People v. Davis ( 1997 )


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  •                                SECOND DIVISION

                                   March 11, 1997

    No. 1-94-1948

    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )    Appeal from the

                                        )    Circuit Court of

               Plaintiff-Appellee,      )    Cook County.

                                        )

     v.                                 )

                                        )

    GEORGE DAVIS,                             )    Honorable

                                        )    Daniel Kelley,

               Defendant-Appellant.     )    Judge Presiding.

     PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

     After a jury trial, defendant George Davis was found guilty of

    first degree murder and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment.   

    Defendant contends on appeal that:  (1) the State committed a  Batson

    violation;  (2)  the trial court erred in granting the State s motion

    in limine preventing the defense from eliciting evidence of

    occurrence witnesses' gang affiliation; (3) he was provided

    ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to properly

    investigate defendant s prior conviction, informed the jury that

    defendant would testify, and then later attempted to explain to the

    jury why defendant did not testify;  (4) the prosecutor made improper

    remarks in closing argument; and (5) the trial court erred in relying

    on defendant s causing or threatening serious harm as an aggravating

    factor in sentencing.  We reverse and remand.

     Anthony Fisher, whose nickname was "Buck," testified that on May

    29, 1991, at 1:30 a.m., he was outside of his home at 6829 S. Perry,

    talking to his friend, Lethon Rogers. Fisher and Rogers talked for

    about 10 or 15 minutes, and then started walking across the street.  

    Fisher then saw a man whom he recognized as George Harrison slowly

    driving a black and gold Trans Am down the street.  Fisher also saw

    defendant, whom he knew from the neighborhood, seated on the front

    passenger side of the vehicle.  Fisher testified that he had also

    seen Harrison earlier that day in the Trans Am. Fisher and Rogers

    thought that it was suspicious that the Trans Am was moving at a pace

    of about five miles per hour and that the occupants seemed to be

    looking for someone.  Fisher and Rogers therefore shouted a warning

    to friends Shawn, "Kango," Emma and Sheila.   

        At around 2 a.m., Fisher and Rogers met up with a friend Leonard

    Smith, and as the three stood near the front of Fisher's and Rogers'

    homes, Fisher heard Kango say "Heads up," telling them to watch out.  

    Rogers did not hear the warning, but Fisher looked around frantically

    before he heard a shot and then saw defendant firing a gun.  The

    shooting occurred about five minutes after defendant and Harrison had

    slowly passed down the street.  Defendant was in a standing position

    in the Trans Am, which had its t-tops open.  The first shots Fisher

    saw defendant shoot were aimed at Shawn, Emma and Sheila, who were

    standing about 15 to 20 feet away from Fisher.  Fisher, Rogers and

    Smith hit the ground. Defendant began shooting at them.  Rogers and

    Smith began running.  Two more shots were fired.  Defendant shot

    towards Rogers and Smith, and defendant and Harrison sped off.  

    Rogers them came running toward Fisher saying that he had been hit.

    Rogers died as a result of his injuries.   

        The following day, after hearing that Fisher had witnessed the

    shooting, Fisher s mother sent him to Washington, D.C.  Fisher

    testified that he feared for his safety because defendant was a known

    drug dealer.  Fisher lived in Washington, D.C., for six weeks prior

    to beginning college in Mississippi.  Fisher returned to Chicago in

    May 1992 and learned that defendant and Harrison were to be tried for

    Rogers  murder.  Fisher then spoke with prosecutors and subsequently

    testified at Harrison s trial.  Fisher had been arrested on an

    unrelated charge following Harrison s trial.  Although a person named

    Tim Hampton signed the bail bond receipt to release Fisher from jail

    on that charge, Fisher testified that he did not know anyone by that

    name at the address listed on the receipt.   

     Leonard Smith testified consistently with Fisher s testimony,

    although Smith testified that he did not see the persons inside the

    car.  Smith admitted that he had a previous conviction for possession

    of a controlled substance with intent to deliver for which he

    received probation in 1992.

     Detective John Halloran testified that defendant was arrested

    and the Trans Am was impounded.  The fingerprints in the car were

    smudged and not suitable for comparison.  Palmprints on the car s

    exterior did not belong to either defendant or Harrison.  The owner

    of the car did not know defendant or Harrison and reported the car

    stolen three days before the shooting.   

     Donald Jenkins testified following his arrest for failure to

    respond to a subpoena.  He testified that on April 19, 1993, two

    years after the shooting, defendant confronted him and told him in

    a threatening tone that neither he nor his daughter or grandson was

    to attend the trial.  Jenkins refused to comply with this request,

    and defendant reached into his back pocket, pulled out a piece of

    paper and hit it against his hand.  As defendant was walking away,

    he said that he should have "got" Buck (Fisher) first.

      Jenkins admitted that he had pled guilty in 1988 to burglary,

    received probation, and was arrested in 1978 for the filing of a

    false police report, which he explained as a misunderstanding

    regarding his car and a friend who took the car without permission.  

     James Hollins testified on defendant s behalf that he was the

    owner of Good Rockin  Lounge at 6950 S. Wentworth in Chicago, which

    was located 2 blocks from the crime scene.   Defendant entered the

    lounge at 1 a.m. on May 29, 1991.   Hollins  routine is to empty the

    bar at 1:45 a.m. so that he can close at 2 a.m.  He did not know

    defendant s whereabouts between 1 a.m. and when he saw him outside

    the bar at about 2:15 a.m.            

     Steven Harris testified that he saw defendant at the lounge on

    the night of the shooting.  Frank Holmes testified that he drank and

    shot pool with defendant at the lounge on the night in question, but

    they were not together the entire time.  Holmes had pled guilty in

    1991 to delivery of cocaine and in 1993 to possession of a controlled

    substance and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.  Phillip Mitchell

    testified that at around 2 a.m. he was in front of his mother s house

    at 6943 S. Wentworth, with defendant, who had been there since the

    lounge closed.  A lady came by and said someone had been shot.  

    Mitchell did not recall telling an investigator that he did not know

    defendant or anyone by that name, or saying that he was not a witness

    to the shooting.     

     Cook County State s Attorney Investigator Thomas Shine testified

    in rebuttal that he had called Phillip Mitchell and Mitchell informed

    him that he did not know defendant and that he had not witnessed any

    shooting.

     At the conclusion of this evidence, defendant was found guilty

    of first degree murder and sentenced to 50 years  imprisonment.   

     Defendant's first claim on appeal is that a Batson violation

    occurred when the State exercised peremptory challenges to dismiss

    four African-American veniremembers in a racially motivated manner.  

    Defendant claims that the trial court hastily ruled that the defense

    had not established a prima case of discrimination, ordered the State

    to provide race-neutral reasons for its challenges, and then

    erroneously held that the proposed race-neural reasons were proper.  

    When the defense raised its Batson claim, it stated that "[t]his is

    a pretty congenial group out there as far as their background, except

    for the people who lied to us."  After naming the four African-

    American and one white venirepersons excused by the State, the trial

    court stated that "I am not going to find that a prima facie case has

    been made but I am going to ask the State to put their reasons on the

    record."  After the State stated its reasons for exercising its

    challenges, the trial court stated that these were legitimate race-

    neutral reasons.   

     In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct.

    1712 (1986), the United States Supreme Court outlined the procedure

    for determining whether the State used its peremptory challenges in

    a racially discriminatory manner.  First, the trial court is to

    determine whether the defendant has made out a prima facie case of

    discrimination.  If the trial court determines that the defendant has

    made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to provide

    legitimate race-neutral reasons for its use of peremptory challenges

    on African-American venirepersons.  Lastly, the trial court must

    determine, in view of all of the relevant circumstances, whether the

    defendant has demonstrated the existence of intentional racial

    discrimination.  

        Defendant claims that the trial court did not follow the

    procedure set forth in Batson.  Defendant claims that because the

    trial court hastily determined that he had not established a prima

    facie case of discrimination, asked the State to provided its

    explanations for its peremptory challenges, and then ruled on the

    validity of these explanations, the issue of whether a prima facie

    case had been established became moot and the only issue in this

    appeal is whether the court made a proper ultimate determination on

    the issue of racial discrimination.   

     In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395,

    405, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991), the Supreme Court held that

    "[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the

    peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate

    question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of

    whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot."  

     The Illinois Supreme Court has applied Hernandez and found that

    the prima facie issue is moot regardless of whether the trial judge

    prompts the State to present neutral reasons for exercising

    challenges or the State defends its use of peremptory challenges

    without any prompting by the court. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d

    401, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993).  People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274,

    604 N.E.2d 877 (1992).  

     Our case is similar to People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914,

    641 N.E.2d 867 (1994).  In that case, the trial court stated that,

    although it did not believe that a prima facie case had been made,

    it believed that some panels of the appellate court might disagree

    and therefore asked the State to give its reasons for exercising its

    challenges.  After the State gave its reasons, the trial court again

    stated that no prima facie case had been made and then discussed why

    it believed the State presented race-neutral reasons for striking

    the venirepersons.  The appellate court determined that when the

    trial court ruled on the ultimate issue of purposeful

    discrimination, the issue of whether defendant established a prima

    facie case became moot.  We reach the same conclusion here and,

    thus, need only address the ultimate issue of whether there was

    intentional discrimination.

     The State claimed that it excused venireperson Ruth Ewing

    because defendants frequently turn themselves in to her husband,

    investigative reporter Russ Ewing.  Sean McGee was excused because

    he spent two years of college as a criminal justice major and the

    State felt that he would be too sympathetic toward the defendant and

    possibly lead the jury down the wrong path.  Willie Saffold was

    removed because the State was concerned he could not pay attention

    to detail since he could not remember his children's ages, he did

    not work and he answered questions incorrectly on his juror

    questionnaire.  We agree with the trial that these were valid

    reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.   

     However, we reach a different conclusion from the trial court

    on the State's excusal of Bertha White.  The prosecutor claimed that

    he excused White because she "has a son approximately the

    defendant's age; we felt that she would be very sympathetic towards

    [defendant]."  In order to satisfy the second prong of the Batson

    analysis, the prosecutor's explanation for excusing the venire-

    person need not be persuasive or even plausible.  Purkett v. Elem,

    514 U.S. 102, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).  However,

    the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant at the

    third stage of the Batson proceeding when implausible or fantastic

    justifications are likely to be found pretexts for discrimination.  

    Purkett, 514 U.S. at _, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 839, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.   

     The record here reveals that the prosecutor's explanation for

    excusing White because her son was "approximately" defendant's age

    was clearly pretextual.  White's son was only 21 years old at the

    time of trial, while defendant was 36 years old.  Furthermore, the

    prosecutor accepted other venirepersons with children closer in age

    to defendant.  The prosecutor  accepted a white juror whose son was

    in his late 20s.  See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d

    357 (1989)(if a prosecutor strikes a minority venireperson for

    possessing certain characteristics but does not reject a nonminority

    juror who shares the same characteristics, there is a presumption

    that the prosecutor's explanations were pretextual).  If the

    prosecutor truly did not want jurors with sons close to defendant's

    age, the white juror would have been the more logical venireperson

    to excuse.  The State also accepted two African-American jurors

    whose sons were in their middle thirties.  The fact that the sons of

    these two African-American jurors matched defendant s age more

    closely than White s son further underscores the fact that the

    State s reason for excusing White was pretextual.   

     The State claims that the prosecutor asserted two distinct

    reasons for excusing White, one, that her son was approximately

    defendant's age, and two, that the prosecutor believed that she

    would be very sympathetic to defendant.  Our review of the

    prosecutor's explanation, quoted above, for excusing White reveals

    a link between her son's age and the prosecutor's belief that she

    would be sympathetic to defendant.  The prosecutor was essentially

    stating that he believed White would be very sympathetic to

    defendant because she had a son close to defendant s age.  The

    prosecutor offered no other reason for believing White would be too

    sympathetic toward defendant.  However, White certainly would be no

    more sympathetic toward defendant than those chosen jurors with sons  

    even closer to defendant's age.  We therefore conclude that the

    State's explanation for dismissing juror White was pretextual, and

    for this reason we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a

    new trial.

         We address the following issues that may arise on remand, as

    well as the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which would

    have been a basis for reversal even if there had been no Batson

    violation.  We first turn to the issue of whether defendant should

    have been allowed to introduce testimony that the State s witnesses  

    belonged to the same gang as the deceased.  Although defendant was

    not a gang member, defendant claims that the State's witnesses  gang

    membership was relevant to show their bias in the form of sticking

    together and testifying consistently with each other, and to rebut

    the impression cultivated by the State that its chief witness

    Anthony Fisher, was a well-behaved college student.  

     Defendants have a constitutional right to cross-examine

    witnesses for the purpose of showing bias, prejudice, or a motive to

    testify falsely.  Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 8.  While defendants

    are granted wide latitude in conducting cross-examination to show

    bias, a trial court may limit such an inquiry in order to avoid

    harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, repetitive or

    irrelevant testimony, or the introduction of remote or uncertain

    evidence.  People v. Jefferson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 895, 631 N.E.2d

    1374 (1994).  A trial court's limitation of the defendant's attempt

    to show bias will be reversed only if the court abused its

    discretion, resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant.  

    Jefferson, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 904.             

        In support of the admission of this gang evidence, defendant

    relies on People v. Gonzalez, 104 Ill. 2d 332, 472 N.E.2d 417

    (1984), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial

    court erred in preventing defendant from cross-examining a key State

    witness on his gang affiliation. In Gonzalez, the defendant had

    recently withdrawn from gang membership.  The gang, and particularly

    the key witness testifying against defendant, had threatened to

    "get" defendant and his family if defendant did not renew his gang

    membership.  The court found that evidence of the witness' gang

    membership should have been admitted at trial since the defense

    theory was that defendant was being framed and the witness had a

    motive to testify falsely either to "get" defendant or to avoid

    being implicated in the crime.  Therefore, evidence of the witness'

    gang affiliation was relevant to the trial.

        The instant case, however, bears more similarity to People v.

    Jefferson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 895, 631 N.E.2d 1374 (1994), where the

    witness' gang membership was excluded since it was completely

    unrelated to the crime and in no way relevant to the defense theory.  

    In our case, defendant has not alleged that State witnesses had a

    motive to falsely accuse him.  There was no evidence of any gang

    retaliation or gang rivalry.  The issue of gangs is completely

    immaterial to the case and therefore properly excluded from trial.  

    Furthermore, while defendant claims that the prejudicial impact of

    excluding Anthony Fisher's gang affiliation was heightened by the

    fact that the prosecution portrayed Fisher as a college student, the

    defendant brought into question Fisher's credibility by informing

    that jury that Fisher had been charged with a crime and was out on

    bail.   

     We next address whether defendant was denied effective

    assistance when his counsel: (1)  informed the jury that defendant

    would testify, failed to investigate whether defendant had a prior

    conviction and attempted to explain to the jury why defendant did

    not testify; (2) failed to elicit the fact that the State s main

    witness, Anthony Fisher, had  attempted murder charges pending

    against him; and (3) failed to take the steps necessary to prove up

    a statement by Fisher to defense counsel that he wanted help from

    the prosecutor.  A defendant receives ineffective assistance of

    counsel if his counsel s performance was so deficient that his error

    deprived defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466

    U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).   

        In opening statement, the defense attorney informed the jury

    that they would hear from defense witnesses and defendant and that

    those people would testify that, at the time of the shooting, the

    defendant was at the Good Rockin' Lounge and was nowhere near the

    scene of the shooting.  During the defense case, four witnesses

    testified as to defendant s whereabouts on the night of the

    shooting.  Defense counsel intended to have defendant testify next

    but claimed that the State had surprised him by seeking to introduce

    a prior conviction of the defendant of which defense counsel was

    unaware.  This prior conviction was a 1986 Montana guilty plea to

    two counts of criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to

    sell.  The prosecutor informed the court that he had supplied

    defense counsel with certified copies of defendant s city, state,

    and federal "rapsheets," which mentioned the Montana guilty plea.   

    Defense counsel did not deny receiving these sheets, but argued

    instead that defendant s guilty plea was not a conviction because

    the plea could have been withdrawn by defendant under certain

    circumstances for a period of three years.  The three-year period,

    however, had expired and the guilty plea was never withdrawn.  After

    the trial court ruled that these were convictions, and that the

    prosecutor could introduce them if defendant testified, defense

    counsel decided to recommend to defendant that he not testify at

    trial.  During closing argument, defense counsel attempted to

    explain to the jury why defendant did not testify by stating that,

    although they did not hear from defendant, they heard from defendant

    through the four witnesses who testified.  

        We find that defendant received ineffective assistance of

    counsel when his counsel informed the jury that defendant would take

    the stand, although he had not investigated or obtained a ruling on

    the admissibility of defendant's prior conviction, and then drew

    attention to the defendant's failure to testify, when he commented

    on such in closing argument.  The instant case is distinguishable

    from People v. Schlager, 247 Ill. App. 3d 921, 617 N.E.2d 1275

    (1993), wherein defense counsel promised the jury that defendant

    would testify, but after becoming aware of defendant's credibility

    problem, decided not to put on a defense, but instead argue that the

    State had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court

    in Schlager found this to be trial strategy, noting that counsel

    "did not exhibit a misunderstanding of the fundamental rules of

    civil procedure, nor did defense counsel fail to subject the State's

    witnesses to meaningful adversarial testing, nor did defense

    counsel's trial strategy contain flawed legal arguments."  Schlager,

    247 Ill. App. 3d at 932.   

        Our case bears more similarity to People v. Lewis, 240 Ill.

    App. 3d 463, 609 N.E.2d 673 (1992), wherein defense counsel told the

    jury in opening statement that defendant gave a pretrial statement

    that was exonerating.  The court determined that counsel was

    ineffective in promising to produce such significant exonerating

    evidence, when such evidence was clearly inadmissible, and that the

    failure to fulfill such promise was highly prejudicial.        

        In the instant case, while counsel did present some exonerating

    evidence as to defendant's whereabouts at the time of the shooting,

    he did not present the most important piece of evidence he had

    promised to produce, defendant's testimony.  The impact of a

    defendant's testimony and the weight given to such testimony by a

    jury is certainly greater than that of an ordinary witness.  

    Furthermore, it was defense counsel's own failure to investigate

    defendant's plea or obtain a ruling from the court on whether the

    plea was a conviction, prior to opening statement, that caused his

    promise to the jury to be unfilled.  This cannot be deemed trial

    strategy.  Had the prosecutor been the one to comment on defendant's

    failure to testify, this would clearly have been prejudicial error.  

    Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct.

    1229 (1965).  Here, defendant was prejudiced by his own counsel's

    emphasis on defendant's failure to testify.  This error alone would

    have given us sufficient basis to reverse defendant's conviction.   

     Turning to defendant's next claim of ineffective assistance of

    counsel, we do not find that counsel was ineffective in failing to

    elicit the fact that the State's chief witness, Anthony Fisher, had

    attempted murder charges pending against him.  Rather, we find this

    to be trial strategy.  Had counsel introduced evidence of Fisher s

    pending attempted murder charges in order to show that Fisher s

    testimony was motivated by a desire to obtain favorable treatment

    from the State, the State would have elicited evidence from Fisher

    that, prior to being charged, he had testified at codefendant

    Harrison s trial consistently with how he had testified at

    defendant s trial.  Thus, defendant would have derived no benefit

    from defense counsel eliciting evidence of Fisher s charge.   

        Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective in

    failing to take the steps necessary to prove up a statement by

    Fisher to defense counsel during a pretrial interview that Fisher

    wanted help from the prosecutor on his pending charge for attempted

    murder.  Fisher denied making this statement, and the trial court

    determined that defendant could only prove up this conversation if

    defense counsel disqualified himself and then became a witness at

    trial.  Defense counsel instead chose not to prove up the

    conversation.  The trial court then struck the question and answer

    regarding the conversation.  It is our opinion that counsel's

    decision to remain in the case rather than withdraw can indeed be

    considered trial strategy.   

     Defendant also claims find that the prosecutor made several

    improper comments in closing arguments.  We agree and find that the

    following comments must not be repeated on retrial.  The prosecutor

    improperly voiced his personal opinion and used the integrity of the

    State's Attorney's office when he commented that defense witnesses

    were the worst liars he had ever seen testify for a defendant.   See

    People v. Valdery, 65 Ill. App. 3d 375, 381 N.E.2d 1217 (1978) (the

    prosecutor's repeated comments that the State's witnesses had the

    highest integrity and character he had ever seen were held to be

    highly prejudicial because they placed the integrity of the State's

    Attorney behind the witnesses).          

     The prosecutor also improperly implied that an expert cannot be

    cross-examined with another expert's prior diagnosis and shifted the

    burden of proof when he commented that the defense attacked the

    State's expert pathologist through cross-examination rather than by

    the defense presenting its own expert.  An expert may be impeached

    with another expert's report (People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 461

    N.E.2d 415 (1984), and the defense had no obligation to call any

    witnesses.   

     The prosecutor also improperly argued facts not in evidence when

    he stated that the Trans Am owner's fingerprints were not found in

    the car and that Fisher had stated at a previous trial that

    defendant was the shooter.  We also note that the prosecutor

    improperly showed extreme disdain for the defense by stating in

    closing argument, "[t]his is how worthless this piece of paper is,"  

    and crumpling up a defense exhibit which the court had admitted into

    evidence.     

       Finally, we note that if defendant is again found guilty, the

    trial court can consider as an aggravating factor the force employed

    and the manner in which the crime was committed, but it must not

    consider that defendant's conduct caused serious harm, since this is

    inherent in the offense of murder.  People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d

    256, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (1986).

     Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendant s

    conviction is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial.

     Reversed and remanded.

     Gordon, J., concurs.

     Hourihane, J., dissents.

     Justice Hourihane, dissenting:

     The majority concludes that the State's explanation for excusing

    veniremember Bertha White was "clearly pretextual" and thus

    necessitated the reversal of the defendant's conviction and

    sentence.  In reaching this conclusion, the majority notes that when

    asked to proffer a basis for his challenge of Ms. White, the

    prosecutor indicated that he was challenging her because she had a

    son approximately the defendant's age and he felt that she would be

    sympathetic toward the defendant.  The majority then concludes that

    this reason was "clearly pretextual" because a white member of the

    jury who also had a son approximately the defendant's age was not

    challenged by the State.   

     I respectfully disagree for the reasons which follow.  First, the

    courts of this state have repeatedly recognized that the State may

    legitimately exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude a

    prospective juror because he or she has children of an age close to

    the defendant's. See People v. Andrews, 155 Ill. 2d 286 (1993);

    People v. Lovelady, 221 Ill. App. 3d 829 (1991); People v. Baisten,

    203 Ill. App. 3d 64 (1990); People v. Batchelor, 202 Ill. App. 3d

    316 (1990).  Accordingly, there is nothing inherently suspicious or

    pretextual about the State offering such a reason for excluding a

    potential juror.

     Second, it would be improper for us to assume, as the majority

    does, that the trial court erred in finding an absence of

    discriminatory intent merely because the State accepted a white

    juror who possessed a similar characteristic.  As our supreme court

    stated in People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259 (1995):

          "In reviewing the reasons given by the State, it is

        necessary to bear in mind that '"in many instances there

        will be no single criterion that serves as the basis for

        the decision whether to excuse a particular venireman."'

        (People v. Mitchell (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 274, 295, quoting

        People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 231, 239.)  The

        State's purposeful discrimination is not automatically  

        established by the mere coincidence that an excluded

        juror shared a characteristic with a juror who was not

        challenged.  The excluded juror may possess an additional

        trait that caused the State to find him unacceptable,

        while the juror who was not challenged may possess an

        additional characteristic that prompted the State to find

        him acceptable to serve as a juror. [Citation]  '[A]

        peremptory challenge is based on a combination of traits,

        and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be

        accepted while another juror possessing that same

        negative trait, but also possessing other negative

        traits, may be challenged.' Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at

        295." People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d at 282-83.  

          In this case, the State did not challenge white veniremember

    Angelo Baez though he also had a son close to the age of the

    defendant.  While this fact may raise an inference of purposeful

    racial discrimination, such is not dispositive. People v. Mack, 128

    Ill. 2d 231.  The record reveals that at least three members of the

    actual jury had children close to the defendant's age.  Mr. Baez,

    a white resident of the north side of Chicago was married and had

    a 28-year-old son who was ser