People v. Sebby ( 2015 )

2015 IL App (3d) 130214
Opinion filed April 27, 2015
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
) La Salle County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-13-0214
v. ) Circuit No. 11-CF-535
)
MONTANA SEBBY, )
) Honorable Cynthia M. Raccuglia,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice O'Brien dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 A La Salle County jury convicted defendant Montana Sebby of resisting a peace officer,
a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two
years’ imprisonment with one year of mandatory supervised release.
¶2 Defendant appeals, claiming: (1) that the trial court committed plain error by failing to
properly ask prospective jurors if they understood and accepted the four Zehr (People v. Zehr,
103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984)) principles codified by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1,
2012); and (2) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon the State’s improper comments during
cross-examination and closing arguments on defendant’s invocation of his right to terminate
police interrogation and his postarrest silence.
¶3 We affirm.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 The State charged defendant by information with resisting a peace officer, a Class 4
felony (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010)). The charging information alleged that defendant
knowingly resisted Deputy Jason Mohr during the authorized act of arrest when he pulled away
from and physically struggled with the deputy, and that defendant’s acts were the proximate
cause of injury to Mohr. At defendant’s arraignment, he pled not guilty and demanded a jury
trial.
¶6 I. Voir Dire
¶7 The case proceeded to jury trial on January 28 and 29, 2011. During voir dire, the trial
court admonished the jury pool of the four principles of law enumerated in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) as follows:
“The most important law on a criminal case is the defendant
who you will meet in a moment is presumed innocent. The
presumption of innocence exists throughout the trial. The
defendant doesn’t have to prove anything. The defendant doesn’t
have to testify. The defendant doesn’t have to present evidence,
and the defendant, if he does not, and you cannot and you must not
hold that against him or assume anything by that. The State is
obligated by law to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
2
¶8 The trial court then proceeded to question potential jurors in panels of six. During the
questioning of the first panel, the court engaged in the following colloquy with a potential juror
regarding bias:
“Q. First of all, you need to understand the presumption of
innocence.
A. Understood.
Q. But what if the defendant denies that but you have to
understand that may be a story told, and it may be you having to
decide whether it’s a story told and credibility. I can’t say that
may not be the story. I may have to say that’s what somebody
says, but the defendant by the way who’s presumed innocent
doesn’t have to testify, and if he doesn’t, you must not hold that
against him. Would that affect your decision?
A. Not if there’s no evidence pointing to that fact.
Q. Okay. Good. That’s what I’m looking for. That was a
very good answer because that was the answer in this case. Now,
going back to all six of you, the defendant is presumed innocent,
and that presumption of innocence exists throughout the trial. The
defendant does not have to prove anything. He doesn’t have to
testify. He doesn’t have to present evidence, and if he does not,
then you must not hold it against him. It’s the State’s burden to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and I need
to go through each of you with that.”
3
¶9 The trial court then individually asked the remaining members of the panel whether any
of them “[h]ad any problems” with the principles of law, while interweaving questions about
whether there was anything that would prevent them from being fair and impartial jurors. The
trial court specifically repeated its question with respect to the presumption of innocence to two
potential jurors because they indicated that they might be biased.
¶ 10 Using much the same phrasing as above, the trial court proceeded to announce the four
principles of law to each panel of prospective jurors. The trial court, again, asked the individual
jurors of each panel whether they “[h]ad any problems” with those principles, while continuing
to interweave questions about whether anything would prevent them from being fair and
impartial jurors. The trial court varied the phrasing of the question to “do you believe in those
principles of law?”
¶ 11 II. Trial
¶ 12 Following opening statements, the State called Deputy Joshua McGrath. McGrath
testified that he and the other deputies went to the Sebby family home to serve a court order for
custody of a minor child, L.S. Defendant informed the deputies that the child was with her
grandmother, Bonnie Sebby, and he did not know how to contact them. McGrath and the other
officers handed the custody order to defendant to read. Defendant handed it back to Deputy
Mohr, yelled for them to leave, and then poked McGrath in the shoulder with his finger.
McGrath advised defendant he was under arrest for battery of a police officer. When McGrath
tried to grab defendant’s wrist, defendant pulled away; the deputies took him to the ground to get
control of him. After the deputies handcuffed defendant, McGrath noticed scratches on Mohr’s
hand and wrist. The prosecutor inquired of McGrath what he “did” with defendant following the
arrest, and if McGrath “attempt[ed] to interview him” at the jail. McGrath responded:
4
“At the jail we did read him his Miranda warning and tried to
talk to him about what happened. When I asked him why he poked
me the way he did he stated that he was just getting ready to tell us
we could go in and check the house for [L.S.] and then when I
explained to him you were just seconds before yelling at us to
leave your property when you reached over and poked me, he did
not want to talk any further. He revoked [sic] his right to not talk
further.”
¶ 13 On cross-examination, McGrath did not recall whether he stuck his foot in the door to
prevent the woman who first answered the door from closing it. He also testified that he did “not
know exactly at what point and time” Mohr’s injuries occurred. McGrath could not recall
defendant’s position on the ground, but stated there was some “rolling around.”
¶ 14 Deputy Jason Mohr testified that defendant poked McGrath and resisted both officers
when they attempted to arrest him. Mohr and McGrath tried to control defendant by grabbing
his arms and taking him to the ground. Mohr had scrapes from the gravel on his hand and wrist.
On cross-examination, Mohr denied that he was agitated, used profanities, or threatened to pull
defendant’s mother from the house by her hair. Mohr admitted that he could not say 100% what
caused his scrapes. Mohr also testified that defendant stepped forward off the front step in order
to poke McGrath. He admitted that the detail about defendant stepping forward was not written
in the incident report, despite the fact that officers are trained to write important details in their
reports.
¶ 15 The State called Deputy Jarred Arthur, who testified that defendant was verbally hostile,
poked McGrath, and resisted when McGrath attempted to arrest him. McGrath and Mohr took
5
defendant to the ground while Arthur held his feet to prevent him from kicking anyone. After
the takedown, defendant was shirtless and mostly on his stomach, although Arthur could not
recall his exact position. On cross-examination, Arthur testified that defendant stepped forward
to poke McGrath. He also admitted that detail was missing from McGrath’s report.
¶ 16 Following the close of the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved
for a directed verdict.
¶ 17 The defense first called Angela Dankenbring. Dankenbring testified that she was a
family friend who had previously dated defendant’s brother, Oakland Sebby. On the morning of
the incident, Dankenbring testified that she answered the door and told the deputies that Bonnie
Sebby was not home and she was not sure if anyone else was home. When she tried to close the
door to put on her shoes, one deputy stuck his foot in the door, yelled at her, and told her he
would arrest her for obstructing justice. An argument ensued when officers wanted to search the
house and Dankenbring told them she did not have permission to allow them to do so.
Defendant then came to the door and shut it behind him while he spoke with the deputies. After
putting on a sweatshirt and shoes, Dankenbring returned and allegedly witnessed the following
events.
¶ 18 Defendant told the deputies that L.S. was not home. Defendant repeatedly asked them to
leave, which made the deputies more agitated and hostile. Defendant talked with his hands until
one officer yelled “assault.” Dankenbring testified this surprised her, as she did not see anything
like an assault occur. Defendant threw his hands up and said, “I’m cool. I’m cool. I’m calm.”
Two deputies then grabbed defendant’s arms and, according to Dankenbring, “played tug of war
with him until he was on the ground face down in the gravel.” Defendant did not struggle with
the deputies, but the deputies “were not clear on who was doing what. Defendant looked like a
6
puppet being held between two people.” Mohr and Arthur had defendant on the gravel, but
McGrath did not engage in the arrest. On cross-examination, the State asked Dankenbring
whether defendant was wrestling with the deputies. She stated that “[t]hey were wrestling his
arms trying to get them in position and that made him move.”
¶ 19 Defendant’s brother, Oakland Sebby, testified that he was in the basement when he heard
the confrontation. He went upstairs and watched the incident through the blinds of the French
door facing the porch. Oakland testified he heard McGrath shouting profanities. Defendant
asked the deputies to leave several times. Oakland did not see defendant step toward or make
contact with any of the deputies. McGrath screamed, “Assault [and] that Montana f’ed up and he
was going to jail ***.” The other two deputies “grabbed each arm and starting playing tug of
war with [defendant], walking him away from the house and trying to take him to the ground.”
Oakland further testified that when McGrath told defendant he was under arrest, he threw his
hands up and said, “I’m cool. I’m cool.” The officers threw defendant down on the gravel face
first. Defendant moved because he was trying to protect himself from the gravel.
¶ 20 Samantha Russell, defendant’s girlfriend, testified that she and defendant were
downstairs asleep with their daughter when the deputies arrived. Defendant went upstairs when
he heard pounding on the door. Five minutes later, Russell awakened her daughter and they
went upstairs to check on defendant. At that point, defendant was already in handcuffs.
McGrath was standing on the porch and the two other deputies were with defendant. Russell
gave a tee-shirt to McGrath to give to defendant, but she found it on the ground after they left.
Following defendant’s release from jail, Russell took photos of the scratches on his arms and
back.
7
¶ 21 Defendant testified on his own behalf, stating that the police had visited the family home
twice before due to custody issues with L.S. L.S. was the daughter of his recently deceased
sister, and L.S.’s father wanted custody. L.S. seemed depressed so Bonnie Sebby, her
grandmother, took her to visit family in the south. On their previous visits to the Sebby
residence, defendant stated that the deputies never told him that they had a custody order for L.S.
Defendant also stated that he did not live in the Sebby residence, but was there to help his
parents feed the animals on the farm while Bonnie was away.
¶ 22 Defendant stated he was shirtless and barefoot when he went upstairs. He saw
Dankenbring try to close the door when it sprung open because a deputy stuck his foot in it.
Three deputies were on the front porch. When defendant stepped outside, one deputy said,
“You're Montana right?” Defendant told them Bonnie and L.S. were not there. The deputy
accused him of lying. One of the deputies stated they would “drag [Bonnie] out by her hair.”
Mohr used profanities and was yelling. Mohr gave defendant the custody order. Defendant
thought it was a search warrant, but when he saw that it was not, he handed it back to the
deputies.
¶ 23 Defendant testified that throughout the incident, he stood on the step and did not leave it.
He asked the deputies to leave multiple times. When the deputies demanded to go into the
house, defendant replied that they could not all go in because it was early in the morning and he
did not want to wake the household, but maybe one person could go in. As he looked at each
one to decide who to let in, the deputies grabbed him, called him a liar, and told him that he
“messed up big time.” Defendant testified he did not make contact with any of the deputies
before they grabbed him nor did he step toward the deputies. They pulled him off the steps and
swung him onto the gravel, where he lost his balance.
8
¶ 24 Defendant stated the officers tugged at him and he landed on his face. They told him to
stop resisting. He told them that they had his arms and he could do nothing because he was “face
first on the side of [his] head.” Defendant scraped his back due to the deputies dragging him
around and he was “trying not to get hurt on the gravel.” Defendant denied resisting and said
that if the officers were trying to arrest him, he would have peacefully complied since he did not
do anything to get arrested.
¶ 25 III. Closing Arguments
¶ 26 During closing arguments, the State argued that defendant knowingly resisted arrest and
that his resistance proximately caused Mohr’s injuries. The prosecutor stated to the jurors that
they were the judges of credibility in the case. The prosecutor noted that each deputy’s
testimony was consistent, repeatedly referring to the deputies’ version of events as the main
source of evidence and arguing that the jury should compare the deputies’ testimony with that of
the defense witnesses to determine defendant’s guilt. The prosecutor stated that “[t]he deputies’
testimony today is clear, and nothing that was presented from the point of view of the defense
witnesses did anything to controvert that.”
¶ 27 The prosecutor characterized the deputies’ testimony as consistent with each other and
with their reports. He noted that none of the defense witnesses, including defendant, made any
statements prior to their testimony that day in court. The prosecutor argued that the jury’s
determination of whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt depended upon its
ability to “decide who’s telling the truth and who’s not.”
¶ 28 IV. Posttrial
¶ 29 The trial court tendered instructions to the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked one
question: “If you tell the police to vacate your property, does this end their authorization or do
9
they have the authority to remain?” With the approval of both parties’ attorneys, the trial court
sent the following response back to the jury, instructing it to continue with its deliberations:
“Ladies and gentlemen, the question you have asked is a legal question. The answers to your
legal questions are found in the jury instructions I have given you. Please review these
instructions again for your answer. I’m sending this back.” The jury returned with a verdict of
guilty. At that time, defense counsel moved for a judgment, notwithstanding the verdict, which
the trial court denied.
¶ 30 On March 8, 2013, defense counsel argued a motion to set aside the jury verdict or, in the
alternative, a new trial, contending that the trial court erred in its response to the jury question.
The trial court denied the motion. The matter proceeded to sentencing. Defendant made a
statement on his own behalf, after which the court sentenced him to two years’ incarceration with
one year of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 31 Defendant appeals.
¶ 32 ANALYSIS
¶ 33 I. Plain Error and Rule 431(b)
¶ 34 Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by failing to comply with
Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)). Specifically, that the trial court erred in
failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the four Zehr principles
codified in Rule 431(b). Defendant argues that despite failing to object to voir dire at trial, we
should review this issue under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine, as the evidence is
closely balanced.
10
¶ 35 The plain-error doctrine is a limited and narrow exception to the general rule of
procedural default (People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008)) and allows a reviewing court
to consider unpreserved error when one of two conditions is met:
“ ‘(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so
closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of
justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the
error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so
serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113,
124 (2009) (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565
(2007)).
¶ 36 “Under both prongs of the plain-error doctrine, the burden of persuasion remains with
defendant.” Id. (citing Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 593). The initial step in conducting plain-error
analysis is to determine whether error occurred at all. People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191
(2008). This requires us to conduct a substantive review of the issue. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.
2d 53, 64 (2003).
¶ 37 Defendant argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court’s question to the potential
jurors whether they had any “problems” with the Zehr principles of law failed to sufficiently
comply with the rule and constituted clear error. A review of both People v. Thompson, 238 Ill.
2d 598 (2010), and People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, support defendant’s contention. In
Thompson, the trial court admonished the jury of the four Rule 431(b) principles. It then asked
each juror whether he or she understood the concepts of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
11
presumption of innocence. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 602. The trial court did not ask the jurors if
they agreed with those principles, but only if they would “ ‘have any problem signing a guilty
verdict.’ ” Id. Our supreme court held that Rule 431(b) “mandates a specific question and
response process” since “[t]he language of Rule 431(b) is clear and unambiguous.” Id. at 607.
The trial court “ ‘shall ask’ potential jurors whether they understand and accept the enumerated
principles.” (Emphases added.) Id. The court concluded that the trial court necessarily violated
Rule 431(b) by failing to do so. Id.
¶ 38 The supreme court reaffirmed Thompson in People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 28,
where it found that the trial court only asked whether potential jurors “ ‘disagree[d] with’ ” the
principles of law. Again, the trial court’s failure to ask jurors if they both understood and
accepted the enumerated principles of Rule 431(b) was “error in and of itself.” Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 39 Having determined that an error occurred, our analysis hinges upon whether or not the
evidence is closely balanced, as this is the only avenue of relief available to defendant under
plain-error review. See Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 610-11 (expressly finding that Rule 431(b)
errors are not structural errors and, therefore, are not per se reversible because failure to comply
with the rule does not automatically result in a biased jury); see also People v. Belknap, 2014 IL
117094, ¶ 47.
¶ 40 The State contends that the evidence was not so closely balanced that the trial court’s
error warrants reversal under the plain-error doctrine. We agree.
¶ 41 The State presented persuasive evidence that defendant committed the offense of
resisting a peace officer. Deputies McGrath, Mohr, and Arthur all testified to essentially the
same sequence of events. McGrath knocked on the door of defendant’s residence several times
before Dankenbring answered. When McGrath asked to speak to the owner of the residence,
12
Dankenbring responded that no one was home. Defendant then came to the door to speak to the
officers. McGrath attempted to explain to defendant why the officers were at the house, and
Mohr handed the court order to defendant. Defendant was uncooperative and became more and
more agitated. Defendant reached over and poked McGrath in the chest with his finger, at which
point McGrath advised defendant he was under arrest for battery of a peace officer. McGrath
and Mohr both testified that McGrath attempted to grab defendant’s wrist to effectuate the arrest,
at which time defendant pulled away and resisted. Mohr assisted McGrath in getting control of
defendant. The struggle with the deputies occurred on the gravel driveway.
¶ 42 Defendant argues that the defense witnesses who observed the arrest all testified that
defendant made no contact with McGrath, and that the deputies announced the arrest because
defendant told them to leave. Defendant cites to People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 608 (2008),
for the proposition that the evidence is closely balanced when it involves a credibility contest.
While defendant correctly states a holding of Naylor, our supreme recently stated that “a
reviewing court must undertake a commonsense analysis of all the evidence in context when
reviewing a claim under the first prong of the plain error doctrine.” Belknap, 2014 IL 117094,
¶ 50; see also People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 22; People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 139
(where defendant claimed the evidence was so closely balanced that it necessitated review of an
error, the court held that a qualitative—as opposed to strictly quantitative—commonsense
assessment of the evidence demonstrated it was not).
¶ 43 Utilizing that contextual commonsense analysis here, it is apparent that defendant’s
witnesses are less than credible. This is evidenced by the fact that Dankenbring originally
informed officers that no one was home. Yet, only moments later, defendant appeared at the
doorway to speak to officers. Both Oakland Sebby and Samantha Russell were also present in
13
the home at the time Dankenbring made that statement, as they testified at trial to details
involving defendant’s arrest. The State also impeached defendant’s credibility with the
stipulated statement of Jason Martin, an investigator with the La Salle County sheriff’s
department. The parties stipulated that if Martin were to testify, he would state that he attempted
to serve the custody order on the evening prior to defendant’s arrest on October 26. At that time,
defendant told Martin that Bonnie Sebby may be out running errands or may be at her attorney’s
office. A mere 12 hours later, defendant told McGrath and Mohr that Bonnie and L.S. were
visiting family down south.
¶ 44 Furthermore, unlike Naylor, where neither party presented extrinsic evidence to
corroborate or contradict either version, the State points to the photographs of Deputy Mohr’s
injuries. This photographic evidence, in addition to the deputies’ testimony, corroborates their
version of events.
¶ 45 Accordingly, we find that defendant failed to show that the evidence was closely
balanced thus, the first prong of the plain-error doctrine does not apply.
¶ 46 Putting our ruling aside for a moment, we note that the State requested defendant’s
appeal be held in abeyance until such time as our supreme court decided People v. Belknap, 2014
IL 117094, in hope of an unambiguous plain-error framework in the context of Rule 431(b)
violations. As the court filed the Belknap opinion on December 18, 2014, we would be remiss
not to mention its holding and effect on this case.
¶ 47 Prior to Belknap, recent decisions of the supreme court explained that plain-error analysis
under the first prong may involve more than just a rigid determination of whether an error
occurred and if the evidence was closely balanced. See People v. White, 2011 IL 109689,
14
¶¶ 133-34, 139-44; People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶¶ 22-23. Both White and Adams state
that a qualitative, not quantitative, commonsense assessment of the evidence is needed in
determining whether it is actually closely balanced. White goes on to posit:
“Plain-error review under the closely-balanced-evidence prong
of plain error is similar to an analysis for ineffective assistance of
counsel based on evidentiary error insofar as a defendant in either
case must show he was prejudiced: that the evidence is so closely
balanced that the alleged error alone would tip the scales of justice
against him, i.e., that the verdict ‘may have resulted from the error
and not the evidence’ properly adduced at trial ***.” White, 2011
IL 109689, ¶ 133 (quoting People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178
2005)).
¶ 48 Indeed, the parties and many court watchers assumed that the supreme court granted the
State’s petition for leave to appeal in Belknap to address just that: “whether, even if the evidence
is closely balanced, reversal is not required unless the error alone likely tipped the scales of
justice against defendant.” Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 39. Yet, the court punted on the issue,
finding simply that the evidence was not closely balanced. This rendered moot the need to
address the State’s argument that defendant must further show “that the error itself likely had
some impact on the jury’s verdict.” Id. ¶ 62.
¶ 49 In instances where the trial court erred in admonishing the jury as to the Zehr principles
of Rule 431(b) and the evidence was closely balanced, the failure of the court to address the
prejudice issue for plain-error review causes more problems than it solves. See Justice Burke’s
15
special concurrence. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶¶ 72-92 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined
by Freeman, J.).
¶ 50 First, the weight of the evidence—either overwhelming, closely balanced or somewhere
in between—is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not defendant received a fair and impartial
jury through the process of voir dire. That is a procedural issue, not an evidentiary one. As
Justice Burke points out, a “[t]rial before a biased jury is structural error.” Id. ¶ 85 (citing
Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 610). “Thus, if a defendant can establish that a question which went
unasked during voir dire was necessary to ensure a fair jury, then the verdict must be reversed,
regardless of whether the evidence at trial was overwhelming, closely balanced or somewhere in
between.” Id. Here, defendant established that the trial court erred in giving Rule 431(b)
admonitions. However, the supreme court rejected the argument that failure to ask a Rule 431(b)
question amounts to plain error under the second prong in Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 610-11, and
again in Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 47.
¶ 51 If not structural error, how should we deal with Rule 431(b) violations where such
violations have absolutely no bearing on the closeness of the evidence? In my1 view, not every
error is so prejudicial as to tip the scales of justice against defendant or warrant reversal even
where the evidence may be closely balanced. Like the majority in White, I would liken the
situation to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 133. If
defendant argues for plain-error review under the closely balanced prong, defendant should
demonstrate that, but for the error, the outcome of the trial would likely be different. Of course,
1
As can be seen by Justice Holdridge's special concurrence and Justice O'Brien's dissent, the
author is alone in the views that follow (infra ¶¶ 51-54), which, admittedly, constitute dicta of
the rankest form.
16
there are closely balanced cases and there are closely balanced cases. For example, in Belknap,
the supreme court disagreed with the two-judge majority in the appellate court who found the
evidence closely balanced. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 56. In a case where the evidence is truly
closely balanced, any error that could tip the scales should be enough to cause one to lose faith in
the verdict.
¶ 52 A panel of this court commented on whether the particular error in question actually or
likely tipped the scales of justice against defendant, but declined to deviate from what it
understood to be established precedent without a more definitive statement from the supreme
court. People v. Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶ 92 n.3. Under the appellate court Belknap
decision, if defendant can show the evidence is closely balanced, reversal is warranted regardless
of whether or not the error could have prejudiced his case. Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶
92. This not only misstates the holding of People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005), it also
leads to an absurd result in practice. First, Herron reiterated the plain-error doctrine, stating that
under the first prong “the defendant must prove ‘prejudicial error.’ That is, the defendant must
show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error
alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.” Id. This court’s decision in
Belknap effectively read the necessity of proving prejudicial error out of the doctrine; the
supreme court then sidestepped the issue.
¶ 53 This court’s decision in Belknap would prevent the State from arguing that absent the
error, the outcome of the trial would have been the same. This would, in turn, lead defense
attorneys to sit silent rather than object in closely balanced cases. It will be easier to obtain a
reversal with no trial objections. Despite the supreme court’s failure to address the issue in
Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, it appears that White and Adams correctly stand for the proposition
17
that a defendant must show the error was prejudicial in addition to showing that the evidence was
closely balanced. A Rule 431(b) error is not evidentiary and, therefore, unable to “tip the scales”
in a closely balanced case. It would have no bearing on the verdict. See Belknap, 2014 IL
117094, ¶¶ 85-87 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.). That is, where no
reasonable person could say that the error could have affected the verdict, it makes no sense to
reverse simply because there was no objection to the error at trial.
¶ 54 The trouble with Justice Holdridge's view is that, as pointed out above, it puts a premium
on defense counsel not objecting at trial. If defense counsel's objection is erroneously overruled,
the State can argue harmless error on appeal. Under the Belknap view adopted by Justice
Holdridge, any error not objected to at trial warrants automatic reversal whenever two of three
appellate judges find the evidence closely balanced. This would be so even when no reasonable
person could conclude that the error could have affected the verdict. This seems
counterintuitive.
¶ 55 II. Defendant’s Invocation of His Right to Terminate the Interrogation
and the State’s Closing Arguments
¶ 56 Defendant challenges the State’s introduction of his postarrest silence as evidence.
Specifically, Deputy McGrath’s testimony on direct examination that after reading defendant his
Miranda rights at jail and attempting to discuss the incident with defendant, defendant invoked
his right to terminate the interrogation. Defendant also takes issue with the State’s closing
arguments where he claims the prosecutor improperly sought to discredit defendant’s testimony
when the prosecutor commented that none of the defense witnesses made statements prior to
their testimony at trial. Having failed to object to either issue at trial, defendant, again, requests
plain-error review under the first prong.
18
¶ 57 We agree that generally questions and remarks by a prosecutor regarding a defendant’s
postarrest silence are improper. People v. Patterson, 282 Ill. App. 3d 219, 234 (1996). Thus, a
defendant’s postarrest silence cannot be used to impeach his trial testimony or to otherwise
create an inference of guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); see also People v.
Mischke, 278 Ill. App. 3d 252, 265 (1995). We disagree, however, with the characterization of
McGrath’s testimony as an improper comment on defendant’s postarrest silence.
¶ 58 People v. Martinez, 86 Ill. App. 3d 486 (1980), is directly on point. In Martinez, Officer
Hanlon testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights and then asked him a question
regarding evidence found at the crime scene. Defendant answered but, as the interview
progressed, stated he had talked enough and did not want to talk to Officer Hanlon any longer.
Hanlon stated that “ ‘[a]t that time the interview was terminated.’ ” Id. at 488. As is the
situation here, Martinez neither objected to this testimony at trial, nor did he raise it as a ground
for relief in his posttrial motion. Id. at 489. The court found that mentioning the fact that the
interview ended at the defendant’s request could not be considered an impermissible comment
on his silence where defendant had not remained silent but, instead, had chosen to talk to the
officer and later end the conversation. Id. Without further reference to the termination of the
interview during the course of the trial or exploitation by the State, the alleged error did not
constitute plain error. Id.
¶ 59 We further reject defendant’s argument that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on
the defendant’s postarrest silence as evidence of defendant’s guilt during closing argument.
¶ 60 “It is well established that prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and
improper remarks will not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the
defendant.” People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1994) (citing People v. Pittman, 93 Ill. 2d 169,
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176 (1982)). “A prosecutor’s comments must be considered in the context of the parties’
arguments as a whole and their relationship to the evidence.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305,
350 (2000) (citing People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 161 (1997)). “Arguments based on facts or
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts are within the scope of proper argument even where
they reflect unfavorably on the accused.” People v. Manley, 222 Ill. App. 3d 896, 907 (1991).
Additionally, “the credibility of a witness is a proper focus of closing argument if it is based on
the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.” People v. Dresher, 364 Ill.
App. 3d 847, 859 (2006) (citing People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 291 (1997)).
¶ 61 The prosecutor stated, “There are no statements made by any defense witnesses to any
law enforcement about what happened that day.” When considered in its proper context, we find
the complained of remarks were within the bounds of acceptable argument. We further find that,
contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor’s statement was not a comment on defendant’s
postarrest silence, and served only to highlight the credibility of the deputies’ testimony over that
of the defense witnesses. It also called attention to the fact that none of defendant’s witnesses
had spoken to police or given their account of the incident prior to their testimony at trial.
Defendant’s contention that the State argued “[defendant] should not be believed since he
remained silent” is disingenuous. Such language is conspicuously absent from the record, nor
can it be gleaned from what is present.
¶ 62 Even assuming error in this instance, it does not rise to the level of plain error, as the
evidence is not closely balanced. We affirm defendant’s conviction.
¶ 63 CONCLUSION
¶ 64 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is
affirmed.
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¶ 65 Affirmed.
¶ 66 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.
¶ 67 I agree with Justice Schmidt that any errors committed by the trial court or the prosecutor
in this case are not reversible under the plain-error doctrine because, under a qualitative,
commonsense assessment of the evidence, the evidence was not closely balanced. I write
separately because I disagree with an important aspect of Justice Schmidt’s plain-error analysis.
Relying on our supreme court’s decisions in People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), People v.
White, 2011 IL 109689, and People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, Justice Schmidt concludes that
“not every error is so prejudicial as to tip the scales of justice against defendant or warrant
reversal even where the evidence may be closely balanced” (supra ¶ 51), and that a defendant
seeking plain-error review under the closely-balanced-evidence prong “must show the error was
prejudicial in addition to showing that the evidence was closely balanced” (supra ¶ 53).
¶ 68 I disagree. As an initial matter, I find it unnecessary to reach this issue because we have
already found that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Normally, I would not
respond to dicta. However, in this case, I feel compelled to address it because I disagree with
Justice Schmidt’s statement of the law on this issue and with his characterization of our supreme
court’s holdings in Herron, White, and Adams. In Herron, the supreme court indicated that,
where there is error in a closely balanced case, we should “err on the side of fairness so as not to
convict an innocent person.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193. Once the defendant proves that there
was an error and that the evidence was closely balanced, the error is considered prejudicial. Id.
The Herron court explained:
“If the defendant carries the burden of persuasion and convinces a
reviewing court that there was error and that the evidence was
closely balanced, the case is not cloaked with a presumption of
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prejudice. The error is actually prejudicial, not presumptively
prejudicial.” Id.
See also People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65, 568, 571-72 (2007); People v.
Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶ 92 n.3, rev'd on other grounds, 2014 IL 117094;
People v. Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 18.
¶ 69 In White, our supreme court noted that a defendant may obtain reversal of his conviction
under the closely-balanced-evidence prong of plain error only if he can show that he was
prejudiced by the alleged error. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 133. However, “this does not alter the
rule established in Herron, i.e., that a defendant may show prejudice (and therefore obtain
reversal of his conviction) merely by showing that the trial court committed an error and that the
evidence was closely balanced.” Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 19. In White, the supreme
court held that the evidence was not closely balanced. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶¶ 134-42. Thus,
under the rule set forth in Herron, the White court reasonably concluded that the defendant had
failed to prove that the error alleged by the defendant was prejudicial. “White does not upend the
established principle that if a defendant shows that there was error and that the evidence was
closely balanced *** the error is both prejudicial and reversible and no further showing of actual
prejudice is required.” Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 19. Thus, although White states that
a defendant alleging plain error under the closely-balanced-evidence prong must “show he was
prejudiced,” (White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 133), a defendant may show such prejudice merely by
showing that an error occurred and that the evidence was closely balanced. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at
193; Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 19; Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶ 92 n.3, rev'd
on other grounds, 2014 IL 117094.
¶ 70 Admittedly, although White’s holding is consistent with the traditional plain-error
analysis described above, certain statements in White appear to be in tension with that analysis.
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For example, as Justice Schmidt notes, White compares the showing of prejudice required in
plain error cases to the showing of prejudice required in cases involving claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on evidentiary error. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 133. In the latter
cases, a defendant must show that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” of a different result
had the evidence in question been excluded.” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)). Applying this “result-oriented” analysis (id. ¶ 134), the supreme court noted
that the alleged error at issue in White was not prejudicial because it did not “figure prominently
in the [trial] court’s finding of guilt.” Id. ¶ 140; see also id. ¶¶ 133, 135. These statements
arguably conflict with Herron’s rulings that a defendant alleging plain error “need not prove that
the error *** actually misled” the fact finder and that a defendant may prove prejudice merely by
showing “that there was error and that the evidence was closely balanced.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at
193. However, in Vesey, we concluded that these statements in White are “dicta which are
unnecessary to the court’s holding.” Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 20. As noted above,
White held that the defendant could not show prejudice because the evidence was not closely
balanced. Because White’s holding is consistent with the traditional plain-error analysis
announced in Herron, I do not read White as changing that analysis. Our appellate court reached
the same conclusion in Vesey. Vesey, 2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 20.
¶ 71 Similarly, in my view, Adams does not change the traditional plain-error analysis
described above. In Adams, our supreme court found that the evidence presented was not closely
balanced because the defendant’s explanation of the events at issue was “highly improbable.”
Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 22. The court also went on to note that the jury was properly
instructed and that the prosecutor’s improper comments were “not of a sort likely to inflame the
passions of the jury.” Although the court referenced these factors in addition to the strength of
the evidence in determining whether the defendant could obtain reversal under the closely
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balanced prong, it did not hold that such factors must be considered. In other words, the Adams
court did not hold that a defendant must independently demonstrate prejudice to obtain plain-
error review even if the evidence is closely balanced. Because the evidence in Adams was not
closely balanced, the court did not need to reach that question. Without a more definitive
statement from the supreme court on this issue, we should adhere to the supreme court’s prior
established precedent as set forth in Herron. See Belknap, 2013 IL App (3d) 110833, ¶ 92 n.3,
rev'd on other grounds, 2014 IL 117094.
¶ 72 One further point bears mentioning. Citing Justice Burke’s special concurrence in
Belknap, Justice Schmidt notes that the weight of the evidence is irrelevant to the issue of
whether or not defendant received a fair and impartial jury through the process of voir dire
because a “ ‘[t]rial before a biased jury is a structural error. ’ ” Supra ¶ 50 (quoting Belknap,
2014 IL 117094, ¶ 85 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.)). I agree. In my
view, a trial court’s failure to properly ask prospective jurors whether they understand and accept
the four Zehr principles codified by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)
deprives the defendant of a fair trial and is therefore reversible error under the second prong of
the plain-error doctrine. However, as Justice Schmidt notes, our supreme court rejected this
argument in Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 610-11. Thus, unless and until the supreme court overturns
Thompson, we are forced to analyze these claims under the “closely-balanced-evidence” prong
of the plain-error doctrine, as the supreme court itself did in Belknap. Although I find this
approach to be illogical, we cannot improve the situation by muddying the analysis under the
closely-balanced-evidence prong. In my view, a better solution would be for the supreme court
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to reconsider its holding in Thompson, stand by its prior holding in Zehr, and enforce Rule
431(b) as it is written. 2
¶ 73 JUSTICE O'BRIEN, dissenting.
¶ 74 Where, like here, the determination of the defendant’s guilt hinges entirely on a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the evidence is closely balanced and a reversal
of the defendant’s conviction under the first prong of the plain error doctrine is required as set
forth in People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 608 (2008). Unlike the majority, I think a
commonsense assessment of the evidence shows that either version of the events is entirely
plausible. It is just this type of case that warrants reversal under the first prong of the plain error
doctrine. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008) (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d
551, 565 (2007)). Therefore, I would reverse the conviction of the defendant and remand to the
trial court for a new trial.
2
I am also sympathetic to the point that Justice Schmidt makes in paragraph 54, supra. As
Justice Schmidt notes, our supreme court’s current approach to analyzing these claims allows the
State to argue harmless error when defense counsel objected to the error at trial, but not when
counsel failed to raise any objection and the evidence is closely balanced. I agree that this seems
“counterintuitive.” Supra ¶ 54. However, contrary to Justice Schmidt’s suggestion, this is not
my approach; it is the approach dictated by our supreme court.
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