without
    prejudice of some of the counts, pursue the undismissed counts to final
    judgment, and then harass the defendant with successive suits simply because
    the dismissals of those counts were entered “without prejudice.” Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 343.
    -8-
    clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring
    preclusion of a second action are overcome for an
    extraordinary reason.” Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341.
    The court found that none of these exceptions were present. Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341-42. Next, this court addressed plaintiffs’ claim that
    sections 2–1009 and 13–217 of the Code gave them an absolute right
    to refile the voluntarily dismissed counts within one year or within the
    remaining period of limitations. This court acknowledged plaintiffs’
    rights under these sections, but held that these legislatively created
    rights did not automatically immunize plaintiffs against res judicata or
    any other legitimate defenses that a defendant might assert. Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 342-43. Finally, this court noted two policy justifications for
    its holding. First, it would prevent a party from filing an action with
    multiple claims, dismissing several of the counts, obtaining a final
    judgment on the undismissed counts and, if unsuccessful on the counts
    not dismissed, refiling the previously dismissed counts. Second, it
    would prohibit plaintiffs from using voluntary dismissals to circumvent
    a judge’s refusal of a Rule 304(a) certification. Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at
    343.
    Rein thus stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who splits his
    claims by voluntarily dismissing and refiling part of an action after a
    final judgment has been entered on another part of the case subjects
    himself to a res judicata defense. Once the holding of Rein is
    understood, the analysis in the present case becomes an unremarkable
    exercise. If we simply insert the case names and the types of counts
    from this case into the above-quoted passage from Rein, we would get
    the following:
    “The first element of res judicata is met here because the
    dismissal of the [negligence count] with prejudice in [Hudson
    I] operates as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res
    judicata, as explained earlier. Although there was not an
    adjudication on the merits of the [willful and wanton count] in
    [Hudson I], the concept of res judicata is broader than
    plaintiffs suggest. If the three elements necessary to invoke res
    judicata are present, res judicata will bar not only every
    matter that was actually determined in the first suit, but also
    every matter that might have been raised and determined in
    that suit. Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d
    -9-
    484, 490 (1993). Therefore, if the three requirements of res
    judicata are met and the [willful and wanton count] could
    have been determined in [Hudson I], plaintiffs will be barred
    from litigating the [willful and wanton count] in [Hudson II].
    ***
    Because the [willful and wanton count] arises out of the
    same set of operative facts as the [negligence count], plaintiffs
    could have litigated and resolved [this claim] in [Hudson I].
    Having failed to do so, plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of
    res judicata from attempting to raise and litigate [it] in
    [Hudson II], even though there was no adjudication on the
    merits of [this claim] in the prior suit.”3 See 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 337
    -39.
    We next look to see if any of the exceptions to the rule against claim-
    splitting are applicable. See Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341. Just as none of
    them were present in Rein, none of them are present here.
    Accordingly, Rein compels an affirmance of the appellate court’s
    decision.
    Plaintiffs and ITLA take two different approaches in trying to
    avoid this clearly controlling authority. Plaintiffs argue that Rein is
    distinguishable, while ITLA argues that Rein was right for the wrong
    reason. According to ITLA, Rein reached the correct result but the
    analysis it used threatens separation of powers principles. We address
    plaintiffs’ arguments first.
    Plaintiffs first contend that Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 
    197 Ill. 2d
    381 (2001), is more similar to this case than Rein and that Nowak
    compels a reversal of the appellate court. This argument is easily
    3
    If there was any doubt whether this court viewed the refiling of a
    voluntarily dismissed count as a new action, it was resolved in Dubina v.
    Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 
    178 Ill. 2d 496
    , 504 (1997), in which
    this court explained that a refiled count was a new, distinct action. Thus,
    when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the remaining part of an action, all
    final orders in the old action become immediately appealable. The refiling of
    the voluntarily dismissed count does not transform the final orders entered
    in the previous case into nonfinal ones, because the refiling commences a
    new action. 
    Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 503-04
    .
    -10-
    refuted. In Nowak, the plaintiff sought recovery for a violation of the
    Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §12101 et
    seq. (1994 & Supp. 1997)). He brought his action, along with a
    pendent state claim, in federal court. The district court granted the
    defendant summary judgment on the ADA claim, finding that the
    plaintiff was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA. The court
    then exercised its statutory discretion to decline jurisdiction over the
    pendent state claim and dismissed that claim for lack of jurisdiction.
    When the plaintiff refiled the state claim in state court, the defendant
    argued that it was barred by res judicata. This court agreed with the
    appellate court’s conclusion that res judicata did not bar the claim.
    The defendant in Nowak relied on River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland
    Park, 
    184 Ill. 2d 290
    (1998), in which this court held that a plaintiff
    was barred by res judicata from bringing claims in state court that he
    could have asserted in a previous federal action. This court
    distinguished River Park as follows:
    “Because plaintiff was required to assert all of its related
    claims in the federal action, and failed to do so, and because
    the dismissal of the federal action constituted an adjudication
    on the merits for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 273 (134
    Ill. 2d R. 273), we found that the doctrine of res judicata had
    been properly applied by the circuit court to bar the
    subsequent assertion of claims that should have been raised in
    the federal action.
    In this case, plaintiff asserted his contract tenure claim in
    the federal action, as required by the transactional test, only to
    have his claim dismissed by the district court ‘for lack of
    jurisdiction’ after an adverse decision on his ADA claim.
    Whether that dismissal was discretionary or otherwise is
    beside the point; it was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
    There was no adjudication of the merits on that claim despite
    plaintiff’s proper and timely assertion of the claim. With
    respect to that timely asserted claim, plaintiff did not get his
    day in court and, therefore, res judicata does not apply.”
    (Emphases in original.) Nowak, 
    197 Ill. 2d
    at 392.
    Plaintiffs argue that Nowak is indistinguishable from the present
    case, focusing on the above statement that “there was no adjudication
    of the merits on that claim despite plaintiff’s proper and timely
    -11-
    assertion of the claim.” However, the very next sentence shows why
    the two cases are different. The plaintiff in Nowak did not get his day
    in court on his dismissed state law claim. The federal court declined
    to exercise jurisdiction over that claim, so plaintiff had not had the
    opportunity to litigate that claim when he filed it in state court. By
    contrast, plaintiffs here, just like the plaintiffs in Rein, did have the
    opportunity to litigate all of their claims. However, they chose to
    voluntarily dismiss part of their case and commence a second action,
    after part of their case had been finally determined in a previous
    action. Thus, it is the following passage from Rein, rather than the
    above passage from Nowak, that applies to plaintiffs:
    “Thus, following the final adjudication of the rescission counts
    in Rein I, plaintiffs were barred from litigating the common
    law counts in a subsequent action. To avoid the bar of res
    judicata, plaintiffs could have proceeded to a decision on the
    merits of the common law counts in Rein I and, if
    unsuccessful, appealed both the result regarding the common
    law counts and the trial judge’s order dismissing the rescission
    counts with prejudice. By failing to proceed on the common
    law counts in the first action, plaintiffs are barred from
    attempting to litigate those issues in a subsequent suit. See
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24 (1982).” Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 340.
    We also noted above that Rein relied on the Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments in setting forth six exceptions to the rule against claim-
    splitting and determined that none of the exceptions were present in
    Rein. By contrast, the situation in Nowak falls squarely within the third
    of these exceptions: “the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his
    claim because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
    court in the first action.” See Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341. Nowak is plainly
    distinguishable.
    Plaintiffs next argue that Rein is distinguishable and does not apply
    here. According to plaintiffs, Rein set forth a “case-specific, anti-abuse
    doctrine.” Plaintiffs bypass Rein’s holding on the res judicata issue
    and focus in on the two policy considerations that Rein gave in
    support of its holding: (1) that a contrary holding would mean that any
    plaintiff could file a complaint with multiple counts, voluntarily
    dismiss some, proceed to judgment on the undismissed counts and, if
    -12-
    unsuccessful, refile the other counts; and (2) a contrary holding would
    emasculate Rule 304(a) by allowing plaintiffs to use voluntary
    dismissals as a means to appeal when a trial judge denies a plaintiff’s
    request to make a Rule 304(a) finding. See Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 343.
    This, however, was not Rein’s holding, nor was it Rein’s explanation
    of why res judicata applied. These were simply policy reasons that the
    court gave in favor of the result it had already reached. Rein’s holding
    on the res judicata issue, which we have discussed in detail above,
    was stated several paragraphs earlier in the opinion. This court held
    that res judicata applied because all three elements of res judicata
    were present. Moreover, we do not find any indication in Rein that its
    holding was meant to be limited to these two situations.
    Plaintiffs seem to have no quarrel with the proposition that res
    judicata would apply to the first of the two situations described in
    Rein. The second of the two situations is closer to what happened
    here, except for the fact that the attorney here did not seek Rule
    304(a) language after the negligence count was dismissed and did not
    appeal that dismissal when it became appealable.4 This, however, is a
    distinction without a difference. An attorney’s subjective motivation
    in taking a voluntary dismissal is not part of a res judicata analysis. As
    Rein recognized, three factors determine whether res judicata applies:
    (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
    jurisdiction; (2) identity of cause of action; and (3) identity of parties
    or their privies. 
    Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 337
    . Rein’s discussion of why
    these factors were met applies equally here.
    If Rein’s central thesis–that if there is an adjudication on the merits
    of one claim in a case, this determination will have res judicata effect
    on the filing of any other claims that could have been raised and
    determined in the first case–is accepted, there are only two possible
    ways to reach different results in Rein and the present case. One
    possibility is that res judicata generally does not apply to the refiling
    of voluntarily dismissed counts after a final, appealable judgment has
    4
    It appears that this was not a conscious choice by plaintiffs. Defendants
    have asked this court to take judicial notice of Cook County circuit court
    case No. 04–L–008252, in which plaintiffs are suing their original trial
    attorney for malpractice for, inter alia, failing to appeal the dismissal of their
    negligence count.
    -13-
    been entered in the first case, but that this court decided to apply that
    doctrine in Rein anyway because it did not like the behavior of the
    plaintiffs’ attorneys. The other possibility is that res judicata generally
    does apply to the refiling of voluntarily dismissed counts after a final
    appealable judgment has been entered in the first case, but that some
    exception applies here. It cannot be the first of these two possibilities,
    because surely no one would argue that courts are free to invoke
    wholly inapplicable legal doctrines as punitive measures. Thus, if Rein
    is distinguishable it would have to be on the basis that an exception to
    res judicata applies here. However, as we noted above, this court in
    Rein set forth the six situations in which it would be inequitable to
    apply the rule against claim splitting, and none of those exceptions are
    present here.
    Plaintiffs refer to Rein as a “pernicious error” and complain that
    applying Rein here would mean that “whenever any count in a multi-
    count complaint is dismissed on the merits, none of the surviving
    counts may be voluntarily dismissed and subsequently refiled.”
    Plaintiffs are incorrect. This court has set forth six situations in which
    plaintiffs will be allowed to split their claims into multiple actions.
    Moreover, one of these situations is if the defendant acquiesces in the
    claim-splitting. Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341. Thus, if an attorney is
    considering taking a voluntary dismissal after a final judgment has
    been entered on part of his case, he can seek the defendant’s
    acquiescence in the refiling. If the defendant is unwilling to do so, then
    the attorney will know that he proceeds at his peril.
    Finally, plaintiffs argue that Rein will have a chilling effect on
    plaintiffs’ willingness to allege novel or speculative theories of
    recovery. According to plaintiffs, a party will have to think twice
    about adding novel or speculative theories of recovery to a complaint
    because that party may lose his or her right to take a voluntary
    dismissal and to refile the complaint if the novel or speculative counts
    are dismissed on the merits. Defendants respond that plaintiffs are as
    free after Rein as before to bring novel or speculative claims.
    Moreover, they are still free to voluntarily dismiss and refile, as long
    as they do so before any final judgments are entered in the case.
    Defendants contend that the only effect of Rein is that plaintiffs who
    have both sound claims and speculative ones may have to weigh
    whether it is more important to take a chance with the speculative
    -14-
    claim or to have a better chance of being able to maintain an absolute
    right to voluntarily dismiss and refile. The stronger the claim, the
    greater the likelihood that a plaintiff will opt to include it. For more
    speculative or frivolous claims, however, there will be an incentive for
    the plaintiff to think twice about including it. Defendants see nothing
    wrong with such a result and argue that, had plaintiffs themselves not
    insisted on bringing a negligence suit against an entity that is
    statutorily immune from negligence suits, they would not be in the
    predicament they find themselves in today. Be that as it may, we add
    once more that Rein allows plaintiffs to claim-split in six different
    situations, and one of these is if the defendant acquiesces.
    ITLA, as amicus curiae, argues that the result in Rein was correct
    but that the court’s res judicata analysis was not. ITLA argues that
    the real problem in Rein was that the plaintiffs attempted to use a
    voluntary dismissal as a way to avoid the trial court’s denial of Rule
    304(a) language. ITLA seizes on the following sentence from Rein:
    “Moreover, an interpretation contrary to that reached here would
    emasculate Rule 304(a) by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent a trial
    judge’s denial of a Rule 304(a) certification by refiling previously
    dismissed counts following an unsuccessful judgment or appeal on
    counts not previously dismissed.” Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 343. ITLA
    points out that this court has previously recognized the legislative
    prerogative in enacting sections 2–1009 and 13–217, while at the
    same time maintaining this court’s right to regulate the judicial system.
    See Gibellina v. Handley, 
    127 Ill. 2d 122
    (1989); O’Connell v. St.
    Francis Hospital, 
    112 Ill. 2d 273
    (1986). ITLA maintains that this
    court can use this rationale to clarify that Rein was meant to apply
    only to those plaintiffs who use the voluntary dismissal and refile
    procedure as a means of circumventing a trial court’s denial of Rule
    304(a) language.
    There are several problems with ITLA’s argument. First, it is
    difficult to accept ITLA’s assertion that this court’s true concern in
    Rein was that the plaintiffs used the voluntary nonsuit and refile
    procedure as a means of circumventing the trial court’s denial of Rule
    304(a) certification. It seems unlikely that, if this were the court’s true
    concern, this court would have devoted a single sentence to the issue
    and buried it at the end of an 11-paragraph discussion that was simply
    window dressing. Rather, it seems clear that the court’s true concern
    -15-
    in Rein was exactly what this court stated it to be: the plaintiffs split
    their claims into multiple actions. Their rescission counts were finally
    resolved in Rein I, and they then instituted a new action, Rein II, in
    which they wanted their common law counts to be resolved. See Rein,
    
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 338-42.
    Second, rewriting Rein in the manner ITLA suggests would not
    address the other policy concern that this court raised in Rein. ITLA
    ignores the two sentences immediately preceding the one mentioning
    Rule 304(a). There, this court stated: “If plaintiffs were permitted to
    proceed on their common law counts, any plaintiff could file an action
    with multiple counts, dismiss some but not all of the counts, obtain a
    final judgment on the undismissed counts, and if unsuccessful on the
    counts not dismissed, refile the previously dismissed counts. Such a
    practice would impair judicial economy and would effectively defeat
    the public policy underlying res judicata, which is to protect the
    defendant from harassment and the public from multiple litigation.”
    Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 343. ITLA fails to explain how rewriting Rein to
    apply only to those plaintiffs who use the voluntary dismissal as a
    means of circumventing the denial of Rule 304(a) certification would
    address this concern, which the Rein court raised before even
    mentioning Rule 304(a).
    Third, ITLA fails to realize that Rein is already based on this
    court’s right to regulate the judicial system. As defendants point out,
    res judicata is a common law doctrine created by the courts to
    regulate the judicial system, and it exists to avoid burdening the courts
    and litigants with duplicative litigation. If a plaintiff uses sections
    2–1009 and 13–217 to voluntarily dismiss and refile a claim after
    another part of the cause of action has gone to final judgment in a
    previous case, that plaintiff will have engaged in claim-splitting. Thus,
    in Rein, this court acknowledged a plaintiff’s rights under sections
    2–1009 and 13–217 but stated that “we do not believe that these
    sections should be read to automatically immunize a plaintiff against
    the bar of res judicata or other legitimate defenses a defendant may
    assert in response to the refiling of voluntarily dismissed counts.”
    Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 342-43.
    Fourth, ITLA fails to grasp the consequences of the rule it
    proposes. For instance, would every plaintiff who takes a voluntary
    dismissal after a denial of Rule 304(a) certification be barred from
    -16-
    proceeding with a second action? How would the courts know which
    plaintiffs are seeking to undermine the court’s authority and which
    plaintiffs simply genuinely determine later that they need to voluntarily
    dismiss? Further, under ITLA’s rule, the plaintiff who is determined
    to appeal the dismissed counts at all costs would likely not even ask
    for the Rule 304(a) certification before voluntarily dismissing the
    remaining counts. This way, he or she would not have to run the risk
    of having the request denied and later being accused of circumventing
    the denial of Rule 304(a) certification. It appears, then, that rewriting
    Rein in the manner ITLA proposes would emasculate Rule 304(a),
    which is precisely what Rein claimed that it was trying to avoid. See
    Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 343.
    Finally, ITLA suggests that rewriting Rein in the manner it
    suggests is necessary to avoid violating the separation of powers
    clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). ITLA
    does not develop this argument or cite any authority, but merely
    suggests that the analysis this court used in Rein shows that this court
    is unduly interfering with the legislatively created right to voluntarily
    dismiss and refile. There is simply no basis to this argument. Sections
    2–1009 and 13–217 do not address the issues of claim-splitting or res
    judicata. Section 2–1009 gives plaintiffs the right to voluntarily
    dismiss an action, without prejudice, in whole or in part any time
    before trial or hearing begins. 735 ILCS 5/2–1009(a) (West 2006).
    Section 13–217 is part of article XIII of the Code, which is entitled
    “Limitations.” This section sets forth the limitations period for, inter
    alia, voluntarily dismissed actions. An action that is voluntarily
    dismissed by the plaintiff may be refiled within one year or within the
    remaining limitations period, whichever is greater. 735 ILCS
    5/13–217 (West 1994). It is true that this court has referred to section
    13–217 as providing a plaintiff with an “absolute” right to refile a
    complaint within one year or within the remaining limitations period
    (see Timberlake v. Illini Hospital, 
    175 Ill. 2d 159
    , 163 (1997);
    Gendek v. Jehangir, 
    119 Ill. 2d 338
    , 340 (1988)), but this description
    referred only to a plaintiff’s rights vis-a-vis the limitations period,
    which is the only subject addressed by section 13–217. These sections
    do not address what happens when a plaintiff commences a second
    action after part of his cause of action has gone to final judgment in a
    previous case. We see no basis for concluding that the legislature
    -17-
    intended in sections 2–1009 and section 13–217 to give plaintiffs an
    absolute right to split their claims.
    CONCLUSION
    The appellate court concluded correctly that Rein is controlling.
    As in Rein, plaintiffs commenced a new action after part of their
    original cause of action had gone to final judgment in a previous case.
    None of the exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting are present
    here, and thus res judicata barred plaintiffs’ refiled complaint. We
    therefore affirm the appellate court’s judgment.
    Appellate court judgment affirmed.
    JUSTICE BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision
    of this case.
    JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because plaintiffs’
    voluntary dismissal in Hudson I does not preclude plaintiffs from
    reinstating their willful and wanton claim. When a plaintiff voluntarily
    dismisses a claim or a lawsuit without prejudice, the plaintiff may
    refile the claim without being barred by res judicata or the rule against
    claim splitting.
    In Rein, this court held that the plaintiffs’ common law claims that
    were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in an earlier lawsuit were
    barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the plaintiffs were
    splitting their claims to appeal the involuntary dismissal of their
    rescission claims. In Rein, this court devoted much of its analysis to
    the rule against claim-splitting and relied on the rule to support its
    holding that res judicata barred the plaintiffs from refiling their
    common law claims. In Rein, this court did not confine its ruling to
    cases involving claim-splitting.
    I believe Rein reached the right result under the circumstances, but
    for the wrong reasons. I believe this court should now take the
    opportunity to limit or overrule Rein. Rein has proven unworkable,
    particularly in cases not involving any improper claim-splitting. This
    -18-
    court’s decision in Rein was based largely on public policy concerns
    and not upon sound legal principles. Once the faulty underpinnings of
    Rein are understood, the foundation of Rein’s rationale crumbles.
    In Rein, this court misconstrued the relationship between section
    2–1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1009
    (West 2002)), section 13–217 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13–217 (West
    2002)), and Supreme Court Rule 273 (134 Ill. 2d R. 273), and then
    misapplied the doctrine of res judicata and the rule against claim-
    splitting.
    “The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment
    rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is
    conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to
    them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the
    same claim, demand or cause of action.” Nowak v. St. Rita High
    School, 
    197 Ill. 2d
    381, 389 (2001). Res judicata applies to bar issues
    that were actually decided in the first action, as well as matters that
    could have been decided. La Salle National Bank v. County Board of
    School Trustees, 
    61 Ill. 2d 524
    , 529 (1975). Three requirements must
    be satisfied for the doctrine of res judicata to apply: (1) a final
    judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
    (2) an identity of cause of action, and (3) identity of the parties or
    their privies. Nowak, 
    197 Ill. 2d
    at 390.
    The res judicata analysis in Rein was faulty because it
    misconstrued Supreme Court Rule 273 in concluding that there was
    a final judgment on the merits. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 
    172 Ill. 2d
    325, 336 (1996). Rule 273 provides that under certain
    circumstances, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication
    upon the merits.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 273. Rule 273 does not, however,
    provide that an adjudication on the merits is a “final” judgment on the
    merits, as required for res judicata to apply.
    A final judgment is “a determination by the court on the issues
    presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and
    finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit.” Flores v. Dugan, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    108, 112 (1982). In Flores, this court held that a dismissal for want
    of prosecution is not a final and appealable order because the plaintiffs
    had the absolute right to refile their cause of action pursuant to section
    24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 24a), the
    predecessor to section 13–217. Flores, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    at 111-12. The court
    -19-
    reasoned that “since the plaintiffs had an absolute right to refile the
    action within the statutory limits, the order of dismissal could not
    terminate the litigation.” Flores, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    at 114. The court further
    noted that the order of dismissal itself stated that it was entered
    without prejudice, clearly manifesting the intent of the circuit court
    that the dismissal order not be considered final and appealable. Flores,
    
    91 Ill. 2d
    at 114.
    The involuntary dismissal of the plaintiffs’ rescission counts in
    Rein I on statute of limitation grounds was clearly an adjudication on
    the merits under Rule 273. It was not, however, a “final” judgment in
    the lawsuit as defined by this court. Thus, in Rein, this court
    misapplied Rule 273.
    Rein also erroneously relied on Downing v. Chicago Transit
    Authority, 
    162 Ill. 2d 70
    (1994), to support its conclusion that an
    involuntary dismissal operates as a final judgment on the merits for
    purposes of res judicata. In Downing, this court examined whether a
    summary judgment was a prior adjudication on the merits for res
    judicata purposes. 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 73-75
    . Downing noted
    that, under Rule 273, involuntary dismissals operate as judgments on
    the merits. 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 75
    . However, Downing found Rule
    273 inapplicable because a summary judgment is not an involuntary
    dismissal. 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 75
    . The court then determined that
    a summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds was not an
    adjudication on the merits because the merits of the action were never
    examined, and res judicata was inapplicable. 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 77
    . The court commented:
    “To label such an order as an adjudication on the merits would
    be the quintessential act of exalting form over substance.
    Courts cannot ignore the basis on which the summary
    judgment was granted. If *** that basis bears no relationship
    to the actual merits of the case, it would be inappropriate to
    apply the doctrine of res judicata ***.” 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 77
    .
    Downing stated that an involuntary dismissal operates as a
    judgment on the merits. 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 75
    . Downing did not,
    however, determine that an involuntary dismissal operates as a “final”
    judgment on the merits. Accordingly, Rein inappropriately relied on
    -20-
    Downing in concluding that the involuntary dismissal of the plaintiffs’
    rescission counts operated as a final judgment on the merits.
    I believe the appellate court in Rein I erroneously assumed that it
    had jurisdiction to hear the initial appeal when there was no final and
    appealable judgment in the lawsuit. Rule 273 only applies to
    “involuntary” dismissals. See 
    Downing, 162 Ill. 2d at 75
    (“Rule 273
    applies only to an involuntary dismissal of an action, such as when a
    motion to dismiss under section 2–615 or section 2–619 of the Code
    of Civil Procedure is granted”). The plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal,
    without prejudice, of their common law claims in Rein I was clearly
    not an adjudication on the merits under Rule 273, nor was it a final
    judgment. Unfortunately, this court has not examined whether the
    appeal in Rein I was proper. It is clear that, under our supreme court
    rules, a voluntary dismissal is not a final, appealable order.
    The Illinois Constitution vests this court with the authority to
    make rules governing appeals. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§6, 16.
    Appeals from final judgments of the circuit court are as a matter of
    right to the appellate court and the supreme court may provide by rule
    for appeals to the appellate court from other than final judgments of
    the circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Supreme Court Rule
    301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301) provides that “[e]very final judgment of a
    circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.” Supreme Court
    Rule 304 (
    210 Ill. 2d
    R. 304) provides for appeals from final
    judgments as to fewer than all the parties or claims. Supreme Court
    Rules 306, 307, and 308 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 306, 307, 308) provide for
    appeals from certain specified interlocutory orders of the court.
    Voluntary dismissals without prejudice are not final appealable orders
    under the provisions of our supreme court rules. See Flores, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    at 114 (order stating cause is dismissed “without prejudice” is not a
    final and appealable order).
    Applying our supreme court rules to Rein I, there can be no
    question that the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of their common law
    claims did not convert the involuntary dismissal of the rescission
    counts into a final and appealable order because the plaintiffs had the
    option to refile their voluntarily dismissed claims under section
    2–1009(a) of the Code. Section 2–1009(a) provides that “[t]he
    plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, *** dismiss his
    or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without
    -21-
    prejudice, by order filed in the cause.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS
    5/2–1009(a) (West 2002). Since a dismissal under section 2–1009(a)
    is without prejudice, section 2–1009(a) protects a plaintiff’s right to
    refile the voluntarily dismissed action.
    Rein’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of their
    common law claims made the involuntary dismissal of the rescission
    claims final and appealable is in direct conflict with other decisions of
    this court. Prior to Rein, this court consistently held that entry of a
    dismissal order cannot be considered final and appealable by a plaintiff
    during the time when the refiling option is available under section
    13–217 because a plaintiff has an absolute right to refile the action
    under section 13–217. See Flores, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    108; Wold v. Bull Valley
    Management Co., 
    96 Ill. 2d 110
    (1983); Kahle v. John Deere Co.,
    
    104 Ill. 2d 302
    (1984).
    In Flores, this court held that a dismissal for want of prosecution
    is not a final and appealable order under Rule 301, in light of a
    plaintiff’s absolute right to refile the suit. Flores, 
    91 Ill. 2d
    at 111-14.
    Following Flores, this court held in Wold that an order of dismissal for
    want of prosecution is not a final and appealable order since plaintiffs
    had the absolute right to refile the action. 
    Wold, 96 Ill. 2d at 112
    . This
    court extended Flores and Wohl to voluntary dismissals in Kahle, 
    104 Ill. 2d 302
    .
    In Kahle, this court recognized that a plaintiff cannot appeal from
    an order voluntarily dismissing a claim without prejudice because
    section 13–217 gives the plaintiff the absolute right to refile the case,
    thereby protecting plaintiffs from prejudice. 
    Kahle, 104 Ill. 2d at 305
    -
    06. Kahle did, however, hold that an order granting a plaintiff’s
    voluntary dismissal after trial has begun is final and appealable by a
    defendant. 
    Kahle, 104 Ill. 2d at 307
    . Kahle’s rationale was based on
    prejudice to the defendant, when no court would be able to determine
    defendant’s contentions of error because plaintiff’s refiled case was a
    new case that constituted a separate cause of action. Kahle, 
    104 Ill. 2d
    at 306. “Kahle did not go so far as to make voluntary dismissals
    the jurisdictional basis from which nonappealable judgments could be
    appealed. Rather, the court made it abundantly clear that the only
    proper subject on appeal was the propriety of granting a voluntary
    dismissal” after trial had begun. Saddle Signs, Inc. v. Adrian, 272 Ill.
    App. 3d 132, 136 (1995).
    -22-
    Thus, in Rein, this court incorrectly assumed that the plaintiffs’
    appeal in Rein I was proper. This incorrect assumption was further
    perpetuated in Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 
    178 Ill. 2d
    496 (1997), when this court held that the plaintiffs’ voluntary
    dismissal made all prior orders entered in the action final and
    appealable. Although I agree with the result in Dubina, that the
    defendants were permitted to appeal because they were prejudiced by
    the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal, Dubina should have relied on Kahle
    for its rationale, rather than on Rein since Rein did not examine the
    appealability of the issues. Under Kahle, an order granting a plaintiff’s
    voluntary dismissal is considered final and appealable solely by the
    defendant on the limited question of whether the trial court erred in
    granting a voluntary dismissal after commencing trial.
    Further, Dubina relied on a string of appellate court cases in
    concluding that “[i]t is well settled that final orders entered in a case
    become appealable following a voluntary dismissal.” Dubina, 
    178 Ill. 2d
    at 503, citing Maggini v. OSF Healthcare System, 
    256 Ill. App. 3d 551
    , 552-53 (1994); Dubina also cited to Rein v. David A. Noyes &
    Co., 
    230 Ill. App. 3d 12
    , 15 (1992), Howard v. Druckenmiller, 
    238 Ill. App. 3d 937
    , 940-41 (1992), and Reagan v. Baird, 
    140 Ill. App. 3d
    58, 62-63 (1985). However, all of these cases were based on a
    misinterpretation of existing precedent and a misreading of Kahle. The
    appellate court’s confusion is understandable because this court’s
    precedent on appeals following a voluntary dismissal has been less
    than clear. For example, Swisher v. Duffy, 
    117 Ill. 2d 376
    , 379 (1987),
    filed just three years after Kahle, cited Kahle as holding “that a
    voluntary dismissal is a final and appealable order.” Clearly, as
    explained earlier, Kahle was limited to allowing defendants to appeal
    from a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal after trial had begun, and its
    holding was not as broad as suggested in Swisher. Then, in Dubina,
    this court allowed a defendant to appeal from the dismissal of its
    contribution claims following the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal.
    Dubina reasoned that the defendant was not appealing from the
    voluntary dismissal order itself but, rather, the defendant sought to
    appeal from the order dismissing its contribution claims. It is not
    surprising that our decisions have led to inconsistent and unpredictable
    results in the appellate court.
    -23-
    This court should clarify that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal is not
    the jurisdictional basis for an appeal. Rather, the rule created in
    Flores, Wold, and Kahle prohibits plaintiffs from taking an appeal
    from a voluntary dismissal, but permits defendants to take an appeal
    from a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal upon a showing of prejudice.
    This court has also been less than clear in determining whether a
    plaintiff’s refiled complaint constitutes a new action or a continuation
    of a voluntarily dismissed action. In Dubina, this court noted that “the
    refiled action is an entirely new and separate action, not a
    reinstatement of the old action.” 
    Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 504
    . Dubina,
    in turn, relied on 
    Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 379
    , Kahle, 
    104 Ill. 2d
    at 306,
    Neuman v. Burstein, 
    230 Ill. App. 3d 33
    , 36 (1992), Lyon v. Hasbro
    Industries, Inc., 
    156 Ill. App. 3d 649
    , 656 (1987), and section 13–217
    of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13–217 (West 2004)) for its conclusion that
    the original and refiled actions are completely distinct. Swisher,
    however, cited no authority for its conclusion. Likewise, Kahle cited
    no authority for its conclusion, but simply noted that the circuit judge
    in the refiled case has no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the
    dismissal of the earlier case by another circuit judge. Kahle, 
    104 Ill. 2d
    at 306. Neuman and Lyon relied on the “new action” language of
    section 13–217 of the Code. None of these cases examined whether
    a refiled action, although a “new action” for purposes of section
    13–217, was actually a continuation of a plaintiff’s former voluntarily
    dismissed action.
    Obviously, the refiled action is assigned a new case number in the
    circuit court, but equally as obvious, the trial court is required to take
    judicial notice of rulings in the prior proceedings. See People v. Davis,
    
    65 Ill. 2d 157
    , 161 (1976) (noting that “In McCormick on Evidence,
    section 330, at 766 (2d ed. 1972), it is said to be ‘settled, of course,
    that the courts, trial and appellate, take notice of their own respective
    records in the present litigation, both as to matters occurring in the
    immediate trial, and in previous trials or hearings’ ”). If a refiled action
    were not to be considered a continuation of the voluntarily dismissed
    action, it would make no sense to consider a plaintiff’s lack of
    diligence in the prior action when ruling on a motion to dismiss a case
    for violating Supreme Court Rule 103(b). See Case v. Galesburg
    Cottage Hospital, No. 103879 (December 13, 2007). Thus, it is not
    as if plaintiffs’ prior cause of action never existed. Rather, from a
    -24-
    procedural standpoint, the refiled action is a new and distinct suit
    treated as a continuation of the former suit, and there can be no doubt
    that all prior rulings are binding in the second action. In fact, an action
    refiled pursuant to section 13–217 is premised on the preexisting
    action. Without the predicate case, there could be no refiling under
    section 13–217. Thus, it cannot logically be viewed as a completely
    new cause of action.
    In Korzinski v. Jackson, 
    326 F. Supp. 2d 704
    , 706 (E.D. N.C.
    2004), the federal court recognized that although the plain language
    of Rule 41, the federal counterpart to our section 13–217, indicates
    that an action commenced after a voluntary dismissal is a “new
    action,” the refiled action is a continuation of the original action. The
    court in Korzinski relying on a North Carolina Supreme Court case
    (Goodson v. Lehmon, 
    225 N.C. 514
    , 518, 
    35 S.E.2d 623
    , 625 (1945))
    interpreting the statutory precursor to Rule 41, reasoned:
    “[B]y its nature, a ‘new action’ commenced pursuant to Rule
    41 must be, in all practical respects, precisely the same action
    that was brought prior to the voluntary dismissal. The action,
    which is only nominally a ‘new action,’ must have the
    ‘strictest factual identity,’ with the original proceeding and
    must ‘involv[e] the same parties, the same cause of action and
    the same right, and this must appear from the record in the
    case.’ ” 
    Korzinski, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 706
    .
    In sum, plaintiffs are not prejudiced by taking a voluntary dismissal
    because of the option to refile pursuant to section 13–217. A plaintiff
    may not, therefore, appeal determinations in the first lawsuit until
    either the time expires for refiling the suit, or a judgment on the merits
    is issued in the refiled action.
    This procedural viewpoint is distinguishable from those
    circumstances when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses some but not all
    of its claims, and then proceeds to trial on the remaining claims.
    Obviously, plaintiffs would be precluded from refiling their voluntarily
    dismissed claims under these circumstances because a trial resulting
    in a final judgment on the merits would trigger the doctrine of res
    judicata.
    Accordingly, I would hold that in Rein I, the plaintiffs improperly
    appealed the involuntary dismissal of their rescission counts following
    -25-
    the voluntary dismissal of their common law counts, and the appellate
    court erroneously determined it had jurisdiction to decide the appeal
    in the first action. I would not, therefore, rely on Rein’s res judicata
    analysis since the appeal in Rein I was improper. The situation
    presented on appeal to this court in Rein was a procedural morass.
    Consequently, the plaintiffs inappropriately took an appeal from their
    voluntary dismissal and the appellate court erroneously considered the
    plaintiffs’ appeal on its merits while the plaintiffs’ voluntarily
    dismissed common law claims remained subject to refiling.
    Equally important, in Rein, this court failed to recognize that when
    a plaintiff elects to dismiss voluntarily a lawsuit without prejudice, the
    voluntary dismissal is not a final adjudication on the merits and res
    judicata is simply inapplicable. See Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments §20(b), Comment a (1982) (res judicata is not applicable
    when the plaintiff elects to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice, and
    “the plaintiff remains entirely free to prosecute all or any part of his
    claim”). Comment f to section 20 explains that, “[a]t common law[,]
    the plaintiff is permitted to submit to a nonsuit, which does not
    operate as a bar to another action on the same claim ***.”
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments §20, Comment f (1982). Rein
    therefore erroneously applied the doctrine of res judicata because res
    judicata is simply inapplicable to voluntarily dismissed claims.
    Moreover, this court’s claim-splitting analysis in Rein is not in
    accord with the section 26(1) of the Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments. In Rein, this court specifically adopted section 26(1) of
    the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments §26(1) (1982)), setting forth examples of situations when
    it would be inequitable to apply the rule against claim-splitting:
    “This section provides that the rule against claim-splitting does
    not apply to bar an independent claim of part of the same
    cause of action if: (1) the parties have agreed in terms or in
    effect that plaintiff may split his claim or the defendant has
    acquiesced therein; (2) the court in the first action expressly
    reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action;
    (3) the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his claim
    because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of
    the court in the first action; (4) the judgment in the first action
    was plainly inconsistent with the equitable implementation of
    -26-
    a statutory scheme; (5) the case involves a continuing or
    recurrent wrong; or (6) it is clearly and convincingly shown
    that the policies favoring preclusion of a second action are
    overcome for an extraordinary reason.” (Emphasis added.)
    Rein, 
    172 Ill. 2d
    at 341, citing Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments §26(1) (1982); Airtite v. DPR Ltd. Partnership,
    
    265 Ill. App. 3d 214
    , 219 (1994); Thorleif v. Larson & Son,
    Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 
    177 Ill. App. 3d 656
    , 661-62
    (1988).
    After acknowledging these exceptions to the rule against claim-
    splitting, this court then held in Rein that the exceptions should not be
    interpreted as immunizing plaintiffs against res judicata. In coming to
    this conclusion, Rein overlooked that a voluntary dismissal is not
    subject to res judicata, and that a voluntary dismissal without
    prejudice is an exception to the rule against claim-splitting. Rein also
    overlooked comment b to section 26(b). Comment b provides an
    illustration to express reservation by the court in the first action of the
    plaintiff’s right to maintain a second action:
    “A determination by the court that its judgment is ‘without
    prejudice’ (or words to that effect) to a second action ***
    should ordinarily be given effect in the second action.”
    (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Judgments §26,
    Comment b (1982).
    Res judicata is not applicable to a voluntary dismissal, and a
    voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a recognized exception to the
    rule against claim-splitting precisely because a voluntary dismissal
    without prejudice is not a final judgment on the merits. Rein’s failure
    to apply the recognized exception has created untenable
    consequences. In my view, Rein rests on extremely unsound legal
    grounds. This court should recognize the error of its way and overrule
    Rein.
    Since the court’s decision in Rein, other courts have struggled to
    distinguish Rein and interpreted Rein’s holding as limited to its unique
    facts to avoid unfair results. In Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., the
    court stated that Rein stands only “for the proposition that ‘a plaintiff
    seeking to split his claims and appeal in a piecemeal manner may be
    barred by res judicata.’ ” Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 
    366 Ill. App. 3d
    395, 401 (2006), quoting Dubina, 
    178 Ill. 2d
    at 507. See also
    -27-
    Gann v. William Timblin Transit, Inc., No. 07 C 3252 (N.D. Ill.
    November 20, 2007) (“the context in which [Rein] found that the
    plaintiff was precluded from later filing his claims was that it was
    doing so for the purpose of splitting his claim in order to appeal an
    earlier ruling”).
    The untenable consequences created in the wake of Rein are made
    abundantly clear by this court’s attempt to apply Rein to this case.
    Plaintiffs’ negligence claim in Hudson I was involuntarily dismissed
    based on statutory immunity. The involuntary dismissal operated as an
    adjudication on the merits under Rule 273, but not a final appealable
    judgment.
    At the time plaintiffs’ negligence claim was involuntarily dismissed
    plaintiffs’ willful and wanton claim was still pending. Plaintiffs
    continued to litigate their willful and wanton claim for the next three
    years until plaintiffs’ counsel passed away and the case was voluntarily
    dismissed on the day it was called for trial (presumably because
    substitute counsel, who appears to have been the deceased attorney’s
    daughter, was not prepared for trial). The order entered clearly stated
    the cause was voluntarily dismissed “without prejudice.” Plaintiffs,
    therefore, had the absolute right to refile the action under section
    13–217. Accordingly, the order granting plaintiffs’ motion for
    voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not a final, appealable
    order.
    The majority, however, relying on the faulty analysis employed in
    Rein and Dubina, concludes that once the voluntary dismissal was
    entered in Hudson I, the litigation was terminated in its entirety and
    all final orders became immediately appealable. Slip op. at 4. The
    majority fails to acknowledge that plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal was
    without prejudice, and that res judicata is not applicable to voluntarily
    dismissed claims under section 20 of the Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments. The majority also overlooks the fact that the voluntary
    dismissal without prejudice in this case presents an exception to the
    rule against claim-splitting, as recognized by section 26 of the
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and adopted in Rein.
    Additionally, this court has overlooked section 20(c) of the
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Section 20(c) provides that res
    judicata does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same claim
    “when by statute or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a
    -28-
    bar to another action on the same claim.” The General Assembly, in
    the exercise of its constitutional powers, has granted plaintiffs an
    absolute right to refile voluntarily dismissed complaints “within one
    year [from the date of dismissal] or within the remaining period of
    limitation, whichever is greater.” 735 ILCS 5/13–217 (West 2002).
    See Aranda v. Hobart Manufacturing Corp., 
    66 Ill. 2d 616
    , 621
    (1977) (Dooley, J., specially concurring). This court has repeatedly
    recognized that the express language of section 13–217 clearly “grants
    a plaintiff the absolute right to refile a dismissed complaint” and “[w]e
    may not infringe upon this statutory right to refile.” (Emphasis added.)
    Case, slip op. at 7. See also Timberlake v. Illini Hospital, 
    175 Ill. 2d 159
    , 163 (1997) (“Section 13–217 provides plaintiffs with the
    absolute right to refile their complaint within one year or within the
    remaining period of limitations, whichever is greater” (emphasis
    added)); Gendek v. Jehangir, 
    119 Ill. 2d 338
    , 340 (1988) (“section
    [13–217] provides plaintiffs with the absolute right to refile their
    complaint *** for the reasons specified therein”). “Section 13–217
    operates as a savings statute, with the purpose of facilitating the
    disposition of litigation on the merits and avoiding its frustration upon
    grounds unrelated to the merits.” Case, slip op. at 7, citing S.C.
    Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 
    181 Ill. 2d 489
    ,
    497 (1998). Applying section 20(c) of the Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments to this case, plaintiffs’ refiling of their willful and wanton
    claim was permitted under section 13–217, and res judicata does not
    bar the refiled action.
    In my view, the doctrine of res judicata and the rule against claim-
    splitting should be employed with judicial restraint and not as tools to
    dispose of litigation. Here, there was no adjudication on the merits of
    plaintiffs’ willful and wanton claim. To label a voluntary dismissal
    without prejudice as a final judgment on the merits mischaracterizes
    the true nature of the disposition. Plaintiffs’ negligence claim was
    dismissed on grounds of immunity and plaintiffs did not appeal that
    determination or engage in any improper claim-splitting. Under these
    circumstances, res judicata and the rule against claim-splitting should
    not be applied mechanically to infringe on plaintiffs’ legislatively
    created right to refile their voluntarily dismissed claim, based on
    grounds totally divorced from the merits of plaintiffs’ claim.
    -29-
    I would therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate and circuit
    courts and remand for further proceedings. For the foregoing reasons,
    I respectfully dissent.
    JUSTICE FITZGERALD joins in this dissent.
    Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing
    JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent from the majority’s denial of plaintiffs’
    petition for rehearing for the reasons stated in my original dissent, as
    well as the points raised by plaintiffs. As noted in the original dissent
    and in plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, the majority depends entirely
    on the flawed rationale of Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 
    172 Ill. 2d 325
    (1996). In its reliance on Rein, the majority misapprehends and
    confuses the doctrine of res judicata with the rule against claim-
    splitting. Additionally, the majority has overlooked the express-
    reservation exception to res judicata set forth in section 26 of the
    Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
    I also agree with plaintiffs that the majority misapprehends and
    overlooks the distinction between this case and Rein, and that the
    rationale of Rein is also flawed because it fails to distinguish between
    two different factual situations for purposes of res judicata and the
    rule against improper claim-splitting. In Rein, the plaintiffs asserted
    two different theories of recovery. One was involuntarily dismissed,
    and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the other to appeal the
    involuntary dismissal order. On appeal, the involuntary dismissal was
    upheld. In that situation, both res judicata and the rule against
    improper claim-splitting properly barred relitigation of the voluntarily
    dismissed claim because the plaintiffs litigated the involuntarily
    dismissed claim to a final judgment before the appellate court. The
    plaintiffs in Rein could have presented both of their theories of
    recovery at the same time and then appealed the adverse ruling, but
    instead chose to abandon their voluntarily dismissed claim to appeal
    immediately the involuntarily dismissed claim.
    -30-
    The situation in this case is entirely distinguishable because the
    plaintiffs never split their cause of action. Here, the plaintiffs raised
    two different theories of recovery. The negligence count was
    involuntarily dismissed, and the willful and wanton claim was later
    voluntarily dismissed “without prejudice.” When the negligence count
    was dismissed, the willful and wanton claim survived and was still a
    viable claim. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
    determining that an “adjudication upon the merits” is the opposite of
    a “dismissal without prejudice”:
    “The primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice,’ we
    think, is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from returning
    later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim. That
    will also ordinarily (though not always) have the consequence
    of not barring the claim from other courts, but its primary
    meaning relates to the dismissing court itself. Thus, Black’s
    Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) defines ‘dismissed without
    prejudice’ as ‘removed from the court’s docket in such a way
    that the plaintiff may refile the same suit on the same claim,’
    [citation], and defines ‘dismissal without prejudice’ as ‘[a]
    dismissal that does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the
    lawsuit within the applicable limitations period,’ [citation].”
    (Emphasis in original.) Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed
    Martin Corp., 
    531 U.S. 497
    , 505-06, 
    149 L. Ed. 2d 32
    , 41,
    
    121 S. Ct. 1021
    , 1027 (2001).
    At the time plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their willful and wanton
    claim, it was still viable. The effect of their voluntary dismissal was to
    remove the claim from the court’s active docket, although they could
    still refile the same claim within the applicable limitations period.
    Following the voluntary dismissal of the willful and wanton claim,
    there was no appeal from the plaintiffs’ involuntary dismissal of the
    negligence claim in this case. This situation simply does not fall within
    the doctrine of res judicata or the rule against improper claim-
    splitting.
    We are in agreement that a plaintiff must assert all claims arising
    from the same transactional setting in one lawsuit. If all claims are not
    initially brought together, the plaintiff will have split the cause of
    action and will be barred from raising not only what was already
    raised and decided, but also what might have been. See Restatement
    -31-
    (Second) of Judgments §§ 24(1), 25 (1982). This rule is clearly
    inapplicable in this case because plaintiffs brought all of their claims
    in their original lawsuit.
    Moreover, there is no dispute that res judicata and the rule against
    claim-splitting is violated when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a
    claim, proceeds to litigate on the remaining claims, and then refiles the
    voluntarily dismissed claim in a second action. In effect, that is what
    happened in Rein when the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their second
    claim so they could appeal the involuntary dismissal of their first
    claim.
    As noted in the original dissent, this court has adopted section
    26(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Subsection (b) of
    that section provides that claim preclusion based on claim-splitting
    does not apply when the court in the first action expressly reserves the
    plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action. The comments to
    section 26(1)(b) establish that “[a] determination by the court that its
    judgment is ‘without prejudice” (or words to that effect)” ordinarily
    acts as an express reservation of the voluntarily dismissed claim. Thus,
    when the trial court in this case granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss
    voluntarily the willful and wanton claim without prejudice, it expressly
    reserved that claim under section 26(1)(b). The majority offers no
    justification for ignoring this application of section 26(1)(b).
    In this case, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ “routine” motion
    to dismiss voluntarily their remaining willful and wanton claim
    “without prejudice” when the attorney representing them died on the
    eve of trial. As plaintiffs aptly note, defendants did not object to this
    voluntary dismissal in Hudson I. If defendants felt they would be
    prejudiced by the court’s express reservation of plaintiffs’ right to
    refile by dismissing the claim “without prejudice,” then they should
    have objected at the time the order was entered, allowing plaintiffs to
    withdraw their motion. If anything, forfeiture should bar defendants
    from now challenging plaintiffs’ refiling of a claim that the trial court
    expressly reserved by dismissing it “without prejudice” and without
    objection. Defendants’ silence in acquiescing to the voluntary
    dismissal should bar the defendants’ stale objection to the refiled suit.
    Additionally it does not appear that defendants were prejudiced by
    plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal and refiling because any discovery
    previously undertaken and prior discovery orders in the voluntarily
    -32-
    dismissed case are to be considered in resolving discovery issues in the
    second case. 
    210 Ill. 2d
    R. 219(e).
    What distinguishes this case from Rein are the events that
    occurred after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their remaining
    claims. As plaintiffs explain, in contrast to Rein, the interim period
    between the voluntary dismissal in Hudson I and the subsequent filing
    in Hudson II was one of inactivity–“a hiatus, but never a detour, on
    the path from point A to point B.” Although the plaintiffs in both Rein
    and this case initially had a right to refile their voluntarily dismissed
    claims under section 26(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments, the plaintiffs in Rein abrogated their right by continuing
    to litigate their involuntarily dismissed count, thus improperly splitting
    their claims.
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of
    plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing.
    JUSTICE FITZGERALD joins in this dissent.
    -33-