People v. Kilcauski , 2016 IL App (5th) 140526 ( 2016 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2016.10.19
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People v. Kilcauski, 2016 IL App (5th) 140526
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption CHARLES L. KILCAUSKI, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Fifth District
Docket No. 5-14-0526
Filed August 31, 2016
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton County, No. 14-CF-94; the
Review Hon. Dennis E. Middendorff, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on John Hudspeth, State’s Attorney, of Carlyle (Patrick Delfino, Stephen
Appeal E. Norris, and Kelley M. Stacey, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, Ellen J. Curry, and Maggie A. Heim, all of State
Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Goldenhersh and Chapman concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The People of the State of Illinois (the State) appeal the order of the circuit court of Clinton
County dismissing this case against the defendant, Charles L. Kilcauski, for violations of the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 The defendant, Charles L. Kilcauski, was arrested in Clinton County, Illinois, on June 23,
2013. On June 24, 2013, he was charged by information (cause No. 13-CF-80) in the circuit
court of Clinton County with obstructing justice, a Class 4 felony (count I), and unlawful
possession of a hypodermic syringe, a Class A misdemeanor (count II). As to the felony count,
the information charged that the defendant, with the intent to prevent his apprehension,
knowingly furnished false information to a police officer in that the defendant, when asked to
identify himself, provided a name and date of birth different from his own. The defendant
appeared in court, pro se, that same day. The court set bond at $20,000, appointed the public
defender, and scheduled the defendant’s first appearance date for July 3, 2013. On June 25,
2013, the public defender filed an entry of appearance, along with the defendant’s plea of not
guilty and jury demand, a discovery motion, and a motion to reduce bond.
¶4 On July 3, 2013, the assistant State’s Attorney and the public defender appeared in court,
but the defendant did not appear. There is no report of proceedings from this date, but an entry
in the court’s docket sheet indicates that the defendant was in custody in St. Louis, Missouri.
The docket sheet shows that the court issued a notice to appear on August 7, 2013, and the
notice was sent to the defendant’s home address.
¶5 On August 7, 2013, the assistant State’s Attorney and the public defender appeared in
court. The defendant did not appear. When the defendant’s case was called for hearing, the
assistant State’s Attorney informed the trial court that the Clinton County sheriff’s department
had turned over the defendant to authorities in St. Louis County. The assistant State’s Attorney
stated that he talked to authorities at the St. Louis County jail and confirmed that the defendant
was in the custody of St. Louis County, being held to bond. The assistant State’s Attorney
advised the court that during the proceedings on July 3, 2013, he had requested a warrant, that
his request had been denied, and that he had been unable to get the defendant back to Clinton
County without a warrant.
¶6 After being apprised of the situation, the trial court indicated that it understood that the
Clinton County sheriff’s department had turned the defendant over to St. Louis County,
without the consent of the State’s Attorney’s office, but then advised the assistant State’s
Attorney that the sheriff’s department is part of the State. The court found that although the
defendant was not in the physical custody of the Clinton County sheriff’s department, the
defendant remained in the sheriff’s custody because he had not posted bond or escaped from
custody. The court stated that it would not issue a warrant for failure to appear because it was
not the defendant’s fault that he could not appear. The court then, on its own motion, dismissed
the case because the State had not provided the defendant with a preliminary hearing within 30
days from the date he was taken into custody. The docket entry from that date stated:
“defendant not present, it appears to the court that the Sheriff of Clinton County has transferred
physical custody of the defendant to the state of Missouri without completion of process in this
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County. As a consequence of the Sheriff’s act, the state is unable to proceed to preliminary
hearing [w]ithin 30 days as required by law. Cause dismissed.”
¶7 On August 8, 2013, the State filed a motion to nol-pros count II of the information. In its
motion, the State noted that a defendant does not have a right to a preliminary hearing on a
misdemeanor charge and that the order dismissing the misdemeanor count was improper. On
that same day, the trial court issued an order granting the State’s motion to nol-pros the
misdemeanor count without prejudice. The court also clarified its prior order. The court
acknowledged that it had authority to dismiss only the felony count for failure to provide a
preliminary hearing and noted that the felony count was dismissed without prejudice.
¶8 On August 14, 2013, the defendant, acting pro se, submitted a motion for speedy trial in the
circuit court of Clinton County in No. 13-CF-80. The handwritten pleading was received and
file-marked by the court on August 14, 2013. The first page states: “I am currently incarcerated
at the St. Louis County Jail, located at 100 South Central Ave., Clayton, MO, 63105. I would
like this motion to be filed and notice to the following people[:] Circuit Clerk Clinton County,
IL, Judge Middendorf [sic] Clinton County, IL; St. Louis County Justice Services, 100 Central
Ave., Clayton MO, 63105; Charles L. Kilcauski, Inmate #188074 100 South Central Ave.,
Clayton, MO 63105.” The second page states: “I Charles Kilcauski file pro se, a motion for a
120 day fast and speedy trial.”
¶9 On July 17, 2014, a Clinton County grand jury returned a bill of indictment against the
defendant, charging one count of obstructing justice, a Class 4 felony, and one count of
unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe, a Class A misdemeanor. These charges arose
from the same offenses for which the defendant was arrested on June 23, 2013, and were
identical to the charges filed on June 24, 2013, in No. 13-CF-80. The indictment was filed in
the circuit court of Clinton County (cause No. 14-CF-94), along with the State’s notice of
intent to seek an extended term of imprisonment. The court issued an arrest warrant. Bond was
set at $50,000 because of the notice of extended term.
¶ 10 The defendant was arrested in Clinton County on September 3, 2014, after being stopped
for a traffic violation. He appeared in court on September 4, 2014. The court appointed the
public defender and set first appearance for September 24, 2014.
¶ 11 On September 9, 2014, the Clinton County public defender filed an entry of appearance, a
plea of not guilty, a jury-trial demand, and a motion for discovery. On September 16, 2014, the
public defender filed a motion to dismiss the felony charge, pursuant to section 114-1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-1 (West 2014)), for failure to
state an offense. In the motion, the defense argued that the alleged acts of intentionally
furnishing a false name and date of birth to a police officer constitute obstructing
identification, a Class A misdemeanor, not felony obstruction of justice. The public defender
also filed a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to the defendant’s sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. In the motion to dismiss, the defense pointed out that the pending charges were
identical to those previously dismissed in August 2013 and that the pending charges were
presented to a grand jury and an indictment obtained on July 17, 2014, approximately 13
months after the alleged offenses were committed and approximately one year after the
original charges were dismissed. The defense argued that the State offered no reason for the
delay, that the defendant had requested a speedy trial while in St. Louis County jail, and that
the defendant did nothing to cause or contribute to the delay. The defense also claimed that the
defendant had been severely prejudiced by the delay.
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¶ 12 The defendant’s motion to dismiss was called for hearing on September 24, 2014. During
the hearing, the defendant noted that the felony count in the original information had been
dismissed because the State violated the defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing and that the
State waited for almost a year to seek an indictment. The defendant claimed that he sought a
disposition of the charges in June 2013 and that the year-long delay between the dismissal of
the information and the filing of the indictment resulted in extreme prejudice because the
defendant lost track of his only witness and because a deal might have been negotiated that
would have allowed him to serve a term concurrent with his incarceration in Missouri.
¶ 13 In response, the State argued that the defendant’s pro se motion for a speedy trial was of no
effect because the underlying charges had been dismissed before the motion was filed and
because the defendant had not served a copy of the speedy-trial request on the State’s Attorney
as required under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The State further argued that there
was no constitutional speedy-trial violation because the subsequent charges were filed within
the applicable statute-of-limitations period and the delay in filing the charges occurred because
the defendant was incarcerated in Missouri.
¶ 14 After considering the arguments of counsel, the court issued its findings and order. The
court found that the State knew, as of August 7, 2013, that the defendant had been transferred
to St. Louis County Justice Center without completion of process in Clinton County; that the
original felony charge was dismissed on August 7, 2013, for failure to provide a preliminary
hearing due to the defendant’s transfer to St. Louis County without process; that the State
elected to nol-pros the misdemeanor charge on August 8, 2013; and that the bill of indictment
was filed on July 17, 2014, more than a year after the defendant was initially taken into custody
on the charges. The court also found that the State knew that the defendant was detained in the
St. Louis County jail and that it could have secured an indictment and sought extradition
shortly after the original charges were dismissed. The court determined that there were both
preindictment and postindictment delays in this case, noting that neither the indictment nor
preliminary hearing was had in a timely fashion and that the State offered no explanation for
the delays. The court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice on
constitutional speedy-trial grounds.
¶ 15 On October 14, 2014, the State filed a motion to reconsider the order of dismissal. In this
motion, the State attributed the delay to the defendant’s failure to properly notify the State’s
Attorney’s office that he was incarcerated in St. Louis County and the defendant’s failure to
follow proper procedure under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The motion was called
for hearing on October 21, 2014. At the outset, the court asked the State if it wished to make
any arguments in support of its motion, and the State declined, electing to stand on its motion.
The court then turned to the defendant’s attorney and asked how long the defendant had been
in custody in St. Louis County. Counsel replied that the defendant remained in custody until
March 2014. The court then asked the assistant State’s Attorney whether it was the State’s
contention that the 120-day speedy-trial clock stopped when the sheriff transferred the
defendant to authorities in Missouri. The assistant State’s Attorney replied that he could not
say that. Counsel stated that the defendant’s transfer to Missouri created an issue regarding the
ability to provide the defendant with a preliminary hearing and that the 120-day speedy-trial
clock stopped when the charges in the information were dismissed.
¶ 16 Following this inquiry, the court found that the defendant had been sent to Missouri
without extradition or a waiver of extradition and that the defendant had been placed in the
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physical custody of Missouri authorities with the consent of the Clinton County sheriff’s
department but without a court order. The court further found that after the original charges in
Clinton County were dismissed, there was never an order releasing the defendant from the
custody of Clinton County and the defendant remained in the physical custody in St. Louis
County until March 2014. Additionally, the court found that the State did not present the case
to the grand jury until July 17, 2014, even though it could have obtained an indictment and
sought extradition of the defendant shortly after the original charges were dismissed. The court
concluded that these delays presented not only a constitutional speedy-trial problem, but also a
statutory speedy-trial problem. The court denied the State’s motion to reconsider, and this
appeal followed.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against the
defendant on speedy-trial grounds. The State claims that the trial court incorrectly applied the
sixth amendment constitutional speedy-trial test when it considered the delay between the
dismissal and nol-pros of the original charges and the filing of the bill of indictment. The State
claims that the only relevant question is whether the delay constituted a denial of due process
under the fifth amendment and that because the trial court did not conduct a due-process
analysis, its decision must be vacated and the cause remanded for a due-process analysis.
¶ 19 The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. A criminal defendant
in Illinois also has a statutory right to a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2014). The
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial are not necessarily coextensive. People v.
Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 250, 840 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (2005).
¶ 20 When considering whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated, there are four factors that may be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the
reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice
to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 250, 840
N.E.2d at 1163. No single factor is regarded as “a necessary or sufficient condition to the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. All factors are
related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances in assessing
whether a defendant’s fundamental right to a speedy trial has been violated. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 533.
¶ 21 In considering whether there is a constitutional speedy-trial violation, the length of the
delay is considered the triggering mechanism for considerations of the other factors, but the
length of delay is necessarily dependent on the peculiar circumstances of the case and not on
any fixed period of time. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. The weight to be accorded the reasons
cited by the prosecution for the delay is likewise dependent on the particular circumstances,
such that deliberate delays are weighted heavily and negligence is weighted a little less
heavily. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is also a factor.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Finally, in assessing the prejudice factor, courts are to consider the
interests of defendants that the speedy-trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing undue
and oppressive incarceration, (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern that accompanies public
accusations, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 532.
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¶ 22 The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in section 103-5 of the Code. 725 ILCS
5/103-5 (West 2014). Section 103-5(a) provides that every person in custody in this state for an
alleged offense must be tried within 120 days from the date that person was taken into custody
unless delay is occasioned by that person. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2014). Section 103-5(b)
provides that every person on bail or recognizance must be tried within 160 days from the date
that person demands trial unless delay is occasioned by that person. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b)
(West 2014). Proof of a violation of a defendant’s rights under section 103-5 requires a
showing that the defendant has not been tried within the period set by the statute and that the
defendant had not caused or contributed to the delay. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 250-51, 840 N.E.2d
at 1163. Defendants who rely on the statutory right to a speedy trial are not required to show
prejudice. People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426, 639 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1994). The provisions
of section 103-5 are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, and the State cannot
improperly manipulate criminal proceedings or purposefully evade the operation of the
provisions in section 103-5. People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 335, 904 N.E.2d 29, 31
(2009).
¶ 23 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution also guarantee due
process in criminal proceedings and protect a criminal defendant against proceedings that are
fundamentally unfair. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV. Due process under the fifth amendment
would require the dismissal of an indictment if it were shown that a preindictment delay
resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and that the delay was an
intentional device by the prosecution to gain tactical advantage over the defendant. United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971); People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 456-57, 367
N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (1977). The trial court has an obligation to insure a fair trial. Where there
has been a clear denial of due process, the trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss a
case. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d at 456, 367 N.E.2d at 1247.
¶ 24 Before considering the merits of the appeal, we consider the appropriate standard of
review. In this case, the relevant facts are uncontested, and as such, the trial court’s
determination of the constitutional issues and the statutory speedy-trial issue are reviewed
de novo. See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 52, 743 N.E.2d 555, 562 (2001) (where relevant
facts are uncontested, the ultimate determination of whether a defendant’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial has been violated is reviewed de novo); People v. Stanitz, 367 Ill. App. 3d 980,
983, 857 N.E.2d 288, 290 (2006) (the application of the speedy-trial statute to undisputed facts
presents questions of law that are reviewed de novo); People v. Totzke, 2012 IL App (2d)
110823, ¶ 17, 974 N.E.2d 408 (the determination of whether due process has been violated is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo).
¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment Speedy-Trial Analysis
¶ 26 Having outlined the due-process and speedy-trial analyses at issue and the appropriate
standards of review, we now address the State’s contention that the trial court erred in
considering the period of delay between the dismissal of the original charges and the filing of
the bill of indictment under a constitutional speedy-trial analysis, rather than a due-process
analysis.
¶ 27 As previously noted, the particular safeguards and protections of the constitutional
speedy-trial provision are engaged either upon filing a formal indictment or information or the
actual restraints imposed by arrest and being held to answer a criminal charge. Marion, 404
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U.S. at 320. Thus, a person may invoke the constitutional speedy-trial provision upon arrest
and being held to answer; he need not await a formal charge. Marion, 404 U.S. at 321.
¶ 28 In this case, the defendant was arrested on June 23, 2013, and he was charged and held to
bond in Clinton County on June 24, 2013. Sometime between June 24, 2013, and July 3, 2013,
the Clinton County sheriff’s department voluntarily relinquished physical custody of the
defendant to St. Louis County, without extradition or waiver of extradition or other order of the
circuit court of Clinton County. The original felony charge was dismissed without prejudice on
August 7, 2013, because the State had failed to provide the defendant with a preliminary
hearing within 30 days of the date the defendant was taken into custody. The State then elected
to nol-pros the misdemeanor on August 8, 2013. The State sought and secured an indictment
on the identical charges on July 17, 2014, and an arrest warrant issued that day. The defendant
was arrested on that warrant following a routine traffic stop on September 3, 2014. After
reviewing the record, the trial court determined that the defendant had never been released
from the custody of the Clinton County sheriff’s department, even though the charges had been
dismissed, and the defendant remained in the physical custody of St. Louis County until March
2014. Thus, there was a delay of more than a year between the date the defendant was arrested
and detained on the original charges and the date of his indictment on those same charges. The
delay between the dismissal of the original charges and the filing of the bill of indictment on
the same charges was almost a year.
¶ 29 Under these unique circumstances, the restraint imposed upon the defendant’s liberty
began on July 23, 2013, the date he was arrested and detained in Clinton County, and extended
through the date of the subsequent indictment and arrest, as there had never been an order
releasing him from custody in Clinton County. In this case, there were restraints on the
defendant’s liberty that triggered the protections of the speedy-trial provision of the sixth
amendment. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320-21. Accordingly, we now consider whether the delay
violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶ 30 As previously noted, there are four factors to be considered when determining whether a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated: the length of delay, the reasons for the
delay, the defendant’s assertion of his speedy-trial right, and the prejudice to the defendant as a
result of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. In this case, there was a delay of more than a year
between the date the defendant was arrested and detained on the original charges and the date
of his indictment on those same charges. The delay between the dismissal of the original
charges and the filing of the bill of indictment was almost a year. Under either measure, the
length of the delay is “presumptively prejudicial” and triggers an inquiry into the other factors.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 53, 743 N.E.2d at 562-63.
¶ 31 Therefore, we next consider the reason for the delay. In this case, the State offered no
explanation to justify the delay. The State attempted to deflect responsibility for its failure to
provide a preliminary hearing by arguing that the Clinton County sheriff’s department
voluntarily relinquished custody of the defendant to authorities in St. Louis County without
notice to the State’s Attorney or the court. As the trial court correctly noted, the sheriff’s
department is part of the State, and any negligent or unlawful actions by that department are
attributable to the State. The State also attempted to blame the defendant for failing to provide
notice of his whereabouts after he was transferred to authorities in St. Louis County. In this
case, the record shows that the State had actual knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts
shortly after he was transferred to the St. Louis County Justice Center. In fact, the assistant
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State’s Attorney advised the court that he had spoken to authorities in St. Louis County and
confirmed that the defendant was being held to bond in St. Louis County. The record also
shows that the defendant filed a motion for speedy trial in Clinton County on August 14, 2013,
and therein stated that he was being held at the St. Louis County Justice Center and provided
the address of that facility. Thus, the defendant was not operating as a fugitive. The State did
not seek an indictment for more than 11 months after the initial charges were dismissed, and it
offered no reason for the delay. As the State did not present any reason to justify the delay, this
factor is weighed against the State.
¶ 32 The third factor is the assertion of the right to a speedy trial. In this case, the defendant
attempted to assert his right to a speedy trial while he was being held in the St. Louis County
Justice Center. The defendant, acting pro se, filed a handwritten motion within a week after the
original charges had been dismissed. There is no indication in the record of whether the
defendant knew that the charges in Clinton County had been dismissed at the time he filed his
motion. In this case, the record demonstrates that the defendant made an attempt to request a
speedy trial and a disposition of the charges in Clinton County. This factor weighs in the
defendant’s favor.
¶ 33 Finally, we consider the prejudice resulting from the delay. In this case, it appears
undisputed that the defendant was subjected to a lengthy pretrial incarceration period of at least
eight months. The defendant also alleged actual prejudice from the delay in that he was unable
to locate the only witness to the conversation with the police officer that led to his arrest for
obstructing justice, and he lost the opportunity for concurrent sentencing. The State offered no
argument or evidence to dispute these allegations of prejudice.
¶ 34 In summary, the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial, the State presented no
facts to justify the delay, the defendant made the attempt to request a speedy trial and a
disposition of the charges, and the defendant made an affirmative showing of actual prejudice
in that he endured a lengthy period of incarceration during the period between the dismissal of
the information and the filing of the indictment. In addition, the defendant’s other allegations
of prejudice were not contested by the State. In our view, under these unique facts, the delay
resulted in a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the trial court
did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss this case on constitutional speedy-trial
grounds.
¶ 35 The Statutory Speedy-Trial Analysis
¶ 36 We will briefly address the State’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that the
defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Under the speedy-trial statute, the
State has 120 days to begin trial once a defendant is taken into custody, unless there is delay
occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2014). In this case, the speedy-trial
clock started to run when the defendant was taken into custody on June 23, 2013. Although the
Clinton County sheriff’s department voluntarily transferred the defendant to authorities in St.
Louis County, Missouri, the defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff’s department.
The trial court determined that the defendant had not been released from custody in Clinton
County, even though all charges were dismissed. Under these circumstances, the speedy-trial
clock was not tolled. According to the record, the defendant was released from Missouri in
March 2014. At that point, the defendant had been in continuous custody for more than eight
months, and the defendant did not to contribute to the delay. Accordingly, the trial court did
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not err in finding that the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial under section 103-5(a)
was violated.
¶ 37 Given our resolution of the speedy-trial issues, we have no need to consider whether the
delay resulted in a due-process violation.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 In this case, the record demonstrates that the defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights
to a speedy trial were violated, and the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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