People v. Hood , 2022 IL App (1st) 171645 ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 171645-UB
FIFTH DIVISION
February 4, 2022
No. 1-17-1645
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County.
)
v. ) 96 CR 5317
)
RONALD HOOD, ) Honorable Stanley J. Sacks,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cunningham and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s 60-year sentence, with eligibility for day-for-day good-
conduct credit, did not amount to a de facto life sentence; the trial court
properly considered all Miller factors in resentencing defendant; affirmed.
¶2 Pursuant to the supervisory order issued by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hood,
No.126546 (Nov. 24, 2021), we vacated our previous order and now reconsider our decision in
light of People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010.
¶3 Defendant, Ronald Hood, was convicted in 1997 of two counts of first degree murder and
two counts of attempted armed robbery in connection with the shooting deaths of Malinda Gavin
No. 1-17-1645
and Ray Bowen. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the crimes and was sentenced to
mandatory life in prison for the murder convictions and 15 years’ imprisonment for the
attempted armed robbery convictions. In June 2013, defendant filed a pro se postconviction
petition, alleging that his natural life imprisonment sentence violated Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012). Miller held that the imposition of a mandatory term of natural life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile convicted of homicide violated the
eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The circuit court granted
defendant a new sentencing hearing. Following the new sentencing hearing, defendant was
sentenced to concurrent terms of 60 years’ imprisonment for each murder. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence, and this appeal follows. For the reasons below,
we affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The evidence presented at defendant’s bench trial showed that on August 29, 1994, the
victims, Gavin and Bowen, were in a parked car, naked from the waist down. Defendant walked
past the car with his friends. One of the friends suggested they “fuck with” the people inside.
Another friend asked defendant if he was scared and then handed him a gun. Defendant
approached the vehicle with his friend and codefendant, Anthony Spaulding, who demanded
money from Bowen. When Bowen refused, Spaulding fired shots into the car. Defendant also
fired shots into the car, shooting twice into the driver’s side window. Both Gavin and Bowen
were killed.
¶6 Defendant was found guilty of the two murders and two counts of attempted robbery. He
received a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison under the multiple-murder provision of
2
No. 1-17-1645
the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c) (West 1994)), and a concurrent 15-
year prison sentence for the attempted robbery convictions.
¶7 In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, which held that the eighth
amendment prohibits mandatory sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for
juvenile homicide offenders. 567 U.S. at 479. Subsequently, defendant filed a pro se successive
postconviction petition challenging his sentence of natural life in prison under Miller. The trial
court granted defendant a new sentencing hearing to consider Miller.
¶8 On May 18, 2017, the new sentencing hearing was held with the same judge that
sentenced defendant and codefendant in 1997. At the hearing, Dr. James Garbarino, a
psychologist, testified that he interviewed defendant twice (February 15, 2016, and June 20,
2016), looked at the information in defendant’s social history, and wrote up a final report. Dr.
Garbarino testified that he spent about four hours with defendant and reviewed records including
a letter from defendant’s GED instructor, transcripts from the original trial, and Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) records.
¶9 Dr. Garbarino testified that he used the factors from the Miller decision as the organizing
framework for generating his report. He testified that defendant was 16 years old at the time of
the murders, and that the brains of adolescents are immature. Adolescents tend to make decisions
that are inferior to adult decisions and their emotions are stronger and harder to manage.
¶ 10 With respect to the second Miller factor, Dr. Garbarino testified that defendant’s social
history and reports indicated that he grew up in a very difficult situation “without effective
parenting, with a lot of disruption of parental or parental surrogate relationships, witnessing
domestic violence, experiencing psychological maltreatment and neglect and a lot of chaos in the
day-to-day caregiving.” Defendant experienced multiple forms of trauma, including witnessing
3
No. 1-17-1645
domestic violence, “which is understood to be a primary traumatic experience; witnessing
fighting, witnessing assaults, being the victim of assaults, [and] living in a dangerous fear-laden
environment.” Dr. Garbarino stated that defendant’s father was completely absent and his mother
was “psychologically unavailable because of her struggles with mental health issues and her own
trauma history.” Dr. Garbarino stated that defendant’s mother had three children that died in a
fire before defendant was born, and that she self-medicated through drugs that impaired her
capacity to be an effective mother to defendant.
¶ 11 Dr. Garbarino stated that defendant’s main childhood house was his maternal
grandmother’s house in Englewood. There was “widespread drug use in that house, widespread
substance abuse amongst [defendant’s] extended family.” He stated that “perhaps 20” people
lived in that house.
¶ 12 Dr. Garbarino further testified that defendant left school completely by tenth grade and he
was in a gang by the time he was 12 years old. His neighborhood was primarily Gangster
Disciples territory, but he was a Vice Lord, which “put him at odds with others in the
neighborhood even for things like going to school.” Defendant had been shot at, had witnessed
shootings, and had friends that had been shot and killed. Dr. Garbarino described defendant’s
neighborhood as a “war zone,” which meant that he was highly sensitive to threats and
developed a “war zone mentality.”
¶ 13 Dr. Garbarino explained that one of the Miller factors was the role of peer pressure and in
the environment that defendant grew up in, “there’s a lot of peer modeling of aggressive
behavior, there’s often a lot of peer pressure to engage in criminal and aggressive behavior.” Dr.
Garbarino stated that “simply the presence of peers tends to degrade the behavior of teenagers,”
4
No. 1-17-1645
which was a factor in defendant’s crimes. Dr. Garbarino testified that codefendant Spaulding was
a “high prestige individual” in defendant’s eyes and that defendant felt a responsibility to him.
¶ 14 Dr. Garbarino stated that defendant had a newfound maturity since being in prison. He
was “able to engage in reflection and study and reading,” and took advantage of programs
available to him. He got a job and began pursuing a GED. The GED instructor spoke positively
about defendant’s enthusiasm and competence. Dr. Garbarino opined that defendant would be a
good candidate for parole with transitional support. Defendant has been institutionalized for a
long time, and there are basic skills that individuals need, but Dr. Garbarino believed he would
be a safe citizen.
¶ 15 When asked if defendant was “irretrievably depraved,” Dr. Garbarino responded,
“Absolutely not.”
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Dr. Garbarino testified that defendant did not specifically say he
was afraid of codefendant Spaulding. He also testified that defendant had siblings who were
presumably exposed to the same risk factors as defendant growing up, but did not kill anyone at
the age of 16.
¶ 17 The trial court then noted that it had some additional questions for Dr. Garbarino. It asked
Dr. Garbarino about an error that had been in a previous draft of his report where Dr. Garbarino
stated that defendant told him one of the victims had a gun. Dr. Garbarino explained, “That was
an error on my part. That’s why we submitted a corrected report. When I went back to the notes,
I realized I had mistakenly drawn that conclusion because [defendant] had talked about being so
afraid. So I accept responsibility for that error.” The trial court then went into detail about the
nature of the crime, asking Dr. Garbarino if he had read the trial testimony. Dr. Garbarino opined
that he did not believe the crime was a planned assassination, but that it was spontaneous. The
5
No. 1-17-1645
trial court asked if defendant was failing to accept responsibility by stating he shot the victims in
self-defense. Dr. Garbarino responded that defendant had not said that and it was an error on his
part. When Dr. Garbarino again explained that he had drawn that conclusion from defendant
stating that he was afraid, the trial court asked what defendant was afraid of and then stated, “He
had the gun. Spaulding had the gun. The people in the car are half naked. What was he afraid of,
according to him?”
¶ 18 Richard Bard, a former supervisor at IDOC, testified that he reviewed defendant’s
records, and that from 1997 to 1998, defendant received eight tickets within IDOC. During one
incident in 1998, defendant attacked an officer, hit him from behind, and kicked another officer
when he was on the floor. Between 2004 and 2015, defendant received five tickets, one of which
was expunged. Bard testified that defendant had a “good” disciplinary record after 2001 and he
had been approved to work in the inmate commissary and the officer’s commissary.
¶ 19 Bard further testified that before the Miller decision, there were not many opportunities
for someone facing life in prison without parole. The resources were primarily directed at
inmates who would be transitioning back into society.
¶ 20 On June 9, 2017, the trial court pronounced its resentencing of defendant and
codefendant. Initially, the trial court noted that it had read the sentencing memorandum filed on
defendant’s behalf and a presentence investigation on defendant. The trial court stated that it
presided over defendant’s jury trial and had read defendant’s court files and postconviction files.
¶ 21 The State submitted victim impact statements from Gavin’s and Bowen’s families that
had been submitted at defendant’s original sentencing hearing. The State read those letters into
the record. Gavin’s mother stated in her letter that Gavin was her only child and had graduated
from nursing school. She thinks of her only child every single day and loses sleep every night.
6
No. 1-17-1645
She has relived the night of the murder over and over, thinking of the fear her daughter must
have felt in the last few moments of her life. Gavin’s mother stated that she always looked
forward to becoming a grandmother and a major part of her is gone forever. No mother expects
to bury a child. She stated that defendant’s and codefendant’s mothers can still visit them in
prison and give them a kiss. Instead, she has to visit her daughter at a graveyard.
¶ 22 The second letter that was read was authored by Bowen’s parents. They stated that
Bowen was the father of a four-year-old at the time of his murder. He loved his daughter very
much. Bowen and Gavin were two people who cared about everybody and everything. Bowen’s
parents will never forget the day they got the news of their deaths. The pain was so great and it
took them weeks to come to terms with the fact that they were gone forever. They asked that
defendant and codefendant be imprisoned for life.
¶ 23 The State then asserted, “The position of the State’s Attorney’s Office as to these
particular defendants based on the mitigation we’ve received would be a term of imprisonment
that would not amount to a de facto life sentence.” The trial court stated, “I’ll certainly consider
it.”
¶ 24 Defendant then spoke on his own behalf. He stated he was so sorry for the pain and
heartache he caused the victims’ families. He should have refused to participate in the robbery
and there was no excuse for what he did.
¶ 25 The State then argued that the two victims were innocent people, and defendant and
codefendant shot into their car multiple times. The victims never had a chance and never saw it
coming. There was no reason to shoot into the car. The State claimed this was not a sentence the
court was giving, but rather a sentence that the defendant and codefendant had given themselves.
7
No. 1-17-1645
They were responsible when they were sentenced in 1997 and they were responsible 20 years
later as they sat in court to answer for their crimes.
¶ 26 Defendant’s attorney then reviewed the factors in mitigation, the Miller factors, and
asked the court to sentence defendant “in the mid range between 20 to 60” years for the murders
of Bowen and Gavin.
¶ 27 Before sentencing defendant, the trial court stated that defendant had not shown, based on
his conduct while in custody that he was “irretrievably depraved,” and therefore he would not be
sentenced to life in prison. The trial court then went into detail about the actual crime. It
described the defenselessness of the victims and the brutality of the shooting. The trial court then
stated that “sorry just doesn’t cut it” and noted that the victims did not get a chance to live, while
defendant and codefendant still did. The trial court then stated:
“These two gentlemen are coldhearted murderers, as simple as that. They
have changed in the last give or take 20 years while they’ve been in custody and
changed much for the better. Had they been 18 instead of 16 back at the time of
these murders, we’d be talking about something besides life in prison most likely.
As I said before, however, the Court cannot find that they’re both irretrievable, as
the Miller case says.
***
I am certainly going to consider that both men have done excellently well
while they’ve been in custody. Maybe being locked up for a long time has
benefited them.
***
8
No. 1-17-1645
We’re hearing all this evidence about [defendant] and [codefendant]. And
it’s sort of like on August 29, 1994, they were one person. They’ve
metamorphosed into two different people now in 2017. And, oh, by the way,
there’s a little footnote to history, they savagely murdered Ray Bowen and
Malinda Gavin. Like they’re a little footnote to history. It’s all about
[codefendant] and [defendant]. I’ve considered all of it in that respect. They’re not
the only people in this case I’ve got to consider. I’ve got to consider Malinda
Gavin and Ray Bowen. They’re the ones who were murdered by these two men in
a cold, calculated manner. And to hear them described as ‘young boys’ is a little
hard to accept. They were young, but this was a crime that warrants something
other than, ‘go home today guys, just don’t do it again.’
***
This is a crime that shocks the conscience of a civilized society. Two
young guys who are now mature men go out and kill two people for nothing,
absolutely nothing at all.”
¶ 28 The trial court sentenced defendant and codefendant to 60 years in prison for each
murder, to run concurrently. The court stated, “a sentence [for] a crime that took place back in
’94 before truth in sentencing, it’s day-for-day credit. So on a sentence of 60 years they’d do 30
calendars, approximately, maybe a little less.” The court noted, “[t]hey get credit for the 20 or 21
years they’ve been in custody so far,” and stated they would be out in 8 or 9 years. The trial court
added that it considered defendant and codefendant’s age and “everything the lawyers on both
sides argued.” Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence and the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant now appeals.
9
No. 1-17-1645
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 Defendant originally contended on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to 60 years in prison, where it failed to adequately consider the Miller factors. In
Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under
the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. The Supreme Court held that minors are
constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes, being less mature and responsible,
more impulsive, and more vulnerable to negative influences and peer pressure than adults, and
not having the fully formed character of adults so that their actions do not necessarily indicate
irreversible depravity. Id. at 471-74. The Court stated, “[w]e therefore hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at 479. The Court continued that while “appropriate occasions
for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon, *** we do not
foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases.” Id. Still, a “judge or
jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id.¶ 31 Our supreme court in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46, considered “what it
means to apply Miller” and stated:
“[A] juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole,
but only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed
irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond
the possibility of rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after
considering the defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances. Those
10
No. 1-17-1645
characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the
juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence
of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the
juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of
familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s
incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s
prospects for rehabilitation.” See also 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016)
(codifying these factors).
¶ 32 The Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016)
(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465), that “[a] hearing where ‘youth and attendant characteristics’
are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be
sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.” The Court stated:
“The [Miller] Court recognized that a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile
offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible
and life without parole is justified. But in light of children’s diminished capacity
for change, Miller made clear that appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles
to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at 733-34.
¶ 33 Our supreme court subsequently determined that Miller’s holding and rationale applied
not only to juvenile defendants who received mandatory life sentences without the possibility of
parole but also to juvenile defendants sentenced “to a mandatory term of years that is the
11
No. 1-17-1645
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole,” i.e. a de facto mandatory life
sentence (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9), and “to discretionary sentences of life without
parole” (Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40). More recently, our supreme court has defined a de
facto life sentence for a juvenile offender as one that is greater than 40 years. People v. Buffer,
2019 IL 12237, ¶¶ 41-42 (stating that “a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a
juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth
amendment” and because the “defendant’s sentence was greater than 40 years,” he received a de
facto life sentence).
¶ 34 In his supplemental brief, defendant argued that his sentence was in fact a de facto life
sentence because it was greater than 40 years. See Buffer, 2019 IL 12237, ¶¶ 41-42. Defendant
further argued that because a trial court may only impose a life sentence on a juvenile offender
“if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation,” (Id.
¶ 46), and the court in this case specifically stated, “the Court cannot find that defendant is
irretrievable,” it therefore could not sentence defendant to another sentence of life in prison.
¶ 35 The State responded that defendant’s 60-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence
because he was sentenced before “truth-in-sentencing,” which requires those convicted of first
degree murder after June 1998 to serve 100% of their imposed sentences. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3(a)(2)(i) (West 2008). Because defendant was sentenced before June 1998, defendant is entitled
to day-for-day good-time credit. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 1996) (the prisoner “shall
receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of service in prison other than where a
sentence of ‘natural life’ has been imposed. Each day of good conduct credit shall reduce by one
day the inmate’s period of incarceration set by the court.”) As a result, defendant, who has been
12
No. 1-17-1645
incarcerated since 1996, could be eligible for release from prison in September 2025. The State
contends that because he is eligible for day-for-day credit, and therefore only likely to serve 30
years of his 60-year sentence, he did not receive a de facto life sentence.
¶ 36 Our supreme court has recently addressed this exact issue. In Dorsey, the court noted that
the statutory scheme applicable to defendant “requires that a person receive ‘one day of good
conduct credit for each day of service in prison,’ where each day of credit must ‘reduce by one
day the inmate’s period of incarceration set by the court.’ ” 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 51. The court
continued:
“This day-for-day credit scheme is designed to encourage rehabilitation and
enable an offender to be released after he serves half of the determinate sentence.
It allows a predictable, fairly accurate assessment at the time of sentencing of the
ultimate length of imprisonment. Prisoners know that they are directly
accountable for their successes or failures of self-control and have a direct stake
in maintaining good order and discipline while incarcerated. The statutory credit
scheme provides prisoners with incentives to conform their behavior to what
society will accept. Thus, an offender sentenced under the statutory scheme
providing for day-for-day credit – who conforms his conduct to the prison rules –
can demonstrate growth and rehabilitation, thereby procuring his own release
after serving half of the judicially imposed prison term.” (Internal quotations
omitted.) Id. ¶ 52.
¶ 37 The court concluded, “[w]e find, then, that the statutory good-conduct scheme in play
here provides defendant ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation’ before he spends more than 40 years in prison, which this court in
13
No. 1-17-1645
Buffer determined as the line for a de facto life sentence based on an extrapolation from the
legislative determination.” Id. ¶ 65. We therefore are likewise compelled to conclude that
defendant’s sentence, which offers an opportunity for release after serving 30 years in prison, is
not a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.
¶ 38 Having found that defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence, we now address
defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to adequately consider the Miller factors during
the resentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant contends that while “the defense presented
evidence of [defendant’s] tragic social history and the impact of his youth on his conduct, the
sentencing court’s comments at the sentencing hearing reveal that it gave little consideration to
these mitigating factors and, instead, focused primarily on the need for retribution and the nature
of the crimes.”
¶ 39 A reviewing court will not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by
the trial court. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion
in determining a sentence where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of
the law or if it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the sentencing court considered all mitigating evidence
presented. People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 134004, ¶ 51.
¶ 40 Illinois has now codified the Miller factors. Section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) provides that when a person under 18 years of age commits an offense, the
trial court at sentencing shall consider the following factors in mitigation: (1) the person’s age,
impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider
risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or
both, if any; (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure,
14
No. 1-17-1645
familial pressure, or negative influences; (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational
and social background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other
childhood trauma; (4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or
both; (5) the circumstances of the offense; (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific
role in the offense, including the level of planning by the person before the offense; (7) whether
the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; (8) the person’s prior
juvenile or criminal history; and (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable,
including an expression of remorse, if appropriate, although, if a defendant chooses not to make
a statement on advice of counsel, a lack of an expression of remorse shall not be considered as an
aggravating factor. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016).
¶ 41 Here, the resentencing hearing was conducted specifically for the purpose of considering
the Miller factors. Dr. Garbarino testified that he used the factors from the Miller decision as the
organizing framework for generating his report on defendant and presented evidence on each of
the factors.
¶ 42 Evidence was presented showing that defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
murders and that the brains of adolescents are immature. Defendant’s social history and reports
indicated that he grew up in a very difficult situation without effective parenting, with a lot of
disrupting of parental or parental surrogate relationships, witnessing domestic violence,
experiencing psychological maltreatment and neglect and a lot of chaos in the day-to-day
caregiving. Defendant’s main childhood house was his maternal grandmother’s house where
there was widespread drug use. Defendant left school by tenth grade and was in a gang by the
time he was 12 years old. His neighborhood was described as a “war zone.” Where defendant
grew up there was often peer pressure to engage in criminal and aggressive behavior.
15
No. 1-17-1645
¶ 43 Evidence was presented that defendant had developed a newfound maturity since being in
prison and took advantage of programs available to him. He received his GED and his instructor
spoke highly of him. Dr. Garbarino testified that defendant would be a safe citizen.
¶ 44 The trial court described the nature of the crime, stating that the victims of the shooting
were defenseless. It noted that while defendant and codefendant had changed for the better over
the last 20 years while they were in custody, the victims were murdered in a “cold, calculated
manner,” and the crime “shocks the conscience of civilized society.” The trial court added that it
considered defendant and codefendant’s age and “everything the lawyers on both sides argued.”
¶ 45 Looking at the entirety of the resentencing hearing, we find that the trial court properly
considered the evidence presented on each of the Miller factors. Although the trial court did not
specifically identify which factors it considered in determining defendant’s sentence, it is
presumed that the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors and rehabilitative
potential. People v. Brazziel, 406 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (1993). A trial court is not required to
specify on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed, nor is it required to recite and assign
value to each factor presented at the sentencing hearing. People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st)
140134, ¶ 22; People v. Baker, 241 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (1993).
¶ 46 To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court gave more weight to the severity of
the crime than the mitigating factors, we note that “because the most important sentencing factor
is the seriousness of the offense, the court is not required to give greater weight to mitigating
factors than to the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345,
¶ 123. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
¶ 47 We granted defendant’s motion to cite additional authority, but find that his reliance on
People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, is without merit. In Zumot, the defendant was found
16
No. 1-17-1645
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to 45 years in prison. Id. ¶ 1. His conviction was
affirmed on appeal. People v. Zumot, No. 1-05-1068 (2009). The defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition, arguing that the trial court failed to properly consider his youth and
attendant circumstances, which was summarily dismissed. Id. ¶ 2. On appeal from the dismissal
of his postconviction petition, this court rejected the argument by the State that the trial court did
in fact consider the Miller factors when it sentenced the defendant in 2004 – years before Miller
was decided – simply because “information touching on those factors was included in the PSI
report submitted at sentencing.” Id. ¶ 40. We stated that “being aware of evidence relevant to the
Miller factors is wholly distinct from considering those factors as mitigating, or carefully
considering the prospect of a defendant’s rehabilitative potential.” Id.
¶ 48 In the case at bar, the resentencing hearing was for the sole purpose of presenting
evidence on the Miller factors. The trial court did not merely review defendant’s PSI. As
discussed above, the court heard extensive evidence on each of the Miller factors and we have no
reason to believe it abused its discretion when resentencing defendant.
¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 51 Affirmed.
17