People v. Snowden ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 200642-UTHIRD DIVISION
May 4, 2022
No. 1-20-0642
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 05 CR 1855101
)
DEONTE SNOWDEN, ) Honorable
) Timothy J. Joyce,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Ellis and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in the second-stage dismissal of defendant’s
postconviction petition where (1) defendant’s sentencing claim based on Miller is
barred by res judicata and, in the alternative, defendant’s discretionary 27-year
sentence is not entitled to Miller protections; and (2) defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is barred by res judicata, and in the alternative, the
claim was forfeited because defendant could have raised the claim on direct
appeal.
¶2 Defendant Deonte Snowden appeals the trial court’s second stage dismissal of his
postconviction petition, arguing his petition made a substantial showing that: (1) his 27-year
sentence violated the proportionate penalties under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); and
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(2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present his motion to suppress when the police
questioned him about the offense prior to advising him of the Miranda warnings.
¶3 In August 2005, defendant was indicted on multiple counts of first degree murder in the
stabbing death of Jataun Jennings. Following an April 2009 trial, the jury found defendant guilty
of first degree murder.
¶4 Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress raised several claims, including that defendant
was not informed of his Miranda rights prior to his interrogation. However, this motion was
never litigated or formally withdrawn.
¶5 We outline the evidence presented at defendant’s trial as necessary for our disposition of
this appeal. A full discussion of defendant’s trial was set forth in People v. Snowden, 2011 IL
App (1st) 092117.
¶6 On July 12, 2005, Officer Tamica Rainey received a call about a person who had been
stabbed and proceeded to 1114 East 73rd Street. When she arrived, she went up the stairs to the
first level of apartments. Officer Rainey noticed blood on the carpeting of the stairs and along the
wall as well as on the apartment door to her right. She saw Jennings to her left, lying on the stairs
to the second level. Officer Rainey observed that Jennings had been stabbed multiple times and
was covered in blood. She also saw stab wounds to the left side of Jennings’ neck to her thighs
and defensive wounds on her forearms. She immediately radioed for an ambulance to come to
the scene.
¶7 Officer Rainey spoke with Jennings very briefly. Officer Rainey asked Jennings who did
this to her and Jennings replied that she did not know. Jennings then asked the officer to get her
baby. Officer Rainey asked where the baby was and then went upstairs. Officer Rainey went into
apartment 2W and saw blood throughout the entire apartment but did not see the baby. She went
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No. 1-20-0642
across the hall, where she saw blood on the wall and the door. She knocked on the door and the
tenant in that apartment had the child. When Officer Rainey walked through Jennings’
apartment, she observed a knife at the opening of the bedroom door. She notified her sergeant
and an evidence technician was called. Jennings was subsequently transported to Stroger
Hospital.
¶8 Detective Pat Hackett received an assignment on July 12, 2005, to go to 1114 East 73rd
Street. When he entered Jennings’ apartment, he saw a “horrific amount of blood on the floor.”
He also observed a knife next to the side of the bed on the bedroom floor and he described the
knife as “a basic kitchen knife[,] *** a sharp carving knife.” He saw a matching knife in the
kitchen and the knives appeared to be a set. He did not see any signs of forced entry. Detective
Hackett went to the hospital to look for Jennings, but was informed that she had been taken
directly to surgery. He was later informed that Jennings had passed away.
¶9 Detective Patrick Durkin was assigned to Jennings’ homicide shortly after 8 a.m. on July
12, 2005, along with his two partners, Detectives Alejandro Almazan and John Fassl. When he
met with Jennings’ family, he learned that Jennings had a cell phone, but it was not in her
apartment after her murder. He found out Jennings’ phone number and received information to
access Jennings’ Cingular account. He discovered that her phone number had been used after she
had died.
¶ 10 An AT&T sales program execution analyst reviewed the cell phone subscriber
information for Jennings’ phone number, including the phone records showing all incoming and
outgoing calls from July 11, 2005, to July 13, 2005. On July 11, the records reflect three phone
calls were made to a phone number with a 773 area code between 10:30 and 10:45 p.m. The
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No. 1-20-0642
phone number was next used for multiple calls just before 4 a.m. The phone then was used
throughout the day of July 12.
¶ 11 The AT&T analyst discussed the subscriber identity module (SIM) card for Jennings’
phone. The SIM card communicates with the network and is how one is able to make a phone
call on the network and it is simple to replace a SIM card. The equipment history for Jennings’
SIM card and phone indicated that Jennings’ SIM card was used from 2:43 p.m. on July 12,
2005, until 9:07 p.m. on July 13, 2005, in an LG C1300 phone.
¶ 12 Detective Alejandro Almazan also reviewed Jennings’ phone records. One of the phone
numbers called from Jennings’ phone number belonged to Danielle Jackson. When he spoke
with Jackson, he asked to see Jackson’s cell phone, which she gave him. He observed that her
phone number matched one of the dialed calls made after Jennings’ death. Detective Almazan
asked her to call that number, which she did. Jackson had a conversation with the person and
afterward, they went to 71st and Woodlawn. They were looking for a young man by the name of
“Donte” or “Tay.” He was a Black male, around 15, 16 years old.
¶ 13 When they arrived at that location at around 5 p.m., Detective Almazan observed several
young Black males on the corner. He exited the vehicle to do a field interview. He identified
defendant in court as the young man he approached. He asked defendant his name and he
responded that it was Deonte Snowden. The detective asked if defendant was in possession of
anything and defendant produced a Cingular LG flip phone. Defendant was with Tyree Bell and
the officers recovered two additional phones from Bell. Both men were transported to Area 2.
They were kept in separate areas at the station. The detectives contacted their parents.
¶ 14 At Area 2, the detectives questioned defendant and was asked how he was in possession
of the telephone. Defendant responded that the phone belonged to him. The detectives asked him
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No. 1-20-0642
how the phone was operating with Jennings’ phone number, and defendant answered that on July
11, 2005, he switched the SIM card in his phone with one in the phone of a friend.
¶ 15 Defendant’s mother arrived at the police station and spoke privately with defendant.
Later, Detectives Almazan and Fassl had a second conversation with defendant. During that
interview, defendant said that on July 10, 2005, he spent the night at Bell’s apartment with
another friend. Bell’s apartment was across the hall from Jennings. The next morning, defendant
and his friend went to throw trash in the dumpster and his friend pointed out to that Jennings’
back door was open. They entered the apartment. Detective Almazan then stopped the
conversation at that point and read defendant his Miranda warnings.
¶ 16 After receiving his Miranda warnings, defendant agreed to continue the conversation.
When they entered the apartment, he saw two cell phones and a cell phone charger on the kitchen
counter. He took one of the phones, which did not work, and his friend took the second phone
and the charger. They left the apartment and returned to Bell’s apartment. He left the cell phone
at Bell’s and returned around 11 p.m. that night to retrieve it. The interview ended at that time.
Defendant’s mother left and the detectives followed up on the investigation based upon the
information from defendant.
¶ 17 The next morning, July 14, 2005, at approximately 5 a.m., Detective Almazan spoke with
defendant’s mother. She stated that she could return around 6 a.m., but she still had not arrived
by 11:40 a.m. The detectives had a third conversation with defendant while a youth officer was
present. Detective Almazan again advised defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant
waived, and agreed to speak with them. Defendant started to tell the same story, but the
detectives told him he was not being truthful about how he got Jennings’ SIM card because the
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No. 1-20-0642
phone records indicated that Jennings used the phone after the time defendant said he was in her
apartment.
¶ 18 Defendant then changed his story and stated that his friend went into the apartment first
while he followed. He went through the entire apartment and found one cell phone and a charger
on the kitchen counter. He took the phone and his friend took the charger. Defendant then heard
his name being called outside by another friend and they left Jennings’ apartment and closed the
back door. Later, defendant went to 72nd and Woodlawn and met three men there. He told them
he knew of a place where “there was a lick,” which defendant explained was “somewhere that
was easy to rob or burglarize.” One of the men asked where “the lick” was and defendant told
him it was across the hall from Bell’s apartment, referring to Jennings’ apartment. The man
asked defendant what time he wanted to ‘do the lick,’ and defendant told the man he did not
want to be there when it happened, but told him to go in through the back door because it would
be open.
¶ 19 Defendant spent that night at a friend’s house. He woke up around 11 a.m. on July 12,
2005, and walked to 72nd and Woodlawn with his friend. Defendant saw Bell’s mother and she
told them her neighbor had been stabbed that night. He then walked over to 71st and Woodlawn
and saw the man he told about “the lick.” Defendant asked the man what he had taken, and the
man said he got a DVD player and a cell phone. Defendant asked for the cell phone, and he then
switched his SIM card to the phone from Jennings’ apartment. After this conversation, Detective
Almazan continued his investigation.
¶ 20 On July 14, 2005, defendant’s father arrived at Area 2 and spoke privately with
defendant. Shortly thereafter, defendant agreed to give another statement to Detective Fassl with
his father present. Detective Fassl read defendant his Miranda rights, which defendant
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No. 1-20-0642
acknowledged and waived. Detective Fassl told defendant that the detectives did not believe he
was being truthful to them and they believed defendant’s involvement was more than he had
stated. Defendant again recounted that he spent the night at Bell’s apartment on July 10.
Defendant and a friend were outside the building when they saw Jennings leave with her child
and drive away. After they took trash out of Bell’s apartment, they saw the back window to
Jennings’ apartment was open. His friend entered first through the back door and they walked
around the apartment and defendant took a cell phone while his friend took a second phone and a
charger.
¶ 21 Later, defendant went to Rob’s Liquor Store at 71st and Woodlawn. While there, he ran
into a person he knew from the neighborhood as “Rico,” who was “a burglar and a stickup man
from the area.” Defendant told Rico where there was an “easy lick.” Rico asked defendant how
he knew that and defendant told him that he had been in the apartment. Rico asked defendant
when he wanted to do it. Defendant told Rico that he did not want to go into the apartment, but
would act as a lookout. Defendant gave Rico his cell phone number and told Rico to call him to
decide when to go to Jennings’ apartment. At about 2 a.m. on July 12, 2005, he received a call
from Rico, asking defendant to meet him at 73rd and Woodlawn. Defendant met with Rico and
they walked to Jennings’ apartment building. Defendant pointed out Jennings’ apartment to Rico.
Rico walked down the gangway while defendant went to the front of 1114 East 73rd. Defendant
stated that he did not see how Rico entered Jennings’ apartment.
¶ 22 Defendant told the detective that he had been sitting on the stoop for about 15 minutes
when he heard a woman screaming. He got up and was going to run westbound, but ran into
Rico, who was carrying a black bag. Both men ran eastbound on 73rd. They crossed University
and Rico ran northbound into an alley and defendant continued eastbound. A few minutes later,
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No. 1-20-0642
defendant received a call on his cell phone from a number he did not recognize and he ignored
the call. Detective Fassl testified that the number from the call was from Jennings’ cell phone.
¶ 23 Defendant went to a friend’s house and spent the night. When he awoke that morning, he
walked back over to 1114 East 73rd and saw Bell’s mother, who told him that her neighbor had
been stabbed and killed. Defendant received another call from Jennings’ cell phone number,
which he answered, and it was Rico. He met with Rico and asked what Rico took from the
apartment. Rico told him he took a DVD player and a cell phone. Defendant asked Rico what
happened since he knew Jennings had been killed, and Rico told him that Jennings woke up
while he was there and because she saw his face, he stabbed her. Defendant asked Rico for some
proceeds from the burglary. Rico gave defendant the phone, which defendant started to use. He
switched the SIM card from Jennings’ phone into his cell phone.
¶ 24 After this conversation, Detective Fassl contacted the Cook County State’s Attorney’s
office felony review unit. Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Bryan Hofeld came to Area 2 and
spoke first with Detective Fassl, and then with defendant and his father. Detective Fassl was
present when ASA Hofeld advised defendant of his rights and defendant agreed to speak with
him. Defendant then related essentially the same statement as he had given to Detective Fassl.
Defendant then agreed to give a videotaped statement to ASA Hofeld. Defendant, his father,
ASA Hofeld, and Detective Fassl each signed the consent to videotape statement form. ASA
Hofeld again advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant then recounted the same
statement that he had given to Detective Fassl earlier that night.
¶ 25 The parties stipulated that if called to testify, a medical examiner would have presented
testimony about Jennings’ autopsy, including that Jennings sustained 17 stab wounds, including
wounds to her head, neck, and chest. The medical examiner would have testified that within a
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reasonable degree of medical and forensic certainty the cause of death was multiple stab and
incised wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.
¶ 26 The State rested after this stipulation and the defense rested without presenting any
evidence. Following deliberations, the jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder.
¶ 27 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the parties presented evidence in aggravation and
mitigation. The defendant’s presentence investigation (PSI) disclosed the following. He was 15
years old at the time of the homicide. Since his incarceration at the Juvenile Temporary
Detention Center, defendant was attending 11th grade and was ranked first in his class. At age
two, defendant was placed with his aunt after his sister was injured in the family home. When he
was eight years old, he was returned to his mother’s care. He described his childhood as normal
and has a good relationship with both of his parents. He denied any history of abuse and was the
only member of his immediate family who had contact with the criminal justice system. He
joined the Gangster Disciples at age 15, but “terminated his affiliation” at age 16.
¶ 28 In aggravation, the State presented victim impact statements and noted that defendant had
been found with a contraband cell phone after a courtroom visit. The prosecutor argued that the
murder was “defendant’s responsibility because he is the one who planned the crime.” He led the
other perpetrator to Jennings’ apartment and served as a lookout. The State requested defendant
be sentenced to “a substantial time in the penitentiary.”
¶ 29 In mitigation, defense counsel focused on defendant’s young age and that defendant
thought “it was nothing more than a burglary,” but was then accountable for Jennings’ murder.
Counsel presented defendant’s school records, certificates for achievement while in juvenile
detention, and letters on defendant’s behalf from a reading specialist and an author and
motivational speaker. Counsel also urged the court to consider that defendant had no criminal
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No. 1-20-0642
record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 27 years in
the Department of Corrections.
¶ 30 On direct appeal, defendant raised several claims, including that defendant was denied
the effective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed to litigate a motion to
quash arrest and suppress statements and the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
defendant to an excessive term in prison in light of his age and lack of criminal background.
Snowden, 2011 IL App (1st) 092117, ¶ 1. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and
sentence. Id. ¶ 96.
¶ 31 In September 2012, defendant filed his pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant
to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), alleging: (1)
the police failed to properly advise him of his Miranda rights; (2) the automatic transfer statute
in the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2012)) was unconstitutional; and (3) his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest these and other claims before the trial court. In
November 2012, the trial court found that defendant’s claims in his 2-1401 petition were more
properly brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2012)) and recharacterized the petition as a postconviction petition. The court admonished
defendant about the recharacterization and allowed defendant the opportunity to make decisions
about how to proceed. Following the admonitions, the trial court continued the case to a later
date to give defendant time to consider the recharacterization of his petition. At the next hearing
in February 2013, the court admonished defendant again and defendant agreed to have the court
consider his petition under the Act. Defendant’s petition was thereafter advanced to the second
stage of review and counsel was appointed.
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¶ 32 Next, defendant, through counsel, filed a supplemental petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that defendant’s 27-year sentence violates the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Specifically, defendant
contended that the trial court failed to consider his youth and attendant characteristics, such as,
his immaturity, impulsiveness, and his family background, before imposing defendant’s
sentence. In July 2018, defendant filed a second supplemental postconviction petition further
discussing the factors set forth in Miller as well as difference between the brains of juvenile and
adult offenders.
¶ 33 In May 2019, the State moved to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition, arguing
that: (1) defendant’s sentencing claim under Miller was barred by res judicata and meritless
because the trial court considered defendant’s age and characteristics prior to sentencing, and he
did not receive a de facto life sentence; (2) defendant’s claim that he was not properly read his
Miranda rights was baseless because he “was not deemed a suspect until he started talking about
entering the victim’s apartment when he saw the door open;” and (3) defendant’s claims
regarding the automatic transfer statute and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were legally
deficient. Defendant responded and acknowledged that his sentence was not a de facto natural
life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, but he asserted that “while the appellate
court noted that the trial court did take defendant’s age into account when he was sentenced, no
other factors expressed in Miller were examined ***.”
¶ 34 In March 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion. At the
conclusion, the trial court granted the State’s motion and dismissed defendant’s petition in its
entirety. In its findings on the record, the court discussed defendant’s Miller claim as well as the
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No. 1-20-0642
fact that defendant did not receive a de facto life sentence. The court acknowledged that recent
statutory changes for juvenile offenders regarding the possibility of parole after serving 20 years
were not applicable in defendant’s case. The court pointed out that the timing of the statute does
not render his sentence unconstitutional. The court also observed that he had presided over
defendant’s trial proceedings and had considered defendant’s youth and background in imposing
the 27-year sentence. The court further found that the trial counsel was not ineffective because
her actions were trial strategy and defendant’s claim would not have changed the outcome of the
case.
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 The Act provides a tool by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert
that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States
Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2018); People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). “The purpose of [a postconviction] proceeding is to
allow inquiry into constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and
could not have been, determined on direct appeal.” People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519
(2001). Thus, res judicata bars consideration of issues that were raised and decided on direct
appeal, and issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are considered
forfeited. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-47 (2005).
¶ 37 At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the postconviction petition
within 90 days of its filing and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without
merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). If the circuit court advances the petition to the
second stage, counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary (725 ILCS 5/122-4
(West 2018)) and the State is allowed to file responsive pleadings (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West
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2018)). At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any
accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. See
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381. If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. “At the
second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial
record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court dismisses the petition at that
stage, we generally review the circuit court’s decision using a de novo standard.” People v.
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). If, however, a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation is set forth, then the petition is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court
conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2018).
¶ 38 Defendant first argues that he made a substantial showing that his 27-year sentence was
unconstitutional under both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 11). Specifically, defendant contends that his sentence violated the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller because the trial court did not take into account his age and youthful
characteristics before imposing defendant’s sentence. Defendant discusses the fact that he was 15
years old at the time of the murder and that while he proposed the idea of the burglary of
Jennings’ apartment and waited outside, he did not participate in her murder. He also notes his
rehabilitative potential and family history, including involvement with DCFS. The State asserts
that defendant’s claim is barred by res judicata because he previously challenged his sentence as
excessive based on his youth and background on direct appeal.
¶ 39 We agree. On direct appeal, defendant argued that “the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing defendant to a 27-year term in prison because defendant was 15 years old at the time
of the offense, he was not inside Jennings’ apartment when she was stabbed, and this was his
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No. 1-20-0642
first conviction.” Snowden, 2011 IL App (1st) 092117, ¶ 85. This court considered defendant’s
claim and found no abuse of discretion.
“The trial court sentenced defendant for one count of first degree murder.
The sentencing range for first degree murder is 20 to 60 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(a) (West 2008). The trial court imposed a sentence of 27 years, which was
within the applicable sentencing range. Nevertheless, defendant argues that the
sentence was excessive in light of his age, the mitigating evidence of his school
work, his lack of criminal background, and that he was not the individual who
stabbed Jennings.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge discussed on the record his
conclusions in determining defendant’s sentence. The judge specifically
considered defendant’s young age as well as the evidence presented at the hearing
and the evidence at trial. The judge also noted that there was ‘[n]o evidence to
suggest that [defendant] was in the apartment when this happened. *** There is
evidence to conclude he was in the apartment before it happened and the fact of
the matter is it wouldn't have happened but for him.’ The judge further stated that
while the ‘evidence doesn’t show that [defendant] intended for this to happen to
Ms. Jennings,’ defendant ‘has to be held responsible for Ms. Jennings’ death
consistent with the jury’s verdict.’
Based on the entire record before us and given the nature of the crime and
defendant’s role in facilitating the burglary that led to Jennings’ death, we do not
find that the trial court abused its discretion. Defendant received a sentence on the
low end of the sentencing range, only 7 years over the minimum and 33 years less
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than the maximum sentence. The trial court clearly considered all factors in
aggravation and mitigation and was especially cognizant of defendant’s young
age and his level of involvement in the crime when imposing the sentence.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s sentence of 27 years’ imprisonment
was not an abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶¶ 88-90.
¶ 40 While defendant’s direct appeal predated Miller, this court considered the same
mitigating factors he asserts merit review in a new sentencing hearing. We observed that “ ‘[i]f
the sentence imposed is within the statutory range, it will not be deemed excessive unless it is
greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense.’ ” Id. ¶ 87 (quoting People v. Starnes, 374 Ill. App. 3d 132,143 (2007)).
Thus, in reviewing defendant’s sentence, we inherently considered whether his sentence was
disproportionate to the offense and his involvement.
¶ 41 In this appeal, he argues that his sentence violates the eighth amendment of the United
States Constitution and proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the
sentencing court did not take into account his youthful characteristics and background, including
his immature mind, difficult childhood, and his prospects at rehabilitation. His age, childhood,
and his work and certificates earned while incarcerated were admitted at the sentencing hearing
and considered by the trial court. Since this court already reviewed defendant’s sentence based
on these same mitigating factors and concluded the sentence was not disproportionate, his claim
is barred by res judicata, and the trial court properly dismissed it at the second stage.
¶ 42 Nevertheless, even if defendant’s sentencing claim was not barred by res judicata, Miller
is not implicated here because defendant did not receive a de facto life sentence.
¶ 43 The sentencing of juvenile defendants has been evolving in the country over the last
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several years. Beginning with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the United States
Supreme Court weighed in and set forth new constitutional parameters for the sentencing of
juvenile offenders. See also Graham, 560 U.S. 48, Miller, 567 U.S. 460, and Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209-12 (2016). “[T]he United States Supreme Court has advised that
‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’ ” People v.
Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 32 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). In Miller, the Court barred
mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Id. Miller has since been held to
apply retroactively. Montgomery, 570 U.S. at 212; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655,
¶ 38 (recognizing that Miller applied retroactively). Most recently, the Supreme Court held that
the eighth amendment allows juvenile offenders to be sentenced to life without parole as long as
the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencing court had discretion to consider youth and
attendant characteristics but that no factfinding by the sentencer is required. Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U.S.____, ____, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1314-15 (2021).
¶ 44 In light of these cases from the United States Supreme Court, the Illinois Supreme Court
has developed its own evolving jurisprudence regarding Miller-related sentencing claims raised
by juvenile defendants. In People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9, the supreme court relied on
Miller to conclude that a de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment when applied to
juveniles. The Reyes court observed that “Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be
sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his
youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation.” Id. The supreme court in People v. Buffer,
2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42, concluded that a sentence over 40 years is considered a de facto life
sentence for juvenile defendants, requiring the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s youth
and attendant circumstances.
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¶ 45 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 27 years, significantly less than a de
facto life sentence under Buffer. Although defendant initially contended that his 27-year sentence
violated both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause, he has now conceded
his sentence does not violate the eighth amendment. However, he maintains that his sentence
violates the proportionate penalties clause.
¶ 46 Under the proportionate penalties clause, all penalties shall be determined both according
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 28. “The purpose of
the proportionate penalties clause is to add a limitation on penalties beyond those provided by
the eighth amendment and to add the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 35 (citing People v. Clemons,
2012 IL 107821, ¶ 39). The proportionate penalties clause calls for the balancing of the
retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment, which requires careful consideration of all
factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, mentality,
credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well
as the nature and circumstances of the crime and of defendant’s conduct in the commission of it.
People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002).
¶ 47 To support his claim that a de facto life sentence is not required for Miller protections to
apply, defendant relies on People v. Barnes, 2018 IL App (5th) 140378, People v. Womack, 2020
IL App (3d) 170208, and People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 181653. We find each of these
cases distinguishable.
¶ 48 Both Barnes and Womack considered the mandatory firearm enhancement in cases where
the defendants did not commit a homicide. In Barnes, the Fifth District found “the sentencing
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scheme employed by the trial court, as applied to [the] defendant, violate[d] the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, as it shocks our community’s evolving standard of
moral decency.” Barnes, 2018 IL App (5th) 140378, ¶ 25. The Barnes court observed that no one
was injured during the armed robbery and that the gun displayed was unloaded, as well as the
defendant’s apology and remorse. Id. We point out that Barnes predated the supreme court’s
decision in Buffer.
¶ 49 Similarly, in Womack, the defendant alleged in a successive postconviction petition that
he had established cause and prejudice to bring an as-applied claim that the firearm enhancement
violated the proportionate penalties clause. Womack, 2020 IL App (3d) 170208, ¶ 13. Citing
Barnes, the majority concluded that the mandatory enhancement as applied to the defendant
violated the proportionate penalties clause insofar as the enhancement did not comport with
“Illinois’s evolving standard of decency” in this case. Id. ¶ 15. While the majority did not
address Buffer, nor that the defendant’s sentence was not a de facto life sentence, the dissenting
justice found no proportionate penalties violation under Buffer. See id. ¶ 43 (Schmidt, J.,
dissenting).
¶ 50 In Robinson, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the
defendant’s pro se postconviction petition and remanded for second-stage proceedings where the
defendant entered into a negotiated plea for a 35-year sentence for first degree murder after being
admonished that he faced a potential 20-to-60-year sentence. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st)
181653, ¶¶ 1, 6, 8, 33. The defendant alleged that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing
because the circuit court did not consider his youth when it accepted his guilty plea, and his plea
was secured by the threat of a now unconstitutional de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 17. The
reviewing court found that the defendant’s petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim that
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“his plea was secured by the threat of a de facto life sentence” and remanded for further second-
stage proceedings under the Act. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
¶ 51 We conclude the analysis in Robinson is no longer valid following the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432. In Jones, the juvenile defendant, who was
facing a mandatory life sentence, entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the State in
which the defendant would plead guilty to one count each of first degree murder and residential
burglary and two counts of armed robbery in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges
and concurrent sentences of 50 years for murder, 30 years for each armed robbery count, and 15
years for residential burglary. Id. ¶ 4. Subsequently, the defendant sought leave to file a
successive postconviction petition, arguing that his guilty plea and judgment were entered years
before the decision in Miller and that the mandatory statutory sentencing scheme that was
applied to him at that time was void when applied to juveniles. Id. ¶ 7. The trial court denied the
motion, and the appellate court affirmed the denial. Id. ¶¶ 7-10.
¶ 52 Our supreme court in Jones observed that voluntarily entering a guilty plea waived all
nonjurisdiction errors, including constitutional errors that could not have been apparent until
later. Id. ¶ 20. To avoid the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment that he would have
received if he had been convicted of other charges, the defendant made a deal with the State and
pleaded guilty in return for 50 years’ imprisonment. See id. ¶ 25. Thus, he waived any
constitutional challenge to the agreed-upon sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment. See id. ¶ 20.
This waiver remained effective despite any later changes in the law regarding the sentencing of
juveniles. “[A]bsent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents [citation],
a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty
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premise.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 53 This court also recently held that following Jones, the defendant’s sentencing challenge
under a blind plea was not cognizable under Miller where the defendant’s plea was voluntary,
and the trial court exercised its discretion in imposing a 48-year sentence for first degree murder.
People v. Aceituno, 2022 IL App (1st) 172116, ¶ 58.
¶ 54 For these reasons, we find that none of these cases relied on by defendant support his
argument that his 27-year sentence for first degree murder violated the proportionate penalties
clause under Miller.
¶ 55 We also reject defendant’s claim that his case is similar to the circumstances present in
People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002). In that case, the supreme court held that a
mandatory sentence of natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause when applied to the
juvenile defendant. The supreme court found that the convergence of the juvenile transfer statute,
the accountability statute, and the multiple murder sentencing statute eliminated the trial court’s
ability to consider any mitigating factors such as age or degree of participation. Id. at 342-43.
The Leon Miller court held that the mandated penalty distorted the case’s factual realities and did
not accurately represent the defendant’s personal culpability, such that it shocked the moral sense
of the community. Id. at 341. The court noted that the defendant was 15 years old, had one
minute to contemplate whether to participate in the incident, and stood as a lookout during the
shooting but never handled a gun. Id.¶ 56 While defendant in this case was subject to the juvenile transfer statute and was held
accountable for Jennings’ murder, he was not subject to a mandatory life sentence. The supreme
court’s analysis in Leon Miller focused on the lack of any discretion allowed by the trial court in
imposing the mandatory life sentence and its ability to consider the defendant’s involvement.
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No. 1-20-0642
Here, the trial court imposed a discretionary sentence which was significantly lower than
mandatory life. Further, defendant in this case was more culpable than the defendant in Leon
Miller. Here, the burglary that led to Jennings’ death was defendant’s idea. He accompanied his
accomplice to Jennings’ apartment and waited outside as a lookout while his accomplice entered
to commit the burglary. Even though defendant did not intend for Jennings to be murdered, he
participated in the planning of the criminal acts that ultimately led to her death. Therefore, we
find Leon Miller distinguishable from the facts of this case.
¶ 57 Our review of defendant’s argument and the cases relied upon fail to establish that a non
de facto life sentence can support a proportionate penalties violation under Miller. Here,
defendant received a discretionary sentence of 27 years for first degree murder. While we
acknowledge that he was 15 years old at the time of the offense and was not an active participant
in the death of Jennings, we do not believe that such a sentence shocks the conscience. The
burglary was committed at defendant’s prompting and he went to that location with his
accomplice. He was later found with Jennings’ phone after the burglary and murder. Defendant
has not cited any relevant authority that extended Miller protections under the proportionate
penalties clause for a sentence less than a de facto life sentence and we decline to do so here.
¶ 58 Moreover, even if defendant’s proportionate penalties claim had merit, which we do not
find, the trial court properly considered defendant’s youth and degree of participation at his
sentencing hearing. The supreme court has held that a de facto natural life sentence for a juvenile
imposed prior to Miller is not invalid if the record established that the trial court considered the
defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics at sentencing. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52.
¶ 59 All of the mitigating evidence defendant relies on now was presented to the trial court at
sentencing. In dismissing this postconviction claim, the trial judge observed that he had also
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No. 1-20-0642
presided over defendant’s trial and sentencing and had considered the factors in aggravation and
mitigation at that time.
“I do believe that the Court -- and I was the judge who presided over Mr.
Snowden’s trial and sentencing. I believe I was very cognizant of the fact that he
was 15 years old at the time of the offense. I was very cognizant of those
circumstances identified in the presentence investigation report and considered
the well-stated arguments of his trial counsel *** regarding the fact that he was of
a particular age and should not be given the same kind of punishment that
someone who committed this offense and was over the [age of] 18 might have,
and I believe the fact that he received the sentence of 27 years for his involvement
in the stabbing of a woman in her home and the resulting death during some kind
of burglary, some kind of taking of her property, is such that it is clear both from
the nature of the sentence and the comments that the Court made at the time of the
sentencing that this sentence does comply with Miller, Buffer and People versus
Lusby as I mentioned.”
¶ 60 As stated, the trial judge was well aware of defendant’s age, childhood background,
degree of culpability, and rehabilitative potential at sentencing. This evidence was before the
trial judge at sentencing and the court stated that he considered such evidence before imposing
the sentence. Our review of the sentencing proceedings confirm that the trial court was presented
with this information and weighed defendant’s youth and background before sentencing
defendant to a term of 27 years. Defendant has failed to set forth a substantial showing that his
sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause.
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No. 1-20-0642
¶ 61 Next, defendant contends that he made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation
of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he asserts that the police detectives violated his Miranda
rights by questioning him first, then instructing him on his rights, and then continuing the
interview. Defendant further argues that his trial counsel’s failure to litigate a viable Miranda
claim constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The State responds that defendant’s claim
that his confession was involuntary is barred by res judicata because he argued on direct appeal
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a motion to suppress defendant’s
statements.
¶ 62 As previously stated, res judicata bars defendant from relitigating claims previously
raised and rejected. People v. English, 403 Ill. App. 3d 121, 131 (2010). Defendant’s motion to
suppress alleged that prior to his interrogation, defendant was not informed of his right to remain
silent, that anything he might say or do could be used against him in court, he had a right to
consult with a lawyer and have a lawyer present during the interrogation, and if he was indigent,
he would be provided a lawyer by the State to be present during his interrogation. Counsel
further alleged that “due to the physical, physiological, mental, educational and/or psychological
state, capacity and condition of the defendant, he was incapable and unable to appreciate and
understand the full meaning of his Miranda rights.” Although counsel filed this motion, it was
never litigated prior to trial.
¶ 63 On direct appeal, defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because “the
voluntariness of his statements to the police should have been challenged because he was a
minor at the time and was questioned initially without a parent present and he had not been given
his Miranda warnings.” Snowden, 2011 IL App (1st) 092117, ¶ 71.
¶ 64 This court considered defendant’s claim and reasoned as follows.
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No. 1-20-0642
“In this case, despite defendant’s young age, his statements were voluntary. He
received Miranda rights at least four times. He was first informed of these rights
immediately after he made an inculpatory statement about entering Jennings’
apartment on July 11. He then received Miranda rights prior to all further
statements. ASA Hofeld testified that when he advised defendant of his Miranda
rights, he made defendant tell him what each of the rights meant to ensure that
defendant understood the rights he was waiving. He was able to speak with each
of his parents privately before continuing any questioning, and when his mother
did not return to the police station, the police had a youth officer present during
questioning. Both defendant and his father signed a consent form to give a
videotaped statement. *** Additionally, ASA Hofeld asked defendant outside the
presence of police officers and while his father was present if he had been treated
well at the police station and defendant said he had and made no complaints.
Given the circumstances of defendant’s statements, it is unlikely that the
motion to suppress would have been granted. The record supports the voluntary
nature of his statements. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights more than
once and was asked to explain the rights to demonstrate his understanding. He
was able to speak privately with his parents before continuing questioning and his
parents or a youth officer was present during questioning. Defense counsel’s
decision not to litigate the motion to suppress was a matter of trial strategy and
defendant cannot show the motion had a reasonable likelihood of success.
Accordingly, defendant failed to establish that his attorney’s performance was
deficient.” Id. ¶¶ 73-74.
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No. 1-20-0642
¶ 65 Defendant contends that his current Miranda claim differs from the issue raised on direct
appeal because on direct appeal, his argument was based on an involuntary statement, rather than
the police employing a question-first, warn-later technique during defendant’s interview. We
disagree with defendant. Trial counsel’s motion specifically alleged that defendant had been
questioned prior to receiving his Miranda rights and defendant contended on direct appeal that
he had been questioned without being given these rights. While defendant did not refer to the
police’s question-first, warn-later technique, he asserted in part that his confession should have
been suppressed because he was questioned prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.
Defendant raised essentially the same claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, it is barred by res
judicata and the trial court properly dismissed this claim at the second stage.
¶ 66 Again, even if defendant did not raise this precise issue on direct appeal, defendant has
forfeited this claim by failing to raise it. We note that defendant has not alleged that his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to present this claim on direct appeal.
¶ 67 Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, are forfeited in
postconviction. People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 499 (2010). Defendant attempts to avoid
forfeiture by contending that defendant’s claim raised factual allegations outside the record. See
People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 132 (2002) (“where a defendant relies on matters outside the
record in support of a post-conviction claim, we will not find waiver”). However, the only facts
outside the trial record are his own statements that he had not been in a situation like that before,
he was not told that he should decline to talk, and the door to the interrogation room was locked.
Defendant did not attach any affidavits or additional documentation to his petition. His
statements fall more within the voluntariness of his confession, as addressed on direct appeal,
rather than the questioning technique employed by the police. The bulk of his argument relating
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No. 1-20-0642
to the interrogation comes from the trial testimony of Detectives Almazan, Fassl, and Durkin.
Trial counsel’s failure to challenge his statement based on this questioning technique is derived
from facts contained in the trial court record. Therefore, this claim could have been raised on
direct appeal, and defendant’s failure to do so results in its forfeiture. Accordingly, the trial court
properly dismissed this postconviction claim at the second stage.
¶ 68 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 69 Affirmed.
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