In re Cathleen E. , 2022 IL App (3d) 170415-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 170415-UOrder filed January 19, 2022
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
______________________________________________________________________________
In re CATHLEEN E., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
A Person Found Subject to Involuntary ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
Commitment and Involuntary Medication ) La Salle County, Illinois.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois )
) Appeal No. 3-17-0415
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit No. 17-MH-10
)
v. )
)
Cathleen E., ) The Honorable
) H. Chris Ryan, Jr.
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment.
Justice Schmidt dissented.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The respondent’s appeal of the trial court’s orders subjecting her to
involuntary hospitalization and the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication was reviewable under the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to mootness; (2) the State’s petitions for involuntary commitment and
involuntary medication were fatally deficient; and (3) the respondent received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 The trial court ordered the Respondent-Appellant, Cathleen E. (Cathleen), subject to
involuntary commitment at an inpatient mental health treatment facility and subject to
involuntary treatment through the administration of psychotropic medications. Cathleen appeals
those judgments, arguing that the State failed to present evidence as to certain essential elements
of the involuntary commitment and involuntary medication statutes in the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2016)) and
otherwise failed to satisfy various mandatory requirements of the Code.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 Cathleen E. is a 65-year-old resident of the Ravlin Center, a structured public housing
apartment building in Ottawa. The Ravlin Center is a senior community that offers its residents
daily meals and a variety of services, including intensive health and therapeutic services for
persons with disabilities, especially following discharge from hospitalization.
¶5 Cathleen had admitted herself voluntarily to OSF St. Elizabeth Medical Center (OSF) for
mental health treatment, but later decided that she wanted to go home. On June 21, 2017, the
OSF staff filed a petition for Cathleen’s involuntary admission. The petition alleged that
Cathleen was at risk of harming herself or others and was unable to provide for her basic
physical needs. As a basis for these allegations, the petition provided only the following: “Patient
is manic as evidenced by rambling, hyperverbal speech, flight of ideas, and not being able to
achieve sleep. Patient is delusional as evidenced by saying ‘I’m pregnant,’ ‘I’m the white lily,’ &
references to a relationship with an individual who denies such.”
¶6 Also on June 21, 2017, Dr. Michael Glavin, Cathleen’s treating psychiatrist, filed a
petition for involuntary medication under the Code. The petition recited the required statutory
elements for the involuntary administration of medication but included no factual evidence
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demonstrating that the elements had been satisfied. The trial court appointed the La Salle County
Public Defender’s office to represent Cathleen. Cathleen’s counsel did not object to the petitions’
insufficiency or move to dismiss the petitions for failure to state a claim.
¶7 The involuntary commitment and medication hearings took place on June 27, 2017.
Immediately prior to the commitment hearing, Cathleen told the trial court “I would be ready
only I don’t have my hearing aids.” She asked the court to “please keep that in mind,” and
explained that “I might talk loud, but I’m not acting out.” Neither Cathleen’s defense counsel nor
the court acknowledged Cathleen’s statements or paused the proceeding so that Cathleen could
obtain her hearing aids.
¶8 Dr. Glavin diagnosed Cathleen with bipolar disorder, manic state, with psychosis. He
stated that Cathleen would “get irritable and yell at staff and *** threaten to sue staff members,”
but she had not hit anyone or exhibited any physical aggression. Cathleen had previously been
hospitalized for overdosing on Ambien. Dr. Glavin testified that, because of her mental illness,
Cathleen would not be able to care for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from
serious harm. However, Dr. Glavin did not testify as to Cathleen’s ability to provide for her food,
shelter, or medical needs.
¶9 Dr. Glavin explained that OSF is a short-term facility. He opined that Cathleen needed a
longer-term facility. For that reason, Dr. Glavin asked the trial court to order that Cathleen be
involuntarily admitted to McFarland Mental Health Center (McFarland) in Springfield. The State
did not file a predispositional report that included a report on alternative treatment settings and a
social investigation of Cathleen, as ordered by the trial court. Instead, it filed a one-page form
treatment plan.
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¶ 10 During closing arguments, Cathleen twice asked when it was “her turn” to speak. On both
occasions, she received no response from the trial court, her attorney, or the State’s attorney. The
trial court found that Cathleen had a mental illness that rendered her unable to safeguard herself
from serious harm without treatment on an inpatient basis. The court ordered her committed to
McFarland for up to 90 days on “basic needs” grounds only. Thereafter, Cathleen’s counsel
announced: “I did not call my client [to testify] because I don’t think she’s capable of testifying
rationally at this time.”
¶ 11 The involuntary medication hearing then commenced. The State questioned Dr. Glavin
about the benefits and dosages of the four medications he had requested but did not ask Dr.
Glavin about the risks of two of the medications (Lithium and Haldol). Dr. Glavin testified that
he provided Cathleen with written information about the medications and their side effects, but
he did not testify that he gave her written information about alternatives to medication, as
required by section 2-107.1 of the Code. Moreover, the State did not ask Dr. Glavin his opinion
about Cathleen’s capacity to make a reasoned decision to accept or refuse medication. The State
also did not ask the doctor questions relating to the other statutory elements of the involuntary
medication statute.
¶ 12 Before closing arguments, Cathleen asked “do I get to share?” Once again, her question
was disregarded.
¶ 13 The trial court found Cathleen subject to involuntary medication for a period of up to 90
days at McFarland. The court did not explain why it believed Cathleen lacked capacity to make a
reasoned decision about the proposed medication.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 1. Mootness
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¶ 16 The State concedes that it committed reversible error by failing to present any evidence
that Cathleen lacked the capacity to make a reasonable decision to accept or refuse medication
and by failing to prove that she had received all the statutorily required written information about
the proposed medications at issue (including the risks and benefits of each medication and
alternatives to medication). The State also concedes that Cathleen’s counsel provided ineffective
assistance by: (1) failing to hold the State to the Code’s mandatory requirements for involuntary
commitment, including section 3-810’s requirement of a predisposition report, (2) failing to
object to the State’s failure to present evidence on each and every element of the involuntary
treatment statute (including that the proposed commitment was the least restrictive alternative),
(3) proceeding with the hearings although Cathleen did not have her hearing aids with her, and
(4) failing to allow Cathleen to testify in her own defense and making a prejudicial statement as
to why he did not call Cathleen as a witness.
¶ 17 Nevertheless, the State argues that we should dismiss this case as moot. The 90-day
involuntary commitment order that is the subject of this appeal has already expired, and Cathleen
has been discharged from treatment. Accordingly, this appeal is moot. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d
30, 45 (2004); see also In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50 (2006).
¶ 18 Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or
consider issues where the result will not be affected by the court’s decision. In re Alfred H.H.,
233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009). However, there are three established exceptions to the mootness
doctrine: (1) the “public-interest” exception, applicable where the case presents a question of
public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the
performance of their duties; (2) the “capable-of-repetition” exception, applicable to cases
involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review; and (3) the
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“collateral-consequences exception,” applicable where the involuntary treatment order could
return to plague the respondent in some future proceeding or could affect other aspects of the
respondent’s life. Id. at 355-63. Whether a particular appeal falls within one of these exceptions
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering each exception in light of the relevant
facts and legal claims raised in the appeal. Id. at 355, 364; In re Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 748,
752 (2010).
¶ 19 The “capable of repetition” exception applies when the complaining party demonstrates
that (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the
same action again. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). In this case, there is no
question that the first criterion has been met, as the trial court’s 90-day commitment and
medication orders were of such short duration that they could not have been fully litigated prior
to their cessation. Thus, the only question is whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
respondent will personally be subject to the same action again. That occurs when the resolution
of the issue raised in the present case would be likely to “affect a future case involving the
respondent” or to “have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a subsequent case”
involving the respondent. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360.
¶ 20 This case satisfies that standard. Cathleen has a history of hospitalization for mental
illness. Given her history, it is reasonably likely that she will face additional involuntary
admission and involuntary treatment proceedings in the future. In re Joseph M., 405 Ill. App. 3d
1167, 1175 (2010) (finding likelihood of recurrence and applying capable of repetition exception
to mootness where respondent had a history of mental illness and had been subject to prior
involuntary admissions).
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¶ 21 In addition, the resolution of the legal issues raised in the present case would be likely to
affect a future case involving Cathleen or to “have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a
subsequent case” involving Cathleen. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360. Cathleen contends that the
State and the trial court failed to comply with certain mandatory requirements of the Code.
Specifically, among other things, she argues that the trial court erred by granting the involuntary
commitment petition even though: (1) the State’s petition failed to state a claim because it
provided no facts suggesting that statutory elements were satisfied in Cathleen’s case; and (2) the
State failed to file a predisposition report or equivalent testimony that included a social
investigation of Cathleen and a report on alternative treatment settings, as required by section 3-
810 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2016)). Cathleen further argues that the trial court
erred in granting the State’s petition for involuntary medication because: (1) Dr. Glavin,
Cathleen’s treating psychiatrist, did not testify that he gave Cathleen written information about
alternatives to medication, as required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5)
(West 2016)); (2) the State did not ask Dr. Glavin whether he believed that Cathleen lacked the
capacity to make a reasoned decision to accept or refuse medication; and (3) the State did not ask
Dr. Glavin any questions relating to the other statutory elements of the involuntary medication
statute, and Dr. Glavin offered no opinions on these matters.
¶ 22 It is reasonably likely that the resolution of each of these issues of statutory compliance
will affect future cases involving Cathleen, because she will likely again be subject to
involuntary admission and medication and the court will likely again commit the same alleged
errors. See In re Val Q., 396 Ill. App. 3d 155, 161 (2009) (overruled on other grounds by In re
Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶¶ 33-34); In re Jonathan P., 399 Ill. App. 3d 396, 401 (2010). The
errors committed in this case recur continually in cases involving involuntary commitment and
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medication under the Code. See, e.g., In re Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶¶ 42-46 (the
State failed to present a written predisposition report or testimony providing the information
required to be included in such a report); In re Lance H., 402 Ill. App. 3d 382, 387-88 (2010)
(the State failed to include the names and addresses of family or friends in its involuntary
commitment petition, as required by the Code); In re R.K., 338 Ill. App. 3d 514, 521-22 (2003)
(State did not present any evidence that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned
decision about her treatment); In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094-95 (2011) (the
respondent was provided no written information about the risks and benefits of the medications
at issue or any alternatives to medication). Accordingly, the “capable of repetition” exception
applies here.
¶ 23 The State and the dissent correctly note that fact-specific issues are not subject to the
“capable of repetition” exception because such issues are unlikely to recur in future cases and the
resolution of such issues will not impact future cases. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345 at 359-61.
Contrary to the State’s and the dissent’s assertion, however, the instant appeal does not merely
involve fact-specific issues. Rather, it involves the State’s complete failure to observe several
mandatory procedural and substantive requirements of the Code, the trial court’s entry of
involuntary commitment and medication orders despite those statutory violations, and Cathleen’s
counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to the State’s errors and omissions. Our appellate
court has recognized that the “capable of repetition” exception applies under these
circumstances. See, e.g., Val Q., 396 Ill. App. 3d 155 (applying the “capable of repetition”
exception where the respondent contended that the trial court erred by delegating to physicians
its duty of assessing the risks of the treatment and it was reasonably likely that the resolution of
that issue “would affect future cases involving respondent, because respondent will likely again
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be subject to involuntary treatment and the court will likely again commit the same alleged
error”); In re Tara S., 2017 IL App (3d) 160357, ¶ 17 (applying the “capable of repetition”
exception to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings under the Code).
¶ 24 Because we hold that the capable of repetition applies, we do not need to address
Cathleen’s argument that the “collateral consequences” exception also applies. We now turn to
the merits of this appeal.
¶ 25 2. The Involuntary Commitment and Medication Petitions
¶ 26 The petition for involuntary commitment filed in this case was fatally deficient. The
petition stated the pre-printed statutory elements for involuntary commitment but provided no
facts suggesting that these required elements were met in Cathleen’s case. The petition therefore
failed to state a claim. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 42, 429-30 (2006); Kucinsky v.
Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719, ¶ 55; Schloss v. Jumper, 2014 IL App (4th) 121086, ¶ 20; see
also In re Jessica H., 2014 IL App (4th) 130399, ¶¶ 26, 35. Moreover, the State did not file a
predisposition report that included a social investigation of Cathleen and a report on alternative
treatment settings, as required by section 3-810 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2016)).
Nor did the State present oral testimony providing the information required by that section. As
the State correctly concedes, these failures by the State require reversal of the trial court’s
commitment order. In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 271 (2008); Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d
at 756; In re Daniel M., 387 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422 (2008).
¶ 27 The petition for involuntary medication was also insufficient as a matter of law. Although
Dr. Glavin testified that he provided Cathleen with written information about the proposed
medications and their side effects, he did not testify that he gave her written information about
alternatives to medication, as required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5)
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(West 2016)). Moreover, the State did not ask Dr. Glavin whether he believed that Cathleen
lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision to accept or refuse medication. Nor did the State
ask him questions relating to the other statutory elements of the involuntary medication statute.
Dr. Glavin offered no opinions on these matters. Accordingly, the State failed to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that Cathleen lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision
about her medical treatment, as required by section 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E) of the Code (405 ILCS
5/2—107.1(a-5)(4)(E) (West 2016)); In re Wilma T., 2018 IL App (3d) 170155, ¶ 23; In re
Tiffany W., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 22. This failure requires reversal of the trial court’s
involuntary medication order. Wilma T., 2018 IL App (3d) 170155, ¶ 23; Tiffany W., 2012 IL
App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 22. The State concedes that it committed these errors and that the errors
were reversible and could not be forfeited. It was the State’s Attorney’s duty to ensure that the
petitions for involuntary commitment and medication were properly prepared. 405 ILCS 5/3-
101(a) (West 2016). The failure to do so rendered both petitions invalid.
¶ 28 Moreover, Cathleen received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed
to object to the aforementioned fatal deficiencies in the State’s petitions or move to dismiss the
petitions for failure to state a claim. He also failed to hold the State to the Code’s substantive
requirements by neglecting to object to the State’s failure of proof as to certain required elements
of its case under the Code, such as the written notice requirement and the required showing that
the respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about her treatment. That rendered
Cathleen’s counsel’s performance deficient and prejudicial, and therefore ineffective. In re
Jessica H., 2014 IL App (4th) 130399, ¶¶ 26, 35 (counsel’s failure to notify the trial court that
the State’s commitment petition was untimely or to move to dismiss the petition constituted
ineffective assistance); Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 748 at 756–57 (counsel’s failure to object to
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the State’s failure to file a predisposition report or present equivalent testimony constituted
ineffective assistance); see also Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d at 271; Daniel M., 387 Ill. App. 3d at
422. Cathleen’s counsel was also ineffective for refusing Cathleen’s request to testify and for not
asking the court to allow Cathleen to get her hearing aids so she could hear the trial testimony.
¶ 29 CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle
County.
¶ 31 Reversed.
¶ 32 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
¶ 33 While the majority’s concerns are well founded, we are bound by our supreme court’s
admonishment not to decide moot questions. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 351. The majority finds
that this case falls within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the
mootness doctrine. Supra ¶ 20. This exception has two elements: (1) the challenged action is in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. In re A
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1989).
¶ 34 The first element is satisfied. However, the second element is not. The fact that
respondent may face involuntary admission and involuntary medication in the future is not a
sufficient basis to satisfy the second element of this exception to the mootness doctrine. Alfred
H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358-61. Respondent is not arguing that any statute is unconstitutional, and
she may be subjected to the same unconstitutional statute in the future. Nor does she challenge
the trial court’s interpretation of a statute. She argues only that the trial court and the State failed
to follow certain statutory procedures, and her counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
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failure to follow the procedures. Her argument is fact-specific. There is no clear indication of
how a resolution of the issues raised in this case could be of use to respondent in a future
litigation as any future litigation would be based upon new petitions, new hearings, new
evidence, and an assessment of whether the State met its burden of proof in those cases. See id.
at 360 (making a similar statement about the argument raised in that case). Nothing in the
majority’s decision constitutes anything other than a recitation of existing case law. In other
words, the majority decision does not offer any new guidance to be used in the future by
litigants. While it is troubling that the court and parties below appear to repeatedly disregard
procedural requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings, there is no justification for
issuing this order, which applies already existing law to the facts of this case and has no
precedential value.
¶ 35 The majority finds the above exception to the mootness doctrine is satisfied and does not
address the alternative mootness exception raised by respondent on appeal. Specifically,
respondent argues that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is also satisfied.
This argument should be rejected as well.
¶ 36 The public interest exception is applicable only if there is a clear showing that: (1) the
question is of a substantial public nature; (2) an authoritative determination is needed for future
guidance; and (3) the circumstances are likely to recur. In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (2003).
The exception is narrowly construed and requires a clear showing of each criterion. In re India
B., 202 Ill. 2d 522, 543 (2002). The second element is not satisfied in this case. This exception
does not apply when there are no conflicting precedents requiring an authoritative resolution.
The majority does not resolve any conflicting issues in the law. Rather, it applies existing case
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law to the specific facts of this case. Therefore, an authoritative determination is not necessary as
required by this exception.
¶ 37 This appeal should be dismissed as moot.
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