In re Commitment of Vance ( 2017 )

2017 IL App (3d) 160683Opinion filed August 8, 2017
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2017
In re COMMITMENT OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
JAMES VANCE ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Tazewell County, Illinois,
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-16-0683
) Circuit No. 05-MR-91
v. )
)
James Vance, ) Honorable
) Paul P. Gilfillan,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION
¶1 Respondent, James Vance, appeals from the trial court’s order, finding that probable
cause did not exist to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine if respondent was no longer a
sexually violent person. On appeal, respondent argues that the court erred in granting the State's
motion for a finding of no probable cause. We affirm.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 In September 2009, respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) and
committed to the Department of Human Services (DHS). After a December 2009 dispositional
hearing, the court ordered respondent placed in a secure facility for institutional care and
custody.
¶4 On May 4, 2016, Dr. Richard Travis conducted a 77-month reevaluation as required by
the Act. Following his evaluation, the State filed a motion for a finding of no probable cause to
believe that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person under section 65 of the Act (725
ILCS 207/65(b) (West 2016)) and attached Dr. Travis’s reevaluation report in support of its
claim.
¶5 In his report, Dr. Travis concluded that respondent should continue to be found a sexually
violent person and remain in DHS custody. He based his evaluation on numerous sources,
including his review of respondent’s criminal history, an interview with respondent, and DHS
treatment progress reports.
¶6 Travis noted that respondent’s underlying sexual offense occurred from January to June
of 1993. During those six months, defendant sexually assaulted his five-year-old stepdaughter by
penetrating her mouth, vagina, and anus with his penis on several occasions. Respondent also
revealed to investigators that three years before he assaulted his stepdaughter he sexually
assaulted an eleven-year-old girl. He was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault and pleaded guilty to one count. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. After
his release in 2003, respondent violated his parole twice by leaving home without permission and
having direct contact with a minor.
¶7 Based on his review of the record and respondent’s interview, Travis concluded that
respondent met the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, DSM-5 (2013) criteria for (1) pedophilic disorder, nonexclusive
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type, sexually attracted to females; (2) other specified personality disorder, with antisocial and
histrionic features; (3) alcohol use disorder and cannabis use disorder, in sustained remission in a
controlled environment; and (4) other specific anxiety disorder, limited-symptom attacks. Travis
opined that respondent continued to pose a substantial risk of reoffense and that “his current
dynamic risk factors and treatment needs fall within the high range.”
¶8 Travis also used the Static-99R and Static-2002R evaluations. Respondent’s scores on
both actuarial assessments placed him in the low to moderate risk category. However, respondent
displayed several additional factors shown to increase risk of reoffense, including (1) sexual
interest in children, (2) any personality disorder, (3) MMPI Pd Scale elevated, (4) general self-
regulated problems, (5) poor problem solving skills, (6) employment instability, (7) substance
abuse, (8) pro-criminal attitudes, (9) childhood behavior problems, (10) attitudes tolerant of
sexual crimes, and (11) violation of conditional release. In support of the additional risk factors,
Travis reported that respondent violated the conditions of his mandatory supervised release by
having contact with and kissing a minor female. He also noted that respondent was arrested in
2005 for a parole violation and that a search of his residence produced a videotape containing
numerous images of naked children. Travis concluded that these additional risk factors supported
the use of a “high risk/high needs” designation as respondent’s risk assessment.
¶9 Travis reported that no protective factors decreased respondent’s risk of reoffense. He
noted that respondent had not completed sex offender treatment and failed to attend treatment to
address his sex offense history. Although respondent began participating in sex offense specific
treatment, he withdrew from the program during the review period. Travis also stated that
respondent’s age of 49 did not merit reduction in his risk assessment beyond that already
reflected in his actuarial scores.
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¶ 10 After reviewing respondent’s commitment history and DHS treatment reports, Travis
stated that respondent’s condition has not changed since the most recent reexamination. He
highlighted respondent’s sporadic participation in sex offense treatment and noted that
respondent “is not yet fully engaged in sex-offense-specific treatment.” He also noted that
respondent had previously reported disturbing sexual thoughts about his offending history and
recently indicated that those troubling thoughts and nightmares continued. Travis concluded that
respondent had not made sufficient progress in treatment to merit conditional discharge.
¶ 11 Respondent filed a motion seeking the appointment of an independent expert, which the
trial court granted. On June 17, 2016, respondent then filed his response to the State’s motion for
a finding of no probable cause. At a subsequent status hearing in September, counsel for
respondent informed the court that respondent would not be using the report authorized by his
independent expert, Jane Velez, and would only be using her as a consultant.
¶ 12 At the probable cause hearing, the State argued, based on Travis’s report, that there was
no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Respondent countered that he had attended
treatment sessions, learned from those sessions, and made sufficient progress for conditional
release or discharge.
¶ 13 The trial court stated that it had read and considered the reexamination report and
concluded there was no probable cause for an evidentiary hearing. The court then granted the
State’s motion.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Respondent’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding no probable
cause was shown to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is still a sexually
violent person.
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¶ 16 Following a commitment under the Act, the DHS is responsible for evaluating the
individual's mental condition within 6 months of the initial commitment and again thereafter at
least every 12 months. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2016). The purpose of these examinations is to
determine if the committed individual has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released
or discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2016).
¶ 17 At the time of each reexamination under the Act, the committed person receives notice of
the right to petition the circuit court for discharge. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). If the
committed person does not affirmatively waive that right, like respondent in this case, the court
must “set a probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist to believe that since the most
recent periodic reexamination ***, the condition of the committed person has so changed that he
or she is no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). At a probable
cause hearing, the court only reviews the reexamination reports and hears the parties' arguments.
725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). If the court finds that probable cause does exist, it must set
an evidentiary hearing on the issue. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2016). Since the trial court
only considers the reexamination reports and other documentary evidence, our review of the
court's finding of no probable cause is de novo. See In re Commitment of Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App
(3d) 140359, ¶ 28.
¶ 18 At a probable cause hearing, the trial court’s role is “to determine whether the movant has
established a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is a
substantial basis for the petition.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 62 (quoting In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d
33, 48 (2010)). For a respondent to receive an evidentiary hearing under section 65(b)(2) of the
Act, the court must find a plausible account exists that the respondent is “no longer a sexually
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violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2016). Thus, a respondent is only entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if plausible evidence shows that the respondent (1) no longer suffers from a
mental disorder or (2) is no longer dangerous to others because his or her mental disorder no
longer creates a substantial probability he or she will engage in acts of sexual violence.
Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 68; 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 15(b) (West 2016)). Under the Act,
“substantially probable” means “much more likely than not.” In re Commitment of Curtner, 2012
IL App (4th) 110820, ¶ 37.
¶ 19 This case advanced to a discharge proceeding after respondent elected not to waive his
right to petition for discharge. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). After the filing of the
State's motion for a finding of no probable cause, which was accompanied by Travis's
reexamination report, the court set the matter for a probable cause hearing. Because respondent
did not actively petition for a discharge, the probable cause hearing consisted only of a review of
the reexamination report and arguments on behalf of the parties. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1)
(West 2016).
¶ 20 At the hearing, respondent had to present sufficient evidence to warrant an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether he is “no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2)
(West 2016). To satisfy this standard, respondent was required to present evidence that he no
longer meets the elements for commitment because he (1) no longer has a mental disorder or (2)
is no longer dangerous to others because his mental disorder no longer creates a substantial
probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. See Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 68.
¶ 21 Respondent did not satisfy his burden. The evidence at the probable cause hearing
consisted only of the report provided by the State's evaluator, Dr. Travis. Travis’s report
diagnosed respondent with pedophilic disorder and other specified personality disorder. This
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diagnosis was based on Travis’s review of respondent’s records, which indicated that respondent
suffered from recurrent intense sexually arousing thoughts about his offending history with his
five-year-old stepdaughter. Respondent’s records also showed that he violated his parole and that
a search of his residence revealed a videotape with images of naked children. Travis documented
that respondent was at a high risk of reoffending. Travis’s report also stated that respondent
withdrew from DHS treatment and failed to complete sex offense specific therapy. This evidence
established that respondent continued to suffer from a mental disorder and that his mental
disorder continued to create a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual
violence. See 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 15(b) (West 2016). Therefore, the trial court did not err in
granting the State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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