People v. Brown , 2024 IL 129585 ( 2024 )

2024 IL 129585IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 129585)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
ALVIN BROWN, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 14, 2024.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Cunningham specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In October 2019, defendant, Alvin Brown, pleaded guilty to driving while
license revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)). Based on his
criminal history, the Boone County circuit court sentenced him to nine years in
prison as a Class X offender under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)). The court later
denied his postplea motion, and the appellate court affirmed. 2023 IL App (4th)
220400, ¶ 1.
¶2 Now on appeal, defendant argues (1) he is entitled to elect the benefit of a Class
X recidivism provision that took effect after sentencing but before the circuit court
ruled on his postplea motion and (2) defense counsel failed to comply with the
requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In July 2017, a grand jury indicted defendant on one count of DWLR (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)), a Class 2 felony, alleging he drove a motor vehicle
on a state highway at a time when (1) his driving privileges had been revoked due
to his commission of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and (2) he
had 14 prior violations for DWLR. The bill of indictment indicated defendant was
subject to Class X sentencing.
¶5 In October 2019, defendant entered an open guilty plea to the offense. At the
plea hearing, the circuit court admonished him that, based on his criminal history,
he was subject to sentencing as a Class X offender with a possible sentencing range
of 6 to 30 years in prison. Defendant indicated he understood. Following a factual
basis, the court accepted his guilty plea, finding it knowing and voluntary.
¶6 In November 2019, the circuit court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing.
At that time, the applicable sentencing statute, section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified
Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)), provided as follows:
“When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class
2 felony *** after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of
an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class
1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater
Class felony, *** and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise
out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X
offender. This subsection does not apply unless:
(1) the first felony was committed after February 1, 1978 ***;
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(2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and
(3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.”
¶7 In support of a Class X sentence, the State’s exhibits showed defendant had
prior felony convictions for (1) burglary, a Class 2 offense committed in September
1978, and (2) rape, a Class X offense committed in July 1981. The State also
submitted evidence indicating defendant was on bond for a March 2017 DWLR
charge when he committed the underlying offense in this case. The State sought a
10-year sentence.
¶8 For the defense, defendant’s sister-in-law, his ex-wife, and his two children
testified on his behalf. Defendant testified he was 64 years old and stated his lengthy
criminal history was the result of “a very bad drug problem.” Defense counsel asked
the circuit court to impose a six-year sentence.
¶9 The circuit court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison and ordered the
sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in Winnebago County
case No. 17-CF-607.
¶ 10 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and vacate his sentence, claiming he was forced to plead guilty after his attorney
told him he would receive a 20-year prison sentence if he went to trial. His pro se
motion for reduction of sentence lacked any specific reasons in support of a
reduction, containing only a boilerplate request asking the circuit court to review
his sentence due to “a litany of substantial extenuating circumstances.” The court
appointed counsel.
¶ 11 In July 2020, defense counsel filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), stating he had consulted
with defendant by phone to ascertain his contentions of error in the sentence,
examined the circuit court file and report of proceedings of the sentencing hearing,
and elected not to file an amended motion.
¶ 12 At the hearing on the postplea motions, counsel indicated defendant did not
want to pursue his motion to vacate the guilty plea. Defendant agreed he did not
want to withdraw his plea. Counsel then argued the nine-year Class X sentence was
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excessive and that defendant should have been sentenced as a Class 2 offender. The
circuit court denied the motion, finding the sentence appropriate.
¶ 13 Defendant appealed, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender was
appointed to represent him. In November 2020, appellate counsel filed an
unopposed motion for summary remand, requesting remand for additional
proceedings under Rule 604(d) due to postplea counsel’s deficient certificate of
compliance. The motion alleged counsel’s certificate was deficient, as it did not
certify he consulted with defendant about both his contentions of error in the guilty
plea and the sentencing hearing.
¶ 14 In granting the motion, the Second District vacated the denial of defendant’s
postplea motion and remanded the matter to the circuit court for the filing of a valid
Rule 604(d) certificate, the opportunity for defendant to file a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentence, and a hearing on any motions. People
v. Brown, No. 2-20-0432 (Dec. 4, 2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23(c)) (granting defendant’s unopposed motion for summary
remand).
¶ 15 At a January 2021 status hearing, the circuit court asked defense counsel if he
had communicated with defendant as to his wishes regarding the filing of a new
motion to withdraw. Counsel indicated he had spoken with defendant, who simply
wanted counsel to file a new certificate. The court inquired of defendant, telling
him he had two options—counsel could file a new certificate and proceed with the
appeal, or defendant could renew his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and have
a hearing. Defendant indicated he wanted counsel to file a new certificate and to
return to the appellate court.
¶ 16 In February 2021, defense counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate, asserting
as follows:
“1. I have consulted with the Defendant in person, by mail, by phone or by
electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the entry
of the plea of guilty and in the sentence;
2. I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea
of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing; and
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3. I have made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate
presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”
¶ 17 Effective July 1, 2021, the General Assembly amended section 5-4.5-95(b) (see
Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)).
The amended version of the statute provided that for Class X sentencing to apply,
a defendant had to be convicted of “a Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony” offense
and have prior qualifying convictions that were also forcible felonies. See id.
¶ 18 In March 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate
the sentence, arguing he did not understand the consequences or the effect of his
plea.
¶ 19 In May 2022, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the postplea motion.
Defense counsel filed a third Rule 604(d) certificate, which was similar to the one
filed in February 2021. Counsel indicated defendant did not intend to seek
withdrawal of his guilty plea, only that the consequences of his sentence be
reconsidered. Counsel pointed out the “changes in the law” and noted that, although
“not retroactive,” the previous enhancements would not apply to defendant at the
current time. The court denied the motion to reconsider the sentence, finding the
sentence “appropriate,” “proper,” and “merited” by defendant’s actions.
¶ 20 Defendant appealed, arguing (1) he was entitled to remand for resentencing
because he was not given the opportunity “to elect the benefit of” amendments to
section 5-4.5-95(b), which made the statute inapplicable to his case and took effect
after his sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his postplea motion, and
(2) the record refuted counsel’s certification of compliance under Rule 604(d),
entitling him to further postplea proceedings.
¶ 21 The Fourth District affirmed. 2023 IL App (4th) 220400, ¶ 1. Pertaining to the
amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b), the appellate court found the doctrine of invited
error precluded defendant’s claim that he was entitled to retroactive application of
the amended statute. Id. ¶ 30. The court also found that, because defendant was not
entitled to have the new version of the statute applied to his case, defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise the argument in the motion to reconsider the
sentence. Id. ¶ 51.
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¶ 22 Regarding the Rule 604(d) issue, the appellate court found defense counsel filed
a certificate that was facially compliant with Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 56. The court also
found the record indicated defendant had been afforded a full and fair second
opportunity to present his motion for reconsideration of his sentence and that
further postplea proceedings were unwarranted. Id. ¶ 61.
¶ 23 In April 2023, defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we
allowed that petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 A. Resentencing and Statutory Amendments
¶ 26 Defendant argues he was entitled to elect the benefit of a Class X recidivism
provision that took effect after sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his
postplea motion. The State initially argues the invited-error doctrine precludes
defendant from claiming he is entitled to resentencing under the amended statute,
as defense counsel explicitly argued the amendment was not retroactive. Defendant,
however, responds that, regardless of whether this court agrees with the State’s
argument, we must still consider the merits of the issue because defense counsel
was ineffective for failing to argue he was entitled to sentencing under the more
favorable version of section 5-4.5-95(b).
¶ 27 A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the
two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People
v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 51. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, “a defendant
must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People
v. Cross, 2022 IL 127907, ¶ 19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
¶ 28 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show “counsel’s
performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v.
Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is
established when a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
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694). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the
failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010).
¶ 29 Whether counsel is ineffective is a question of law subject to de novo review.
People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 52. Moreover, where we are called upon to
employ statutory construction to determine whether a statutory amendment applies
to defendant’s case, that analysis is also subject to de novo review. People v.
Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 15.
¶ 30 Public Act 101-652 was passed by the General Assembly on January 13, 2021,
and signed by Governor Pritzker on February 22, 2021. However, in section 99-
999 of the public act, the legislature delayed implementation of the changes it made
in section 10-281—which amended the recidivism statute by requiring felony
offenses for Class X sentencing to be a “forcible” felony—to July 1, 2021. See Pub.
Act 101-652, § 99-999 (eff. July 1, 2021).
¶ 31 In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of DWLR in October 2019.
In November 2019, the circuit court sentenced him to nine years in prison. A month
later, he filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence.
Ultimately, the circuit court denied his remaining postplea motion in May 2022.
¶ 32 Given the change in the sentencing law created by Public Act 101-652,
defendant argues he was entitled to the benefit of the new provision that took effect
after sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his postplea motion. He
contends that, when a new law contains no explicit indication of temporal reach,
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes guides its application. 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2022).
He points out that section 4 provides, in part, that “[i]f any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by
the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the
new law takes effect.” Id. We note the appellate court here found the temporal reach
of the statute was not clearly indicated and analyzed the issue under section 4. 2023
IL App (4th) 220400, ¶ 36.
¶ 33 The State, however, argues the General Assembly clearly stated its intent that
the amendment apply prospectively only by expressly delaying the amendment’s
implementation date in the text of the legislation. The State argues defendant was
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not entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment that took effect after his
sentencing and thus counsel was not ineffective in declining to argue otherwise.
¶ 34 This court has stated, when evaluating a statute enacted after events giving rise
to the litigation, courts evaluate the temporal reach of the new law utilizing the
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 201 (2007).
“Under the Landgraf standards, the threshold inquiry is whether the legislature has
expressly prescribed the statute’s temporal reach. If it has, that expression of
legislative intent must be given effect absent some constitutional prohibition
against doing so.” Id. “[W]hen a statute is silent as to temporal reach, section 4 of
the Statute on Statutes supplies the default rule and procedural changes are applied
retroactively.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 23.
¶ 35 In Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 201, the statute in question—juvenile justice reform
provisions—contained a section calling for its delayed implementation. Although
the law was enacted in June 1998, the provisions were not to take effect until
January 1999 or January 2000. Id. This court found it clear “that the law was
intended to have only prospective application.” Id.¶ 36 In General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 187 (2011), the amendment
at issue was signed into law on August 12, 2005, and became effective on January
1, 2006. Thus, as in Brown, this court found “the delayed implementation date of
the amendment indicates a clear legislative intent for the prospective application of
the provision.” Id.; see Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 23 (noting “a statute that has
an express delayed implementation date but is otherwise silent as to temporal reach
will be applied prospectively”).
¶ 37 We find the legislature clearly stated its intent that the amendment apply
prospectively when it expressly delayed the amendment’s implementation date in
the text of the legislation. Public Act 101-652 expressly stated the relevant
provisions of the Unified Code became effective on July 1, 2021. Thus, section 4
of the Statute on Statutes does not apply here. See Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234
Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009) (“Because section 4 of the Statute on Statutes operates as a
default standard, it is inapplicable to situations where the legislature has clearly
indicated the temporal reach of a statutory amendment.”).
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¶ 38 Defendant, however, argues a question remains as to whether a defendant has a
right to elect when an amendment is not effective at the time of sentencing but is
effective while the case is still pending in the circuit court. Relying largely on
People v. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, defendant argues he should have been
able to elect to be sentenced under the amended statute because, even after his
sentencing on November 7, 2019, his postplea motion was pending in the circuit
court when the amendment became effective on July 1, 2021.
¶ 39 In Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶¶ 3, 5, the defendant pleaded guilty, and
the circuit court sentenced him as a Class X offender under the version of section
5-4.5-95(b) in effect prior to July 2021 (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)).
Thereafter, he filed postplea motions and had his case remanded for compliance
with Rule 604(d). Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶¶ 6-10. His postplea
proceedings continued on remand after the July 2021 amendment to section 5-4.5-
95(b) took effect, until the circuit court denied his amended motion to reconsider
sentence in October 2021. Id. ¶¶ 11-16.
¶ 40 On appeal, the defendant argued the circuit court erred in denying his amended
motion to reconsider sentence because, since his case was still “pending” in the
circuit court, “he was entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment to section 5-
4.5-95 of the Code that took effect after sentencing but before the trial court ruled
on his amended motion to reconsider the sentence.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 41 The Second District agreed. Id. ¶ 27. Relying on People v. Feldman, 409 Ill.
App. 3d 1124, 1127 (2011), the appellate court found it was “the order denying his
amended motion to reconsider the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the
underlying proceedings.” Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29; see Feldman,
409 Ill. App. 3d at 1127 (stating the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
the “final judgment”). Thus, the court found the case was still pending in the circuit
court when the July 1, 2021, amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) took effect and that
the amended version of the statute should have applied. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d)
210583, ¶ 29. The court then remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id.¶ 42 We find the Spears analysis misguided, as it looked at the ruling on the amended
motion to reconsider sentence instead of the actual imposition of sentence to
determine when the judgment was final. In doing so, the Spears court failed to
adhere to “our long-standing case law holding that imposition of a sentence
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constitutes the final judgment in a criminal case.” People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965,
¶ 23; see People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 19 (“ ‘The final judgment in a
criminal case is the sentence.’ ” (quoting People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 51
(1984))). Thus, because the sentence had been imposed and rendered a final
judgment in that case, the defendant could not elect the benefit of the newer version
of the statute that took effect thereafter. It should be noted that, after Spears was
decided, this court in Walls explicitly stated its disagreement with Feldman and
overruled it. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶ 24. Given Spears’s similar holding, that
decision is likewise overruled.
¶ 43 On both dates of defendant’s offense (June 3, 2017) and sentence (November
7, 2019) in this case, section 5-4.5-95(b) made him eligible for mandatory Class X
sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018). Because the amended statute was
not yet in effect when the circuit court sentenced him in November 2019, defendant
was not entitled to be sentenced under the newer version of section 5-4.5-95(b).
The operative time for determining whether the amended statute applies is the date
of sentencing, and that defendant had a pending postplea motion does not change
the fact that the judgment had been finalized before the July 1, 2021, effective date.
Thus, we reject defendant’s argument that judgment was not final and the
proceedings were ongoing until May 2022 such that he could elect to avail himself
of the newer version of the statute.
¶ 44 Moreover, because defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under the newer
version of section 5-4.5-95(b), where the amended statute was not yet in effect
when the circuit court sentenced him in November 2019, he suffered no prejudice
when defense counsel agreed that the new statute was not retroactive. Thus, counsel
did not render ineffective assistance.
¶ 45 B. Rule 604(d) Compliance
¶ 46 Defendant argues defense counsel failed to comply with the requirements of
Rule 604(d), thereby depriving him of a full and fair hearing on his sentencing
claim. He asks this court to remand for further postplea proceedings.
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¶ 47 Rule 604(d) governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to
appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1,
2017). Specifically, Rule 604(d) provides:
“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that
the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic
means or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence
and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the
report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the
sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for
adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Id.The filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate allows the circuit court to ensure counsel has
reviewed the defendant’s claim and considered all relevant bases for moving to
withdraw the guilty plea or to reconsider the sentence. In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529,
¶ 10. “ ‘The attorney certificate thereby encourages the preservation of a clear
record, both in the trial court and on appeal, of the reasons why a defendant is
moving to withdraw his plea or to reduce sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Shirley,
181 Ill. 2d 359, 361 (1998)). Rule 604(d) warns that any issue not raised by the
defendant in the motion to reconsider sentence or the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea shall be deemed waived on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 48 “This court requires strict compliance with the certification requirement of Rule
604(d).” H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 8. Counsel’s failure to strictly comply with the
rule “requires ‘a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to
withdraw guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.’ ”
People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33
(1994)). Whether counsel has complied with Rule 604(d) is a question of law that
is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 49 In this case, defendant concedes defense counsel’s certificate complied with
Rule 604(d). However, even with the facially sufficient certificate, defendant
argues a review of the record refutes the validity of the certificate such that he did
not receive a full and fair hearing on his sentencing claim. See People v. Curtis,
2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 36 (stating the record may be utilized to refute
compliance with a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate).
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¶ 50 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and a motion to reduce his sentence. After his appointment, defense counsel filed
his Rule 604(d) certificate in July 2020. At the July 2020 hearing on the postplea
motions, counsel told the circuit court that defendant did not want to withdraw his
plea but instead argued his sentence was excessive. Counsel noted defendant had
been arrested “a number of times” but the State on those occasions “chose not to
upgrade it” to a felony. Considering his age and the length of his prison sentence,
counsel asked the court to reconsider its decision. The court denied the motion to
reconsider sentence.
¶ 51 After the case was remanded by the appellate court, defense counsel filed a
second Rule 604(d) certificate in February 2021. In March 2022, counsel filed a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the sentence, claiming defendant did
not understand the consequences of the plea. Counsel then filed his third Rule
604(d) certificate in May 2022.
¶ 52 At the May 2022 hearing, defendant indicated he had had enough time to speak
with counsel about all the issues. Counsel indicated defendant did not wish to
pursue his motion to withdraw his guilty plea but instead wanted his sentence
reconsidered. Counsel said he was “going back to what we had brought up at the
past hearing” and stipulating to the prior arguments on the motion to reduce the
sentence made at the July 2020 hearing. He went on to argue the sentence was
enhanced because of reasons that did not apply at the time of the May 2022 hearing.
He asked the circuit court “on the basis of justice” to reconsider in light of the
“recent changes in the law.” The court denied the motion.
¶ 53 The point of Rule 604(d) is to “ ‘protect the defendant’s interests through
adequate consultation. The certificate serves as evidence that the requisite
consultation has taken place.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 16
(quoting People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 32). This court has rejected
arguments that the strict compliance standard of Rule 604(d) “must be applied so
mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new
hearings following the initial remand hearing.” Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 369. Where a
defendant has been “afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion
for reduced sentencing,” there is “limited value in requiring a repeat of the exercise,
absent a good reason to do so.” Id.- 12 -
¶ 54 Here, the record shows defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to
present his postplea claims. Beyond the sentencing hearing, the circuit court had
two opportunities to reconsider defendant’s sentence. Consistent with counsel’s
valid certificate, defendant explicitly told the court that he had enough time to speak
with counsel regarding the issues. Counsel then argued the sentence was excessive
considering the nature of the offense and even noted the change in the law. Nothing
indicates the ruling would be different following a third attempt at reconsideration.
Moreover, counsel’s argument sufficiently presented the claim to the circuit court
and allowed for appellate review. Thus, requiring another remand and a hearing on
the motion to reduce the sentence “would be an empty and wasteful formality.” Id.
at 370.
¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment.
¶ 57 Judgments affirmed.
¶ 58 JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring:
¶ 59 I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate court must be
affirmed. However, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning in reaching that result.
I believe the majority misconstrues the principal issue presented in this appeal, and
I thus specially concur.
¶ 60 I. Brown’s Reliance on Spears
¶ 61 In October 2019, the defendant, Alvin Brown, pled guilty to the offense of
driving while license revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)).
Based on his criminal history, Brown was found eligible for a Class X sentence,
which has a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
25(a), 5-4.5-95(b) (2018). On November 7, 2019, the trial court sentenced Brown,
as a Class X offender, to nine years in prison.
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¶ 62 On December 9, 2019, Brown filed three pro se motions: (1) a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence, (2) in the alternative, a motion
seeking to reduce his sentence, and (3) a motion for the appointment of counsel.
The trial court granted the latter motion and appointed counsel to represent Brown
during his postplea proceedings. Following a hearing, the trial court denied
Brown’s remaining postplea motions.
¶ 63 On appeal, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s orders denying
Brown’s postplea motions and summarily remanded the matter to the circuit court
for the filing of a valid attorney certificate of compliance as required by Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Brown, No. 2-20-0432
(Dec. 4, 2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23(c)). Brown was also given the opportunity to file new postplea motions and to
have a new motion hearing. Id. Upon remand to the circuit court, defense counsel
filed a motion to reconsider Brown’s sentence.
¶ 64 In January 2021, while Brown’s new postplea motion to reconsider his sentence
was still pending, the Illinois General Assembly enacted an amendment to the Class
X sentencing statute to provide that a defendant must have been convicted of “a
Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony” offense and have prior qualifying convictions
that were also forcible felonies in order to be sentenced as a Class X offender. Pub.
Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)). The
amended statute went into effect on July 1, 2021. There is no dispute that Brown
would not have qualified for Class X sentencing had the amended statute been in
effect at the time of his sentencing in November 2019.
¶ 65 On May 11, 2022, the trial court denied Brown’s new postplea motion to
reconsider his sentence, finding that the nine-year sentence imposed in November
2019 was appropriate. Brown appealed.
¶ 66 On appeal, Brown argued that (1) he was entitled to a remand for resentencing
because he was not given the opportunity “to elect the benefit of” the new, more
favorable sentencing law that became effective in July 2021 and (2) the record
showed his counsel had not filed a valid Rule 604(d) certificate, thus requiring
further postplea proceedings. The appellate court rejected both arguments and
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. 2023 IL App (4th) 220400. This court
allowed Brown’s petition for leave to appeal.
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¶ 67 On appeal to this court, Brown maintains that he is entitled to be resentenced
pursuant to the amended sentencing statute because his postplea proceedings were
pending in the trial court when the amendment went into effect. He argues that the
trial court retained jurisdiction over his case during ongoing postplea proceedings
and, therefore, had the authority to change his sentence in compliance with the
updated sentencing law. In other words, Brown asks this court to treat the trial
court’s ruling on his postplea motion as the date of “judgment” for purposes of
determining the applicability of the amended statute to his sentencing situation.
¶ 68 In support of his argument that he is entitled to resentencing, Brown relies
principally on People v. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583. The relevant facts in
Spears are nearly identical to those in this case. In that case, the defendant, Michael
Spears, pled guilty to various offenses and was sentenced as a Class X offender in
June 2019. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. Spears filed a postplea motion to reconsider sentence, which
was denied. Id. ¶ 8. The appellate court then vacated the trial court’s order and
remanded the case for compliance with Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 10. Upon remand to the
trial court, on May 18, 2021, Spears filed a new motion to reconsider sentence, and
on September 14, 2021, he filed an amended motion to reconsider sentence. Id.
¶¶ 11, 13. On October 5, 2021, the trial court denied Spears’s amended motion. Id.
¶ 16. On appeal, Spears made the same argument Brown makes in the present case.
Spears argued “that he was entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment to section
5-4.5-95 of the Code that took effect after sentencing but before the trial court ruled
on his [postjudgment] amended motion to reconsider the sentence.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 69 The appellate court agreed with Spears and remanded the matter for a new
sentencing hearing to allow the trial court to resentence Spears in accord with the
new sentencing statute. Id. ¶ 29. Citing People v. Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1124,
1127 (2011), the appellate court reasoned that,
“[b]ecause defendant entered an open guilty plea, he could not file an appeal
without first filing a motion to reconsider the sentence or a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, and it is the order denying his amended motion to reconsider
the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the underlying proceedings.”
(Emphasis added.) Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29.
The Spears court further held that, because the proceedings in the trial court were
ongoing when the statute took effect on July 1, 2021, the new version of the statute
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should have applied to Spears’s motion to reconsider sentence and the trial court
erred in denying Spears’s amended motion to reconsider on that ground. Id.According to the Spears court, denying Spears the benefit of the new sentencing
law would lead to an absurd result because, if the trial court had granted the
amended motion to reconsider on a different ground, e.g., that the sentence was
excessive, the new, more favorable sentencing statute would have applied at
Spears’s new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 70 The problem with Brown’s reliance on Spears is that this court has considered,
and rejected, the precise rationale underlying the holding in Spears. In People v.
Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 46-47, two juvenile defendants argued that an amended
sentencing statute that became effective while the defendants’ cases were pending
on direct appeal in the appellate court should be applied to their cases. This court
held that their argument was foreclosed by the language in the second sentence of
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016)). Hunter, 2017 IL
121306, ¶ 52. That section states, “[i]f any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be
mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of
the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes
effect.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). This court noted that the quoted language meant
that, if the statutory changes mitigated a punishment, those changes could not be
applied to defendants who “were sentenced before the statute took effect”
(emphasis added) (Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 52), because the sentencing is when
a judgment becomes final.
¶ 71 This court thus concluded that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes negated the
defendants’ argument. Our reasoning was as follows:
“In People v. Hansen, 28 Ill. 2d 322, 340-41 (1963), we held that the
defendant was not entitled to be resentenced under the new criminal code,
which went into effect just 13 days after he was sentenced, because, under
section 4, ‘a punishment mitigated by a new law is applicable only to judgments
after the new law takes effect.’ Similarly, in People v. Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492,
504 (1985), we held that, under section 4, the defendant was not eligible to be
sentenced under a statutory amendment that became effective while his case
was pending in this court because he had already been sentenced prior to the
statute’s effective date. Where, however, a defendant’s sentence is vacated on
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appeal and the matter remanded for resentencing, under section 4 of the Statute
on Statutes, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the law in effect at
the time of the new sentencing hearing. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12
(per curiam) ***.
Here, no dispute exists that defendants were sentenced well before the new
juvenile sentencing provisions, including subsection (b), became effective on
January 1, 2016. Further, defendants make no claim that error occurred in the
trial court that would require vacatur of their sentences and remand for
resentencing, thus giving them the option to be sentenced under subsection (b).
*** Accordingly, defendants are not eligible to be sentenced under
subsection (b).” Id. ¶¶ 54-56.
¶ 72 Subsequently, in People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶ 23, this court reaffirmed
“our long-standing case law holding that imposition of a sentence constitutes the
final judgment in a criminal case.” (Emphasis added.) In so holding, this court
expressly overruled Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1124, the decision upon which the
Spears court relied. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶¶ 23-24.
¶ 73 Brown attempts to distinguish Hunter on the ground that the amendments in
that case took effect while the defendants’ cases were pending on appeal, while the
amendment in this case took effect while his case was pending in the trial court.
This is a distinction without a difference. As the appellate court below correctly
observed, “the court’s rationale in Hunter was not based upon the fact that the
defendants’ cases were pending on appeal rather than in the trial court when the
amendments took effect, but explicitly on the fact that the defendants ‘were
sentenced well before’ the sentence amendments took effect.” 2023 IL App (4th)
220400, ¶ 40 (quoting Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 55); see People v. Bradford, 106
Ill. 2d 492, 504 (1985) (“Judgment is defined as ‘an adjudication by the court that
the defendant is guilty or not guilty and if the adjudication is that the defendant is
guilty it includes the sentence pronounced by the court.’ [Citation]. Bradford was
sentenced prior to the effective date of [the amended statute], and he is not eligible
to elect to be sentenced under it.”); People v. Hansen, 28 Ill. 2d 322, 341 (1963)
(holding a new sentencing statute did not apply to the defendant under section 4 of
the Statute on Statutes because the judgment and sentence were pronounced prior
to the effective date of the new law); People v. Lisle, 390 Ill. 327, 328 (1945)
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(holding that “Section 4 of the [Statute on Statutes] does not give the defendant the
right to be sentenced under a law not in full force and effect at the time of his
sentence”).
¶ 74 Finally, numerous other appellate decisions have rejected the reasoning of
Spears. See 2023 IL App (4th) 220400, ¶¶ 48-49; People v. Neal, 2024 IL App (4th)
230029-U, ¶¶ 29-30; People v. Foy, 2023 IL App (4th) 220680-U, ¶¶ 30-37; People
v. Stevenson, 2023 IL App (3d) 220055, ¶¶ 16-18; People v. Hilson, 2023 IL App
(5th) 220047, ¶¶ 82-89; People v. Lopez, 2023 IL App (4th) 220144-U, ¶¶ 34-38;
People v. Foster, 2022 IL App (3d) 210342-U, ¶¶ 13-15.
¶ 75 Spears is clearly irreconcilable with this court’s established precedent, and I
agree with the majority that it should be overruled. Supra ¶ 42. Based on our well-
established case law, the date of the final judgment in Brown’s case was the date
of his sentencing (November 7, 2019), not the date that the trial court finally denied
his postplea motion (May 11, 2022). Thus, under section 4 of the Statute on
Statutes, Brown cannot avail himself of the new sentencing law that became
effective after his sentencing date in November 2019. See, e.g., Hunter, 2017 IL
121306, ¶ 55. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the judgment of the
appellate court must be affirmed.
¶ 76 II. Misconstruing Brown’s Argument
¶ 77 The majority affirms the judgment of the appellate court but, in so doing,
misconstrues the issue presented. The majority frames the issue in this case as
whether the temporal reach of the amended sentencing provision is both retroactive
and prospective, or prospective only. The majority concludes that the provision is
prospective only and, on that basis, affirms the judgment of the appellate court.
However, that is not the argument Brown is raising.
¶ 78 Brown is asking this court to adopt the rule announced in Spears. That is, Brown
is asking this court to hold that, if a new sentencing law becomes effective after a
defendant’s sentencing but while postsentencing proceedings are still pending, the
defendant is entitled to be resentenced under the new sentencing law because the
pendency of the postsentencing issues means the judgment is not yet final. See
Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29 (“it is the order denying his amended
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motion to reconsider the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the underlying
proceedings”). Brown’s argument means that imposition of a sentence would no
longer be a final judgment so long as there were postsentencing matters pending.
This is not a retroactivity argument. Rather, it is an argument that asks this court to
upend established case law regarding when a judgment becomes final.
¶ 79 As Brown argues in his reply brief,
“the effective date [of the amended statute at issue in this case] is ultimately
irrelevant. Indisputably, the amendment was not effective when Mr. Brown was
originally sentenced, and it was effective when the motion to reconsider
sentence was denied. Nothing in the plain language of the amended Class X
recidivism provision addresses this situation. Accordingly, a delayed effective
date sheds no light on the question at issue. In other words, merely saying that
[the] statute applies ‘prospective only’ begs the question: prospective based on
the date of sentencing or the date of the denial of the motion to reconsider
sentence?”
¶ 80 In short, Brown concedes that the amended sentencing statute is only
prospective. However, his contention is that applying the sentencing statute to a
defendant whose proceedings are still pending in the trial court is a prospective
application of the statute because the judgment is not yet final. This argument is, of
course, without foundation in Illinois law.
¶ 81 The majority, by focusing solely on whether the amended sentencing statute is
prospective or retroactive, addresses an issue that is not in dispute. And, in so doing,
the majority fails to address Brown’s actual argument. Although the majority
correctly holds that the “final judgment” was pronounced at Brown’s sentencing in
November 2019 (supra ¶ 42), the majority fails to explain why this matters. The
date of the final judgment matters because the rule, as stated in section 4 of the
Statute on Statutes, is that a new, more favorable sentencing law does not apply to
a defendant if the statute becomes effective after the “judgment” is pronounced,
i.e., after a defendant is sentenced. See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018); Hunter, 2017 IL
121306, ¶¶ 52, 54-56. The application of that rule to the present case is
straightforward. Accordingly, the majority’s conclusion that section 4 of the Statute
on Statutes “does not apply” to this case (supra ¶ 37) is simply incorrect.
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¶ 82 The majority should address this issue as it was raised and briefed by the parties
in this appeal. For the foregoing reasons, I therefore specially concur.
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