People v. Hinton , 402 Ill. App. 3d 181 ( 2010 )

No. 3--08--0583
(Consolidated with No. 3--08--0780)
_________________________________________________________________
Filed June 22, 2010
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2010
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 08--CM--741
)
WILLIAM L. HINTON, ) Honorable
) Bennett J. Braun,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:
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Following a jury trial, the defendant, William L. Hinton,
was found guilty of violating an order of protection (720 ILCS
5/12--30 (West 2006)) and sentenced to 364 days in jail and fines
and costs. The defendant appeals, contending that his conviction
should be reversed because the State failed to prove that he had
notice or knowledge of the order of protection. We reverse.
FACTS
The complaint charged the defendant with violating an order
of protection by making contact with a protected residence on
February 24, 2008. The subject order of protection was a plenary
order that was entered on November 14, 2007, extending a
previously issued emergency order of protection. The defendant
declined appointed counsel, and represented himself in the
pretrial proceedings and the jury trial.
The evidence at trial consisted of two exhibits and the
testimony of Will County Sheriff's Deputy James O'Halloran. The
State's first exhibit was a certified copy of the emergency order
of protection, which was issued on October 24, 2007. It ordered
the defendant to stay away from 329 West Oak Avenue, Lockport,
Illinois. It also ordered the defendant to stay away from
protected persons George Hinton, the defendant's brother, and
Mary Hinton, the defendant's mother. It provided that the
emergency order was effective until November 14, 2007, and that
there would be a hearing on the entry of a plenary/interim order
of protection on that date. The first exhibit also contained a
certified copy of the plenary order of protection, entered on
November 14, 2007, extending the emergency order of protection
under the same terms and conditions until November 13, 2009.
O'Halloran testified that he was dispatched to the residence
at 329 West Oak Avenue on February 24, 2008. George informed
O'Halloran that he had an order of protection against the
defendant. O'Halloran contacted Will County communications and
verified that there was an order of protection in effect.
O'Halloran found the defendant in the basement of the residence
and arrested him. O'Halloran testified that the State's second
exhibit, which was a cover sheet for orders of protection kept in
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the ordinary course of business by the sheriff's department,
showed that the defendant was personally served on October 24,
2007, with the emergency order of protection while in the Will
County jail. The defendant remained in jail until January 10,
2008. The defendant did not present any evidence.
The jury found the defendant guilty. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to 24 months of conditional discharge,
364 days in the county jail, and fines and costs of $250.
Subsequently, however, the defendant filed a petition for relief
from judgment in the trial court, which was granted in part. The
parties agreed that the original sentence was illegal, and the
order of conditional discharge was vacated. The defendant
appealed.
ANALYSIS
The defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed
because the State failed to prove that he had notice or knowledge
of the extended, plenary, order of protection, as required by
section 12--30(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720
ILCS 5/12--30(a)(2) (West 2006)). Although the defendant claims
he is not contesting the facts and argues this court should
review the matter de novo (See People v. Smith 191 Il. 2d 408,
732 N.E.2d 513 2000)), he is contesting the inferences that can
be drawn from the evidence. Thus, the defendant's challenge is
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict.
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When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the
applicable standard of review is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill.
2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). Under this standard, a reviewing
court resolves all reasonable inferences in favor of the State.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.
A person commits the offense of violating an order of
protection when he commits an act prohibited by a valid order of
protection and has been served notice of the contents of the
order "or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of the contents
of the order." 720 ILCS 5/12--30(a)(2) (West 2006). Under
section 223(d)(4) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986,
actual knowledge can be shown by service, notice, or "[b]y other
means demonstrating actual knowledge of the contents of the
order." 750 ILCS 60/223(d)(4) (West 2006). The defendant does
not deny that he was found in the basement of the residence at
329 West Oak Avenue, which was subject to the stay away order of
both the emergency and plenary orders of protection. Rather, the
focus of defendant's argument is that he had no notice or actual
knowledge of the plenary order of protection.
The State presented evidence that the defendant was
personally served with the emergency order of protection while he
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was in the Will County jail. The State also showed that the
emergency order was extended on November 14, 2007. The State
failed, however, to present any evidence to show that the
defendant received notice of the plenary order. Although the
emergency order warned the defendant that a plenary order could
be entered against him by default if he failed to appear at the
hearing, the defendant was still in jail on the date of the
hearing. The State did not show that the defendant was brought
to court for the hearing or that he was later served with notice
of the plenary order.
The focus of our inquiry, then, is whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant had
otherwise acquired actual knowledge of the order of protection
that he was charged with violating. People v. Ramos, 316 Ill.
App. 3d 18, 735 N.E.2d 1094 (2000). In general, knowledge is the
awareness of the existence of facts that make a defendant's
conduct unlawful. People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 573 N.E.2d
818 (1991). Section 4--5(a) of the Code, defining knowledge,
states that:
"[a] person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge
of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her
conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when
he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature
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or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material
fact includes awareness of the substantial probability such
fact exists." 720 ILCS 5/4--5(a) (West 2006).
Section 12--30 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12--30 (West 2006))
requires "actual knowledge," which is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as:
"Direct and clear knowledge, as distinguished from
constructive knowledge[.] *** Knowledge of such information
as would lead a reasonable person to inquire further."
Black's Law Dictionary 876 (7th ed. 1999).
The State argues that the defendant had constructive knowledge of
the plenary order of protection. Constructive knowledge,
however, is defined as:
"[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by
law to a given person." Black's Law Dictionary 876 (7th ed.
1999).
Considering the definitions of actual and constructive knowledge,
and the legislature's specific use of the word "actual," we find
that proof of constructive knowledge is insufficient under
section 12--30 of the Code.
The question remains, then, whether the State's evidence
proved that the defendant actually knew about the plenary order,
i.e., whether there was evidence that showed that the defendant
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was aware that the plenary order had been entered or that there
was at least a substantial probability that the order had been
entered, which would have led a reasonable person to inquire
further.
Actual knowledge can be, and is often, proven by
circumstantial evidence. People v. Austin, 123 Ill. App. 3d 788,
463 N.E.2d 444 (1984). "Circumstantial evidence is proof of
facts or circumstances that give rise to reasonable inferences of
other facts that tend to establish guilt or innocence of the
defendant." People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417, 871
N.E.2d 244, 251 (2007). Whether based on circumstantial or
direct evidence, however, the inference of knowledge must "based
on established facts and not pyramided on an intervening
inference." People v. Pinta, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1078, 569
N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (1991). Proof of actual knowledge cannot be
based on circumstances that give rise only to conjecture and
suspicion.
In this case, even construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we cannot find sufficient facts to
support the jury's finding that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the November 14, 2007, plenary order of protection.
The evidence at trial was limited to a showing that the defendant
had notice of the emergency order, so that he knew that a plenary
order could be entered after the hearing on November 14, 2007.
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Although the plenary order was in fact entered, the State offered
no evidence of facts that would tend to show the defendant's
knowledge that the order was entered. The State had the burden
to present some evidence from which the jury could find that the
defendant was aware and conscious of the order of protection,
i.e., that he had actual knowledge. Thus, we conclude that there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the plenary order
had been entered and was in full force and effect on the date he
entered the protected residence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Will County is reversed.
Reversed.
LYTTON and WRIGHT, J. J. concurring.
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