People v. Kidd , 2022 IL 127904 ( 2022 )


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    2022 IL 127904
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    (Docket No. 127904)
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
    ANTONIO D. KIDD, Appellant.
    Opinion filed November 28, 2022.
    JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Chief Justice Theis and Justices Anne M. Burke, Michael J. Burke, Carter, and
    Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    Justice Overstreet dissented, with opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1       A jury found Antonio D. Kidd guilty on two counts of predatory criminal sexual
    assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)). The appellate court
    affirmed the convictions. 
    2021 IL App (4th) 190345-U
    . Kidd argues on appeal that
    the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his pretrial motion to
    dismiss the indictment. We find the indictment does not set forth all the elements
    of the charged offenses and, therefore, the court erred by failing to dismiss the
    indictment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and the
    trial court.
    ¶2                                   I. BACKGROUND
    ¶3        In June 2017, the Sangamon County grand jury indicted Kidd on two counts of
    predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. In both counts of the indictment, the
    grand jury alleged, “KIDD ***, who was over the age of 17, committed an act of
    sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in
    contact with the mouth of T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” The
    first count asserted the contact occurred “between the 28th day and the 29th day of
    August,” 2016, and the second count asserted the contact occurred between July 1,
    2011, and August 29, 2016.
    ¶4                               A. Trial Court Proceedings
    ¶5       Kidd represented himself during some of the pretrial proceedings. He filed a
    pro se motion to dismiss the indictment for not sufficiently stating the elements of
    the offense charged. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor asserted, “Both
    of the two predatory criminal sexual assault counts include all of the necessary
    factors that the State must prove at trial.” Kidd responded:
    “They [are] charging me with sexual conduct *** by sexual contact; *** you’re
    charging me with a penetration case, *** but accusing me of a conduct case.
    There’s no way I can make a proper defense ***.
    ***
    *** [I]n order for that to be used as contact alone, which, contact is, under
    the definition, is sexual penetration or conduct, and in order for them to use the
    sexual contact, they would have to put the whole definition in there, ***
    [including] contact, *** for purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the
    victim or accused.”
    -2-
    The prosecutor persisted, claiming the indictment “appropriately charged Mr. Kidd
    with sexual contact.” The court ruled as follows:
    “I do find that *** both counts of the indictment in this matter sufficiently set
    forth the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault as was indicated. *** I do
    not find that the failure to allege the various motives, if you will, such as sexual
    gratification [affect the completeness of the indictment].”
    The court denied Kidd’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
    ¶6       Kidd also moved to dismiss count II on grounds its date range overlapped with
    the date range for count I. The court denied the motion to dismiss and did not
    require from the prosecutor any clarification of the dates.
    ¶7       Kidd requested reappointment of defense counsel before trial. Immediately
    before trial, the prosecutor orally moved to amend both counts of the indictment to
    add to each an allegation that Kidd made the sexual contact “for the purpose of the
    sexual gratification of the Defendant or victim.” Defense counsel objected and
    moved to dismiss the indictment. The court denied both the prosecutor’s motion to
    amend the indictment and Kidd’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that
    Kidd suffered no prejudice, as the indictment sufficiently informed him the State
    would prove he made the contact for the purpose of sexual gratification. The court
    said:
    “[Kidd] seized on *** the definition of sexual conduct which is exactly that
    language for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of another. He knew
    it. He wasn’t surprised.”
    ¶8       The case proceeded to trial with an indictment that did not include an allegation
    that Kidd sought sexual gratification for himself or the victim when his penis made
    contact with T.F. After the presentation of the evidence, the court instructed the
    jurors that a defendant commits an act of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
    child if “he is 17 years of age or older and intentionally commits an act of contact,
    however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the
    body of another for the purposes of sexual gratification of the Defendant and the
    victim is under 13 years of age.” The court also eliminated the overlap in the dates
    -3-
    for the two counts, requiring proof of an act of sexual contact “between July 1,
    2011[,] through August 27, 2016,” for a conviction on count II.
    ¶9         The jury found Kidd guilty on both counts. Kidd again raised his objections to
    the indictments in his posttrial motion, which the trial court denied. The court
    sentenced Kidd to 25 years in prison on each count, with the sentences to run
    consecutively.
    ¶ 10                              B. Appellate Court Proceedings
    ¶ 11       Kidd argued on appeal that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment
    because it did not set forth all the elements of the alleged offense. The appellate
    court held that, by alleging an act of sexual contact, the indictment sufficiently
    alleged contact “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.” 
    2021 IL App (4th) 190345-U
    , ¶ 8. The court affirmed the convictions. Id. ¶ 78. We granted
    Kidd’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
    ¶ 12                                      II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 13       Kidd argues on appeal that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment
    because it did not set forth all the elements for the charge of predatory criminal
    sexual assault of a child by sexual contact, the charge on which the jury found him
    guilty. The State contends the indictment adequately alleged both sexual contact
    for the purpose of sexual gratification and sexual penetration. To resolve the issues,
    we must construe section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
    ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2016)) and section 11-1.40 of the Criminal Code of 2012
    (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)).
    ¶ 14       We review de novo issues of statutory construction. Board of Education of
    Chicago v. Moore, 
    2021 IL 125785
    , ¶ 18. Our primary objective in statutory
    construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable
    indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. Id. ¶ 20. We also review
    de novo the issue of whether an indictment states the elements of the charged
    offense. People v. Espinoza, 
    2015 IL 118218
    , ¶ 15.
    -4-
    ¶ 15                    A. The Indictment Must Delineate the Nature and
    Elements of the Charged Offenses Pursuant to
    Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
    ¶ 16       Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides in pertinent
    part:
    “(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense
    by:
    ***
    (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 725
    ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2016).
    ¶ 17       When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment before trial in a
    pretrial motion, the indictment must strictly comply with section 111-3. People v.
    Carey, 
    2018 IL 121371
    , ¶ 21 (citing People v. Rowell, 
    229 Ill. 2d 82
    , 93 (2008),
    and People v. Benitez, 
    169 Ill. 2d 245
    , 257 (1996)). If the indictment does not
    strictly comply with section 111-3, the “rule requiring a showing of prejudice does
    not apply, and the proper remedy is dismissal.” People v. Cuadrado, 
    214 Ill. 2d 79
    ,
    87 (2005); Benitez, 
    169 Ill. 2d at
    258 (citing People v. Thingvold, 
    145 Ill. 2d 441
    ,
    448 (1991)).
    ¶ 18                   B. A Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault Indictment Alleging
    Contact Requires an Allegation That the Purpose of the
    Contact Was for Sexual Gratification
    ¶ 19       The indictment in this case charged Kidd with two counts of predatory criminal
    sexual assault of a child. Section 11-1.40(a) of the Criminal Code prescribes the
    elements that must be alleged in an indictment to state a charge of predatory
    criminal sexual assault of a child:
    “(a) A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that
    person is 17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight,
    between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another
    -5-
    for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused,
    or an act of sexual penetration, and:
    (1) the victim is under 13 years of age[.]” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)
    (West 2016).
    ¶ 20       According to the statute, an indictment charging predatory criminal sexual
    assault of a child must plead allegations establishing contact or penetration. When
    the indictment alleges “contact” with a victim 13 years or younger, the indictment
    must allege (1) the perpetrator was 17 years of age or older, (2) the perpetrator
    committed an act of contact between the sex organ or anus of one person and a part
    of the body of another person, and (3) the perpetrator made the contact for the
    purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused. 
    Id.
     But, when
    the indictment alleges an act of penetration by a perpetrator 17 years of age or older
    with a victim 13 years of age or younger, the indictment sufficiently pleads a count
    of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, without any allegation about the
    purpose of the penetration. 
    Id.
    ¶ 21        This court in People v. Terrell, 
    132 Ill. 2d 178
    , 203-05 (1989), reviewed
    sections 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault) and 12-16 (aggravated criminal
    sexual abuse) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶¶ 12-14,
    12-16), the predecessor statutes to the statute under review. The Terrell court
    explained that the former statute permitted convictions in either of two ways: if the
    prosecution proved an act of sexual penetration, the trier of fact could convict
    without evidence concerning the purpose of the act; if the prosecution proved only
    sexual contact, for a conviction the trier of fact needed to find the defendant
    committed the contact “ ‘for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the
    victim or the accused.’ ” Terrell, 
    132 Ill. 2d at 208
    ; see also People v. Novak, 
    163 Ill. 2d 93
     (1994). We find that our interpretation of the predatory criminal sexual
    assault statute under review is consistent with the reasoning used in Terrell and
    Novak by this court.
    -6-
    ¶ 22                  C. The Ambiguous Indictment of Kidd Did Not Set Forth
    All the Elements for a Charge of Sexual Contact.
    ¶ 23       As Kidd pointed out in his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, the
    prosecution hindered Kidd’s preparation for trial by failing to clarify the charge.
    Because the indictment did not include any allegation of the purpose of the contact,
    the prosecution appeared to “charg[e Kidd] with a penetration case.” By then using
    language of only contact, without adding the element of purpose, the prosecution
    did not charge a violation of the statute. The prosecutor affirmed the State had no
    intention of proving that Kidd made contact for the purpose of sexual gratification,
    by repeatedly asserting that the indictment alleged all necessary elements, even
    though Kidd pointed out the indictment failed to allege purpose. The trial court
    agreed with the prosecutor that the “failure to allege the various motives, *** such
    as sexual gratification,” did not affect the sufficiency of the indictment.
    ¶ 24       The State’s brief on appeal thoroughly supports Kidd’s claim that the
    incomplete indictment hampered his preparation. The State now claims its
    “indictment set forth the facts necessary to establish all the elements of predatory
    criminal sexual assault of a child through sexual penetration.” Because the
    indictment included an allegation that Kidd placed his penis in contact with T.F.’s
    mouth, according to the State, the indictment asserted an act of penetration, even
    though the indictment specifically called the act “sexual contact,” not “sexual
    penetration.” And the State adds that Kidd’s own remark, that the State charged
    him with a penetration case, shows that he knew the State meant for the indictment
    to charge sexual penetration.
    ¶ 25       We do not here confront a case of a mere omission of an element from the
    charging instrument. The prosecutor and the court told Kidd the State could prove
    predatory criminal sexual assault by proving contact without also proving the
    purpose of the contact. Then, immediately before trial, the prosecutor sprang on
    Kidd the news that the State intended to prove Kidd acted for the purpose of sexual
    gratification. While the court did not allow the State to amend the indictment, the
    court permitted the change by including the statutory language of purpose in the
    jury instructions. And now, for the first time on appeal, the State claims it actually
    pled and proved not sexual contact but sexual penetration.
    -7-
    ¶ 26       Because Kidd filed a pretrial motion questioning the sufficiency of the
    allegations in the indictment, he did not need to show prejudice to obtain reversal
    of the conviction here. See Cuadrado, 
    214 Ill. 2d at 88
    ; Rowell, 
    229 Ill. 2d at 93
    .
    This case shows why courts must dismiss the indictment before trial when the
    charging instrument fails to set forth all the elements of the offense. Kidd pointed
    out the ambiguity in the indictments, and the trial court forced him to complete his
    preparation for trial without a clear statement of the charges on which the State
    intended to proceed.
    ¶ 27       In Espinoza, 
    2015 IL 118218
    , ¶¶ 1, 3, the State charged Espinoza with domestic
    battery of “ ‘a minor.’ ” Before trial, Espinoza made an oral motion for an
    amendment to identify the minor by his initials. Id. ¶ 5. The State refused to amend
    the complaint, and the circuit court dismissed the complaint because it violated
    section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Id. ¶ 7. The circuit court
    in a second, similar case reached a similar conclusion, and the courts consolidated
    the cases for appeal. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. The Espinoza court held:
    “[W]here an indictment or information charges an offense against persons or
    property, the name of the person or property injured, if known, must be stated
    in the charging instrument and the allegation must be proved as alleged.
    [Citation.] In the cases before it, the charging instruments at issue charged
    crimes committed against individual persons, but neither charging instrument
    contained any information suggesting the victims’ identities. [Citation.]
    Further, the State declined to cure the defects in the charging instruments.
    Under the circumstances, the trial courts acted properly in dismissing both
    criminal complaints.” Id. ¶ 10.
    ¶ 28       The Espinoza court rejected the State’s argument that Espinoza needed to show
    the complaint’s deficiency prejudiced him. In the case before us, the trial court
    adopted the reasoning rejected in Espinoza, finding that Kidd knew the State needed
    to prove the purpose of the contact, and therefore he suffered no prejudice from the
    omission of that element in the indictment. The trial court’s reasoning would apply
    just as well if the State had finally decided, immediately before trial, to amend the
    indictment to charge sexual penetration, as Kidd’s remarks showed he knew the
    State might have intended that charge. The trial court’s failure to dismiss the
    insufficient indictment violated Kidd’s “fundamental right to be informed of the
    -8-
    nature and cause of criminal accusations made against him.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Rowell,
    
    229 Ill. 2d at 92-93
    ).
    ¶ 29        In the present case, the appellate court argued at length that the absence of
    language concerning sexual gratification did not affect the sufficiency of the
    indictment because “sexual contact is, in effect, contact done for the purpose of
    sexual gratification or arousal.” 
    2021 IL App (4th) 190345-U
    , ¶ 57. The court
    decided the clause “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal” had no effect
    on the meaning of the statute. The court’s interpretation violated the principle of
    statutory construction that “[n]o part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or
    superfluous.” Van Dyke v. White, 
    2019 IL 121452
    , ¶ 46 (citing Skaperdas v.
    Country Casualty Insurance Co., 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 15). The appellate court’s
    reasoning also conflicts irreconcilably with this court’s explanation, in Terrell, 
    132 Ill. 2d at 209-11
    , that when the prosecution proves sexual penetration, it need not
    also prove the defendant acted for sexual gratification but, if the prosecution proves
    only sexual contact, it must also prove the defendant acted for the purpose of sexual
    gratification, because “it is possible for the touching which is part of that offense to
    occur accidentally or unintentionally.”
    ¶ 30                                    III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 31       By failing to allege in the indictment that when Kidd made sexual contact with
    T.F. he acted for the purpose of sexual gratification, the State violated the
    requirement of section 111-3(a)(3) that the indictment must include all elements of
    the charged offenses. The trial court committed reversible error by denying Kidd’s
    pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, and the appellate court erred by affirming
    the convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and
    the trial court and remand to the trial court with directions to dismiss the indictment.
    See People v. Stapinski, 
    2015 IL 118278
    , ¶ 56.
    ¶ 32      Judgments reversed.
    ¶ 33      Cause remanded with directions.
    -9-
    ¶ 34      JUSTICE OVERSTREET, dissenting:
    ¶ 35        I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ reversal of defendant’s convictions
    and sentence in this case on the basis that the indictment did not strictly comply
    with the pleading requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
    Specifically, the indictment in this case alleged penis-to-mouth contact, which, in
    Illinois, is an act of sexual penetration. The majority’s analysis is based on the
    erroneous conclusion that the indictment failed to allege sexual penetration.
    ¶ 36       There is no question that, under both the federal constitution and the Illinois
    Constitution, a defendant has the fundamental right to be informed of the “nature
    and cause” of criminal accusations made against him. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill.
    Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The Illinois legislature codified this principle in section
    111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (720 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2018)).
    People v. Wisslead, 
    198 Ill. 2d 389
    , 394 (1985) (“Section 111-3 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure of 1963 mirrors this constitutional principle, requiring,
    inter alia, that a charging instrument set forth ‘the nature and elements of the
    offense charged.’ ” (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 111-3(a)(3))).
    Specifically, section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, with respect
    to the “form of charge,” as follows:
    “(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense
    by:
    (1) Stating the name of the offense;
    (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;
    (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;
    (4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be
    done; and
    (5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known,
    designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be
    identified with reasonable certainty.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/111-3
    (West 2016).
    - 10 -
    Here, the focus of our analysis is on the third requirement in section 111-3(a), that
    the indictment set “forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 
    Id.
     § 111-
    3(a)(3).
    ¶ 37       This court has specifically held that section 111-3 is “designed to inform the
    accused of the nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare
    a defense and to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to subsequent
    prosecution arising out of the same conduct.” People v. Simmons, 
    93 Ill. 2d 94
    , 99-
    100 (1982). Nonetheless, in People v. Thingvold, 
    145 Ill. 2d 441
    , 448 (1991)
    (quoting People v. Gilmore, 
    63 Ill. 2d 23
    , 29 (1976)), this court held that, in an
    appeal from a circuit court’s denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss a charging
    instrument, it is improper for the reviewing court to consider whether the charging
    instrument “ ‘apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient
    specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar
    to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.’ ” Instead, this court has held
    that, when an indictment or information is attacked before trial, as is the case here,
    the reviewing court must determine whether the indictment strictly complies with
    the pleading requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
    Id.
     1
    ¶ 38       In the present case, prior to trial, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the
    indictment, which the circuit court denied. Therefore, per Thingvold, our task is to
    determine whether the indictment strictly complied with pleading requirements.
    The specific question we must answer is: does the indictment strictly comply with
    section 111-3(a)(3)’s requirement that it set “forth the nature and elements” of
    predatory criminal sexual assault of a child?
    1
    I note parenthetically that this court has not been consistent in adhering to a standard of review
    that excludes any consideration of the purpose of section 111-3 in reviewing whether a charging
    instrument strictly complies with section 111-3. In People v. Meyers, 
    158 Ill. 2d 46
    , 54 (1994), a
    case decided after Thingvold, we reviewed the sufficiency of a criminal complaint that was
    challenged prior to trial. The Meyers court concluded that the complaint was sufficient to withstand
    a motion to dismiss, noting that, although some allegations of the complaint could have been made
    “with greater particularity,” “the relevant inquiry is not whether the alleged offense could be
    described with greater certainty, but whether there is sufficient particularity to enable the accused
    to prepare a proper defense.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also People v. Klepper, 
    234 Ill. 2d 337
    ,
    351 (2009) (citing Meyers and applying the same standard in evaluating whether a pretrial motion
    challenging an information would have been successful).
    - 11 -
    ¶ 39       Here, when I consider the indictment in light of the requirements of section 111-
    3, I reach the conclusion that the indictment does, in fact, strictly comply with
    section 111-3(a)(3)’s pleading requirements. Therefore, I believe that the circuit
    court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment and that this
    court should affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.
    ¶ 40       As stated, the narrow issue on appeal centers on whether the indictment sets
    “forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” The charged offense is
    predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The indictment sets forth the “nature
    and elements” of this offense by alleging facts that, if proven, establish all the
    required elements of the commission of this offense by sexual penetration.
    ¶ 41       The legislature has defined the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of
    a child, in relevant part, as follows:
    “A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is
    17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between
    the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the
    purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, or an act
    of sexual penetration ***.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40 (West
    2016).
    ¶ 42       The majority correctly construes this statute as providing for a conviction of the
    offense in one of two ways: (1) if the prosecution pleads and proves an act of sexual
    penetration, the trier of fact can convict the defendant without the State pleading
    and proving the additional element that the purpose of the defendant’s act was for
    sexual gratification, or (2) alternatively, if the prosecution pleads and proves only
    contact between certain body parts of the defendant and the accused, the trier of
    fact must also find that the purpose of the contact was for sexual gratification or
    arousal of the victim or the accused. My disagreement with the majority’s analysis
    centers on the majority’s conclusion that the indictment at issue here fails to allege
    the necessary elements to establish acts of “sexual penetration.” On the contrary,
    the indictment does allege acts that are, unquestionably, acts of sexual penetration.
    ¶ 43      Both counts of the indictment alleged that defendant “committed an act of
    sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in
    contact with the mouth of T.F.” (Emphasis added.) In the definitions section of
    - 12 -
    article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the legislature has specifically defined
    “sexual penetration,” in relevant part, as follows: “any contact, however slight,
    between the sex organ *** of one person and *** [the] mouth *** of another
    person.” (Emphases added.) 
    Id.
     § 11-0.1.
    ¶ 44       Therefore, the act of placing one’s penis in contact with the mouth of a child
    falls squarely within the definition of “sexual penetration” for purposes of alleging
    the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child by sexual penetration.
    Accordingly, in the present case, as the indictment alleged specific acts of sexual
    penetration, the allegations in the indictment strictly complied with section 111-
    3(a)’s requirement that the indictment set forth the “nature and elements” of the
    offense charged, i.e., penis-to-mouth contact, and no additional allegations about
    the purpose of this contact was required. Nothing more needed to be alleged in the
    indictment with respect to the “nature and elements of the offense[s] charged.”
    ¶ 45       I recognize that the indictment does not specifically use the term “penetration.”
    However, the word “penetration” is not required under section 111-3(a) for the
    indictment to set “forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” As I have
    explained above, in Illinois, it is not necessary that defendant’s penis actually
    “penetrated” T.F.’s mouth to be found guilty of the statutorily defined offense of
    predatory criminal sexual assault of a child by “sexual penetration.” Instead, penis-
    to-mouth contact alone is the equivalent of sexual penetration, and this contact is
    specifically and plainly alleged in both counts of the indictment in no uncertain
    terms. The absence of the word “penetration” does not transform actual acts of
    sexual penetration, as alleged here, into mere acts of sexual contact requiring the
    State to now plead and prove the purpose of defendant’s acts. Instead, the
    legislature has determined that there is no need for the State to prove sexual
    gratification when a defendant places his penis in contact with a child’s mouth.
    ¶ 46       Had the indictment alleged that defendant knowingly contacted his penis to
    T.F.’s leg, such an allegation would require additional proof of the purpose of the
    contact. However, with an allegation of penis-to-mouth contact, the purpose of the
    contact is not an element of the offense, and this court should not require the
    indictment to include this element where this indictment factually alleges acts that
    plainly constitute sexual penetration.
    - 13 -
    ¶ 47       In its analysis, the majority gives some significance to the fact that the jury
    instructions in this case instructed the jury that it must find that defendant
    intentionally committed the penis-to-mouth contact for the purposes of defendant’s
    sexual gratification. However, we are not asked to evaluate whether any errors in
    the jury instructions resulted in an unfair trial. Instead, the issue defendant has
    raised before this court pertains only to the sufficiency of the indictment. The
    analysis of this issue, in turn, is strictly an evaluation of whether the indictment
    complies with section 111-3. The sufficiency of the jury instructions does not factor
    into this analysis. Regardless, to the extent that the jury instructions incorrectly
    stated the law, that was to defendant’s benefit, as the instructions required the State
    to prove the purpose of defendant’s acts of sexual penetration, which was not an
    element of the crimes alleged in the indictment.
    ¶ 48       The majority concludes that the record establishes that defendant was hindered
    in his preparation for trial by the State’s failure to clarify the charge. My review of
    the record finds no support for this conclusion. Instead, the defense benefited from
    the State having to prove an additional element that was not required to secure the
    convictions. Regardless, since we are reviewing a pretrial motion challenging the
    indictment and adhering to the standard of review set out in Thingvold, prejudice is
    not part of the analysis per Thingvold, cited by the majority.
    ¶ 49       In addition, to the extent that prejudice is considered, the record establishes that
    the indictment was sufficient for the defendant to prepare his defense. This is true
    because, regardless of whether defendant’s acts are called “penetration” or merely
    “contact,” the defendant always understood that he had to defend the allegations
    that he knowingly placed his penis in contact with the mouth of T.F. as alleged in
    both counts of the indictment. This requirement of the defense remained steadfast
    and never wavered throughout the parties’ dispute about the sufficiency of the
    indictment. Therefore, nothing about the allegations in the indictment prevented or
    hindered defendant from defending against these alleged acts of sexual penetration.
    If anything, as stated, by requiring the State to also prove the purpose of defendant’s
    sexual penetration, defendant benefited by being provided an additional avenue of
    defense that should not have been available.
    ¶ 50      Although the standard of review here is strict compliance with the pleading
    requirements of section 111-3, I do not believe the analysis of strict compliance
    - 14 -
    must be completely divorced from any consideration of the very purpose of section
    111-3, which is, as this court has specifically stated, to inform the accused of the
    nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare a defense and
    to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to subsequent prosecution
    arising out of the same conduct. Simmons, 
    93 Ill. 2d at 99-100
    ; Meyers, 
    158 Ill. 2d at 54
    . To the extent relevant, the indictment in this case satisfied the purposes for
    which section 111-3 was enacted. The indictment informed defendant of the nature
    of the offense (penis-to-mouth contact with a person under 13 years of age) such
    that he can and did prepare his defense, and the indictment described the nature and
    elements of the charged offenses sufficiently to bar future prosecutions arising out
    of the same conduct
    ¶ 51       Regardless of which standard is applied, the indictment here strictly complied
    with section 111-3. The indictment charged defendant with two counts of predatory
    criminal sexual assault of a child. The indictment was in writing, specifically named
    the alleged committed offense, provided citation of the relevant statutory provision,
    provided the date of the offenses and the county of their occurrences, and provided
    defendant’s name and the victim’s initials. The indictment alleged specific acts of
    sexual penetration in that defendant “placed his penis in contact with the mouth of
    T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” Because this indictment strictly
    complies with all requirements of section 111-3, defendant’s convictions and
    sentences in this case should be affirmed.
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