Hadley v. Subscriber Doe , 2015 IL 118000 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                           Illinois Official Reports
    Supreme Court
    Hadley v. Doe, 
    2015 IL 118000
    Caption in Supreme   BILL HADLEY, Appellee, v. SUBSCRIBER DOE, a/k/a Fuboy,
    Court:               Whose Legal Name is Unknown, Appellant.
    Docket No.           118000
    Filed                June 18, 2015
    Decision Under       Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that
    Review               court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County, the
    Hon. David L. Jeffrey, Judge, presiding.
    Judgment             Appellate court judgment affirmed.
    Cause remanded.
    Counsel on           Robert M. Fagan, of Freeport, for appellant.
    Appeal
    Andrew T. Smith and Ronald A. Barch, of Cicero, France, Barch &
    Alexander, P.C., of Rockford, for appellee.
    Justices             JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,
    Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1        The plaintiff, Bill Hadley, filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant, Subscriber
    Doe, a/k/a “Fuboy,” based on statements made by Fuboy in the comments section of a
    newspaper website. After the suit was filed, Hadley requested the circuit court, pursuant to
    Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 224 (eff. May 30, 2008)), to order Fuboy’s
    Internet service provider to disclose Fuboy’s identity. The circuit court granted the request and
    the appellate court affirmed. 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    . For the reasons that follow, we affirm
    the judgment of the appellate court.
    ¶2                                         BACKGROUND
    ¶3       On December 28, 2011, the Freeport Journal Standard published an online newspaper
    article entitled “Hadley returns to county politics. Candidate stresses fiscal responsibility.” The
    article discussed plaintiff Bill Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the county board of
    Stephenson County, Illinois. Online readers could post comments in response to the article
    after completing a basic registration process. On December 29, an individual using the name
    “Fuboy” posted the following comment: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check
    out the view he has of Empire1 from his front door.” Fuboy also made a second comment,
    stating: “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? It is kinda ‘It’s a Wonderful
    Life’ with Pottersville win[n]ing out. We can just be happy that Stephenson County is
    fortunate enough to have this guy want to be of ‘service’ again.”
    ¶4       In early 2012, Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit in the circuit court of Stephenson County
    against the parent company of the Freeport Journal Standard, Gatehouse Media (Gatehouse), a
    New York corporation. Thereafter, Gatehouse provided Hadley the Internet Protocol (IP)
    address acquired from Fuboy’s Internet service provider, Comcast Cable Communications
    LLC (Comcast).2 This was the IP address from which the comments had been transmitted to
    the Freeport Journal Standard’s website. On March 1, 2012, Hadley issued a subpoena to
    Comcast, seeking the identity of the subscriber who had been assigned that IP address. The
    next day, however, Gatehouse successfully removed the cause to federal court and the circuit
    court action was subsequently dismissed.
    ¶5       While in federal court, Hadley issued a subpoena to Comcast, again seeking the identity of
    the person assigned the IP address. On March 28, 2012, a representative from Comcast advised
    Hadley’s counsel that it was preserving the records and information requested; that it had the
    name and address of only one account holder of the IP address at issue; and that it required a
    court order directing it to provide Hadley with the information. Based on these representations,
    Hadley filed a motion for an order directing Comcast to turn over the records and information
    it possessed regarding the IP address. The federal court granted Hadley’s motion, directing
    Comcast to turn over information to Hadley regarding the IP address. However, the court also
    1
    Empire Elementary School is in Freeport, Illinois.
    2
    “IP addresses identify computers on the Internet, enabling data packets transmitted from other
    computers to reach them.” National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
    
    545 U.S. 967
    , 987 n.1 (2005).
    -2-
    allowed the subscriber at the IP address the ability to contest the subpoena. On April 24,
    counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion to quash the subpoena.
    ¶6          On July 11, 2012, the federal court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Gatehouse, finding
    that Hadley’s claim against Gatehouse was barred by federal statute. The dismissal of the
    lawsuit rendered the motion to quash moot.
    ¶7          On August 7, 2012, Hadley returned to the circuit court of Stephenson County and filed the
    instant defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy.”3 In this complaint, Hadley
    alleged that the comment made by Fuboy that Hadley was a “Sandusky waiting to be exposed”
    was defamatory per se because it imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley. Along with
    the complaint, Hadley issued a subpoena to Comcast requesting records and information
    concerning the IP address. Hadley also filed a motion for entry of an order directing Comcast
    to turn over such information.
    ¶8          On August 31, 2012, the circuit court entered an order directing Comcast to comply with
    the subpoena and to provide the information requested, with the conditions that Comcast
    would have to notify the subscriber and the subscriber would be allowed 21 days to contest the
    subpoena. On September 26, the same attorney who had appeared in federal court filed a
    motion to quash the subpoena. Counsel also filed a special and limited appearance to contest
    jurisdiction.
    ¶9          During a hearing held in January 2013, the circuit court informed the parties that the better
    procedure to use to discover the identity of Fuboy would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224.
    Ill. S. Ct. R. 224 (eff. May 30, 2008). In general, Rule 224 provides a means to identify
    potential defendants prior to the commencement of suit. Relying on Stone v. Paddock
    Publications, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 093386, the circuit court stated that, to show that relief
    under Rule 224 was necessary, Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that
    would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)), even if such a motion was not filed. As the Stone
    court explained, this requirement is necessary in order to protect any first amendment interest
    possessed by the online commentator to engage in nondefamatory, anonymous speech. The
    circuit court then entered an order granting Hadley leave to file an amended complaint to add a
    count seeking relief under Rule 224.
    ¶ 10        Based on the circuit court’s instructions, Hadley filed an amended complaint on January
    24, 2013. Count I alleged a cause of action for defamation against Subscriber Doe a/k/a Fuboy.
    Count II, directed at Comcast as respondent, sought an order directing Comcast to disclose
    Fuboy’s identity pursuant to Rule 224.
    ¶ 11        After additional briefing and hearing, the circuit court concluded that count I of Hadley’s
    complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 and, therefore, Hadley was
    entitled to Rule 224 relief. The circuit court found that the “Sandusky” in Fuboy’s statement
    referred to Jerry Sandusky, the Penn State University football coach who was charged with
    sexual abuse of numerous boys, and that this would be obvious to any reasonable person who
    read Fuboy’s statement. The court also concluded that the comment imputed the commission
    of a crime to Hadley; that it was not capable of an innocent construction; and that it could not
    3
    Counsel for defendant has not challenged plaintiff’s assertion that Subscriber Doe and “Fuboy”
    are one and the same, and we treat them as such for purposes of this appeal.
    -3-
    be considered an opinion. Accordingly, the circuit court held that Rule 224 relief should be
    granted. The court directed Comcast to provide the identification and last known address of the
    holder of the IP address. The court also stayed its order pending the appeal process.
    ¶ 12       The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    . The
    appellate court first concluded that Fuboy had standing to contest the circuit court order since
    he or she had an interest in the proceedings, i.e., to remain anonymous. 
    Id. ¶ 12.
    After adopting
    the analysis for Rule 224 in connection with defamation claims as set forth in Stone and Maxon
    v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 
    402 Ill. App. 3d 704
    (2010) (
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    , ¶ 15), the
    court rejected Fuboy’s contention that Hadley’s defamation claim would not survive a section
    2-615 motion to dismiss. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court’s conclusion that
    Fuboy’s statement was defamatory per se because it imputed the commission of a crime; that it
    was not reasonably capable of an innocent construction; and that it could reasonably be
    interpreted as stating an actual fact. 
    Id. ¶ 21.
    Therefore, the appellate court held the circuit
    court did not err in granting Rule 224 relief (id. ¶ 13). We granted Fuboy’s petition for leave to
    appeal.
    ¶ 13                                            ANALYSIS
    ¶ 14                    Whether Hadley’s Original Complaint Was a Legal Nullity
    ¶ 15       Fuboy initially contends that the circuit court should not have granted Hadley relief under
    Rule 224 because Hadley would not be able to bring a defamation suit within the one year
    statute of limitations for that offense. Citing to Bogseth v. Emanuel, 
    166 Ill. 2d 507
    (1995),
    Fuboy maintains that a complaint which uses a fictitious name for a defendant is a legal nullity.
    According to Fuboy, Hadley’s original complaint, filed on August 7, 2012, used a fictitious
    name and, therefore, was of no legal effect. From this, Fuboy maintains that Hadley’s amended
    complaint could not relate back to the original complaint (since it legally did not exist) and,
    therefore, any action against Fuboy is barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree.
    ¶ 16       In Bogseth, plaintiffs in two cases filed complaints naming as the sole defendant “John
    Doe” and naming other parties as respondents in discovery. The legal question presented was
    whether a fictitious “John Doe” could be considered a “named defendant[ ]” as required under
    section 2-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1992)), the respondent
    in discovery statute. Answering that question in the negative, this court observed that the
    general rule in Illinois is that suits brought against fictitious parties are legally invalid or
    without legal effect. 
    Bogseth, 166 Ill. 2d at 513-14
    . We then held that a plaintiff must name at
    least one “real person or entity as a defendant” (id. at 513) before the procedures afforded by
    the respondent in discovery statute could be invoked. The plaintiffs’ complaints in Bogseth
    were invalid because they failed to “commence[ ] an action against an identifiable, real person
    or entity.” 
    Id. ¶ 17
          Bogseth is distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiffs chose to use the placeholder “John
    Doe” to sue defendants who were unknown and unidentifiable. Here, in contrast, Hadley knew
    that an individual named Fuboy had made the statements on the Freeport Journal Standard’s
    website. Hadley did not make up a fictitious name to identify an unknown defendant. Instead,
    Fuboy was defendant’s validly assumed alias and Hadley simply filed suit against that alias.
    There is a significant difference, in our view, between a plaintiff suing an unknown John Doe
    and a plaintiff suing a known defendant using an alias adopted of the defendant’s own volition.
    -4-
    ¶ 18       Critically, too, the concerns that are typically associated with the use of John Doe
    defendants, e.g., ensuring adequate notice or preventing fraud on the courts, are not present in
    this case. Counsel has litigated this matter on behalf of defendant since it was in the federal
    court, and has not disputed that Fuboy is the name defendant used. Fuboy would in no way be
    prejudiced by a finding that Hadley’s original complaint had legal validity. Additionally, there
    is no evidence defendant utilized the name Fuboy to deceive or defraud the court. Instead,
    defendant chose that alias as a user name on the Freeport Journal Standard’s website.
    Permitting Hadley’s original complaint to stand would, therefore, in no sense subvert the
    justice system.
    ¶ 19       Under the unique facts presented here, we find that the general rule set forth in Bogseth is
    inapplicable. Hadley filed his claim against a real person, using a validly adopted alias chosen
    by the defendant. Accordingly, we reject Fuboy’s argument and conclude that Hadley’s
    original complaint was not a legal nullity.
    ¶ 20                         Whether Hadley Abandoned His Original Complaint
    ¶ 21        Fuboy next contends that, even if Hadley’s original complaint had legal validity, Hadley is
    still not entitled to relief under Rule 224. Fuboy observes that Rule 224 contemplates the filing
    of a separate action prior to the commencement of any lawsuit. That being the case, Fuboy
    maintains that Hadley’s amended complaint, because it sought relief under Rule 224, must, as
    a matter of law, be viewed as asserting a stand-alone, Rule 224 action. In other words, Fuboy
    contends that when Hadley sought relief under Rule 224, he necessarily abandoned his original
    complaint and commenced a new, separate action. Continuing, Fuboy then argues that Hadley
    is not entitled to relief under that separate action because the statute of limitations had run on
    the defamation claim by the time Hadley requested his Rule 224 relief.
    ¶ 22        Rule 224 states that a petitioner “may file an independent action.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1)(i).
    We agree with Fuboy that this language makes clear that a separate action is contemplated
    under the rule. However, we cannot agree with the remainder of Fuboy’s argument. In essence,
    Fuboy is contending that, because Hadley erred in pursuing Rule 224 relief after his suit was
    filed rather than before, he must face dismissal of his lawsuit. We note, however, that Hadley
    was specifically instructed by the circuit court to pursue Rule 224 in the manner that he did.
    Further, nothing in Rule 224 requires dismissal of Hadley’s suit. Instead, the rule is silent on
    the issue raised here, i.e., how to proceed when a circuit court erroneously instructs a plaintiff
    to proceed under Rule 224 after suit has commenced. Finally, there is no contention that the
    specific procedure employed here was prejudicial to Fuboy. Given these circumstances, we
    conclude that dismissal of Hadley’s defamation suit would be too harsh a sanction.
    Accordingly, we find the procedural irregularities here do not render Hadley’s Rule 224
    request for relief invalid.
    ¶ 23        However, having reached this conclusion, we emphasize that the proper way to invoke
    Rule 224 is before suit commences. Our holding here should not be read as expressing
    approval of the actions taken by the circuit court in this case.
    -5-
    ¶ 24                       Standards Applicable to Rule 224 in Defamation Actions
    ¶ 25        Rule 224(a)(1) provides:
    “(a) Procedure.
    (1) Petition.
    (i) A person *** who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of
    ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages may file an
    independent action for such discovery.
    (ii) The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a verified petition
    in the circuit court of the county in which the action or proceeding might be brought
    or in which one or more of the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought
    resides. The petition shall be brought in the name of the petitioner and shall name as
    respondents the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought and shall set
    forth: (A) the reason the proposed discovery is necessary and (B) the nature of the
    discovery sought and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain such
    discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit discovery to the identification
    of responsible persons and entities and where a deposition is sought will specify the
    name and address of each person to be examined, if known, or, if unknown,
    information sufficient to identify each person and the time and place of the
    deposition.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1) (eff. May 30, 2008).
    Rule 224 is designed as a tool to assist a plaintiff in discovering the identity of an unidentified
    individual who may be liable to him. Ill. S. Ct. R. 224, Committee Comments (Aug. 1, 1989).
    At issue here is the rule’s requirement that the petitioner must demonstrate that discovery of
    the individual’s identity is “necessary.”
    ¶ 26        The appellate court below, following Stone and Maxon, found that to demonstrate
    necessity, a petitioner must present sufficient allegations of a defamation claim to overcome a
    section 2-615 motion to dismiss. 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    , ¶ 15. See Stone, 2011 IL App (1st)
    093386, ¶ 18; 
    Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 712
    . “[I]n ordering the disclosure of a potential
    defendant’s identity pursuant to Rule 224, a court must balance the potential plaintiff’s right to
    redress for unprotected defamatory language against the danger of setting a standard for
    disclosure that is so low that it effectively chills or eliminates the right to speak anonymously
    and fails to adequately protect the chosen anonymity of those engaging in nondefamatory
    public discourse.” 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    , ¶ 17. The Maxon court concluded the section
    2-615 standard was proper since “subjecting a Rule 224 petition to the same level of scrutiny
    afforded the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 will address any
    constitutional concerns arising from disclosing the identity of any potential defendant,” i.e., a
    plaintiff must plead facts to establish the alleged defamatory statements are not
    constitutionally protected. 
    Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 712
    . That court further found that a more
    stringent standard was not required, such as those courts employing the Dendrite-Cahill
    summary judgment standard (Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 
    775 A.2d 756
    (N.J.
    Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 
    884 A.2d 451
    (Del. 2005)), since once a
    plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for defamation to satisfy section 2-615, a potential
    defendant has no first amendment right to balance against the plaintiff’s right to redress
    because there is no first amendment right to defame. 
    Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 714
    . Moreover,
    Illinois is a fact pleading state and, therefore, if a complaint can survive a motion to dismiss, it
    -6-
    is legally and factually sufficient and should be answered. 
    Id. at 715.
    See also Stone, 2011 IL
    App (1st) 093386, ¶¶ 18-21 (rejecting summary judgment standard).
    ¶ 27        We find the reasoning espoused by these courts persuasive and agree this is the proper
    standard to apply. Thus, we hold that to ascertain whether a petitioner has satisfied Rule 224’s
    necessity requirement, the court must evaluate a defamation complaint to determine whether it
    will withstand a section 2-615 motion to dismiss.
    ¶ 28                              Rule 224 and Hadley’s Defamation Claim
    ¶ 29       We now turn to whether the circuit court properly concluded that Rule 224’s necessity
    requirement was met. A section 2-615 motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a
    complaint. Green v. Rogers, 
    234 Ill. 2d 478
    , 491 (2009). The question to be answered is
    whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, state sufficient facts to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
    
    Id. All facts
    apparent from the face of the complaint, including any attached exhibits, must be
    considered. A circuit court should not dismiss a complaint under section 2-615 unless it is
    clearly apparent no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery. 
    Id. The standard
    of review is de novo. 
    Id. ¶ 30
          To state a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must present facts showing the
    defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, the defendant made an unprivileged
    publication of that statement to a third party, and the publication caused damages. 
    Id. A defamatory
    statement is one that harms a person’s reputation because it lowers the person in
    the eyes of others or deters others from associating with her or him. Tuite v. Corbitt, 
    224 Ill. 2d 490
    , 501 (2006). A statement is defamatory per se if its harm is obvious and apparent on its
    face. 
    Id. In Illinois,
    there are five categories of statements that are considered defamatory
    per se, only one of which is relevant here: words imputing the commission of a crime. 
    Id. ¶ 31
          Even if an alleged statement falls into one of the categories of statements that are
    defamatory per se, it will not be actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent
    construction. Under the innocent construction rule:
    “ ‘courts must give the allegedly defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning.
    [Citations.] Courts must therefore interpret the allegedly defamatory words as they
    appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to
    the reasonable reader. [Citation.] When a defamatory meaning was clearly intended
    and conveyed, this court will not strain to interpret allegedly defamatory words in their
    mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to hold them nonlibellous under the
    innocent construction rule.’ [Citation.]” 
    Id. at 504.
    ¶ 32       The innocent construction rule “does not require courts ‘to espouse a naїveté unwarranted
    under the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” 
    Id. at 505.
    “[I]f the likely intended meaning of a
    statement is defamatory, a court should not dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under the innocent
    construction rule. In those circumstances, an innocent construction of the statement would
    necessarily be strained and unreasonable because the likely intended meaning is defamatory.”
    
    Id. at 512.
    ¶ 33       In addition, if a statement is defamatory per se, but not subject to an innocent construction,
    it may still enjoy constitutional protection as an expression of opinion. As we stated in Solaia
    Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 
    221 Ill. 2d 558
    (2006):
    -7-
    “[T]here is no artificial distinction between opinion and fact: a false assertion of fact
    can be defamatory even when couched within apparent opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
    [Citations.] Indeed, ‘[i]t is well established that statements made in the form of
    insinuation, allusion, irony, or question, may be considered as defamatory as positive
    and direct assertions of fact.’ [Citation.] Similarly, ‘[a] defendant cannot escape
    liability for defamatory factual assertions simply by claiming that the statements were a
    form of ridicule, humor or sarcasm.’ [Citation.] The test is restrictive: a defamatory
    statement is constitutionally protected only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as
    stating actual fact. [Citation.] Several considerations aid our analysis: whether the
    statement has a precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement is
    verifiable; and whether the statement’s literary or social context signals that it has
    factual content. [Citations.] If a statement is factual, and it is false, it is actionable.” 
    Id. at 581.
    ¶ 34       Fuboy contends that Hadley’s complaint does not sufficiently allege a defamation claim to
    withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2-615. Fuboy maintains that it is not a crime to
    have the last name Sandusky. According to Fuboy, Hadley’s complaint is therefore deficient as
    a matter of law since he is unable to show that a reader would discern a defamatory meaning
    from the statement without the benefit of extrinsic facts. In other words, in Fuboy’s view, the
    statement did not have a particular meaning sufficient to find it defamatory per se.
    ¶ 35       Hadley contends his complaint adequately set forth a defamation claim to withstand a
    motion to dismiss under section 2-615. Hadley asserts that the statement need only infer the
    commission of a crime. And, considered in context with the timing of national events and
    circumstances, Hadley maintains it is clear that Fuboy conveyed that Hadley was a child
    molester living adjacent to a grade school.
    ¶ 36       Like the appellate court, we agree with Hadley that Fuboy’s statement imputes the
    commission of a crime to Hadley. The appellate court took judicial notice of the fact that, at the
    time Fuboy’s comment was posted, “the Sandusky sexual abuse scandal had dominated the
    national news for weeks. Sandusky was a football coach for the famed Penn State football
    program. Over the course of years, Sandusky allegedly sexually abused young boys. The
    degree to which Sandusky’s coaching colleagues knew of and failed to alert the appropriate
    authorities of Sandusky’s criminal activities became part of the scandal.” 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130489
    , ¶ 27.
    ¶ 37       In short, at the time of Fuboy’s comment, numerous men were testifying to the abuse they
    allegedly suffered at the hands of Sandusky when they were young boys. The general public
    was mindful of the fact Sandusky was accused of sexually abusing young boys. Stating that
    Hadley was “a Sandusky” while the scandal dominated the national news, coupled with the
    reference to Empire Elementary School, conveyed the idea that Hadley was a pedophile or had
    engaged in sexual acts with children and, thus, had committed criminal conduct. As the
    appellate court stated, “[t]o ignore the reference to a national story of this magnitude would be
    to ‘espouse a naïveté unwarranted under the circumstances.’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.)” 
    Id. While Fuboy
    did not explicitly state Hadley was a pedophile, as we concluded in
    Tuite, this is not fatal. 
    Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 514
    . Giving the words used by Fuboy their natural
    and obvious meaning, and considering the timing of the comment, we find the idea Fuboy
    intended to convey to the reasonable reader by his statement, “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to
    -8-
    be exposed. Check out the view he has of Empire from his front door,” was that Hadley was a
    pedophile or had engaged in sexual acts with children.
    ¶ 38       Fuboy contends, however, that the comment is susceptible to an innocent construction. He
    maintains the appellate court failed to consider the political context in which the statement was
    made, as well as the fact that it was made in an effort to seek debate over the candidate. We do
    not find this argument persuasive.
    ¶ 39       The focus of the online newspaper article was about how Hadley, if reelected, intended to
    employ fiscal responsibility to the county board’s actions. If Fuboy’s argument had any
    validity, he would have made comments about the topic of the article, not a comment about
    Hadley’s sexual proclivities. We conclude that a defamatory construction is far more
    reasonable than an innocent one. An innocent construction of Fuboy’s comment would be
    strained and unreasonable.
    ¶ 40       Fuboy also maintains that the appellate court erroneously concluded that the comment was
    a factual assertion. Fuboy maintains it was simply opinion.
    ¶ 41       Again, we look to three factors to determine whether a statement is an assertion of fact:
    whether the statement has a precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement is
    verifiable; and whether the statement’s literary or social context signals that it has factual
    content. Solaia Technology, 
    LLC, 221 Ill. 2d at 581
    . For the reasons stated above, we find
    Fuboy’s comment had a precise and readily understood meaning, i.e., Fuboy intended to
    convey the idea that Hadley was a pedophile or had engaged in sexual acts with children. Thus,
    the first factor is met. We further find the second factor, verifiability, is met. If Hadley had in
    fact molested young boys or children, those individuals could come forward, just as they did in
    the Sandusky case. Lastly, with respect to the forum, we note, as the appellate court did, that
    while the Internet is susceptible to hyperbole, exaggerations, and rhetoric, it is also a place
    where factual content is conveyed. There is nothing in the content or forum of the Freeport
    Journal Standard’s website to suggest that Fuboy’s allegation could not reasonably be
    interpreted as stating an actual fact. Indeed, Fuboy expressed familiarity with Hadley not only
    through the reference to where Hadley lived but also by his comment regarding Hadley’s
    alleged suicide attempt and how it was like “It’s a Wonderful Life.” These references would
    give readers the reasonable belief that Fuboy had personal knowledge of or familiarity with
    Hadley. We find that Fuboy’s comment cannot be viewed as mere hyperbole. Moreover, as the
    court stated in Maxon, “unless we are prepared to hold as a matter of law that nothing
    published on the Internet is capable of being interpreted as factual, the mere fact that the
    allegedly defamatory statement is published on the Internet does not render it hyperbole.”
    
    Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 716
    . We agree. Accordingly, we find that Fuboy’s comment can
    reasonably be considered an assertion of fact.
    ¶ 42       We conclude that Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a cause of action for
    defamation sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit
    court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224.
    ¶ 43                                           CONCLUSION
    ¶ 44      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand this
    matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    -9-
    ¶ 45   Appellate court judgment affirmed.
    ¶ 46   Cause remanded.
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 118000

Citation Numbers: 2015 IL 118000

Filed Date: 7/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2020

Cited By (26)

Doe v. Catholic Diocese , 2015 IL App (2d) 140618 ( 2015 )

Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC , 41 N.E.3d 1011 ( 2015 )

Dobias v. Oak Park , 2016 IL App (1st) 152205 ( 2016 )

Foote v. Corrections Officer Ben Streed , 2022 IL App (4th) 220333-U ( 2022 )

Allen v. The Clark County Park District Board of ... , 67 N.E.3d 536 ( 2016 )

Carey v. Pritzker , 2023 IL App (1st) 210977-U ( 2023 )

Hadley v. Subscriber Doe , 34 N.E.3d 549 ( 2015 )

Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta , 2022 IL App (2d) 210234 ( 2022 )

Butler Brothers Supply Division, LLC v. HN Precision Co. , 2022 IL App (2d) 220148-U ( 2022 )

Veazey v. Rich Township High School District 227 , 2016 IL App (1st) 151795 ( 2016 )

Allen v. Clark County Park District Board of Commissioners , 2016 IL App (4th) 150963 ( 2017 )

Better Government Association v. Illinois High School Ass'n , 2017 IL 121124 ( 2018 )

Tirio v. Dalton , 2019 IL App (2d) 181019 ( 2019 )

Dew-Becker v. Wu , 2020 IL 124472 ( 2020 )

Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. , 2020 IL App (1st) 191652 ( 2020 )

Advantage Marketing Group, Inc. v. Keane , 2019 IL App (1st) 181126 ( 2019 )

Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High School Ass'n , 2017 Ill. LEXIS 460 ( 2017 )

Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. , 2022 IL 126795 ( 2022 )

Doe v. Catholic Diocese , 2015 IL App (2d) 140618 ( 2015 )

Veazey v. Rich Township High School District 227 , 59 N.E.3d 857 ( 2016 )

View All Citing Opinions »