Winders v. People ( 2016 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2016.01.21
14:29:21 -06'00'
Winders v. People, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798Appellate Court DONALD L. WINDERS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE PEOPLE OF
Caption THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee (The Department
of State Police, Intervenor-Appellant).
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-14-0798
Rule 23 order filed November 10, 2015
Motion to
publish allowed December 23, 2015
Opinion filed December 23, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, No. 13-MR-338;
Review the Hon. Eugene P. Daugherity, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.
Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Frank H. Bieszczat,
Appeal Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.
Bradley P. Popurella, of Popurella Law Office, of Granville, for
appellee Donald L. Winders.
Brian Towne, State’s Attorney, of Ottawa (Terry A. Mertel, of State’s
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Lytton and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The petitioner, Donald L. Winders, applied to the appellant, the Department of Illinois
State Police, for a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card and was denied based on his
criminal history. Winders petitioned the circuit court for relief from the Department’s decision,
which the court granted. The Department, which was not a party to the circuit court case, filed
a petition to intervene pursuant to section 2-408(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735
ILCS 5/2-408(a) (West 2012)) and a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section
2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), both of which the court denied. On
appeal, the Department argues that the circuit court erred when it denied the petitions to
intervene and for relief from judgment. We reverse and remand with directions.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 On July 3, 1982, a criminal complaint was filed that alleged Winders committed
aggravated battery with a firearm that caused bodily harm to an individual. Winders entered a
negotiated plea of guilty and was sentenced to two years of conditional discharge. On April 28,
1989, a criminal complaint was filed that alleged Winders committed battery in that he
knowingly and without legal justification caused bodily harm to his paramour and household
member. Winders was found guilty of the offense.
¶4 In 2013, Winders filed an application for a FOID card with the Department. The
Department denied the application based on Winders’ felony conviction.
¶5 On November 13, 2013, Winders filed a petition with the circuit court that requested relief
from the Department’s decision to deny him a FOID card. Winders alleged that he met the
requirements of section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Act) (430
ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2012)) such that he was entitled to relief from the Department’s decision.
¶6 On April 7, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on Winders’ petition. The State did not
object to granting the petition. The court found that Winders’ criminal history did not prohibit
him from obtaining a FOID card, and the court accordingly granted the petition and ordered the
director of the Department to issue a FOID card to Winders.
¶7 On July 11, 2014, the Department filed a petition to intervene, as well as a petition for relief
from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). The
section 2-1401 petition alleged that the Department was not given notice of Winders’ 2013
petition filed with the circuit court, and that because the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C. § 922 (2006)) prohibited Winders from possessing a firearm due to his 1989 battery
conviction, he did not meet the requirements of section 10(c) of the FOID Act to obtain relief
from the Department’s decision. The Department’s section 2-1401 petition was not
accompanied by an affidavit.
¶8 Winders filed a motion to strike the Department’s petitions, alleging, inter alia, that the
Department failed to support its section 2-1401 petition with an affidavit.
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¶9 On September 9, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on the Department’s petition.
Counsel for the Department argued that the Department’s interests were not always identical to
the State’s Attorney’s office on behalf of the people of Illinois. Here, counsel argued, “[t]he
Illinois State Police, as the agency that is required by law to administer the FOID Act, has a
sort of unique interest in making sure that it is complying both with federal and state law in
issuing a firearms identification card.” Counsel also pointed out that it was unclear from the
court’s order whether it had considered the amendments made to the FOID Act in 2013 that
added a prohibition to issuing a FOID card if a federal law prohibited the individual from
possessing a firearm. The Department’s position was that Winders’ two criminal convictions
prohibited him under federal law from possessing a firearm. Counsel also added that it filed its
petition to intervene as soon as the Department received notice of the court’s order directing it
to issue Winders a FOID card. In response, counsel for Winders stated, inter alia, that the
supreme court’s decision in Coram v. State of Illinois, 2013 IL 113867, allowed for the
issuance of a FOID card to Winders.
¶ 10 After hearing arguments, the court found that: (1) the Department’s petition to intervene
was untimely; (2) the petition to intervene was not supported by an affidavit; and (3) the
Department had not complied with section 2-1401. Further, the court stated that it was “aware
of dicta in the Coram v. Illinois decision which says that even if there were to have been a
violation of federal law in the instance involved there, the Court indicated that the FOID card
should have been issued.” Accordingly, the court denied the Department’s petition to
intervene. The Department appealed.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, the Department argues that the circuit court erred when it denied the petitions to
intervene and for relief from judgment. Specifically, the Department contends that both of the
circuit court’s grounds for its ruling–that the petition to intervene was untimely and that the
petition for relief from judgment did not comply with section 2-1401 of the Code–were
impermissible legal grounds upon which to base the decision.
¶ 13 In relevant part, section 2-408(a) of the Code provides that a party shall be permitted to
intervene in a case when the application is timely and “when the representation of the
applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or may be
bound by an order or judgment in the action.” 735 ILCS 5/2-408(a) (West 2012). This
paragraph is to be liberally construed. Freesen, Inc. v. County of McLean, 258 Ill. App. 3d 377,
381 (1994). In determining whether to allow a petition to intervene, the circuit court “must
consider whether the petition to intervene is timely, whether the petitioner’s interest is
sufficient, and whether that interest is being adequately represented by someone else in the
lawsuit.” Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Illinois Power Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 916, 918
(1991). Whether to allow intervention is a discretionary decision for the circuit court that we
will not disturb absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Estate of Barth, 339 Ill. App. 3d 651,
661 (2003).
¶ 14 With regard to timeliness, we note that “[w]hile a person may not normally seek
intervention after the rights of the original parties have been determined and a final decree
entered [citation], a motion to intervene may be filed even after dismissal of the case and still
be timely where necessary to protect the interests of the intervenor.” Citicorp Savings of
Illinois v. First Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 298 (1995). A party that
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seeks to intervene after a judgment has been entered must explain its failure to seek
intervention prior to the judgment being entered, and intervention may be allowed in the
court’s discretion if the party lacked knowledge of the action prior to the judgment being
entered. Schwechter v. Schwechter, 138 Ill. App. 3d 602, 604-05 (1985). In addition,
intervention may be allowed after a judgment has been entered if doing so is the only way to
protect the rights of the party seeking to intervene. In re Marriage of Kueteman, 273 Ill. App.
3d 77, 79 (1995).
¶ 15 Our review of the record in this case reveals that the Department’s petition to intervene was
timely on these facts. Without explanation, the circuit court found that the petition was
untimely. 1 However, the Department alerted the court both in the petition for relief from
judgment and in arguments at the hearing that it lacked knowledge of Winders’ action in the
circuit court and did not learn of the action until it received the court’s order directing it to issue
Winders a FOID card. While the Department was not a necessary party to that action (Williams
v. Tazewell County State’s Attorney’s Office, 348 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659 (2004)), the
above-cited case law indicates that there is nothing per se untimely about a petition to
intervene that is filed after a judgment has been entered (Citicorp Savings, 269 Ill. App. 3d at
298; Schwechter, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 604-05; Kueteman, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 79). Under these
circumstances, and construing the attempt to intervene liberally, we hold that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it found the Department’s petition to intervene to be untimely.
¶ 16 With regard to the requirements that the party seeking to intervene possesses sufficient
interest and whether that interest was represented by existing parties, we note that the
Department alleged that its rights were not adequately represented by either of the parties
involved. Because the judgment bound the Department, the Department’s rights were clearly
impacted and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the State’s Attorney’s office did
represent the Department’s rights. In fact, the State’s Attorney’s office took a position opposite
to the Department in that it did not object to Winders’ petition for relief, at least in part due to
interpretations of Coram and section 10(c) that ran contrary to those of the Department. In
addition, the Department’s interest is beyond that of the general public, as the Department is
tasked with the administration of the FOID card program and must ensure compliance with
federal and state law. See People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 57-58 (2002)
(holding that “[a]lthough a party [seeking to intervene] need not have a direct interest in the
pending suit, it must have an interest greater than that of the general public, so that the party
may stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of a judgment in the suit”).
Thus, not only was the Department’s petition timely, the Department also demonstrated a
sufficient interest and the inadequacy of the existing parties to represent that interest. See
Soyland Power, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 918. Because section 2-408(a)(2) (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(2)
(West 2012)) provides that intervention shall be permitted as a matter of right when these three
requirements are met, the circuit court had no discretion to deny the petition to intervene. 735
ILCS 5/2-408(e) (West 2012).
1
We note that the court seemed to indicate that the failure to file an affidavit affected the timeliness
of the petition to intervene. We believe the court misspoke and was referencing the petition for relief
from judgment in this regard, as section 2-1401 requires an affidavit, while section 2-408 does not. If
the court in fact did not misspeak, then the court’s belief that the lack of an affidavit rendered the
petition to intervene untimely was erroneous.
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¶ 17 Even though we have held that the circuit court erred when it denied the Department’s
petition to intervene, we will also address the Department’s second argument that the court
erred when it denied the petition to intervene on the additional ground that the section 2-1401
petition was procedurally insufficient.
¶ 18 Section 2-408(e) of the Code provides that “[a] person desiring to intervene shall present a
petition setting forth the grounds for intervention, accompanied by the initial pleading or
motion which he or she proposes to file.” Id. In this case, that pleading or motion would be the
petition for relief from judgment. It is important to note that there is no requirement in section
2-408 that the accompanying motion be meritorious or even procedurally flawless. In Soyland
Power, the Fourth District stated:
“The purpose of section 2-408(e) of the Code is to give both the trial court and any
opposing party a clear indication of the relief the potential intervenor will be seeking if
his petition to intervene is granted. This purpose is achieved by the requirement that the
potential intervenor’s initial pleading he proposes to file be attached to the petition to
intervene. Only when the goals of the potential intervenor are revealed in this fashion
can the trial court and any opposing party assess the appropriateness of the petition to
intervene.” (Emphasis added.) Soyland Power, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 920.
Thus, the accompanying motion can serve to clarify the intention of the party seeking to
intervene, but even if that motion would be denied, the court cannot prohibit a party from
intervening when the party seeks to intervene as a matter of right and it has met the three
aforementioned requirements. Accordingly, to the extent that the circuit court premised its
denial of the Department’s petition to intervene on a determination that the section 2-1401
petition was deficient, that ruling was erroneous.
¶ 19 Lastly, because the circuit court also apparently premised its denial of the petition to
intervene in part on its belief that the Coram decision permitted a state court to remove an
applicant’s federal impediment to possessing a firearm, we will briefly address the
Department’s claim that the court misinterpreted Coram.
¶ 20 While it was not decided until after the circuit court issued its decision in this case, in
O’Neill v. Director of the Illinois Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (3d) 140011, a
different panel of this court addressed the supreme court’s decision in Coram and the 2013
amendments to section 10(c) of the FOID Act. This court held, inter alia, that in dicta, four
justices of the supreme court found in Coram that under the 2013 amendments to section 10(c),
a state court could not remove a federal prohibition on the ability of an individual to possess a
firearm. Id. ¶ 27. Further, this court held that the applicant was not entitled to a reinstatement
of his FOID card because the FOID Act “prohibits the court from granting relief where doing
so would be contrary to federal law.” Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 21 In this case, the circuit court found that Coram allowed a state court to remove an
applicant’s federal impediment to possessing a firearm. Pursuant to O’Neill, that finding was
incorrect. Thus, to the extent that the circuit court based its denial of the Department’s petition
to intervene on the court’s interpretation of Coram, that ruling was erroneous.
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when it
denied the Department’s petition to intervene. We remand the case for the court to allow the
Department’s petition to intervene, and to hold further proceedings consistent with our
decision.
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¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed and the cause is remanded
with directions.
¶ 25 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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