In re Michael D. , 2015 IL 119178 ( 2016 )

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Supreme Court Date: 2016.01.22 10:13:36
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In re Michael D., 2015 IL 119178Caption in Supreme In re MICHAEL D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
Court: Appellee, v. Michael D., Appellant).
Docket No. 119178
Filed December 17, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.
Richard F. Walsh, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg and
Appeal Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defenders, and Christopher M. Kopacz,
Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate
Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and
Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel),
for the People.
Justices JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Kilbride, Karmeier, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Freeman.
OPINION
¶1 At issue is whether, in a juvenile delinquency case, this court’s rules allow a minor to
appeal an order continuing the case under supervision, when the order is entered after a finding
of guilty. We hold that no supreme court rule provides for appeal of such orders.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against respondent, Michael D.,
charging him with two counts of misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control
over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to
believe that it was stolen (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4) (West 2014)). Count 2 alleged that he
committed theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2) (West 2014)). Following a bench trial,
the circuit court of Cook County found him guilty of both counts. Respondent filed a motion to
reconsider, and the circuit court acquitted him of count I.
¶4 At a hearing, the probation officer recommended that respondent be placed on supervision
for one year. The State recommended a sentence of one year’s probation and asked that the
minor be required to make restitution of $160 to the victim. The trial court entered an order
continuing the case under supervision for one year. The order also referred respondent for a
TASC evaluation and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution to the victim. The continuance of
the case under supervision with conditions was memorialized in both a “Supervision Order”
and a “Sentencing Order.” On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box next to “No
finding or judgment of guilty entered.” The court did not adjudge respondent a ward of the
court. The court advised respondent of his appeal rights and appointed the State Appellate
Defender to represent him.
¶5 Respondent appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
2015 IL App (1st) 143181.1 The court explained that, until recently, supervision could be
ordered in a juvenile case only prior to a determination of guilt (see 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)
(West 2012)), and the appellate court had already determined that such orders were not
appealable (see In re A.M., 94 Ill. App. 3d 86, 90 (1981)). The court noted that a recent
statutory change allowed supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of
guilt (see 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)(b) (West 2014)) but held that this change did not make such
orders appealable under any supreme court rule. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶¶ 53-55. The
court stated that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) gives the appellate
1
Respondent appealed only the finding of guilty. He did not challenge the restitution order or any
other condition of supervision.
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court jurisdiction to review final judgments in juvenile cases,2 but that a supervision order is
not a final judgment. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 54. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 662 (eff.
Oct. 1, 1975) gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory orders in
juvenile cases but not supervision orders. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 55. The court noted that
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014) gives the appellate court jurisdiction
over adult supervision orders but found that rule inapplicable to juvenile cases. 2015 IL App
(1st) 143181, ¶ 53. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶6 We allowed respondent’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, respondent argues that postdelinquency supervision orders are final, appealable
orders under this court’s rules. Respondent further argues that, if such a reading is not clear
from the plain language of the rules, then the rules should be interpreted in a way to avoid an
unconstitutional reading that would bar a juvenile’s right to appeal. Alternatively, respondent
asks that we amend our rules to make postdelinquency supervision orders appealable.
¶9 This case involves interpretation of both a statute and supreme court rules. The same rules
of construction apply to both. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2005). Our primary goal
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 41
(2007). The most reliable indicator of the drafters’ intent is the language used, given its plain
and ordinary meaning. Id. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without
resort to other tools of interpretation. It is never proper to depart from plain language by
reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly
expressed legislative intent. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 414 (2003). Our review is
de novo. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41-42 (2007).
¶ 10 The Illinois Constitution gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review final judgments.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. That same section provides that this court may provide, by rules,
for appeals from other than final judgments. Id. Thus, postguilt supervision orders in juvenile
delinquency cases are appealable either if they are final judgments or if this court has provided
for their appealability by rule.
¶ 11 Section 5-615(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West
2014)) provides as follows:
“§ 5–615. Continuance under supervision.
(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision for an offense
other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony:
(a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor
respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before the court makes a finding
of delinquency, and in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor,
his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor’s attorney or the State’s
Attorney; or
2
Jurisdiction to review final judgments is given to the appellate court not by Supreme Court Rule
660(a) but by article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6). Rule
660(a) provides that the criminal appeals rules apply to appeals from final judgments in delinquent
minor proceedings.
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(b) upon a finding of delinquency and after considering the circumstances of
the offense and the history, character, and condition of the minor, if the court is of
the opinion that:
(i) the minor is not likely to commit further crimes;
(ii) the minor and the public would be best served if the minor were not to
receive a criminal record; and
(iii) in the best interests of justice an order of continuance under supervision
is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Act.”
¶ 12 Subsection (b), which allows the court to place a minor on supervision after a finding of
delinquency has been made, became effective on January 1, 2014. Prior to that, supervision
was an option in a delinquency case only before a delinquency finding was made. See In re
Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 134, 146-47 (2010). In A.M., 94 Ill. App. 3d 86, the appellate court
determined that supervision orders entered under the previous version of the statute were not
appealable.3 The A.M. court reasoned that supervision orders entered in a juvenile proceeding
are not final orders. Id. at 88. See also M.W.W., 125 Ill. App. 3d at 835 (“if in fact the order here
is an order for continuance under supervision *** then the State’s assertion of unappealability
is correct”). Respondent does not contest the correctness of these decisions and concedes that a
supervision order entered prior to a finding of delinquency is not an appealable order.
¶ 13 The question, then, is whether a supervision order entered after a finding of delinquency is
a final, appealable order. A final judgment is one that finally determines the litigation on the
merits “ ‘so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the
judgment.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Commitment of Hernandez, 239 Ill. 2d
195, 202 (2010) (quoting In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d 764, 771 (2003)). In In re Samantha V.,
234 Ill. 2d 359, 365 (2009), this court explained that there are three phases to a juvenile
delinquency proceeding: the findings phase, the adjudicatory phase, and the dispositional
phase. At the findings phase, the trial court conducts a trial and determines whether the minor
is guilty. If the court finds the minor guilty, a delinquency finding is made and the court
proceeds to the adjudicatory phase. At the adjudicatory phase, the court determines if the
minor should be made a ward of the court. If the minor is made a ward of the court, the case
then proceeds to the dispositional phase, at which the court fashions an appropriate sentence.
Id. at 365-66. The final judgment in a juvenile delinquency case is the dispositional order. In re
J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (1982).
¶ 14 It is difficult to see how anything referred to as a “continuance” could be a final judgment.
And, indeed, the plain language of section 5-615 shows that, whether entered preguilt or
postguilt, a continuance under supervision is not a final order. The court may enter the
continuance under supervision either “before the court makes a finding of delinquency” (720
ILCS 405/5-615(1)(a) (West 2014)) or “upon a finding of delinquency” (720 ILCS
405/5-615(1)(b) (West 2014)). Thus, the continuance under supervision is made either before
phase one or immediately following phase one. This is confirmed by subsection (7) which
3
The supervision order in that case was entered after an adjudicatory hearing at which the minor
was found guilty of simple battery. See A.M., 94 Ill. App. 3d at 87. However, it appears that no one
raised the timing of the supervision order as an issue. In In re M.W.W., the same court recognized that
supervision is not an option after a finding of guilty. 125 Ill. App. 3d 833, 835 (1984).
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explains what happens when the court finds that a condition of supervision has not been
fulfilled: “If the court finds that a condition of supervision has not been fulfilled, the court may
proceed to findings, adjudication, and disposition [preguilt] or adjudication and disposition
[postguilt].” 720 ILCS 405/5-615(7) (West 2014). Whether the supervision order is entered
preguilt or postguilt, it is still entered before the second and third phases. Further, when a case
has proceeded through the second and third phases and the court must enter a dispositional
order, supervision is not one of the sentencing alternatives. See 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1) (West
2014).
¶ 15 The record shows that respondent’s case never made it to phase two. Although respondent
insists that a final, appealable order was entered, he also concedes in his brief that the trial
court never made him a ward of the court. Having conceded that phase two was not completed,
the respondent cannot argue that a final order was entered. Further, although the trial judge
found respondent guilty, he did not enter judgment on that finding when he agreed to the
continuance under supervision. The order continuing the case under supervision specifically
states, “No finding or judgment of guilty entered.” Again, the final judgment in a juvenile
delinquency case is the dispositional order, and the trial court did not enter a dispositional
order. He declined to enter judgment on the guilty finding and continued the case under
supervision.
¶ 16 Respondent contends that a postguilt supervision order is akin to adult supervision and that
adult supervision orders are appealable. It is true that adult supervision orders are appealable,
but they are appealable not because they are final judgments but because a rule of this court
makes them so. This court explained in Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 167 (1989), why
supervision orders are not final judgments:
“[W]e conclude that a disposition of supervision is not a final judgment. As noted
above, supervision does not dispose of the proceedings on the underlying offense but
merely defers the proceedings until the conclusion of the period of supervision. An
order of supervision does not possess any of the characteristics of finality: it does not
terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause or settle the rights
of the parties. (See People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 527, 537.) On the
contrary, when supervision is imposed, a judgment on the underlying offense is
deferred until the period of supervision is completed.”
¶ 17 Adult supervision orders are appealable not because they are final judgments but because
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014), which provides as follows:
“(b) Appeals When Defendant Placed Under Supervision or Sentenced to
Probation, Conditional Discharge or Periodic Imprisonment. A defendant who has
been placed under supervision or found guilty and sentenced to probation or
conditional discharge (see 730 ILCS 5/5–6–1 through 5–6–4), or to periodic
imprisonment (see 730 ILCS 5/5–7–1 through 5–7–8), may appeal from the judgment
and may seek review of the conditions of supervision, or of the finding of guilt or the
conditions of the sentence, or both. He or she may also appeal from an order modifying
the conditions of or revoking such an order or sentence.”4
4
The legislature provided in section 5-6-3.1(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-6-3.1(h) (West 2014)) that a “disposition of supervision is a final order for the purposes of appeal.”
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¶ 18 For two reasons, Rule 604(b) does not make juvenile supervision orders appealable. First,
when it mentions supervision, probation, or conditional discharge, it specifically references
sections 5-6-1 through 5-6-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Thus, by its plain language, it
applies only to supervision orders entered under the Unified Code of Corrections. Second, as
this court explained in In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 5, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660(a)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2001), incorporates the criminal appeals rules for use in delinquent minor cases,
but does so only as to final judgments.5 Thus, we concluded in that case that Rule 604(a)’s
provision granting the State the right to appeal suppression orders was not made applicable to
juvenile cases through Rule 660(a). 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 5. Clearly, then, a supervision order
entered in a juvenile case is not appealable under Rule 604(b).
¶ 19 The only Illinois Supreme Court Rule that grants appeals of interlocutory orders in juvenile
cases is Illinois Supreme Court Rule 662 (eff. Oct. 1, 1975). This rule, however, specifies the
interlocutory orders that it makes appealable, and an order continuing a delinquent minor
proceeding under supervision is not one of them. Thus, no supreme court rule makes juvenile
supervision orders appealable.
¶ 20 Respondent cites the canon of construction that, where reasonably possible, a statute or
rule must be construed in a manner that upholds its constitutionality and validity. See People v.
Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001). According to respondent, construing our rules to mean
that postdelinquency supervision orders are not appealable would deny juveniles the
fundamental right to appeal guaranteed by article VI, section 6, of the constitution. Respondent
further contends that such a construction would violate the equal protection clauses of the
United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 2) because juveniles would be treated differently than adults who receive supervision.
¶ 21 Respondent’s contentions are meritless. The right to appeal guaranteed by article VI,
section 6, of the constitution applies only to final judgments. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6.
Whether to allow appeals from other than final judgments is a power given exclusively to this
court by article VI, section 6. Id. As explained above, a supervision order in a juvenile case,
whether entered before or after a delinquency finding, is not a final order. Thus, construing the
supreme court rules as not allowing appeals of juvenile supervision orders does not violate the
constitution.
¶ 22 Respondent’s equal protection claim is more of an assertion than an argument. Respondent
devotes a mere four sentences to this claim and simply asserts that juveniles who receive
supervision after a delinquency finding are similarly situated to adults who are sentenced to
supervision and that there is no rational basis for treating them differently. As this court
explained in In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463—another case in which a juvenile tried to raise
The legislature, however, has no power to make nonfinal orders appealable. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d
53, 60 (2002). That is a power given solely to this court by article VI, section 6, of the constitution. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 213
(1994). This court explained in Kirwan that this section of the code does not make a supervision order a
final adjudication on the merits and that it should be viewed simply as a rule of procedure
supplementing Rule 604(b). Kirwan, 133 Ill. 2d at 167-68.
5
Rule 660(a) provides that, “Appeals from final judgments in delinquent minor proceedings, except
as otherwise specifically provided, shall be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.” Ill. S.
Ct. R. 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001).
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an equal protection claim regarding the differences between the supervision provisions for
juveniles and those for adults—juveniles are simply not similarly situated to adults. This court
noted that the equal protection clause forbids disparate treatment of persons who are “ ‘in all
relevant respects alike’ ” (emphasis omitted) (id. ¶ 92 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.
1, 10 (1992))) and then explained that juvenile proceedings are “fundamentally different from
criminal proceedings” (id. ¶ 103) and that the reason the Act exists separate and apart from the
Criminal Code and the Unified Code of Corrections is that the “legislature has recognized that
juveniles are not similarly situated to adults” (id. ¶ 101). More specifically, respondents placed
under supervision in juvenile delinquency proceedings are not in the same situation as an adult
criminal defendant placed under supervision. In the criminal context, the court must wait to
dismiss the charges against the defendant until the conclusion of the supervision period and
may do so only if the defendant has successfully complied with all the terms of supervision.
730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(e) (West 2014). By contrast, when a juvenile is placed under supervision,
the court may vacate the finding of delinquency at any time and can do so even if the minor has
not complied with all of the conditions of supervision. 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2014).6
Juveniles placed under court supervision are not similarly situated to adult criminal defendants
placed under supervision, and therefore respondent cannot make even the threshold showing
necessary to establish an equal protection violation.
¶ 23 Finally, respondent argues that, if this court determines that the rules as currently written
do not allow for appeals of postdelinquency juvenile supervision orders, then we should
modify our rules to make them appealable. This court’s rulemaking procedures are set forth in
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3 (eff. Mar. 22, 2010). The typical procedure involves a proposed
rule going through this court’s rules committee (Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(b)) and, where appropriate, a
judicial conference committee or a supreme court committee (Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(d)(1)). When a
proposed rule is recommended for adoption, it is submitted for public hearing. Ill. S. Ct. R.
3(d)(1), (3). Rule 3(a)(1) states that one of the reasons that the rulemaking procedures exist is
to “provide an opportunity for comments and suggestions by the public, the bench, and the
bar.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(a)(1). This court, however, has reserved the right to dispense with Rule 3’s
procedures. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(a)(2).
¶ 24 Here, respondent argues that this court should dispense with the rulemaking procedures
and, in this opinion, modify either Rule 604(b) or 660(a) to allow juveniles to appeal
postdelinquency supervision orders. Respondent noted that this is the procedure this court
followed in B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶¶ 15, 17-18, when it modified Rule 660(a) to allow the
State to appeal interlocutory suppression orders in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In that
case, this court explained that, beginning in 1998, there was a shift in the policy of the Act to
make juvenile delinquency proceedings more like adult criminal proceedings. Id. ¶ 13.
Specifically, the legislature wanted to shift the purpose of the Act from the singular goal of
rehabilitation to one that also included protecting the public and “ ‘holding juvenile offenders
accountable for violations of the law.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 167
(2006)). This shift in policy had led this court to hold that juveniles were now entitled to many
of the same protections that adult criminals receive, and we explained that this same policy
6
This section provides in relevant part that, “The court may terminate a continuance under
supervision at any time if warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice or vacate the
finding of delinquency or both.” 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2014).
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shift meant that the State has the same interest in appealing interlocutory suppression orders in
juvenile cases that it does in criminal cases. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. This court believed that the State’s
argument for why it had the same need for appeal of suppression orders in juvenile cases that it
had in criminal cases was sufficiently compelling that this court could modify the rule without
first turning the question over to the rules committee. Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 25 Respondent contends that the case for allowing juveniles to appeal postdelinquency
supervision orders is similarly compelling. Respondent provides a statement from the floor
debates when the postdelinquency supervision provision was being considered. Representative
Tracy said that the purpose of the amendment was to “create[ ] parity among the way we
sentence juveniles and adults.” 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 29, 2013, at 96
(statements of Representative Tracy). Thus, respondent argues that juveniles should have the
same right to appeal suppression orders that adult criminal defendants have. Respondent also
notes that this court has zealously guarded the appellate rights of juveniles by providing for
expedited appeals in delinquent minor proceedings. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 660A (eff. July 1, 2013).
Finally, respondent argues that an entire class of cases should not be insulated from appellate
review, and the fact that the finding of delinquency may eventually be vacated does not make
an appeal less worthy. Respondent points out that supervision orders remain part of a
juvenile’s history and could adversely affect the minor’s employment opportunities or be the
basis for a harsher punishment if the juvenile is ever convicted in criminal court. Moreover,
minors placed on supervision must report to a probation officer and comply with numerous
obligations.
¶ 26 The State counters by noting that, unlike the situation in B.C.P., this case involves a
statutory change that was enacted after the shift in policy of the Act, so it must be presumed
that the legislature believed it operated harmoniously with the current policies underlying the
Act. Further, in B.C.P., this court was facing a circumstance where the State never had the right
to appeal a suppression order at any juncture, thus severely curtailing its ability to prosecute
juvenile cases. By contrast, a minor who has a case continued under supervision will either: (1)
have the guilty finding vacated and the case dismissed, either at the completion of the period of
supervision or before, which would also be the point of an appeal; or (2) fail to comply with
supervision, at which point the case would move to adjudication and disposition, and the minor
could appeal the final order. In either case, the minor has a path to having the guilty finding
vacated. This is quite different from the situation in B.C.P. The State also contends that having
a case on appeal may work to the minor’s detriment in certain circumstances by impeding the
trial court’s ability to terminate a case or vacate a finding of guilty at any time. Finally, the
State contends that the minor’s concerns about the possible effects of a supervision order on a
minor’s criminal history and future employment opportunities are overstated. The State notes
that supervision orders entered prior to a finding of guilty are also part of a minor’s criminal
history, and these orders are indisputably not subject to appeal. The State further points out that
minors who successfully complete supervision may petition the court to expunge the law
enforcement records relating to the event (see 705 ILCS 405/5-915(1)(c) (West 2014)) and
also that there is a confidentiality statute protecting juvenile court records (see 705 ILCS
405/1-8 (West 2014)).
¶ 27 After considering the arguments on both sides, we believe that the minor has identified an
issue worthy of review by this court’s rules committee. However, we decline the minor’s
invitation to modify the rules in this opinion. Bypassing the rules committee and public hearing
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process and amending the rule in an opinion of this court is a power that this court exercises
sparingly. In B.C.P., a majority of this court believed that it was clear and obvious that, in light
of the shift in policy of the Act to hold juveniles more accountable for their crimes, the State
must be allowed the right to appeal suppression orders in juvenile delinquency cases. Here,
although the minor has presented a compelling argument, the State has provided a reasonable
response to that argument, and this is not a situation where it is clear and obvious that
respondents in juvenile delinquency cases must be given the right to appeal postguilt
suppression orders. We note that the panel of appellate court judges who decided the case
below actually stated that it was wise that this court’s rules do not allow for appeal of postguilt
supervision orders in delinquent minor cases because of the trial court’s ability to vacate the
finding of delinquency at any time: “The supreme court rules do not authorize our review, and,
wisely so, because review at this point in the case would not be efficient, where the trial court
could still vacate its prior conclusion.” 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 56. Whether or not we
ultimately agree with this conclusion, it helps to illustrate the fact that the differences of
opinion and competing considerations on this issue are such that this court would benefit from
having the issue go through the committee and public hearing process before we decide
whether to amend the rule.
¶ 28 CONCLUSION
¶ 29 The order continuing respondent’s case under supervision, although entered after a finding
of guilty, was not a final, appealable order. Moreover, no supreme court rule currently provides
for appeal of this type of interlocutory order. The appellate court therefore correctly dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirm that court’s judgment.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
¶ 31 JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting:
¶ 32 The majority holds that an order of supervision rendered by a circuit court after a finding of
guilty in a juvenile delinquency case is an interlocutory order and that, under our current
supreme court rules, such orders may not be appealed to the appellate court. I agree with this
holding.
¶ 33 The majority also dismisses, however, respondent’s request that this court amend its rules
to allow for the appeal of orders of supervision so that he may seek appellate review of the
order entered against him. While the majority finds respondent’s argument in favor of
amendment “compelling” (supra ¶ 27), it also notes that the State has provided a “reasonable
response” to that argument (id.). Given the “differences of opinion and competing
considerations” offered by the parties (id.), the majority concludes that it would be best not to
decide whether to amend our rules in this case. Instead, the majority determines that any
proposal to amend the rules governing the appeal of supervision orders must go through our
rules committee and the public hearing process. In so holding, the majority makes clear that it
has not reached any decision as to whether our rules should be amended, but has determined
only that the answer to that question will not come in this case. Id. The majority therefore
applies the current rules and concludes that respondent has no right to appeal.
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¶ 34 I disagree with the majority’s refusal to answer respondent and decide whether our rules
should be amended. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 gives this court the exclusive authority to
provide by rule for appeals to the appellate court from other than final judgments of the circuit
courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 60 (2002). Pursuant to that
authority, and as part of our general rulemaking authority, we have created a procedure, set
forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3 (eff. Mar. 22, 2010), for receiving and reviewing
proposed rules and rule amendments.
¶ 35 In general, under Rule 3, proposals for rule amendments are submitted to our supreme
court rules committee. Proposed amendments which come from members of the bench, the bar
or the public are reviewed by the committee and, if warranted, placed on the agenda for a
public hearing. If the proposal comes from a supreme court or judicial conference committee,
it is automatically placed on the public hearing agenda. After the hearing, the rules committee
forwards the proposal to this court with a recommendation to either adopt or not adopt the
amendment.
¶ 36 The process outlined in Rule 3 accomplishes two important things that are relevant here.
First, it makes it possible for a person or organization interested in changing the rules
governing interlocutory appeals to do so outside the context of a case. Second, the public
hearing provides an opportunity for adversarial testing of any proposed amendment. The
hearing helps ensure that any argument in opposition to a suggested amendment will be heard
by this court before we make a decision on adoption.
¶ 37 Although our rules committee and the public hearing process provide one way in which our
rules regarding interlocutory appeals may be amended, it is not the only way. A litigant
appearing before this court may also request that a supreme court rule governing interlocutory
appeals be amended. In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908. See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(a)(2) (eff. Mar. 22,
2010) (stating that this court may adopt rule changes outside the Rule 3 procedures). In other
words, a litigant may request, in an appeal before this court, that we amend our interlocutory
appeal rules so that he or she may obtain relief. This is a proper claim to raise in this court, like
any other claim. And this is understandable.
¶ 38 The process outlined in Rule 3 ensures that there is adversarial testing of a proposed rule
amendment so that both sides, pro and con, have an opportunity to be heard. This is essentially
the same process that occurs when a case is argued before this court. In this respect, an opinion
from this court that amends a rule governing a matter over which this court has exclusive
authority is no different from an opinion that holds a statutory rule unconstitutional or that
alters an important common-law rule—we have the authority to address claims that request
these changes when they are properly presented in a case before us. Furthermore, once
subjected to the adversarial testing that occurs in a case, it is appropriate and necessary that the
claims be resolved.
¶ 39 The majority acknowledges that respondent’s contention that our rules should be amended
is properly before us but, instead of providing an answer to that contention, the majority simply
walks away from it, leaving it unresolved. The majority justifies its dismissal of respondent’s
claim by explaining that the answer to whether our rules should be amended to allow for
appeals of supervision orders is not “clear and obvious” (supra ¶ 27), and that the State has
given a “reasonable response” (id.) to respondent’s argument in favor of amendment. These
“differences of opinion” (id.), the majority reasons, mean that we cannot decide whether to
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amend our rules in this case but, instead, must defer to our rules committee and the public
hearing process. This cannot be correct.
¶ 40 The majority is in essence saying: “Respondent, we recognize that you have raised a
compelling argument in favor of amendment, and this contention is properly before us. We
also recognize that we have the sole constitutional authority to decide this issue and that your
rights and interests are at stake. However, the State has responded reasonably to your
argument. Therefore, we are not going to decide the issue. The rules remain unchanged and
you lose your case.” This makes no sense.
¶ 41 Moreover, the existence of the rules committee and the public hearing process does not,
and cannot, trump the right of a litigant to receive an answer to a claim that is properly
presented in a case on appeal. The fact that there exists an additional means by which other
people may seek a rule amendment does not, in any way, eliminate our responsibility to answer
a properly raised claim that directly affects the rights of a litigant in a case before us.
¶ 42 Now, perhaps what the majority means to say is that deciding whether to amend our rules is
inappropriate in this case, but only at this time, because the record is missing an important fact,
or because the parties have overlooked a key legal point in their briefs. There is a suggestion
that this is the majority’s intent when it states that this court would “benefit from having the
issue go through the committee and public hearing process before we decide whether to amend
the rule.” Id.
¶ 43 The majority, however, has failed to identify any deficiency that would justify not
answering respondent’s claim. There is no factual dispute at issue and the question of whether
to amend our rules has been thoroughly briefed by the parties, as the majority itself details at
length (see id. ¶¶ 24-26). Further, if the majority does, in fact, mean to say only that there is
something more that needs to be added to this case before an answer about amending the rules
can be given, then the proper disposition is to retain jurisdiction and remand to gather that
information, not to deny respondent any relief. By refusing to retain jurisdiction, the majority
is saying: “Respondent, you have done nothing wrong and, in fact, have properly raised a
compelling argument for relief. However, on the court’s own motion, we are going to order an
additional hearing. Therefore, you lose your case.” Again, this makes no sense.
¶ 44 We have established that a litigant has the right to contend, in a case before this court, that
we should amend our rules governing interlocutory appeals. In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908.
Recognition of that right carries with it the concomitant responsibility of this court to decide
the issue. It is fundamentally unfair of the majority to simply refuse to answer a claim—in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding no less—when that claim is properly before us, is fully
briefed and argued, and is potentially dispositive. This is particularly true when, by the
majority’s own admission, the claim is “compelling.”
¶ 45 In my view, respondent’s request that we amend our rules to allow for appeal should be
granted. Absent a rule change, minors sentenced to supervision after a finding of guilty will be
unable to appeal any aspect of the proceedings, from pretrial suppression orders through
sentencing. Even the sufficiency of the State’s evidence that brought about the supervision
order cannot be contested. In short, as things currently stand, the proceedings entirely escape
appellate review, regardless of how clear or prejudicial any errors may be.
¶ 46 Consider, for a moment, just one aspect of what this means. After a finding of guilty, a
minor may be sentenced to up to two years of supervision and, as part of the conditions of
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supervision, ordered to pay restitution, as respondent was here (supra ¶ 4). Denial of the right
to appeal means that a minor can be forced to pay hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars in
restitution and have no way ever to contest that order, even if he or she is innocent of all
charges. This may be an “efficient” scheme for the State, as the appellate court below
described it (id. ¶ 27), but it is hardly fair. The need for a rule change is obvious.
¶ 47 I would amend our rules to allow for the appeal of orders of supervision rendered after a
finding of guilty and remand this cause to the appellate court to address respondent’s appeal on
the merits.
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 49 JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.
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