People v. Johnson , 2013 IL 114639 ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Supreme Court
People v. Johnson, 2013 IL 114639
Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. OMAR
Court: JOHNSON, Appellant.
Docket No. 114639
Filed September 19, 2013
Held The Counties Code provision awarding state’s attorneys $50 for each day
(Note: This syllabus employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus does not use that term
constitutes no part of in the generic sense so as to apply to other collateral proceedings—fee
the opinion of the court imposed on offender for seeking section 2-1401 relief from judgment
but has been prepared vacated.
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court
Review on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Carol A.
Kipperman, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Judgments reversed in part.
Cause remanded with directions.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy
Appeal Defender, and Yasaman Hannah Navai, Assistant Appellate Defender, of
the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Annette
Collins and Christine Cook, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for
the People.
Justices JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke,
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case concerns whether section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-
2002.1(a) (West 2008)), which permits State’s Attorneys to collect a $50 fee “[f]or each day
actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus,” also permits State’s Attorneys
to collect such a fee when they participate in the hearing of a petition for relief from
judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401
(West 2008)). The circuit court of Cook County assessed the fee, and the appellate court
affirmed. 2012 IL App (1st) 111378. This court allowed Johnson’s petition for leave to
appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). For the following reasons, we reverse, in part,
the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts and remand this cause to the circuit court
with directions that it vacate the $50 State’s Attorney fee.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Petitioner Omar Johnson was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery,
aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping and concealment of a homicidal
death. He was sentenced to a term of natural life for murder; 60 years’ imprisonment for
armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated kidnapping; and 10 years’
imprisonment for concealment of a homicidal death. The appellate court affirmed Johnson’s
convictions and sentences on appeal, as well as the circuit court’s dismissal of his subsequent
postconviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2004)).
¶4 Johnson filed a section 2-1401 petition in 2008, which the circuit court erroneously
dismissed, and the appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. At a hearing in
2010, Johnson withdrew his original petition and filed an amended petition. The State filed
a motion to dismiss the amended petition and requested that Johnson be assessed filing fees
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and court costs for filing a frivolous petition, as provided for in section 22-105(a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/22-105(a) (West 2010)). That section permits a court
to assess filing fees and court costs against an inmate who files a petition that the court
determines is frivolous. 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a) (West 2010). The circuit court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss and assessed numerous fees and costs against Johnson, including
the $50 State’s Attorney fee at issue here, pursuant to section 4-2002.1(a). Johnson now
appeals to this court, challenging only the imposition of the $50 State’s Attorney fee.
¶5 II. ANALYSIS
¶6 The sole issue before us is whether the $50 State’s Attorney fee in section 4-2002.1(a)
of the Counties Code applies to Johnson’s section 2-1401 petition. Johnson contends that the
fee was not statutorily authorized since section 4-2002.1(a) does not mention a section 2-
1401 petition for relief from judgment.
¶7 The State responds that the fee should apply to all collateral proceedings in which the
State is employed in the hearing of a case. The State argues there is little reason to
differentiate between collecting a fee when the State’s Attorney is employed “in the hearing
of a case of habeas corpus” or in the hearing of a section 2-1401 petition or postconviction
petition.
¶8 To answer the question presented on appeal, we must construe section 4-2002.1(a) of the
Counties Code, which provides in relevant part:
“(a) State’s attorneys shall be entitled to the following fees:
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For each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus in which
the people are interested, $50.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a) (West 2010).
¶9 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature, bearing in mind that the best evidence of such intent is the statutory
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011
IL 111838, ¶ 11. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the
statute as written. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999).
When statutory terms are undefined, we presume the legislature intended the terms to have
their popularly understood meaning. People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010). Moreover,
if a term has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the legislature
intended to incorporate the established meaning. Id. We review questions of statutory
construction de novo. Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (2011).
¶ 10 The appellate court agreed with the circuit court that the $50 State’s Attorney fee should
apply to Johnson’s section 2-1401 petition. The court held that the statute referred to habeas
corpus proceedings “generically” and was meant to encompass a section 2-1401 petition.
2012 IL App (1st) 111378, ¶ 13. The court further held that the statute applied to all
collateral proceedings since the legislative intent was to deter frivolous filings. 2012 IL App
(1st) 111378, ¶ 13.
¶ 11 We disagree with the appellate court’s interpretation. As stated above, section 4-
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2002.1(a) of the Counties Code allows State’s Attorneys to collect a fee “[f]or each day
actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus in which the people are
interested.” Since the term “habeas corpus” is not defined in the Counties Code, we will
presume the legislature intended the term to have its popularly understood or settled legal
meaning. The term “habeas corpus,” which is Latin for “that you have the body,” refers to
a “writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 715 (7th ed. 1999). There
are numerous types of writs of habeas corpus (e.g., habeas corpus ad deliberandum et
recipiendum (“[a] writ used to remove a person for trial from one county to the county where
the person allegedly committed the offense”); habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum
(“[a] writ used in civil cases to remove the case, and also the body of the defendant, from an
inferior court to a superior court”); habeas corpus ad prosequendum (“[a] writ used in
criminal cases to bring before a court a prisoner to be tried on charges other than those for
which the prisoner is currently being confined”); habeas corpus ad respondendum (“[a] writ
used in civil cases to remove a person from one court’s custody into that of another court,
in which the person may then be sued”); habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (“[a] writ directed
to someone detaining another person and commanding that the detainee be brought to
court”); and habeas corpus ad testificandum (“[a] writ used in civil and criminal cases to
bring a prisoner to court to testify”)). Id.
¶ 12 Giving the term “habeas corpus” in section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code its plain
and ordinary meaning, we conclude that it only applies to the various types of habeas corpus
proceedings. We reject the State’s contentions that the fee should apply “generically” to all
collateral proceedings, as the appellate court concluded. 2012 IL App (1st) 111378, ¶ 13. The
statutory provision that allows imposition of the $50 fee first appeared in the statute in a
1907 amendment, and has remained unchanged, despite the creation of additional collateral
proceedings such as a section 2-1401 petition and a postconviction petition.1 The legislature
could have amended the statute to include additional collateral proceedings, but it never did.
We will not read words or meanings into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to
include them. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154-55 (1997).
Therefore, any remedy lies with the legislature, not the courts, if the legislature may be so
inclined. See Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 427 (2008).
¶ 13 Further, we are not persuaded by the appellate court’s opinion in People v. Gutierrez,
2011 IL App (1st) 093499, to which both parties cite. In Gutierrez, the appellate court
vacated the $50 State’s Attorney fee that was assessed to the defendant following the
summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 65. The court reasoned that since the
defendant’s postconviction petition was dismissed at the first stage, which occurred without
any input from the State, the State had not been “employed” in the hearing of the case, and
1
The statutory provision that preceded a section 2-1401 petition was enacted in 1872 when
the General Assembly abolished the writ of error coram nobis. People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 23
(1947). The legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in 1949. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, ch.
38, ¶¶ 826-832. Additionally, the above definitions of the various types of writs of habeas corpus
are substantially the same as they were in 1907.
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therefore was not permitted to recover the fee. Id. ¶ 65. However, the appellate court did not
first consider whether the fee should apply to a postconviction proceeding. To the extent the
appellate court in Gutierrez assumed the fee could apply to a postconviction petition, we
disagree with that assumption. As stated above, we hold the fee only applies to habeas
corpus proceedings. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the circuit court with directions
that it vacate the $50 State’s Attorney fee assessed against Johnson and correct the mittimus.
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are reversed
in part. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions that it vacate the $50
State’s Attorney fee and correct the mittimus.
¶ 16 Judgments reversed in part.
¶ 17 Cause remanded with directions.
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