People v. Harris ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (3d) 200234Opinion filed February 23, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-20-0234
v. ) Circuit No. 17-CF-977
)
THOMAS MOSE HARRIS, ) Honorable
) Paul P. Gilfillan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Daugherity and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Thomas Mose Harris, appealed his conviction for unlawful use of a weapon
by a felon.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The defendant was indicted on January 2, 2018, on charges of unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)) and battery (id. § 12-3(a)(1)). Defense
counsel filed a motion to quash the defendant’s arrest and suppress all evidence arising from that
arrest, alleging that there was no probable cause to stop and detain the defendant.
¶4 At the suppression hearing, evidence was presented that a female victim was reportedly
put in a headlock and hit by a heavyset black male behind a liquor store on December 7, 2017.
Officers from the City of Peoria Police Department responded to the liquor store, which had a
video camera that recorded the incident. The police viewed the video recording, obtaining a
description of the perpetrator and his vehicle. The temporary tag number on the vehicle appeared
to be 585T515. Joseph Smiles, a City of Peoria police officer, testified that he was on his way to
work a few days later, on December 13, 2017, when he observed a silver Chevy Tahoe that
matched the description of the vehicle at the liquor store, but with a temporary registration of
575T815. Smiles observed the driver to be a heavy-set black male with a short beard, who appeared
to be the same male as in the liquor store video. Smiles did not stop the vehicle at that time, but
proceeded to work, where he identified the owner of the vehicle as the defendant, viewed a prior
booking photograph of the defendant, and reviewed the surveillance video from the liquor store.
Smiles determined that the defendant was the male individual in the liquor store video. Smiles
contacted Peoria police officer Jonathan Irving, who was on patrol with a new recruit, Officer
Kerry, in the area of one of the two addresses on record for the defendant. Smiles advised Irving
and Kerry that the defendant was a suspect in a battery and that there was probable cause to arrest
the defendant for the battery. Smiles directed Irving and Kerry to go to one of the addresses to look
for the defendant and the Tahoe, and Smiles proceeded to the other address.
¶5 Irving testified that he was contacted via car-to-car messenger, also known as an
investigative alert, by Smiles with an arrest message regarding the defendant. In the alert, Smiles
provided Irving with the description of the vehicle, the license plate (575T815), and the address,
and Smiles requested that Irving patrol by that location. Irving did not know the defendant and did
not observe the defendant engaging in any obvious criminal behavior. Irving did locate the vehicle,
with the defendant inside, and Irving and Kerry approached the vehicle. The officers confirmed
2
that the defendant was the person identified by Smiles and proceeded to arrest the defendant
pursuant to Smiles’s arrest message. The defendant was taken into custody, and a loaded gun was
found on his person during a pat-down search.
¶6 After being indicted, the defendant brought a motion to quash the arrest and suppress all
evidence arising from the arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that
Irving and Kerry had probable cause to arrest the defendant based upon the information in the
investigative alert provided to them by Smiles. Defense counsel then filed a supplemental motion
to suppress, arguing that arresting the defendant based on an investigative alert was contrary to the
Illinois Constitution and People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, aff’d in part, vacated in part,
2021 IL 125434. The trial court denied the supplemental motion, declining to follow Bass. The
trial court found that Bass was distinguishable because, contrary to the couple of weeks delay
between the investigative alert and the arrest in Bass, this case indicated a “fast[-]acting field
response.”
¶7 The defendant waived his right to a trial by jury, and the matter proceeded to a stipulated
bench trial on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The State dismissed the
battery charge. The trial court found that the stipulated evidence was sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The
defendant’s posttrial motion was denied, and he was sentenced to 3½ years in prison. The
defendant appealed.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash and suppress.
The defendant contends that there was no reasonable grounds, exigent circumstances, or good faith
to support the arrest and the search of the defendant absent an arrest warrant. Also, the defendant
3
argues that the Peoria Police Department’s use of an investigative alert violates separation of
powers. The State contends that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and that the
use of investigative alerts is proper.
¶ 10 The state and federal constitutions both protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. “An arrest without probable cause or
a warrant based thereon violates these constitutional provisions.” People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476,
484 (2005). The police may make an arrest without a warrant when the officer “has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense.” 725 ILCS 5/107-
2(1)(c) (West 2018); People v. Hardimon, 2021 IL App (3d) 180578, ¶ 39. In the context of a
warrantless arrest, “ ‘reasonable grounds’ ” has the same meaning as “ ‘probable cause.’ ” People
v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (3d) 120239, ¶ 85 (quoting Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 484).
¶ 11 The determination of whether police had probable cause to arrest is based on the officer’s
reasonable belief at the time of the arrest. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d at 484. The inquiry is, viewed through
an objective lens, whether the facts known to the police presented a probability of criminal activity.
Id. at 485. “Whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a crime is
based on an evaluation of all of the information available, including its source.” Id. In reviewing a
motion to suppress, we uphold factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. However, the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be suppressed is
reviewed de novo. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2004).
¶ 12 In this case, Smiles spoke to the victim, viewed the video of the attack, obtained a
description of the perpetrator, and obtained a description of the perpetrator’s vehicle. The vehicle
had a temporary plate, but Smiles could not identify the perpetrator with that plate number.
However, six days after the attack, Smiles was driving to work and observed a vehicle matching
4
the description, driven by a male individual who matched the description of the man that Smiles
had seen in the surveillance video, and with a license plate that differed from the temporary plate
by two digits. Smiles did not make an arrest at that point but continued to the police station, ran
the license plate, pulled the vehicle owner’s booking photograph, and rewatched the surveillance
video. There were two addresses for the defendant; Smiles proceeded to one and contacted Irving
with the other address. Smiles described the defendant and the battery investigation and informed
Irving via the investigative alert that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The
investigative alert that was relayed to the arresting officers provided reasonable grounds to make
a warrantless arrest. See People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 61 (arrest based on
investigative alert was upheld where the State presented evidence that officer who issued the alert
had probable cause to make the arrest); People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 31 (vacating the portion
of the appellate court opinion that held arrests based on investigative alerts to be unconstitutional).
Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to quash his arrest
and suppress evidence.
¶ 13 The defendant also contends that the investigative alert process violates the doctrine of
separation of powers because it is an administrative procedure promulgated by the executive
branch (i.e., a law enforcement agency) and conflicts with the authority of the courts. However,
the mere use of alerts to disseminate information among officers does not eliminate judicial
evaluations of probable cause. “ ‘When officers are working in concert, probable cause can be
established from all the information collectively received by the officers even if that information
is not specifically known to the officer who makes the arrest.’ ” People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144,
204 (1999) (quoting People v. Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127 (1997)).
5
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 16 Affirmed.
6
No. 3-20-0234
Cite as: People v. Harris, 2022 IL App (3d) 200234Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 17-CF-977;
the Hon. Paul P. Gilfillan, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Drew Charles Parsons,
for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Jodi Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino and
for Thomas D. Arado, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s
Appellee: Office, of counsel), for the People.
7