In re P.J.-M. ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 210456-UOrder filed February 14, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
In re P.J.-M and R.M., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the Tenth Judicial Circuit,
Minors ) Peoria County, Illinois.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-21-0456 & 3-21-0457
) Circuit No. 18-JA-96 & 18-JA-97
v. )
)
Angela J., )
) The Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Timothy Cusack,
) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Orders finding respondent unfit to care for the minors and subsequently
terminating her parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶2 The circuit court found respondent, Angela J., to be an unfit parent to P.J.-M and R.M. It
subsequently terminated her parental rights. On appeal, respondent argues that the court’s finding
of unfitness and termination order were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s finding of unfitness and its termination order.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 8, 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of neglect regarding the
minors P.J.-M (born June 15, 2013) and R.M. (born May 26, 2005). The petitions alleged, among
other things, that on January 30, 2018, police officers executed a search warrant for sale of crack
cocaine at the minors’ home and found respondent attempting to flush cocaine down the toilet,
two grams of cocaine in 13 individual baggies, approximately 1.7 grams of cannabis, a loaded
.45 caliber handgun in a purse in the bedroom, and 9mm ammunition in a Victoria’s Secret bag.
The petitions also alleged (1) that respondent had a criminal history, which included pending
charges for possession of controlled substances and attempt at obstructing justice; (2) that
respondent was in a relationship with person involved in drug sales and who had been held unfit
in other, unrelated cases; and (3) that police responded to the minors’ home on May 29, 2017, to
investigate a report of shot fired and to search for respondent’s alleged boyfriend. The circuit
court entered adjudicatory orders finding the petitions proven on June 8, 2018.
¶5 Although the orders found the minors neglected and declared them wards of the State,
respondent and the minors’ father were found fit over the objection of the State and the guardian
ad litem, and respondent was named the minors’ guardian. Respondent was further ordered to (1)
execute all authorizations for releases of information requested by DCFS or designee; (2)
cooperate fully and completely with DCFS or designee; (3) obtain a drug and alcohol assessment
and follow recommendations; (4) perform random drug drops two times per month; (5)
participate in and successfully complete counseling; (6) participate in and successfully complete
a parenting course or classes; (7) obtain and maintain stable housing conducive to the safe and
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healthy rearing of the minors; (8) provide any change in address, phone number, or change in
members of household within three days; and (9) provide to assigned caseworker information for
any person with whom DCFS or designee had reason to believe a relationship existed or had
developed affecting the minors.
¶6 On September 21, 2018, the circuit court entered a new order appointing DCFS guardian
after respondent failed to disclose incidents of domestic violence and driving with the minors in
the car on a suspended license. The minors were placed in the care of their maternal
grandparents, Solomon and Sultan H. On March 26, 2021, after several permanency reviews and
orders, the court changed the permanency goal to “substitute care pending court decision on
parental rights.
¶7 On April 23, 2021, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights
relative to the minors, alleging that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of
the minors during the nine-month period following adjudication date of May 18, 2020, to
February 18, 2021. Respondent filed an answer denying the allegations and the State filed
supplemental petitions on July 26, 2021. In each supplemental petition, the State alleged
respondent failed to make reasonable progress during a different nine-month period running from
October 2, 2020 to July 2, 2021.
¶8 The hearing on the supplemental petitions commenced on September 10, 2021. Brianna
Colvin testified she had been the caseworker in this matter since September 13, 2020. She stated
that during the time period of October 2, 2020, and July 2, 2021, respondent did not complete
any substance abuse treatment, did not complete “drug drops” consistently, and tested positive
for THC (consumption of cannabis) on October 28, 2020, and cocaine on February 11, 2021.
Colvin also admitted that, during the designated period, respondent was not required to perform
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any services because they had been completed except for on-going “drug drops.” After the goal
changed to substitute care pending decision on parental rights, the agency no longer paid for
services, so there were no further drug drops requested. Colvin agreed that orders to comply with
services remained in place, but services were not paid for by the agency.
¶9 Respondent testified on her own behalf. She did not believe her last drug drop was in
February 2021 and recalled that she made additional drops after February. She stated that she had
not been asked to do a drug assessment because she had been assessed three times and, that she
was not offered drug treatment nor requested to make any additional drug drops. Respondent
testified that during the relevant period the agency did not ask her to do anything because she
had completed all ordered services. She explained that “[t]hey didn’t have proof” so she had to
get “proof from the place from the department” because “she” (possibly Colvin) did not have all
the information. Respondent testified that during the relevant period she was able to visit the
minors once a week, but her visits were reduced to one hour without prior notice. She explained
that she was offered overnight and unsupervised visits if she had completed her services, but that
never happened because caseworkers were often changed or reassigned. She, however, still
attended the one-hour visits per week and abided by what her father said because he was the
supervisor during her visits. On cross-examination, respondent was not sure of her last positive
drug drop but noted a caseworker had said it was February 11, 2021, and that she tested positive
for cocaine. She offered no evidence of any drug drops after February 11, 2021.
¶ 10 Respondent recalled Colvin as a witness, who stated a family team meeting was held and
they discussed decreasing visitation and drug drops with respondent. Colvin testified that she did
not tell respondent she had to complete drug drops out of her own pocket or on her own. Colvin
also affirmed (on examination by the court) that a March 22, 2021, permanency addendum
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accurately reported respondent failed to appear for six out of seven requested drops. The
referenced addendum showed respondent “failed to appear to every drop requested of her since
[January 20, 2021] aside from one that she completed on” February 26, 2021. When recalled as a
witness, respondent denied failing to appear for requested drops.
¶ 11 The State argued respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant
period, testing positive for cocaine in February 2021 and for THC in October 2020 and failing to
consistently complete drug drops. Respondent noted that, during the relevant time period, she
had already completed her substantive services and had maintained regular visits despite the
reduced visitation hours. She contended that there was no evidence presented as to non-
cooperation, missed visits, or inconsistent (“poor”) visits. Respondent also contended that
terminating parental rights on one dirty drop during the relevant period was not sufficient. She
argued that the evidence did not rise to the level of failing to make reasonable progress during
the relevant period. The guardian ad litem noted that at no time during the course of the cases
was the agency in a position to return the minors to respondent’s care, contending that despite
having completed services prior to the reporting period, there was at least one positive test result
for cocaine with multiple missed drug drops. The guardian ad litem argued respondent should be
found unfit given her history of substance abuse, which impacted the safety and security of the
minors and their ability to return to her care.
¶ 12 Following argument, the circuit court found the State had met its burden of proving
respondent unfit, stating that “while she completed everything else, [respondent] hadn’t taken
control of her drug habit and her drug issues.” The court explained: “She misses drops. She
didn’t take an assessment. She fails to appear for drops on a consistent basis during this period of
time.” The court stated the conditions requiring removal had been persistent during the three-
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year lifetime of the case but “certainly during this nine-month period of time there was not
reasonable progress made regarding that issue.”
¶ 13 The circuit court then immediately proceeded to a best interest hearing. The court first
considered the single best interest report DCFS filed on July 8, 2021. The report indicated that
the minors had been placed in foster care with their maternal grandparents for over 1,018 days.
The minors’ basic needs of food, shelter, clothing, and health were met by their grandparents.
The home had been observed during monitoring visits by a licensing worker every six months;
no safety concerns have been raised and the home “has met all DCFS licensing standards for a
relative foster home. Both P.J.-M and R.M were growing, and each was “meeting her
developmental milestones.” The report noted that the “grandparents [were] willing and
committed to providing permanency for” P.J.-M. It also noted that R.M shared her future goals
with the caseworker: She was looking for summer employment, wanted to start working to
purchase a car after getting her driver’s license, and was “really focused on establishing her
independence.” The minors have the same biological father, against whom the State also had
pending petitions for termination of parental rights. The report stated that, when the case was
opened, respondent was in an on-going relationship with “a known sex offender” whom she
allowed to stay in the home with the minors. Her boyfriend’s offense involved a minor under the
age of twelve. The report recommended that respondent’s parental rights be terminated and
determined that there were no concerns with the minors’ current placement. Colvin requested
that the court correct the report, explaining that “it says [respondent] has not completed a walk-in
substance abuse assessment, it should say during this reporting period.”
¶ 14 The State’s sole witness was Colvin, who testified that the minors have been in their
current placement for “exactly 1,079 days” and that they have developed “strong community
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ties” there. She also stated that “the current caregivers [were] willing to be permanent adoptive
placements for [the] minors.” Respondent called Solomon H., respondent’s father, who stated
that he was willing to adopt the minors. He testified that he supervised all of respondent’s visits
with the minors. She attended all of the scheduled visits and interacted appropriately with the
minors. Both minors identify respondent as their mother, calling her mom. Solomon H. stated
that R.M., who was sixteen at the time, had a phone and “probably” spoke regularly with
respondent but he did not actually know if she did.
¶ 15 The State recommended that the circuit court terminate respondent’s parental rights,
change the permanency goal to “adoption,” maintain the minors as “wards of the Court,” and
keep DCFS as guardian. Respondent contended that both minors know and refer to her as their
mother. She noted that she has attended visits “every week without fail.” She argued that
termination was not in the best interest of the minors. The guardian ad litem noted there was a
mother-daughter relationship between respondent and each minor, but stated that, throughout the
case, respondent had failed to “address the issues [required] to have her children returned to her
care.” She contended the minors deserve “safety and stability,” which their grandparents have
been providing for “[a] significant number of days.” She did not believe return to respondent’s
care would “be safe or appropriate.” The guardian ad litem argued the termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the minors’ best interest.
¶ 16 The circuit court ruled that termination was in the best interest of the minors. First, the
court found that the grandparents have (1) been providing for the minors’ physical safety and
welfare; (2) helped the minors’ development of their identity; (3) encouraged them in
establishing family, cultural, and religious ties; (4) created a sense of attachment and security
with the minors; and (5) provided continuity of affection for the minors. The court concluded
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that the placement with the grandparents was “the least disruptive placement alternative for the
children.” The court then noted that respondent will be able to maintain a presence in minors’
lives because “the grandparents are [a] stable factor in this case,” which has lasted for three
years. In relevant part, the court stated:
“I don’t believe, as I sit here today, based upon the testimony, and based upon
all information that has been received by the Court that [respondent] has taken
care of her drug problem at this point in time. That is what caused this case to
come back in. I don’t feel secure that in allowing the children to go back to her
and not terminating her rights in any respect would be appropriate at this time,
and it’s not in the children’s best interest.”
The court concluded that the minors’ placement with and ultimate adoption by their grandparents
was what they needed.
¶ 17 The circuit court entered its order on September 16, 2021. Respondent now appeals this
order.
¶ 18 ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where (1) the State proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a parent is unfit pursuant to grounds set forth in Section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act, and (2) the circuit court finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. 750
ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2019); In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244 (2006). The State is not
required to prove every ground it has alleged for finding a parent unfit. In re K.I., 2016 IL App
(3d) 160010, ¶ 37 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349 (2005)). “A parent’s rights may
be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id.8
¶ 20 Pursuant to the Adoption Act, a parent is unfit if she failed “to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent during any [nine]-month period following the
adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2019). Reasonable
progress under section 1(D)(m)(ii) requires “demonstrable movement toward the goal of
reunification.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 211 (2001). On review, the circuit court’s fitness
determination will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
K.I., 2016 IL App (3d) 160010, ¶ 38 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354). A court’s
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly
apparent. Id.¶ 21 The manifest weight of the evidence shows that respondent failed to make reasonable
progress toward correcting her drug abuses during the relevant nine-period spanning from of
October 2, 2020, and July 2, 2021. Respondent tested positive for cannabis on October 28, 2020,
and cocaine on February 11, 2021. She also failed to appear for six requested drug drops between
January 20, 2021, and February 26, 2021.
¶ 22 On appeal, respondent argues that she made reasonable progress because she made
significant progress in addressing her court-ordered services. She notes that there is no dispute
that she completed all services requested except for the required continued compliance with drug
drops. She contends that the conditions requiring the minors’ removal were for incidents of
unreported domestic violence and driving on a suspended license. Respondent argues that she
had made measurable or demonstrable movement toward reunification with the minors because
“there was no indication that domestic violence persisted or that [she] continued to use poor
judgment in her driving habits.”
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¶ 23 We disagree. The order adjudicating the minors neglected and the conditions supporting
it predated the allegations for DCFS’s appointment as guardian. The State filed the initial
petitions because respondent had pending charges for possession of controlled substances and
was found attempting to flush cocaine down her toilet. The court found these petitions proven
and ordered respondent to, inter alia, perform random drug drops two times per month. We note
that respondent has completed all court ordered services during the lifespan of this case, except
regularly and successfully complying with ongoing drug testing. It was concealment of domestic
violence and driving the minors while her license was suspended that brought respondent back
into court, resulting in removal of the minors and their current placement with their grandparents.
However, the conditions initiating this case were created by and remained intertwined with
respondent’s use and trade of controlled substances. Respondent’s failure to regularly perform
drug drops hindered her ability to resolve this impediment to reunification. Therefore, the finding
of unfitness is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 24 On a petition for termination of parental rights, once a finding of unfitness has been
made, all considerations must yield to the best interest of the child. In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d
628, 633 (3rd Dist. 2006). At this stage of the proceedings, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In
re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347 (2004). The trial court’s decision requires consideration of statutory
factors, including, inter alia: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food,
shelter, clothing, and health; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s
background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of
attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties, including
church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every
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family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (10) the
preference of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1–3(4.05) (West 2021).
The trial court’s task requires the court to balance these factors, weighing them at the first
instance, and places the court “in a better position to see the witnesses and judge their
credibility.” In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71 (internal citations and quotations marks
omitted). Thus, on review, we accord the trial court’s determination in a termination proceeding
great deference and will not reverse it unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 633.
¶ 25 The relevant factors in this case show that the trial court’s termination order was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, the current placement with their grandparents
meets the minors’ basic needs of food, shelter, clothing, health, and physical safety. The home
met all DCFS licensing standards for a relative foster home at each semi-annual monitoring
during the minors’ placement there. Both minors were growing, and each was “meeting her
developmental milestones.” By contrast, respondent’s home placed the minors with a drug user
and in close contact with “a known sex offender.”
¶ 26 Second, the current placement satisfies the minors’ need for permanence. Colvin testified
that they had been placed with their grandparents for exactly 1,079 days at the time of the
hearing. She noted that the grandparents were willing and committed to providing permanency
for P.J.-M. Solomon H. affirmed his intent to adopt both minors. During the placement, R.M has
been able to develop her identity by focusing her future goals which included looking for
summer employment, getting her driver’s license, and purchasing a car. Although her goals also
included “establishing her independence,” the court found that her grandparents were a
stabilizing force, within which, we note, she was able to formulate positive goals.
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¶ 27 Finally, the minors’ placement with their grandparents would encourage them in
establishing and maintaining family, cultural, and religious ties. On appeal, respondent argues
that this factor is neutral because the minors’ grandparents are her parents and would foster the
same ties as she would. Our goal in evaluating this factor, however, is not centered solely on the
nature of the ties established and maintained, but also on the minors’ ability to safely and
positively foster those ties. Solomon H. has supervised all of respondent’s visits with the minors
with no indication of interfering with their interaction. Under his guidance, respondent has
attended all of the scheduled visits and interacted appropriately with the minors. Both minors
continue to identify her as their mother, with R.M. “probably” speaking regularly with
respondent over the phone. The court concluded, and we agree, that respondent will be able to
maintain a presence in minors’ lives under the current placement while they continue to benefit
from their grandparents’ stabilizing guidance.
¶ 28 CONCLUSION
¶ 29 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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