People v. Cherry , 2022 IL App (4th) 200309-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE 2022 IL App (4th) 200309-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
NO. 4-20-0309 February 18, 2022
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances Court, IL
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
WILLIE JAMES CHERRY, ) No. 10CF42
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Scott D. Drazewski,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding postconviction counsel provided
reasonable assistance.
¶2 In March 2014, defendant, Willie James Cherry, filed a pro se postconviction
petition. In February 2020, the State moved to dismiss defendant’s petition. In July 2020, the
trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing postconviction counsel failed to comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) and provided unreasonable assistance when she
did not certify she made the necessary amendments to adequately present defendant’s claims and
adopted the pro se petition without making any amendments or shaping the claims into the
proper legal form. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In January 2010, the State charged defendant with three counts of predatory
criminal sexual assault, alleging defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with (1) K.W.,
who was under 13 years of age, and the act involved defendant’s penis and K.W.’s anus (count
I); (2) K.W. and the act involved defendant’s penis and K.W.’s mouth (count II); and
(3) K.M.W., who was under 13 years of age, and the act involved defendant’s penis and
K.M.W.’s anus (count III).
¶6 During the March 2011 trial, the State established that K.W. and K.M.W. lived
with their grandmother, Julia Howard, at the time of the offense. In the late 1990s, a friend
introduced Howard and defendant and the two later began dating. In 2000, defendant
occasionally babysat K.W., K.M.W., and their sibling, Kh.W. K.M.W. testified that, one
morning when Howard was gone, defendant asked her to go to a bedroom with him. According
to K.M.W., she ended up unclothed on the bed on her stomach and defendant “put his penis in
[her] butt.” K.M.W. testified this happened more than once but fewer than 10 times. Kh.W.
testified he got up one night and observed defendant having sexual intercourse with K.M.W.
through an open bedroom door.
¶7 Defendant was interviewed in November 2009, and he stated he occasionally
watched Howard’s grandchildren when he dated Howard approximately 10 years before. Later
in the interview, defendant denied ever being alone with the children and denied abusing the
children. At trial, defendant testified he watched Howard’s children while Howard was gone.
Defendant testified his relationship with Howard ended when he reconciled with his wife in late
1999. Defendant denied abusing the children. Dottie Cherry, defendant’s wife, testified she and
defendant separated for a time in 1999. According to Dottie, she and defendant reconciled in
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December 1999. Dottie testified she knew of Howard during the time she was separated from
defendant.
¶8 The jury found defendant not guilty of counts I and II and guilty of count III. In
June 2011, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years’ imprisonment followed by a 3-year
term of mandatory supervised release. On direct appeal, defendant argued (1) the court erred in
admonishing the potential jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1,
2007), (2) the court erred by advising the jurors that the State was not required to prove the dates
alleged in the indictment, and (3) the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In November 2012, this court affirmed. People v. Cherry, 2012 IL App (4th) 110624-U.
¶9 In March 2014, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petition
raised 25 claims. In relevant part, the claims included an allegation that trial counsel failed to
use an expert-accepted study in defending against the allegations of child abuse and counsel
failed to investigate five witnesses identified before trial (claim six). According to the petition,
Robert Freyman, a probation officer, would testify that Howard tried to convince him that
defendant had violated his probation by lying about the death of defendant’s cousin. Brandi
Russell would testify that Howard tried to get defendant into trouble with his probation officer
and that Howard threatened defendant. Jimmy Rodgers, a deacon at defendant’s church, would
testify about Howard’s vindictiveness. Michael Farmer, defendant’s former neighbor, would
testify that defendant worked full-time in 1999. Finally, Michael Mitchell would testify that
defendant worked in his hat shop in 1999.
¶ 10 The petition also alleged trial counsel and the trial court failed to conduct a fitness
hearing where counsel knew defendant was taking trazodone hydrochloride with side effects
including difficulty breathing, facial swelling, mood or behavior changes, anxiety, panic attacks,
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trouble sleeping, impulsivity, irritability, hostility, aggressiveness, restlessness, hyperactivity,
depression, and suicidal thoughts. The petition alleged the medication prevented defendant from
consulting with his lawyer. Defendant also alleged trial counsel failed to sufficiently consult
with defendant “before changing the venue from judge Charles G. Reynard to judge Jame[s] E.
Souk without giv[ing] [defendant] a heads up on what was going on.”
¶ 11 Defendant attached his affidavit reiterating the testimony the five witnesses would
give as alleged in claim six. Defendant also attached an affidavit in the name of his wife, Dottie,
although defendant signed the affidavit. According to the second affidavit, Dottie would testify
that Howard committed perjury when she testified that defendant babysat while she worked, that
defendant lived with her in 2000, and that she did not know defendant was married. Defendant
averred his trial counsel was given the names of witnesses and never interviewed them.
¶ 12 Six days after filing his postconviction petition, defendant filed a letter asking for
leave to add an affidavit from Brandi Russell to his petition. In the affidavit, Russell averred she
started dating defendant in December 1999. Russell received a phone call from Howard who
told Russell defendant had molested her grandchildren. According to Russell, Howard “also 3
way called [defendant’s] probation officer.” Howard tried to keep Russell from dating defendant
and threatened to get back at defendant. Russell moved in with defendant after Valentine’s Day
and witnessed a property dispute between defendant and Howard. Russell averred Howard “was
jilted [and] looking for revenge.”
¶ 13 In June 2014, the trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant in
second-stage postconviction proceedings. In August 2014, Carey Luckman entered an
appearance on behalf of defendant. Thereafter, Luckman asked for regular continuances before
withdrawing in August 2018. In January 2019, Kelly Harms appeared on defendant’s behalf and
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sought a continuance to file an amended postconviction petition. In June 2019, Harms filed a
motion for a finding of no merit in the postconviction petition and a motion to withdraw. In her
accompanying brief, Harms stated that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present witnesses
that would testify defendant did not live with Howard in 2000 as an alibi defense was not
ineffective assistance because defendant admitted to babysitting the children. As to the evidence
of Howard’s motive to lie, Harms stated, “There is no way that testimony regarding [Howard’s]
past jealousy issues and vindictive behavior after [defendant] left her and went back to his wife
give rise to the inference that the three children who testified had something to gain or lose by
testifying that two of them had suffered sexual abuse at the hands of [defendant.]” Harms also
stated trial counsel was allowed to explore why the abuse was not disclosed until nearly 10 years
after it happened.
¶ 14 Harms addressed defendant’s claim that trial counsel failed to adequately
communicate with him. According to Harms, the record demonstrated trial counsel kept
petitioner informed of what was happening with his case where counsel indicated at a hearing he
needed time to speak with defendant. Harms also indicated there were notes in trial counsel’s
file about visits with defendant and a letter from trial counsel to defendant about the judge
changing. As to defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have him
evaluated for fitness, Harms noted that during the trial court’s inquiry as to whether defendant
chose to testify and understood the ramifications, defendant understood the questions and
answered coherently. Further, Harms stated trial counsel had copies of defendant’s medical file
from the jail which showed many of the medications he took and the ailments he faced.
¶ 15 Included with the motion to withdraw, Harms filed a certificate pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The certificate indicated Harms
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consulted with defendant to ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights and
examined the record of proceedings at trial. The certificate stated, “Undersigned counsel has
attempted to make amendments to the pro se petition necessary for adequate presentation of
[defendant’s] proceedings; however, undersigned counsel finds the pro se petition to be without
merit.”
¶ 16 In August 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Harms’s motion to withdraw.
Harms stated she thoroughly reviewed defendant’s case and spoke with him at great length on
several occasions. Harms researched each of the issues set forth in the pro se petition and looked
for any additional issues. Harms said she did not feel there were any meritorious issues and
asked to withdraw.
¶ 17 The trial court noted it needed to be “extremely careful with reference to its
findings *** so no inference is either intended to be drawn or drawn by counsel with reference to
the [c]ourt’s ruling on the motion.” The court noted it was not ruling on a motion to dismiss but
rather “a motion for finding of no merit in postconviction.” The court further stated it had made
an affirmative determination at the first stage that one or more allegations in the pro se petition
was neither frivolous nor patently without merit and postconviction counsel’s responsibility was
to present the petition to the court in proper legal form. The court stated it could not address
each of the claims in the pro se postconviction petition but must view the petition as a whole.
The court went on to state as follows:
“And so the [c]ourt is not making any findings concerning each of
the claims at this time if the [c]ourt makes the determination that at
least one of the claims could or might be required to be advanced
to a Stage 3 hearing. And since there are, from the [c]ourt’s
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perspective, at least three of those claims, that being Claim 6,
Claim 11[,] and Claim 20, that would require the [c]ourt to engage
in fact finding which is not permissible at this time because it also
would include as contained within the motion filed by Ms. Harms
for the [c]ourt to consider matters outside of the record, matters
that are contained within trial counsel’s file which is not available
to the [c]ourt and nor is it admissible or can it be considered by the
[c]ourt as it relates to this particular motion at this time that
prevents the [c]ourt from granting the relief that Ms. Harms is
seeking.”
The court noted that although the motion to withdraw was well-taken with regards to many of the
claims, the court could not address them on an individual basis. Accordingly, the court denied
the motion to withdraw and allowed the State time to elect to file an answer or a motion to
dismiss. Postconviction counsel adopted the original pro se postconviction petition.
¶ 18 In February 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction
petition. The State argued the petition was unsupported by sufficient affidavits where
defendant’s affidavit was silent on all but one of the claims raised. The State argued the second
affidavit with Dottie’s name consisted of conclusory statements and hearsay. The State first
noted defendant failed to attach affidavits from any of the five witnesses identified in claim six
and failed to explain the omission of those affidavits. The State noted that, even if defendant’s
affidavit was sufficient to support his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and call witnesses regarding Howard’s vindictive nature or challenging defendant’s
opportunity to commit the offenses, defendant could not establish prejudice. The State noted this
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court recognized defendant’s admission that he had access to the children on multiple occasions.
While defense counsel may have impeached Howard’s testimony by inquiring into her bias
against defendant, the State argued she did not testify to the underlying criminal conduct and her
testimony had little bearing on defendant’s conviction. As to defendant’s claim regarding trial
counsel’s failure to request a fitness hearing, the State argued defendant failed to support his
claim with medical records or affidavits establishing a reasonable probability that he would have
been found unfit had a fitness hearing been held.
¶ 19 In July 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss
defendant’s postconviction petition. Postconviction counsel argued a third-stage evidentiary
hearing was necessary to hear from trial counsel about why he did or did not take certain actions
and whether his decisions were matters of trial strategy. The court noted postconviction counsel
had ample opportunity to file an amended petition or additional affidavits. The court dismissed
the first five claims in the petition as lacking support or specificity, matters of trial strategy,
baseless, conclusory, and barred by res judicata. As to claim six, the court noted defendant
identified particular witnesses trial counsel was informed of but, despite having ample
opportunity to do so, defendant failed to include affidavits from the witnesses. However, the
court determined defendant’s summary established the witnesses would have testified to
Howard’s vindictiveness and trial counsel’s decision not to pursue this line of inquiry was a
matter of trial strategy, particularly where the testimony would be inadmissible or limited to
Howard’s truthfulness and Howard was not the victim. The court dismissed claims 7 through 10
as barred by res judicata, conclusory, unsupported, and speculative. As to the claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing, the court agreed with the State
that defendant failed to support the claim with medical records or affidavits establishing a
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reasonable probability that defendant would have been found unfit if a fitness hearing had been
held. Moreover, the court noted a defendant is presumed fit and the record did not indicate a
bona fide doubt as to his fitness.
¶ 20 The trial court dismissed claims 12 through 19 as matters of trial strategy, lacking
a showing of prejudice, conclusory, barred by res judicata, and baseless. As to the claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with defendant about a
transition from one judge to another because of a change in assignments, the court noted
defendant failed to allege he would have exercised his right to a substitution of judge and the
record showed he did not avail himself of the opportunity to inform counsel he wanted a
different judge after he was made aware of the change. The court dismissed the remaining
claims as conclusory or meritless. In summary, the court noted the postconviction petition was
only supported by defendant’s affidavit, which was silent on all but one of defendant’s claims,
and the petition failed to explain the omission of any affidavits or other records. Finally, the
court noted that, even if trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, defendant was unable to show he was prejudiced by any of trial counsel’s
decisions.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule
651(c) and provided unreasonable assistance when she did not certify she made the necessary
amendments to adequately present defendant’s claims and adopted the pro se petition without
making any amendments or shaping the claims into the proper legal form.
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¶ 24 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to
122-7 (West 2018)) provides a collateral means for a defendant to challenge a conviction or
sentence for a violation of a federal or state constitutional right. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140,
143, 809 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2004). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial
court must determine, taking the allegations as true, whether the defendant’s petition is frivolous
or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). At the second stage of
postconviction proceedings, “the State may move to dismiss a petition or an amended petition
pending before the court.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1008
(2006). The defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. Id. at 473. “At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not
positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court
dismisses the petition at that stage, we generally review the circuit court’s decision using a
de novo standard.” Id.¶ 25 “[A] defendant in postconviction proceedings is entitled to only a ‘reasonable’
level of assistance, which is less than that afforded by the federal or state constitutions.” Id. at
472. Pursuant to Rule 651(c), counsel’s duties “include consultation with the defendant to
ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional right, examination of the record of the
proceedings at the trial, and amendment of the petition, if necessary, to ensure that defendant’s
contentions are adequately presented.” Id. “Our review of an attorney’s compliance with a
supreme court rule, as well as the dismissal of a postconviction petition on motion of the State, is
de novo.” People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 17, 974 N.E.2d 813.
¶ 26 The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance. People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st)
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092529, ¶ 23, 955 N.E.2d 1200. “Rule 651(c) requires only that postconviction counsel certify
having undertaken the limited actions prescribed. Those requirements do not include bolstering
every claim presented in a petitioner’s pro se postconviction petition, regardless of its legal
merit, or presenting each and every witness or shred of evidence the petitioner believes could
potentially support his position.” People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 38, 155 N.E.3d 374. With
respect to counsel’s duty to submit affidavits, the supreme court has stated, “In the ordinary case,
a trial court ruling upon a motion to dismiss a [postconviction] petition which is not supported by
affidavits or other documents may reasonably presume that [postconviction] counsel made a
concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the [postconviction] claims, but was unable to
do so.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 241, 609 N.E.2d 304, 311 (1993). The defendant
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of reasonable assistance by demonstrating his
attorney’s failure to substantially comply with Rule 651(c). Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529,
¶ 23.
¶ 27 Defendant first asserts Harms never certified she made the necessary changes and
amendments to defendant’s petition to adequately present his claims, so her certificate did not
create the presumption of compliance with Rule 651(c). Specifically, defendant asserts that
Harms’s certificate stated she “attempted to make amendments to the pro se petition necessary
for adequate presentation of [defendant’s] proceedings; however, undersigned counsel finds the
pro se petition to be without merit.” Defendant argues that Harms’s statement that she attempted
to make any amendments necessary for the adequate presentation of defendant’s claims indicates
she failed to comply with Rule 651(c)’s requirement that postconviction counsel certify he or she
“has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate
presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).
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¶ 28 As the State correctly points out, this court has “note[d] that, before withdrawing,
postconviction counsel can quite consistently certify that he or she ‘has made any amendments to
the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s
contentions.’ ” People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (4th) 140085, ¶ 37, 50 N.E.3d 353 (quoting Ill. S.
Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). This court explained that such a certification does not mean
that postconviction counsel has concluded the pro se petition requires amendment. “The
operative qualifying words are ‘any’ and ‘necessary.’ [Citation.] ‘If amendments to a pro se
postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or patently nonmeritorious claim, they are
not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of the rule.’ ” Id. ¶ 38 (quoting People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d
192, 205, 817 N.E.2d 511, 519 (2004)). Although the certification filed by Harms indicated she
attempted to make necessary amendments, it does not follow that she concluded there were
necessary amendments to adequately present defendant’s claims. We note defendant also relies
on Smith for the proposition that Harms’s unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from the case “does
not excuse her failure to certify that she actually made the necessary alterations to shape
[defendant’s] claims into proper legal form.” This argument assumes there were necessary
amendments. Here, Harms’s certificate indicates she would have made any necessary
amendments, but she found the claims to be meritless and any amendment was therefore
unnecessary.
¶ 29 Under these circumstances, we conclude postconviction counsel exercised her
professional judgment in her representation of defendant and substantially complied with Rule
651(c), giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance. People v. Richardson,
382 Ill. App. 3d 248, 257, 888 N.E.2d 553, 561 (2008) (finding substantial compliance with Rule
651(c) where counsel certified she prepared a supplemental petition that adequately
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complemented the defendant’s claims and did not improperly defer to the defendant’s wishes);
but cf. People v. Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967-69, 838 N.E.2d 972, 976-77 (2005) (finding
no substantial compliance with Rule 651(c) where counsel certified she reviewed the record of
proceedings on appeal and the defendant indicated he wished to rely on his original
postconviction petition, which the court concluded was a failure of counsel to fulfill their duty to
exercise professional judgment because counsel improperly surrendered the decision about what
amendments to make to defendant).
¶ 30 Defendant argues that, even if Harms’s certification substantially complied with
Rule 651(c), the record affirmatively refutes that Harms made the necessary amendments to
defendant’s claims. Defendant asserts amendment was necessary after the trial court denied
Harms’s motion to withdraw and concluded some of the claims in the petition had merit. In
response, the State argues that postconviction counsel has no duty to amend a pro se petition. As
discussed above, “Rule 651(c) requires only that postconviction counsel certify having
undertaken the limited actions prescribed. Those requirements do not include bolstering every
claim presented in a petitioner’s pro se postconviction petition, regardless of its legal merit, or
presenting each and every witness or shred of evidence the petitioner believes could potentially
support his position.” Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 38. Although the court concluded some of the
claims in defendant’s pro se petition had merit, it does not follow that counsel was required to
amend the petition. Where postconviction counsel finds “all the claims in the petition to be
frivolous, the appropriate procedure would have been to stand on the pro se petition or seek to
withdraw as counsel.” People v. Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 22, 100 N.E.3d 193. Here,
postconviction counsel determined the claims were without merit, unsuccessfully sought to
withdraw, and stood on the pro se petition.
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¶ 31 Defendant places great weight on postconviction counsel’s failure to amend the
pro se petition by attaching Russell’s affidavit. As noted, the Russell affidavit was filed six days
after defendant filed his pro se petition. Nothing in the record affirmatively shows a failure by
postconviction counsel to adequately support this claim. Although the trial court and the State
failed to mention Russell’s affidavit, the affidavit was filed in the circuit court and included in
the record. Where defendant filed a motion for leave to add Russell’s affidavit to his
postconviction petition, we cannot say that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable
assistance by failing to amend the petition to include the affidavit. In his reply brief, defendant
contends the subsequent filing of Russell’s affidavit was insufficient to place it in the record
before the trial court because “a circuit court must grant the petitioner leave to amend the petition
before a subsequent pleading is considered as part of the parties’ pleadings.” In support of this
contention, defendant cites People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (4th) 110220, ¶ 23, 986 N.E.2d 1274.
However, Smith involved a situation where the defendant attempted to “amend” a postconviction
petition with new substantive petitions after the trial court had entered a final order dismissing
the petition. Id. The Smith court concluded the subsequent petitions filed by the defendant
“must be considered successive petitions.” Id. Nothing in Smith suggests that an additional
affidavit filed six days after filing the pro se petition cannot be considered a part of the
pleadings. As for the other witnesses identified in claim six, we “may reasonably presume that
[postconviction] counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the
[postconviction] claims, but was unable to do so.” Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 241. Moreover,
although the trial court did note that defendant failed to include affidavits from the witnesses
identified in claim six, the court further concluded that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue a
line of inquiry into Howard’s vindictiveness was a matter of trial strategy, particularly where the
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testimony would be inadmissible or limited to Howard’s truthfulness and Howard was not the
victim.
¶ 32 Defendant also argues postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance
by failing to amend the petition to include mental health records to support defendant’s claim
that there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial. However, defendant points to no
affirmative evidence in the record to establish that postconviction counsel failed to seek out and
examine evidence relevant to this claim. Rather, he notes that Harms acknowledged there were
medical records in trial counsel’s file and failed to attach medical records from the jail. Contrary
to defendant’s argument, this indicates postconviction counsel did seek evidentiary support for
defendant’s claim and was presumably unsuccessful. People v. Wallace, 2016 IL App (1st)
142758, ¶ 27, 67 N.E.3d 976 (“A court may reasonably presume postconviction counsel made a
concerted effort to obtain evidence in support of postconviction claims, but was unsuccessful.”).
¶ 33 Defendant also argues postconviction counsel failed to amend the petition to
include sufficient detail on defendant’s claims regarding expert testimony on child abuse
allegations and on an investigation technique employed by the detectives. Defendant further
asserts postconviction counsel failed to provide any details about how trial counsel’s failure to
investigate the apartments where the abuse occurred prejudiced defendant. Again, we “may
reasonably presume postconviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain evidence in support
of postconviction claims, but was unsuccessful.” Id. As discussed above, we conclude
postconviction counsel’s certificate was substantially in compliance with Rule 651(c) and gave
rise to the rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance. Defendant has failed to demonstrate
the record affirmatively rebuts this presumption. Accordingly, we conclude postconviction
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counsel provided reasonable assistance and complied with Rule 651(c). Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
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