People v. Woods ( 2023 )

2023 IL 127794IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 127794)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
CAROLINE WOODS, Appellant.
Opinion filed March 23, 2023.
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, and
Cunningham concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Rochford took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Caroline
Woods was convicted of four counts of aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2016)). The jury also concluded that the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the aggravated battery was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Defendant’s paramour and
codefendant, Andrew Richardson, was found guilty of the same offenses.
Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years in the Department of
Corrections. On appeal, defendant challenged her convictions on the basis that,
inter alia, the jury instructions on accountability and parental accountability were
directly conflicting instructions. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s
convictions. 2021 IL App (1st) 190493. On appeal to this court, defendant argues
that (1) jury instructional error on an essential element cannot be harmless error and
(2) even if it could be harmless error, it was not in this case. We find that any
conflict in the required knowledge element in the accountability instructions was
harmless error because defendant’s knowledge was not an essential element when
defendant was proven guilty of aggravated battery of a child beyond a reasonable
doubt as a principal. Thus, we affirm defendant’s convictions.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant and Richardson were jointly charged in a 27-count indictment for
the abuse of defendant’s son, Z.W. The State elected to proceed to trial on four
counts. Count II alleged that both defendants committed aggravated battery of a
child in that defendants, knowingly and without legal justification, caused Z.W.
great bodily harm by striking Z.W. about his body. Count IV alleged aggravated
battery of a child against both defendants but alleged that the battery caused
permanent disfigurement. Counts V and VI alleged that both defendants committed
aggravated battery of a child, knowingly and without legal justification causing
Z.W. great bodily harm and permanent disfigurement, respectively, by burning
Z.W. about the body. Defendant and Richardson were tried separately and
simultaneously, with defendant by a jury and Richardson by the court. The State
argued that defendant was guilty as both a principal and under the doctrine of
accountability.
¶4 Around 10 a.m. on October 2, 2016, Z.W. was found, alone, on Lake Shore
Drive in Chicago by Mason Arion. Arion testified that he was walking his dog that
morning when he observed a young male child “sort of jogging” and “sort of
limping” north along Lake Shore Drive. Arion approached the child, whom Arion
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identified in court from a photograph as Z.W., and chatted with the child until a
police officer arrived. Arion observed visible scars and bruises on the child.
¶5 Sergeant Troy Williams, an officer with the Chicago Police Department,
responded on October 2, 2016, to a report of an approximately seven-year-old boy
running northbound on Lake Shore Drive. Williams arrived at a park in that area
and found Arion talking to a young boy. The boy identified himself as Z.W.
Williams observed facial scars and bruises on Z.W. and observed that Z.W. had a
limp. Z.W. was dressed in a gray shirt and blue jeans, with what appeared to be a
diaper protruding from Z.W.’s waistband. Z.W. told Williams that he wanted to go
to the park. When asked about his injuries, Z.W. told Williams that they were
punishment wounds from his parents. Z.W. also showed Williams a wound or scar
on Z.W.’s back, which Z.W. stated was from being held on a stove by his father.
Due to Z.W.’s physical condition, an ambulance was sent to the scene. After
paramedics initially examined Z.W., Williams and the ambulance proceeded to the
apartments where Z.W. indicated he lived, 4800 South Chicago Beach Drive.
¶6 Lieutenant Jacob Alderden arrived at 4800 South Chicago Beach Drive after
talking to Williams. Alderden observed obvious injuries on Z.W.’s face. Alderden
spoke with Z.W. in the ambulance. Z.W. stated that he had been routinely beaten
by his mother and his father, and he proceeded to tell Alderden about the various
weapons used to inflict the injuries. At that point, Alderden halted the interview so
that he could document the interview. After two officers with body-worn cameras
joined them in the ambulance, Alderden continued the interview with Z.W.
¶7 Z.W. told Alderden that his bedroom was the closet that was to the left in the
hallway of the apartment. There was a camera in the closet and also cameras outside
the closet. Z.W. said the cameras were to protect him and keep him safe. Defendant,
Richardson, and Z.W.’s sister, H.R., would strike Z.W. with a black baseball bat
that was by the front door, on all areas of Z.W.’s body. Defendant and Richardson
would strike Z.W. with Richardson’s black belt and a white wire cord. Defendant
would strike Z.W. with the black pole for the vacuum cleaner on his head, arms,
hands, back, legs, and neck. The cuts on Z.W.’s face were caused when Richardson
struck Z.W. with a metal spray bottle. Defendant and H.R. were home at the time.
Z.W. said that the last time he left the apartment was last year, to go to the store.
The last time Z.W. had been struck was the day before, by defendant. Alderden
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then asked Z.W. what caused the scab on his back. Z.W. stated that Richardson held
Z.W. against the burners on the stove. Defendant was home at the time but in the
bedroom asleep with H.R. Z.W. did not tell defendant about the burn, but Z.W.
heard Richardson tell defendant. Z.W. said “she didn’t care”; “[s]he never does.”
Z.W. left the apartment that day because the front door was unlocked. He put on
pants, a shirt, and shoes and ran for the elevator. Z.W. was trying to go play at the
playground. Defendant would know Z.W. left the apartment because the cameras
were connected to both her phone and to Richardson’s phone.
¶8 Bodycam footage of defendant and H.R. entering the lobby on October 2, 2016,
was played for the jury. Upon entering the lobby and seeing police officers,
defendant calls out that she was just about to call the police. She then tells police
officers that, when she left her apartment to throw something away downstairs, her
son, Z.W., was not feeling well and was asleep in bed. After defendant returned
about 10 minutes later, he was gone. Defendant stated that this was the first time
that Z.W. had ever left the apartment alone but it was also the first time she ever
left him alone. Defendant also stated that, about four years earlier, her aunt had
molested Z.W. and also “beat on him and hurt him.” Defendant went on to say that
Z.W. was accident-prone, he tripped a lot, and he blamed the injuries on other
people. When asked what happened to Z.W.’s face and body, defendant stated that
Z.W. had been in a few accidents. Defendant and Z.W. had been in a motor vehicle
accident five or six years earlier, and defendant and Z.W. had recently fallen down
the stairs together. Defendant did not seek medical attention for either of them
because she did not feel the injuries were that serious. The scar on Z.W.’s back was
from the motor vehicle accident. Defendant stated that she lived alone with her two
children; her former fiancé had moved to California. When asked if the former
fiancé was abusive, defendant stated that the fiancé was not abusive toward her or
Z.W. and the fiancé treated Z.W. very well. Defendant reported that Z.W. had a
disability.
¶9 Marsha Byndom testified that she resided at 4800 South Chicago Beach Drive
in 2015 and 2016. Byndom would see defendant out walking almost daily, pushing
a little girl in a stroller. Byndom never saw any other children with defendant.
¶ 10 Ronnie Rush testified that he began working at the Newport Condominiums,
4800 South Chicago Beach Drive, in December 2015 and he was still employed
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there on October 2, 2016. Rush was employed as the chief engineer and was
responsible for the maintenance work on the buildings. Rush identified defendant
and Richardson as residents of the condominiums. Rush would see defendant
almost every morning; defendant would leave the building with a baby girl in a
stroller. Rush often opened the door for defendant. Rush saw Richardson less often,
possibly once or twice a week. Rush never saw defendant or Richardson together,
or with any other children, other than on one occasion when Rush went to their
apartment in response to a leaking bathtub in the late summer of 2016. On that day,
when Rush arrived at the apartment, there was initially no response to his knock.
Richardson was contacted, and Rush returned to the apartment to meet Richardson
in the hallway. Richardson did an irregular knock on the door that Rush believed
was a code for defendant to open the door. Defendant answered the door; she was
holding the little girl that Rush had observed defendant pushing in the stroller. Rush
observed a little boy on the couch in the front room that Rush had never seen before.
Rush identified the little boy as Z.W. Rush noticed scratches and marks on Z.W.’s
face, neck, and part of his chest. Rush testified that he did not report Z.W.’s injuries
because Richardson told Rush that Z.W. was defendant’s nephew and Richardson
had just picked Z.W. up that morning because Z.W. was being sexually abused by
an aunt.
¶ 11 Upon entering the apartment, Richardson went directly to the couch and sat
shoulder-to-shoulder with Z.W. Z.W. was holding what Rush believed to be a dog
shock collar. While walking around the apartment, Rush noticed a number of
cameras and a closet set up like sleeping quarters. There was a pillow and a blanket
on the floor of the closet, and there was a strap hanging from the closet’s clothes
rod. Rush shared his lunch with Z.W., with Richardson’s permission.
¶ 12 Rush returned to the apartment a week or two later. Richardson answered the
door, and Rush observed defendant and the little girl in the bedroom before
Richardson closed the door. Rush did not observe Z.W., but he did notice that the
closet door was closed that day.
¶ 13 Gabrielle Aranda testified that she was working as a social worker at Comer
Children’s Hospital on October 2, 2016, when Z.W. was brought into the
emergency department. Z.W. was wearing a soiled diaper that was held together
with duct tape. Aranda noted a number of abrasions on Z.W.’s body: above his right
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eyebrow, on the bridge of his nose, on the left side of his face, behind his left ear,
and on his lower back. Z.W. also had a number of older scars. Aranda identified
the injuries on photographs of Z.W. in the emergency room. Z.W. told Aranda that
he lived with his mother, his sister, and his father. The abrasions on his face were
caused by being struck with a bottle by Richardson. The burn on his back was the
result of being held on the stove by Richardson. Z.W. also identified burns on the
back of his ear, on his scrotum, and on his penis as burns caused by Richardson.
Z.W. told Aranda that defendant struck Z.W. with a pole and that a number of the
scars and marks on his body were caused by defendant striking him with the pole.
Aranda did not ask Z.W. about the source of each scar because Z.W. had too many
scars.
¶ 14 Dr. Veena Ramaiah, a pediatric emergency room physician and child abuse
pediatrician at Comer Children’s Hospital, examined Z.W. on October 3, 2016. Dr.
Ramaiah identified the wounds she noted on Z.W., which were documented in
photographic exhibits. She identified many current and older scarred injuries on
Z.W.’s face, neck, collarbones, shoulders, chest, abdomen, upper and lower back,
arms, penis, groin area, buttocks, legs, and feet. Dr. Ramaiah defined the five
parallel curved wider lines of scar on Z.W.’s abdomen as a pattern mark, consistent
with the pattern of an electric stove, that was highly indicative of abusive injuries.
The linear scars on Z.W.’s back were consistent with being struck with some type
of implement. An ulcerated wound on Z.W.’s back was about two to three weeks
old and consistent with a burn. According to Dr. Ramaiah, the number of scars on
Z.W.’s genitalia, groin, and inner thigh were very specific to abusive injuries. Dr.
Ramaiah ordered a skeletal survey of Z.W., which indicated a healing fracture in
his right foot that was weeks to months old, a healing fracture in his left foot that
was weeks old, and a healing fracture of his left femur that was weeks old. Z.W.’s
scars and injuries were too numerous to count. Dr. Ramaiah’s main medical
diagnosis of Z.W. was physical abuse; she opined that Z.W. was a victim of torture.
¶ 15 Officer Jerry Doskocz testified that he was an evidence technician for the
Chicago Police Department. While assisting with executing a search warrant of
defendant’s and Richardson’s apartment, Doskocz took photographs of the one-
bedroom apartment and identified those photographs in court. There was a black
wooden baseball bat leaning against the wall at the end of the entry hallway. Along
the same wall, in the living room, Doskocz identified a black belt and a pink hair
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iron. There were three surveillance cameras in the apartment, one of which was in
a closet. The camera wires led to a smaller television in the living room, to the right
of a larger television, and showed a live feed from the cameras. There was a vacuum
cleaner in the living room, along the same wall as the televisions. The stove in the
kitchen was an electric stove, with electric burners. In the hallway closet near the
bathroom, there was a white power strip on the floor that was not connected to a
power source and a strap tied to and hanging from the closet’s clothes rod. There
were three okra cans and two water bottles in the same closet. In the other closet in
the hallway, there was a metal starch can and a black hair iron.
¶ 16 Bryan Boeddeker, a detective with the Chicago Police Department, testified that
he met with Z.W. at Comer Children’s Hospital on October 2, 2016. He observed
visible injuries on Z.W.’s face and arms. Z.W. described abuse by defendant and
Richardson. Z.W. stated that both defendant and Richardson struck Z.W. on the
feet with the black baseball bat that was kept in the hallway by the front door.
Richardson burned Z.W. on the stove in the kitchen. Both defendant and
Richardson struck Z.W. on the head and the back of the neck with a black belt.
Z.W. said that he received the injury above his eyebrow when Richardson struck
Z.W. with a metal spray bottle a few weeks earlier. Z.W. had an injury to the left
side of his penis that was caused by Richardson burning him with a black hair iron.
Both defendant and Richardson injured Z.W. with vacuum cleaner hoses, electrical
cords, a belt, the black baseball bat, the stove, and a hair iron. Z.W. said that
defendant installed the video camera inside the closet, and Z.W. had observed
images of himself on both defendant’s and Richardson’s cell phones. Boeddeker
reviewed some of the video footage that was stored on the hard drive next to the
small television in the apartment; the footage was from a variety of different dates
and times. The last footage that was recovered from the hard drive was from April
2016. Boeddeker did not view any footage of defendant striking Z.W.
¶ 17 Alison Alstott, a forensic interviewer for the Chicago Children’s Advocacy
Center, conducted the initial forensic interview of Z.W. in his hospital room at
Comer Children’s Hospital on October 3, 2016. During the videotaped interview, a
detective, an individual from the Department of Children and Family Services, and
an assistant state’s attorney were present behind a curtain to observe. Z.W. told
Alstott that Richardson liked to strike Z.W. When asked about the very last time
that Richardson struck him, Z.W. reported that Richardson struck Z.W. on the nose
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with a book in the living room. At the time, defendant was putting H.R. to sleep.
Z.W. described how Richardson caused the injury to Z.W.’s back by holding
Z.W.’s arms and legs and holding Z.W. against the hot burner of the stove. There
were video cameras in the apartment that were linked to defendant’s and
Richardson’s cell phones. When asked if Richardson held Z.W. on the stove more
than the one time, Z.W. responded that Richardson had done it three times. The
first time, Richardson used do-rags to tie up Z.W.’s arms and legs. Richardson used
tape from underneath the sink to place over Z.W.’s mouth while holding him on the
stove. Alstott asked if Richardson ever injured Z.W. in another way. Z.W. showed
Alstott an injury over his right eye where Richardson had struck Z.W. with a metal
spray bottle.
¶ 18 When asked if anyone else ever struck him, Z.W. replied that defendant would
also strike him. Defendant had struck Z.W. on the head with a black vacuum pole;
on his back with a black baseball bat; and on his legs, feet, back, head, arms, and
hands with a belt and a white wiring cord.
¶ 19 Alstott asked if something different from the stove ever burned Z.W. Z.W.
replied that Richardson had burned his “peepee” with a black hair iron. Z.W. said
“they” had three hair irons, a black one, a blue one, and a pink one, and they used
the black one on his “peepee.”
¶ 20 Z.W. testified at trial that he was born on October 22, 2008. He was nine years
old at the time of trial and was in the fourth grade. He was currently residing in a
transition center. Z.W. described three homes that he had lived in with defendant
and Richardson: first a yellow house until he was about four years old, then a blue
house until he was about six years old, and then the apartment building. Richardson
first injured Z.W. while they were living in the yellow house, tying Z.W. to a bed
and striking Z.W. in the back with a baseball bat. Richardson also struck Z.W. with
a wire and a belt. Richardson did the same things to Z.W. in the blue house. No one
else struck Z.W. while he lived in the yellow and the blue houses.
¶ 21 After moving to the apartment, Z.W. slept in the closet, on a blanket. Defendant
and Richardson would tie Z.W.’s hands to a rope hanging from the clothes rod in
the closet. Z.W. was sometimes allowed out to use the bathroom. Z.W. would often
eat in the closet, mostly okra and water. While living in the apartment, Richardson
did a number of things to injure Z.W., including striking Z.W. in the face with a
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baseball bat. Defendant struck Z.W.’s feet with the bat. Richardson burned Z.W.’s
face on the stove, and Richardson also burned Z.W.’s privates with the stove and a
hair iron. Defendant also burned Z.W.’s privates with a hair iron. On cross-
examination, Z.W. confirmed that defendant burned Z.W.’s privates with a hair
iron, at a different time than when Richardson did so. Although Z.W. did not
initially tell the police officers that defendant had also burned his privates with a
hair iron, Z.W. did tell Alstott during the videotaped interview at the hospital.
¶ 22 On the day Z.W. escaped from the apartment, defendant had tied Z.W. to the
rope in the closet. Richardson was in California. Z.W. managed to untie the knot,
and he took the elevator down to leave the building. Z.W. testified that sometimes
defendant would be away from the apartment when Richardson hurt Z.W., but
sometimes defendant was home. If defendant was home, she would try to calm H.R.
¶ 23 Defendant testified in her own defense. She met Richardson in 2012, when
Z.W. was almost four years old, and they began living together later in 2012. In late
2012, an allegation was made by Richardson and a family friend that defendant’s
aunt was sexually abusing Z.W. Defendant called the police and took Z.W. to the
emergency room. Defendant’s aunt moved out, and defendant, Richardson, and
Z.W. continued to live with defendant’s grandmother until the grandmother passed
away in July 2013. Then, they moved in with Richardson’s father. During that time,
Z.W. was attending preschool. Defendant thought that Richardson was initially
very good with Z.W., but she first witnessed Richardson strike Z.W. in December
2013. Richardson struck Z.W. in the back of his head so hard that Z.W. stumbled.
Defendant told Richardson not to do that again. Defendant’s and Richardson’s
daughter, H.R., was born in January 2014.
¶ 24 Defendant, Richardson, and both children moved again around August 2015,
after Richardson’s father passed away, into the apartment. Richardson installed
cameras inside the apartment that he could monitor. Richardson was a personal
trainer with an inconsistent schedule. When they first moved into the apartment,
defendant, Z.W., and H.R. would go to the park, play video games, and play with
toys. Z.W. no longer attended school; defendant homeschooled him. Z.W. initially
slept on the couch, but he was having accidents, so defendant and Richardson
obtained an air mattress for Z.W. to sleep on in the living room. Eventually,
Richardson decided that Z.W. should sleep in the closet.
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¶ 25 After moving to the apartment, Richardson became more agitated with Z.W.
Richardson also started striking defendant. Defendant was frightened of Richardson
because he was physically stronger than her. Defendant and Richardson never left
the apartment together, but defendant would take Z.W. and H.R. out when
Richardson was not around. When she left the apartment, Richardson would
become angry and call her, telling her to return to the apartment. Richardson knew
that defendant had left the apartment because he monitored the cameras.
¶ 26 According to defendant, Richardson had threatened to strike Z.W. with a belt,
but she never witnessed Richardson do so. She only witnessed Richardson strike
Z.W. with his hand. Defendant admitted that she struck Z.W. with a belt and a
“stretchy plastic” hose from the vacuum cleaner, but only on his bottom. Defendant
denied ever striking Z.W. with a baseball bat or ever burning him on the stove. She
did admit to accidently burning Z.W. once with a hair iron on his back. Defendant
denied tying Z.W. up in the closet. Defendant was aware of a scar on Z.W.’s penis,
but she denied knowing that it was caused by an injury. Defendant was aware that
Z.W. had a number of scars, but she did not know how he received most of them.
¶ 27 In mid-2016, Richardson began acting more violently toward Z.W. and striking
Z.W. more often. Defendant saw marks on Z.W., and when she questioned
Richardson, he admitted to striking Z.W. Richardson struck defendant if she
suggested taking Z.W. to the hospital for injuries. Richardson was in charge of
bathing Z.W., but defendant walked in once and observed scars on Z.W.’s stomach.
When defendant confronted Richardson regarding the scars, Richardson said that
he had punished Z.W. for misbehaving. Defendant admitted that Z.W. was terrified
of Richardson.
¶ 28 About a month before October 2, 2016, Richardson told defendant, if asked
about Z.W.’s injuries, to say that she and Z.W. had gotten into a motor vehicle
accident or that she and Z.W. had fallen down the stairs. This was in response to
Richardson getting more violent with Z.W. and Z.W. having more marks on his
body. With respect to the wound on Z.W.’s nose, Richardson told defendant that he
threw a book at Z.W. and accidently struck Z.W. in the face. Defendant noticed the
injury on Z.W.’s left eyebrow about a week before October 2. Richardson told
defendant that he struck Z.W. Defendant cleaned both wounds but did not call the
police or take Z.W. to the hospital.
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¶ 29 Defendant denied leaving the apartment every day with H.R., but she did admit
that she did not take Z.W. out of the apartment at all in the two weeks preceding
October 2 due to the wounds on Z.W.’s face. Defendant only left the apartment on
the morning of October 2 with H.R. to throw away some garbage. It was the first
time she had ever left Z.W. home alone. At the time, Richardson was out of town
and had been for several days. When defendant returned to the apartment and
discovered Z.W. gone, defendant tried to call 911, but the call would not connect.
¶ 30 Defendant was not aware of how Z.W. received all the scars on his face, but she
believed that one was from an accident a few years earlier. Defendant also denied
knowing that Z.W. had ever broken his femur; she thought Z.W. walked differently
because he was pigeon-toed. She was aware that Z.W. had a number of scars on his
back.
¶ 31 At the jury instruction conference, the State offered the pattern jury instruction
on accountability, which was given over defendant’s objection as People’s
instruction No. 14:
“A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person when,
either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of an offense, he knowingly solicits, aids,
abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or
commission of an offense.
The word ‘conduct’ includes any criminal act done in furtherance of the
planned and intended act.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03
(approved Oct. 28, 2016) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 5.03).
¶ 32 The State also offered two nonpattern jury instructions from the committee note
to IPI Criminal No. 5.03, which were given over defendant’s objection. One of
those instructions, the instruction at issue here, People’s instruction No. 15, stated:
“A parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent knows or should
know about a danger to the child and the parent has the physical ability to
protect the child. Criminal conduct may arise by overt acts or by an omission to
act where there is a legal duty to do so.” IPI Criminal No. 5.03, Committee Note
(approved Oct. 28, 2016).
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¶ 33 Defendant argued that People’s instruction No. 15 should not be given pursuant
to People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189 (2002), because the instruction improperly
defined the necessary mental state for aggravated battery. The trial court overruled
the objection, distinguishing Pollock on the basis that defendant’s knowledge of the
purported abuse in Pollock was at issue, while defendant’s knowledge of the abuse
in the instant case was not at issue, since defendant testified that she knew of the
abuse. Specifically, the court stated:
“[I]n Pollock, that was a scenario where there was evidence by which it was
possible that the defendant did not know of the purported abuse by the other
person. By virtue of [defendant’s] testimony, it is clear that [defendant] did
know. So I don’t think taking the, should know, out is appropriate in this
because [defendant] acknowledged by virtue of her testimony that she did
know. So unlike Pollock where there was purportedly an instance where the
instructions had the potential effect to put criminal liability upon a person who,
A, might not have known and perhaps could not have known, that’s not the
scenario that we have here on the evidence.”
¶ 34 In her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the elements that the State
needed to prove, as stated in the jury instructions, including the proposition of legal
responsibility and accountability. The prosecutor read the accountability
instructions to the jury and stated: “most importantly in this case, His Honor will
tell you that a parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent knows or
should know about a danger to the child, and the parent has the physical ability to
protect the child.” The prosecutor argued that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily harm on Z.W. Additionally, the prosecutor argued that defendant was legally
responsible for Richardson’s abuse of Z.W. because defendant knew what
Richardson was doing to Z.W. and she not only did nothing but she facilitated the
abuse. Defense counsel argued that defendant could not physically fulfill her duty
as a parent to protect Z.W. because Richardson was controlling and striking her,
too. If defendant attempted to stop Richardson, Richardson struck defendant.
¶ 35 The jury found defendant guilty on all four counts of aggravated battery of a
child. In her amended motion for a new trial, which was denied, defendant argued,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing the “should know” language in
People’s instruction No. 15 over defendant’s objection.
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¶ 36 At sentencing, the trial court found that the permanent disfigurement counts
(counts IV and VI) merged with the great bodily harm counts (counts II and V),
and it sentenced defendant to consecutive 25-year sentences on counts II and V.
The court found that the criminal conduct forming the basis for the verdicts was
accompanied by brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The
court specified on the record that defendant’s liability was not premised on her
passive presence; rather, both defendant and Richardson “were active participants
in the brutalization of [Z.W.]”
¶ 37 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury
on accountability. 2021 IL App (1st) 190493, ¶ 2. The appellate court affirmed
defendant’s convictions, rejecting defendant’s argument that the jury received
contrary and conflicting instructions on accountability such that defendant was
deprived of a fair trial. Id. ¶ 65. The jury was instructed on the theory of
accountability with IPI Criminal No. 5.03, and it was also given additional
accountability instructions derived from the committee note for IPI Criminal No.
5.03. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. The additional accountability instructions, which concerned
parental accountability, were derived from People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218(1992). 2021 IL App (1st) 190493, ¶ 56. After summarizing Stanciel (id.), the court
analyzed the resulting parental accountability instruction that was given in Pollock
(id. ¶ 57). In Pollock, the defendant had been convicted solely on the basis that she
was accountable for her boyfriend’s actions that resulted in the murder of her child.
Id. Under the facts of Pollock, where there was no evidence that the defendant
abused her child, no evidence that she was present when her child was abused, and
no evidence that she was aware of any abusive acts committed by her boyfriend,
the law of accountability was misstated in the additional instruction and in the
State’s repeated argument that the defendant could be found guilty if she did not
know, but should have known, that her boyfriend was abusing her child. Id. ¶ 60.
Since the State’s case was based exclusively on the defendant’s accountability, the
error was not harmless. Id.
¶ 38 In affirming defendant’s convictions, the appellate court found that there was
no confusion or inconsistency between the primary accountability instruction and
the issues instructions, so the jury was properly informed of the required mental
state. Id. ¶ 65. Specifically, the appellate court found that (1) the evidence
overwhelmingly established that defendant was aware of the injuries sustained by
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Z.W. and inflicted by Richardson, (2) the State only referred to the additional
accountability instruction once during closing arguments when it was read to the
jury, (3) the State was not relieved of its burden of proof because the primary
accountability instruction and the issues instruction did not state that defendant
“knew or should have known” and neither minimized the requirement of knowing
mental state, and (4) the State pursued and overwhelmingly established that
defendant was a principal just as much as she was accountable for Richardson’s
acts. Id. ¶¶ 62-68.
¶ 39 In her petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that (1) the jury instruction
error could not be, and was not, harmless error, (2) the appellate court read Pollock
too narrowly and misapprehended the facts of Pollock, and (3) the appellate court
overlooked the fact that the State encouraged the jury to give special emphasis to
People’s instruction No. 15. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
¶ 40 ANALYSIS
¶ 41 Defendant argues that she was denied a fair trial because the trial court gave the
jury directly conflicting instructions regarding accountability, one of which
incorrectly stated that a negligent mental state was sufficient to trigger a parent’s
liability. Defendant contends that when a jury receives conflicting instructions on
the law, one of which is incorrect, such instructional error can never be deemed
harmless.
¶ 42 The State acknowledges that this court, in Pollock, held that it is error to instruct
the jury that a parent’s duty to act is triggered if a parent “should know” a child is
being abused because a knowing mental state is required for aggravated battery of
a child. But the State argues that defendant’s convictions should be affirmed
because any error in the accountability instructions was harmless where the
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty as a
principal, so defendant’s knowledge of Richardson’s abuse of Z.W. was not an
essential element. Alternatively, the State argues that, even if defendant was
convicted under the accountability theory, any error in the parental duty portion of
the instructions was also harmless because defendant admitted at trial that she knew
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Richardson was abusing Z.W. and knew she had a duty to protect Z.W. but that it
was impossible for her to do so.
¶ 43 To prove a defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a child, the State must
prove that the defendant was at least 18 years old, committed a battery, and
knowingly or without legal justification caused great bodily harm or permanent
disfigurement to a child under the age of 13. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West
2016). A defendant may be found guilty based upon her actions as a principal, or
she may be found guilty based upon behavior that makes her accountable for the
crimes of another. See Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d at 233; 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2016).
Accountability is specifically linked to the crime charged, so the intent is dictated
by the underlying crime. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d at 233. Aggravated battery of a child
is an offense that requires a knowing or intentional state of mind. Pollock, 202 Ill.
2d at 209.
¶ 44 As noted above, the jury was given People’s instruction No. 14, IPI Criminal
No. 5.03, which accurately instructed the jury on the law of accountability. See 720
ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2016). Over defendant’s objection, the court gave additional
accountability instructions. People’s instruction No. 15, a nonpattern jury
instruction, provided that a parent had a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent
“knows or should know” about a danger to the child. This instruction was derived
from Stanciel, which addressed the consolidated appeals of two mothers who were
both held accountable for their respective child’s murder by a paramour. Stanciel,
153 Ill. 2d at 232. We held in Stanciel that, to sustain a conviction for murder on
accountability grounds, it was sufficient to show that, since murder was a general
intent crime, a defendant had a general intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the offense. Id. at 234. Intent to promote or facilitate could be shown
by evidence that a defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal or there was
a common criminal design. Id. at 234-35. We concluded that a mother’s knowledge
that her child was the victim of a pattern of abuse, along with the mother’s
continued sanctioned exposure of the child to the abuse, was sufficient to support
the inference that the mother shared the principal’s criminal intent or there was a
common criminal design. Id. at 235. The mothers could be found legally
responsible for the murders of their children based on their failure to protect them
from what they knew was serious ongoing abuse. Id. at 237. As we later clarified
in Pollock, the statement in Stanciel that defendants “ ‘either knew or should have
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known of the serious nature of the injuries which the victims were sustaining’ ” was
not intended to reduce the knowing or intentional mens rea requirement. (Emphasis
omitted.) Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 215 (quoting Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d at 237). Rather,
that statement stands for the proposition that, when accountability is based on
failure to act, a parent’s knowledge that there was a substantial risk that death or
great bodily harm would result can be inferred from evidence that the parent was
aware of the severity of the injuries being sustained by the child. Id.¶ 45 Thus, as we found in Pollock, IPI Criminal No. 5.03 correctly instructed jurors
that accountability liability required a knowing mental state. The instruction based
on the committee note to IPI Criminal No. 5.03 incorrectly allowed that a negligent
mental state sufficed to trigger a parent’s culpability. See id. at 216.
¶ 46 Although acknowledging that People’s instruction No. 15 was incorrect, the
State contends that the error is subject to harmless-error review. Generally, jury
instructions, when considered as a whole, should fully and fairly announce the law
that is applicable to the case. Id. at 210. While IPI instructions that are appropriate
to the issues in the case should be given, a trial court may exercise its discretion
and give nonpattern instructions. Id. at 211-12. However, as a whole, the
instructions must not be misleading or confusing. Id. at 212.
¶ 47 Defendant acknowledges that some errors in jury instructions can be considered
harmless, such as when an inaccurate instruction, standing alone, may be
misleading but other instructions clear up the confusion. See People v. Nere, 2018
IL 122566, ¶ 67. Defendant contends, though, that the giving of two directly
conflicting instructions on an essential issue in the case can never be harmless. In
support of her argument, defendant relies primarily on People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d
61 (1977), Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, and People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729.
¶ 48 In Jenkins, a jury found the defendant guilty of attempted murder. Jenkins, 69
Ill. 2d at 63. The jury was given two issue instructions, one submitted by the State
and one submitted by the defendant. Id. at 64. The State’s attempted murder
instruction required the jury to find the defendant guilty if he performed an act that
constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder and
did so with the intent to commit that particular crime. Id. The State’s instruction
made no mention of the third essential element: the defendant must not have been
justified in using the force employed. Id. at 65. The defendant’s attempted murder
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instruction was correct; it directed the jury to find the defendant guilty if all three
elements were present. Id. Applying plain error analysis because the defendant
failed to object to the State’s instruction, this court held that the giving of two
conflicting mandatory instructions on an essential element that was at issue in the
case was a prejudicial error and required reversal. Id. at 65-66. In reaching that
conclusion, we relied on the fact that the instructions were mandatory and directly
contradictory on the element of justified use of force, which was at issue in the case,
so it could not be known if the defendant was convicted on the basis of the
erroneous instruction. Id. at 67 (“Where the instructions are contradictory[,] the jury
is put in the position of having to select the proper instruction—a function
exclusively that of the court.”).
¶ 49 In Pollock, the jury was given the same additional nonpattern jury instruction
regarding parental accountability that was given in this case, based upon the
committee note to IPI Criminal No. 5.03 and Stanciel:
“A parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent knows or should
have known about a danger to the child and the parent has the physical ability
to protect the child.
Criminal conduct may arise not only by overt acts, but by an omission to
act where there is a legal duty to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d. at 208.
We concluded that the law of accountability was misstated in that the jury was
instructed that the defendant could be held accountable if she did not know, but
should have known, of her paramour’s abusive conduct. Id. at 216. It was
undisputed that the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery of a child and
felony murder based solely on the theory of accountability. Id. at 210. Under the
specific facts of that case, where there was no evidence the defendant knew of any
abuse by her paramour, but the jury received the “should have known” instruction
and the prosecutor repeatedly argued that the defendant could be held accountable
if she did not know, but should have known, that her paramour was abusing her
child, the additional accountability instruction could not be deemed harmless. Id. at
216.
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¶ 50 Our statement in Pollock that “[i]f conflicting instructions are given, one being
a correct statement of law and the other an incorrect statement of law, the error
cannot be deemed harmless” (id. at 212) has to be interpreted in light of the facts
of the case. Reading Pollock as applicable to its facts, rather than for a broad
statement of law that conflicting jury instructions can never be harmless error, is in
line with our decision in People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1979).
¶ 51 In Jones, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder. Id. at 4. While the
offense of attempted murder required the mental state of specific intent to kill, the
jury also received definitional murder instructions that referred to both intent to do
bodily harm and knowledge that one’s acts may cause, or create the possibility of,
bodily harm. Id. at 7-8. We held that the error in the conflicting jury instructions on
intent to kill was harmless, since intent to kill was “blatantly evident from the
circumstances” and the only question for the jury was whether the defendant was
the perpetrator. Id. at 10.
¶ 52 While this case was pending on appeal, we filed the opinion in Hartfield, 2022
IL 126729. Defendant argues that Hartfield reaffirms the proposition that two
directly conflicting jury instructions on the burden of proof in relation to an
essential element of the offense cannot be deemed harmless.
¶ 53 In Hartfield, the jury was instructed that a person commits the offense of
aggravated discharge of a firearm when he knowingly discharges the firearm in the
direction of a peace officer. Id. ¶ 18. However, in response to questions from the
jury during deliberations, the jury was instructed to determine if officers may have
been in the line of fire. Id. ¶ 22. Since the defendant did not preserve the issue for
review, we reviewed the jury instruction error for plain error. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. After
concluding that the mid-deliberation instruction was not an accurate statement of
the law, we held that the error was presumed prejudicial. Id. ¶ 59. “[T]wo directly
conflicting instructions on an essential element, one stating the law correctly and
the other erroneously, cannot be cured this way due to the simple fact that we can
never know which instruction the jury was following.” Id.
¶ 54 In line with Hartfield, we conclude that directly conflicting instructions may be
harmless when they do not concern a disputed essential issue in the case so that
there is not a fear that the jury relied on the incorrect instruction.
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¶ 55 Since we have concluded that erroneous conflicting jury instructions may be
harmless, we must consider if they are harmless in this case. “ ‘An error in a jury
instruction is harmless if it is demonstrated that the result of the trial would not have
been different had the jury been properly instructed.’ ” People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d
53, 69 (2008) (quoting People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2003)). While we
generally review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to give a
particular instruction (id. at 66), we review de novo the question of whether the jury
instructions accurately conveyed the applicable law to the jury (People v. Pierce,
226 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (2007)).
¶ 56 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her
convictions. If she had, our review would be whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Dennis, 181
Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1998). Rather, to establish that an error was harmless, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error. People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 121. “Where the evidence
of guilt is clear and convincing, an instructional error may be deemed harmless.”
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 95.
¶ 57 We begin by addressing the State’s primary argument—that the error in the
parental duty portion of the accountability instructions was harmless because the
evidence proved that defendant was guilty as a principal. The State relies on the
theory that when a jury is instructed on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is
improper, harmless-error analysis is proper, citing People v. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244,
270-71 (2009). In Davis, the defendant argued that the jury was incorrectly
instructed that it could convict him of felony murder based on aggravated battery,
since the acts in the aggravated battery were the predicate for the first degree murder
counts. Id. at 262. We agreed with the State that it was error, but any error was
harmless under the one-good-count presumption. Id. at 263. In Davis, the defendant
was charged with three different theories of first degree murder—intentional,
knowing, and felony murder—for killing a single victim, and the jury returned the
single general verdict form finding the defendant guilty. Id. When such a general
verdict is returned, the defendant is guilty as charged in each count, and it is
presumed that defendant committed the most serious offense. Id.- 19 -
¶ 58 In People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1994), the trial court gave an
accountability instruction when there was no evidence to support that theory of
guilt. We concluded that, since the entirety of the State’s case was that the
defendant alone shot the victim, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on
the theory that he was accountable for the acts of others, so the extra accountability
instruction was harmless error. Id. at 51-52.
¶ 59 Defendant argues that these cases do not involve directly conflicting
instructions. Although the situations in Davis and Williams involved giving
additional instructions that were not warranted by the law or by the evidence, the
State argues that the logic also applies when an erroneous instruction on
accountability is given, and warranted by the evidence, but the evidence is
sufficient to convict defendant as a principal. We agree with the State. See People
v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355, 404 (1992) (erroneous jury instructions that allowed jury
to convict for attempted murder based upon felony murder and knowledge that the
act performed would cause death or created a strong probability of death, rather
than intent to kill, did not amount to reversible error when intent to kill was clear
from the evidence).
¶ 60 Defendant and Richardson were charged jointly in the four counts of aggravated
battery that proceeded to trial. Counts V and VI alleged that defendant and
Richardson burned Z.W., and counts II and IV alleged that defendant and
Richardson struck Z.W. The State’s theory was that defendant and Richardson
acted together to brutalize and torture Z.W. Defendant does not challenge the jury
instructions regarding principal liability.
¶ 61 The State proved that defendant was guilty as a principal of aggravated battery
of a child by striking, causing Z.W. great bodily harm, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the ambulance before going to the hospital, Z.W. told Alderden that defendant
struck Z.W. with a black bat, a black belt, a white wire cord, and a pole for the
vacuum cleaner. Z.W. made essentially the same statements to Alstott in the
forensic interview: defendant struck Z.W. in the head with a black vacuum pole; on
his back with a black baseball bat; and on his legs, feet, back, head, arms, and hands
with a belt and a white wiring cord. In the hospital, in separate interviews, Z.W.
told Aranda that defendant struck Z.W. with a pole, which caused a number of
Z.W.’s scars and marks, and told Boeddeker that defendant struck Z.W. on his feet
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with a baseball bat and on his head and neck with a black belt. Dr. Ramaiah testified
that the linear scars on Z.W.’s back were consistent with being struck with some
type of implement. Further, Z.W. testified at trial that defendant struck Z.W.’s feet
with a baseball bat, and medical imaging revealed prior fractures in both of Z.W.’s
feet. Defendant admitted at trial that she struck Z.W. with a belt and the hose from
the vacuum cleaner. A black baseball bat was recovered in the entry hallway of the
apartment, a black belt and a vacuum cleaner were recovered in the living room,
and a white power strip, not connected to any power source, was recovered in the
closet that functioned as Z.W.’s bedroom. On the day that Z.W. escaped from the
apartment, defendant made a number of statements to police that can be considered
evidence of consciousness of guilt: Z.W. was accident prone, Z.W. tripped a lot and
blamed other people, defendant’s aunt had hurt Z.W., defendant and Z.W. had been
in a motor vehicle accident, and defendant and Z.W. had fallen down the stairs. See
People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 181 (2004) (a false exculpatory statement is
probative of defendant’s consciousness of guilt).
¶ 62 The State also proved that defendant was guilty as a principal of aggravated
battery of a child by burning, causing Z.W. great bodily harm, beyond a reasonable
doubt. Z.W. testified unequivocally at trial that defendant burned his privates with
a hair iron and reiterated that testimony when challenged on cross-examination. See
People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36 (“The testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive and credible, even where it is
contradicted by the defendant.”). Defendant challenges this testimony on the basis
that Z.W. did not make the same allegation to the police at the scene or to the
forensic interviewer. Defendant argues that Z.W.’s testimony was uncorroborated
and impeached because Z.W.’s prior statements had been consistent that
Richardson burned him. Z.W. acknowledged at trial that he did not tell the first
responders or the police officers that defendant burned him, but he did tell Alstott
during the videotaped forensic interview. In that interview, Z.W. told Alstott that
“they” (defendant and Richardson) both burned Z.W. with the hair iron. Z.W. was
never asked to catalog and describe every injury and scar on his body; according to
Dr. Ramaiah, Z.W.’s scars were too numerous to count, including numerous scars
on his genitalia, groin, and inner thigh. Defendant admitted to burning Z.W. with a
hair iron, although she claimed it was an accident. A pink hair iron was recovered
from the living room of the apartment, near the black belt, and a black hair iron was
found in a closet.
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¶ 63 We find that the evidence of defendant’s guilt as a principal in the abuse of
Z.W. was clear and convincing; the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Since, under the
principal liability theory, defendant’s knowledge of Richardson’s actions toward
Z.W. was not an essential element, any error in the parental accountability
instruction was harmless in this case. See Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 10 (where intent to
kill was “blatantly evident from the circumstances,” contradictory instruction on
the necessary intent was harmless). But cf. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 66 (directly
contradictory instructions on essential element at issue in the case is prejudicial
error); Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 59 (same). Of note, at sentencing, the trial court
emphasized that defendant was guilty as a principal who personally abused Z.W.
The trial court stated that the record was “replete” with evidence that both defendant
and Richardson “were active participants in the torture of this child” and
defendant’s liability was not based on her passive presence.
¶ 64 Alternatively, the State argues that defendant’s knowledge of Richardson’s
abuse of Z.W. was uncontested and not at issue in the case, so the “should have
known” language in the parental accountability instruction was harmless in this
case. While we are affirming defendant’s conviction on the basis of principal
liability, we note that the evidence of defendant’s knowledge and participation in
the abuse of Z.W. was clear and convincing. Not only did Z.W. have visible injuries
that were noted by every witness, defendant admitted that she knew Richardson
was becoming more violent and striking Z.W. more often. Defendant admitted that
the stories that defendant told police about Z.W. being injured in a motor vehicle
accident and a fall on the stairs were fabricated in response to more marks on Z.W.’s
body that might need to be explained. Defendant also admitted that she was aware
that Z.W. had a number of marks and scars on his body, and she had even suggested
to Richardson that Z.W. should be taken to the hospital for some of his injuries.
Defendant knew that Z.W. was terrified of Richardson. In light of defendant’s
proven, and admitted, knowledge of the ongoing abuse of Z.W., there is no chance
that the jury relied on the “should have known” language in the parental
accountability instruction. See Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 9 (“[w]e would be remiss, on
these facts, to hold the conviction should be reversed”).
¶ 65 It should be noted that both parties have requested the amendment of the
committee notes to IPI Criminal No. 5.03. We suggest that, until such time as the
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drafting committee proposes an amendment, any instruction on parental
accountability not include the “should have known” language.
¶ 66 CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are
affirmed.
¶ 68 Affirmed.
¶ 69 JUSTICE ROCHFORD took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
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