People v. Kimber , 2022 IL App (3d) 200233-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 200233-UOrder filed October 18, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-20-0233
v. ) Circuit No. 17-CF-782
)
TIFFINI E. KIMBER, ) Honorable
) Paul P. Gilfillan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HAUPTMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Holdridge and McDade concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Firearm
Concealed Carry Act; and it was plain error for the circuit court to order medical
treatment as a condition of defendant’s probation.
¶2 Defendant, Tiffini E. Kimber, appeals her aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW)
conviction arguing that the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Act) (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West
2016)) is unconstitutional as applied to her. Defendant also argues the Peoria County circuit
court abused its discretion in ordering her to undergo medical, psychiatric, and substance abuse
treatment as conditions of her probation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with
directions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged by superseding indictment with AUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)
(West 2016)). The charge alleged: “that she knowingly carried an unloaded, uncased handgun
with the gun and ammunition immediately accessible to her in a motor vehicle while located
upon a public street *** in Peoria, Illinois and [she] had not been issued a currently valid license
under the *** Act.”
¶5 Defendant filed a motion to declare the AUUW statute unconstitutional. Defendant
alleged that she was unlawfully deprived of her right to carry a firearm under both the Illinois
and United States Constitutions. Defendant filed an amended motion wherein she argued the
costs associated with procuring a concealed carry license under the Act unlawfully hindered her
right to carry a firearm openly in self-defense. The court denied defendant’s motion following a
hearing.
¶6 Defendant’s case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. Upon review of the evidence, the
court found defendant guilty of AUUW.
¶7 According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), defendant was previously
convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. Defendant described her neighborhood as “not great,”
referencing moderate criminal activity and the availability of drugs. Defendant reported first
using cannabis at the age of 18, smoking two “joints” daily. Defendant discontinued use
approximately five years prior to being sentenced in this case. Defendant started consuming
alcohol at the age of 19. Defendant reported her current alcohol consumption consisted of one
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beer and one glass of wine on the weekend. Defendant reported that she did not use any other
illicit substances.
¶8 The PSI stated that defendant suffered from fibroids on her uterus which “may require a
partial hysterectomy in the future.” Defendant reported she was prescribed muscle relaxers for
this condition. She also reported that her mental health was good. The PSI stated that based on an
adult risk assessment and other pertinent factors, defendant’s risk level to reoffend was
moderate. The PSI identified “[d]efendant’s anti-social beliefs toward her criminal behavior” as
a risk factor. The PSI recommended cognitive behavioral therapy.
¶9 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the State did not present any evidence in aggravation.
Defendant did not present any evidence in mitigation. Defendant stated:
“Nobody knew where [my firearm] was except for me, because again, it’s
mine. I had my FOID card with me. I did not know anything about not having it
outside of my home. I’ve had it since I’ve been 20 years old, and I’ve taken it a
lot of places with me besides the shooting range and things like that.
But I live in a very bad neighborhood, the South End of Peoria. I’ve lived
there all my life. I’ve had break-ins. I’ve had people approach me. I’ve had people
approach my car. Basically, I’m traumatized and scared for my life, like, literally,
and my kids. There’s a lot of things that has happened to me previously in my life
from the guys I’ve been with to just from where I live. So that is the reason why I
had my weapon on me.
But I have a nursing license. I have a phlebotomy license. I’ve been in
school. I want to go back to school, and I want to raise my kids to do better if we
have to end up living in Peoria, which everybody knows it’s not a good place. But
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I just feel like I know I shouldn’t have done what I did. I’m an adult. I know
better, but that time I was drinking. I wasn’t in my right mind.”
The court stated:
“I’ve considered the [PSI], the arguments of the attorneys, the statement of
[defendant]. I’ve considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation,
the history and character of the defendant, having due regard for the nature and
circumstances of the offense.
***
The PSI indicates that the defendant is a moderate risk. Her employment
status is outstanding, responsibility otherwise is outstanding. Her longtime
boyfriend is a stable influence.”
The court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ probation. Additionally, the probation order
required defendant to undergo medical, psychiatric, and substance abuse treatment. Defendant
did not file a motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant appeals.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 A. Firearm Concealed Carry Act
¶ 12 Defendant raises an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Act (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq.
(West 2016)). Defendant argues the Act violates the second amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution because it infringes on her
fundamental right to bear arms outside of the home. The Act specifically allows a license holder
to “keep or carry a loaded or unloaded concealed firearm on or about his or her person within a
vehicle.” Id. § 10(c)(2). Defendant argues that she is unable to afford the training and fees
associated with obtaining a concealed carry license. She contends because she cannot afford the
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license, she is now subject to weapons charges like AUUW, when she otherwise would not be as
a license holder. The State argues that there is no evidence defendant ever actually applied for a
concealed carry license and was rejected. Therefore, defendant lacks standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute as applied to her.
¶ 13 Generally, all statutes are presumed constitutional. People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116,
¶ 15. To overcome this strong presumption, a party challenging the statute must clearly establish
a constitutional violation. People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005). “A party has standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it adversely impacts his or her own
rights.” People v. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2004). If no constitutional defect is found in the
application of the statute to defendant, she does not have standing to argue it before this court.
See id. “An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it
applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL
118151, ¶ 36. We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. Aguilar, 2013
IL 112116, ¶ 15.
¶ 14 To establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, defendant must
“submit to the challenged policy.” Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (1997). In
other words, defendant must have attempted to comply with the Act. The failure to apply for the
concealed carry license would not preclude defendant from challenging the statute if she made a
substantial showing that an application would be futile. See id. However, defendant does not
provide any evidence that she attempted to apply for the license and was subsequently denied, in
fact, defendant admits that she was not aware she needed an additional license. Supra ¶ 9.
Additionally, defendant has not provided evidence to prove that she does not have means to
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obtain the license if she wished to pursue applying for it. Thus, defendant does not have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.
¶ 15 B. Conditions of Probation
¶ 16 Defendant argues the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering her to undergo
medical, psychiatric, and substance abuse treatment as conditions of her probation when she was
not convicted of a drug offense and no evidence was presented that she required such treatment.
Defendant concedes that she did not preserve this argument for appellate review. Accordingly,
we review defendant’s claim under the plain error doctrine. See People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d
551, 565 (2007).
¶ 17 “The plain-error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception” to forfeiture. People v.
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The first step is to determine whether a clear or obvious error
occurred. Piatkowski, 255 Ill. 2d at 565.
¶ 18 “The [circuit] court is afforded wide discretion in fashioning the conditions of probation
for a particular defendant.” People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997). However, this is not
without limitation. Id. The court may require defendant undergo medical, psychological, or
psychiatric treatment, or treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism, if reasonably related to the
nature of the offense or rehabilitation of defendant. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(4) (West 2016).
¶ 19 Regarding defendant’s health, she reported she suffered from fibroids on her uterus
which she was treating with muscle relaxers. Defendant noted that this condition “may require a
partial hysterectomy in the future.” Without any discussion of whether this condition was related
to her offense or rehabilitation, the court determined that defendant should undergo medical
treatment as a condition of her probation. In effect, the court’s order for medical treatment could
require defendant to undergo a partial hysterectomy as a condition of probation. See Seymour v.
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Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41 (an abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the circuit court). As this procedure or any treatment for defendant’s
condition was wholly unrelated to the offense or her rehabilitation, the court abused its discretion
in ordering defendant to undergo medical treatment as a condition of her probation. Accordingly,
the court clearly erred.
¶ 20 Following the finding of a clear or obvious error, “[i]n the sentencing context, a
defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely
balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.”
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Here, the evidence did not strongly weigh against defendant. See
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). Rather, the only evidence that defendant may
reasonably benefit from medical care was her own statement in the PSI that she “may require a
partial hysterectomy in the future.” This statement is not dispositive. In fact, “may” expresses a
possibility, and “in the future” indicates a lack of urgency. Additionally, defendant was already
treating her condition. Defendant has met her burden under the first prong of the plain error
doctrine. See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.
¶ 21 We reverse defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. On remand,
we instruct the court to ensure that the ordered conditions of defendant’s probation relate to the
offense or her rehabilitation.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded with directions.
¶ 24 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
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