Nichols v. Fahrenkamp , 113 N.E.3d 1183 ( 2018 )

2018 IL App (5th) 160316NOTICE
Decision filed 07/09/18. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-16-0316
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Peti ion for
IN THE
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ALEXIS NICHOLS, ) Appeal from the
f/k/a Alexis Brueggeman, ) Circuit Court of
) Madison County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 13-L-1395
)
DAVID FAHRENKAMP and DAVID )
FAHRENKAMP, d/b/a Fahrenkamp Law Offices, ) Honorable
) Barbara L. Crowder,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
JUSTICE CHAPMAN concurred in the judgment.
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Alexis Nichols, f/k/a Alexis Brueggeman, brought a legal malpractice action
against defendants, David Fahrenkamp and David Fahrenkamp, d/b/a Fahrenkamp Law Offices,
to recover damages occasioned by the negligence of defendants during the time attorney
Fahrenkamp was acting as plaintiff’s guardian ad litem. Plaintiff alleged that attorney
Fahrenkamp’s negligence caused the dissipation of settlement proceeds that had been recovered
from a personal injury lawsuit brought on behalf of plaintiff when she was a minor. The circuit
court of Madison County entered summary judgment for defendants, relying on the premise that
a private attorney appointed as a guardian ad litem has quasi-judicial immunity for his or her
omissions “so long as the guardian ad litem follows the directions of the court and is within the
1
scope of the appointment.” We reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants
and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 When plaintiff was 11 years old, she received a $600,000 settlement for injuries she
sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Because plaintiff was a minor, her mother was appointed
as guardian of plaintiff’s person and estate. Attorney Fahrenkamp was appointed by the court as
the guardian ad litem for plaintiff. In 2012, plaintiff brought suit against her mother, alleging that
she spent funds from the settlement account that were not used for the benefit of plaintiff, but
instead were used solely for her mother’s benefit. According to the allegations in the 2012
litigation, plaintiff alleged that her mother petitioned the probate court and withdrew some
$79,507 that was not used on plaintiff’s behalf. This litigation, case number 12-MR-188,
proceeded to trial in 2013.
¶3 On April 17, 2013, during trial, the judge asked, “And where was the GAL [guardian
ad litem] in all of this?” (The guardian ad litem, attorney Fahrenkamp, had not been named as a
party-defendant in 12-MR-188.) At the conclusion of the trial in 12-MR-188, the court entered
an award for plaintiff, but limited the amount of the recovery. With regard to the amount of
damages, the trial court determined that plaintiff’s mother could not be faulted for her failure to
have receipts to prove each and every amount she claimed to have spent for the items provided to
her daughter. The court explained that it would not assess damages “while [Plaintiff] had a
guardian ad litem who approved the estimates and expenditures.” In other words, the court relied
on attorney Fahrenkamp’s status as guardian ad litem to limit plaintiff’s remedies against her
mother. As a result, judgment was entered against plaintiff’s mother for $16,365, plus $10,000 in
attorney fees and the return of a 2007 vehicle, far less than the amount plaintiff claimed had been
dissipated.
2
¶4 On August 16, 2013, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, contending that they failed to
protect her interests by allowing her mother to convert plaintiff’s settlement funds for the
mother’s personal benefit. In her complaint against defendants, plaintiff alleged that attorney
Fahrenkamp never met with or talked to plaintiff during any of the time he was acting as her
guardian ad litem, nor did he ever ask her if the statements contained in her mother’s petitions to
withdraw monies from the settlement account were accurate. She averred that if Fahrenkamp had
spoken with her, she would have told him that the expenses her mother claimed needed to be
paid out of plaintiff’s settlement account either did not exist, were grossly inflated, or were
covered expenses that plaintiff, herself, was already paying for out of other proceeds. Plaintiff
further stated that she had no idea she could ask attorney Fahrenkamp, or any other attorney, for
advice regarding her mother’s requests to withdraw funds from the settlement proceeds. Plaintiff
claimed she did not even realize that she had a guardian ad litem appointed for her, let alone
attorney Fahrenkamp, until after the probate file was closed on September 2, 2010, when she
reached the age of 18. Plaintiff further asserted that information about her settlement monies, and
the process by which such funds could be used on her behalf, were largely kept from her during
her childhood. Finally, plaintiff also claimed that defendants negligently failed to audit the
account or report any irregularities to the court or to the plaintiff.
¶5 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and then a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that attorney Fahrenkamp, as a guardian ad litem, had quasi-judicial immunity for the functions
he performed in the probate proceeding, given that he was acting within the scope of his
appointment by the court. Attorney Fahrenkamp specifically averred that he met with plaintiff on
three separate occasions during the time he acted as her guardian ad litem. He also stated that he
gave plaintiff, who was then 11 years old, his business card when he was first appointed as her
3
guardian ad litem, and there was nothing that prevented her from contacting him through the
numbers listed on the business card, if she had any questions or concerns.
¶6 On June 22, 2016, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court, in ruling in favor of defendants, recognized that Illinois law had not yet answered the
question of whether a guardian ad litem was subject to a grant of immunity under the
circumstances presented by plaintiff’s claims. The trial court recognized, however, that a
guardian ad litem, appointed by the court in a probate proceeding, is under a duty to help
safeguard and protect the interests and welfare of the minor. In drawing a distinction between
immunity and duty, the court then explained, relying on McCarthy v. Cain, 301 Ill. 534, 134 N.E.
62 (1922), that a guardian ad litem should examine the case, determine what the rights are of his
wards, what defense their interests demand, and then make such defense as the exercise of care
and prudence would dictate. “The guardian ad litem who perfunctorily files an answer for his
ward and then abandons the case fails to comprehend his duties as an officer of the court.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCarthy, 301 Ill. at 539.
¶7 Despite the trial court’s recognition of the duty imposed upon a guardian ad litem, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the failure of the
guardian ad litem to meet with plaintiff over the monies requested by mother did not “constitute
a failure to fulfill the actions and duties that were assigned to defendant by the probate court.”
The court reasoned that so long as the guardian ad litem acted within the scope of his
appointment to give advice to the court, he should enjoy the same immunity as the court.
Because attorney Fahrenkamp’s role was general, and his duty was to act in the ward’s best
interests by making recommendations to the court, the court concluded that Fahrenkamp had no
duty to perform the specific tasks of verifying mother’s requests, perform audits of the settlement
4
account, or act as an accountant to review receipts, unless specifically instructed by the court to
do so.
¶8 In making its ruling, the court relied on Heisterkamp v. Pacheco, 2016 IL App (2d)
150229, 47 N.E.3d 1192. Although the facts of that case involved a court-appointed expert to
perform a custody evaluation, the trial court adopted the Heisterkamp reasoning and determined
that when a court-appointed individual acts within the scope of his or her appointment to give
advice to the court regarding the best interest of the minor, for use in the court’s decision-making
process, that individual must be cloaked with the same immunity as the court. With regard to
plaintiff’s allegations that Fahrenkamp did not meet with her, the court recognized that the facts
regarding this issue were in dispute. The court held, however, that this dispute was not a material
fact that precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the failure to meet with plaintiff over
monetary requests did not constitute a failure to fulfill the actions and duties that were assigned
to the guardian ad litem by the probate court. This meant, in essence, that plaintiff had little
remedy for the dissipation and conversion of her assets. According to the trial court, the
plaintiff’s mother was shielded from liability for her alleged misconduct because plaintiff had a
guardian ad litem, who approved the expenditures, and the guardian ad litem was immune from
liability because the court order appointing him as guardian ad litem lacked any specificity
regarding his duties.
¶9 We agree with plaintiff that the trial court erred in granting defendants quasi-judicial
immunity because of the lack of specific directions in the order appointing attorney Fahrenkamp
as guardian ad litem. Under the court’s reasoning, the guardian ad litem had no independent duty
to plaintiff, and the appointment of a guardian ad litem was nothing more than an empty gesture.
5
¶ 10 Analysis
¶ 11 The review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Forsythe v. Clark USA,
Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 864 N.E.2d 227, 232 (2007) (opinion of Garman, J., joined by
Fitzgerald and Karmeier, JJ.). Summary judgment should not be allowed unless the moving
party’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. If the undisputed material facts could lead
reasonable observers to divergent inferences, or if there is a dispute as to a material fact,
summary judgment should be denied and the issue should be decided by the trier of fact. Wells v.
Enloe, 282 Ill. App. 3d 586, 589, 669 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1996). Only when the party seeking
summary judgment demonstrates that his or her right to judgment is clear, free from doubt, and
determinable solely as a matter of law should summary judgment be entered. Taitt v. Robinson,
266 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132, 639 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1994). Under the circumstances before us, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Fahrenkamp, as the guardian
ad litem, was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity or any immunity for that matter.
Fahrenkamp was under a duty to serve the best interests of plaintiff, and the facts, if taken as
true, created a material question of fact with regard to whether Fahrenkamp breached his duty to
plaintiff.
¶ 12 This court has previously recognized that “[i]t is the public policy of this State that rights
of minors be carefully guarded. No citation of authority need be given to state that one of the
cardinal precepts of our law is that in any court proceeding involving minors their best interest
and welfare is the primary concern of the court.” Layton v. Miller, 25 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838, 322
N.E.2d 484, 487 (1975). Here, the probate court recognized that an 11-year-old child needed an
attorney who would look out for her best interests and ensure that anyone who sought to use her
settlement funds was doing so for the child’s welfare. Therefore, a guardian ad litem was
6
appointed to protect plaintiff from anyone who could exploit her. Plaintiff claims she never met
with attorney Fahrenkamp, or even knew that he had been appointed to represent her. Attorney
Fahrenkamp claims he met with plaintiff three times over a period of six years, and gave the 11­
year-old plaintiff his business card the first time they met. We find it incredulous that an 11-year­
old would understand the significance of attorney Fahrenkamp being appointed as her guardian
ad litem, or even understand that she could call numbers listed on a business card to get advice.
In any event, contrary to the court’s ruling, these issues represented material facts, and this
factual dispute was not capable of being resolved by summary judgment. See Ahle v.
D. Chandler, Inc., 2012 IL App (5th) 100346, ¶ 13, 966 N.E.2d 1249 (trial court determines
whether a question of fact exists when ruling on a motion for summary judgment; court does not
decide a question of fact and cannot make credibility determinations or weigh evidence). These
conflicting facts, despite their significance, are irrelevant if the guardian ad litem is immune from
liability, as concluded by the trial court. In our view, such a finding ignores a decision of our
supreme court in Stunz v. Stunz, 131 Ill. 210, 23 N.E. 407 (1890), wherein the court stated:
“It is the duty of the guardian ad litem, when appointed, to examine into the case and
determine what the rights of his wards are, and what defense their interest demands, and
to make such defense as the exercise of care and prudence will dictate. He is not required
to make a defense not warranted by law, but should exercise that care and judgment that
reasonable and prudent men exercise, and submit to the court, for its determination, all
questions that may arise, and take its advice, and act under its direction in the steps
necessary to preserve and secure the rights of the minor defendants.” Stunz, 131 Ill. at
221.
7
As the guardian ad litem, Farhrenkamp was obligated to protect and defend the interests of the
minor plaintiff, regardless of whether the court order contained any specifics. In doing so, “[i]t
was his duty to have understood the cause and the rights of the parties, and to have called [to] the
attention of the court” any irregularities in the withdrawals of plaintiff’s settlement proceeds. See
Stunz, 131 Ill. at 221.
¶ 13 In deciding this case, we also acknowledge the reasoning set forth in Dixon v. United
States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961), as noted by the trial court in its order, even though
based on South Carolina law. The tenets are equally applicable here, where the trial court
described more fully the duties and obligations of a guardian ad litem:
“The position of a guardian ad litem or next friend is one of trust and confidence toward
the infant as well as the court; hence, it is his duty fully to protect the infant’s interests in
all matters relating to the litigation, as the infant might act for himself if he were of
capacity to do so. His duty requires him to acquaint himself with all the rights of the
infant in order to protect them, and to submit to the Court for its consideration and
decision every question involving the rights of the infant affected by the suit. He should
be as careful not to do anything, or allow anything to be done, to the prejudice of his
ward’s interest, as the court from which he receives his appointment. If in consequence of
the culpable omission or neglect of the guardian ad litem the interests of the infant are
sacrificed, the guardian may be punished for his neglect as well as made to respond to the
infant for the damage sustained.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dixon, 197 F. Supp.
at 802-03.
¶ 14 In light of Stunz, and the foregoing, we hold that attorney Fahrenkamp, as guardian
ad litem for the minor plaintiff, owed a duty to plaintiff to render advice and to protect plaintiff’s
8
assets and interests arising out of the underlying personal injury settlement. He had a duty to act
as an advocate on behalf of plaintiff. His failure to meet with or otherwise communicate with his
ward, as plaintiff contends, did not comply with that duty owed plaintiff, as he was not fulfilling
his role as plaintiff’s advisor, advocate, negotiator, or evaluator. Contrary to the arguments made
by plaintiff, there are no statutory or common law requirements that would have mandated that
the guardian ad litem provide the court with an accounting. But there was certainly a common
law duty that may have been breached, depending on the outcome of the factual disputes
presented by the parties.
¶ 15 We also agree with plaintiff that attorney Fahrenkamp was not entitled to the protections
of any form of immunity in his role as guardian ad litem. Giving any guardian ad litem absolute
immunity under the circumstances presented here is contrary to the public policy of this state.
Unlike the expert witness in Heisterkamp, Fahrenkamp was not simply a neutral party, appointed
by the court to act as a professional expert. Fahrenkamp was a licensed attorney, an officer of the
court, who should have understood the need to protect the assets of his ward. In his role as
guardian ad litem, he was to advise the court, but only after making careful inquiry for the
purpose of protecting the minor plaintiff’s interests. In his role as advisor to the court,
Fahrenkamp was not the mother’s rubber-stamp, but instead the plaintiff’s watchdog, authorized
by the court to protect the minor’s assets. And, if attorney Fahrenkamp was not supposed to
question the mother’s requests for funds she was withdrawing from plaintiff’s settlement monies,
we question what he was supposed to do, and what he got paid for during the six years he
allegedly served as plaintiff’s guardian ad litem. If the situation were as plaintiff claims, attorney
Fahrenkamp did not advise plaintiff and seemingly did very little to verify that the substantial
sums of money withdrawn from plaintiff’s account were truly being used for the benefit of
9
plaintiff. Fahrenkamp’s alleged omissions, if proven true, were not in plaintiff’s best interests
and, according to plaintiff, led to the dissipation of her settlement proceeds. Granting the
guardian ad litem quasi-judicial immunity meant that plaintiff was not allowed to pursue any
remedy for the guardian ad litem’s failure to exercise that degree of care and judgment that
reasonable and prudent men exercise in these circumstances, to protect the assets of a minor.
¶ 16 The trial court concluded, and defendants argue, that they are entitled to the same
protection afforded guardians ad litem appointed in dissolution of marriage and child custody
proceedings. See 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2012). The rationale behind giving child
representatives in dissolution cases absolute immunity is so that they can fulfill their obligations,
without worry of harassment or intimidation from dissatisfied parents. Vlastelica v. Brend, 2011
IL App (1st) 102587, ¶ 23, 954 N.E.2d 874. Under the circumstances presented here, there is no
reason for granting that kind of immunity. Rather, the situation here is more akin to a fiduciary
relationship between a guardian and a ward as a matter of law. See Apple v. Apple, 407 Ill. 464,
469, 95 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1950). Such a relationship between a guardian and a ward is equivalent
to the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary. See Parsons v. Estate of Wambaugh, 110
Ill. App. 3d 374, 377, 442 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1982); see also In re Estate of Swiecicki, 106 Ill. 2d
111, 117-18, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1985) (the fiduciary duties owed a beneficiary by a trustee
and a ward by a guardian are similar). The guardian of a minor is a trustee of the minor’s
property for the minor’s benefit and is chargeable as such; in other words, the guardian must be
held to have dealt with the minor’s property for the benefit of the minor. In re Estate of
Swiecicki, 106 Ill. 2d at 119. Attorney Fahrenkamp clearly did not deal with plaintiff’s property
for her benefit, if plaintiff’s allegations prove true.
10
¶ 17 In further support of our reasoning that a guardian ad litem has a duty, independent of
merely acting as an arm of the court, we note that in In re Estate of Finley, 151 Ill. 2d 95, 601
N.E.2d 699 (1992), our supreme court allowed a guardian ad litem to file an appeal on behalf of
a minor, even after the court had terminated the need for the guardian. Finley involved a
wrongful death claim wherein the court ruled that minor siblings of the decedent were not
entitled to any recovery for loss of society. The guardian ad litem for the minors objected to the
settlement, wherein the minor siblings of the decedent were awarded no portion of the settlement
proceeds for the loss of society of their brother. The trial court overruled the objections of the
guardian ad litem and approved the settlement. In the same order, the court terminated the
guardian ad litem’s representation of the minors. Two weeks after the trial court entered its
order, the guardian ad litem filed an appeal on behalf of the minors. The first issue raised was
whether the guardian ad litem had standing to bring the appeal. Our supreme court answered this
question in the affirmative, finding that the trial court could not preclude the filing of an appeal
on behalf of the minors simply by vacating the appointment of the guardian ad litem. The
guardian ad litem was simply fulfilling his obligation to protect the best interests of his wards.
Finley, 151 Ill. 2d at 100.
¶ 18 The dissent suggests that not granting immunity to a guardian ad litem, no matter the
factual circumstances, will have a chilling effect on attorneys willing to serve as guardians
ad litem in general. In support, the dissent refers primarily to those cases involving marital
dissolution and child custody. First, we are not concluding that all guardians ad litem have no
immunity. Again, we recognize that those guardians ad litem appointed to serve as “an arm of
the court,” as in custody situations, for instance, need immunity in order to best serve the needs
of the court and any minors involved in such proceedings. Second, the threat of civil liability in
11
those instances where a guardian does not have immunity is no different than that faced by any
attorney appearing in any other type of lawsuit and is consistent with the fiduciary obligation
imposed upon any guardian in representing a ward under the Probate Act of 1975. See 755 ILCS
5/11-13(b), (d) (West 2012).
¶ 19 Having concluded that attorney Fahrenkamp, as guardian ad litem, did not have quasi-
judicial immunity under the circumstances presented here, we also conclude that summary
judgment should not have been entered. The evidence presented by plaintiff showed there were
genuine issues of fact regarding whether defendant breached his duties to her. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. We therefore reverse the grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants and remand this cause to the circuit court of
Madison County for further proceedings.
¶ 20 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 21 JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
¶ 22 I respectfully dissent.
¶ 23 As noted in the majority opinion, while alluding to both qualified and absolute immunity
of attorney Fahrenkamp, as plaintiff’s guardian ad litem, the majority concludes that attorney
Fahrenkamp is not entitled to either form of immunity. In my view, this runs contrary both to
sound authority and is impractical in practice in our trial courts.
¶ 24 The trial judge, in her ruling adverse to plaintiff, found that there was no failure by
attorney Fahrenkamp to fulfill the actions and duties directed by the probate court. Accordingly,
attorney Fahrenkamp, in the trial court’s opinion, acted within the scope of his appointment,
including making recommendations to the court, and fulfilled the instructions of the court. The
12
trial court determined that although there was a dispute between plaintiff and defendants as to an
alleged failure to meet, this was not a material fact that would preclude summary judgment in
favor of defendants. The trial court determined that defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity and relied substantially on Heisterkamp (Heisterkamp v. Pacheco, 2016 IL App (2d)
150229, ¶ 1 (absolute immunity before an expert)). In my view, the determination of the trial
court was correct.
¶ 25 The majority’s disposition denying any form of immunity, absolute or quasi-qualified,
runs counter to sound authority and reads Vlastelica v. Brend, 2011 IL App (1st) 102587, too
narrowly. The Brend court determined that the child representative and guardians ad litem were
entitled to absolute immunity. Its sound reasoning, with which I agree, is as follows:
“The Supreme Court has recognized that the common law provides for absolute
immunity for judges (see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983)), and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (hereinafter, the Seventh Circuit) has held that
guardians ad litem and child representatives are entitled to the same absolute immunity
because they are ‘arms of the court.’ Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir.
2009). The Cooney court stated:
‘Guardians ad litem and court-appointed experts, including psychiatrists, are
absolutely immune from liability for damages when they act at the court’s
direction. [Citations.] They are arms of the court, much like special masters, and
deserve protection from harassment by disappointed litigants, just as judges do.
Experts asked by the court to advise on what disposition will serve the best
interests of a child in a custody proceeding need absolute immunity in order to be
able to fulfill their obligations “without the worry of intimidation and harassment
13
from dissatisfied parents.” [Citation.] This principle is applicable to a child’s
representative, who although bound to consult the child is not bound by the
child’s wishes but rather by the child’s best interests, and is thus a neutral, much
like a court-appointed expert witness.’ Cooney, 583 F.3d at 970.
Plaintiffs here argue that as a federal court decision, Cooney is not binding on us
(see Werderman v. Liberty Ventures, LLC, 368 Ill. App. 3d 78, 84 (2006)) and should not
be followed unless its logic is persuasive. ***
Contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, we find Cooney’s logic persuasive.” Brend,
2011 IL App (1st) 102587, ¶¶ 21-23.
¶ 26 This decision and its reasoning clarifies earlier supreme court authority. Clarke v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 393 Ill. 419, 66 N.E.2d 378 (1946) (which implied that some form of
immunity was appropriate for persons in situations similar to that of defendants). In sum, existent
authority and sound reasoning for the authority cited above indicates that some form of immunity
is appropriate for defendants and the trial court appropriately so found.
¶ 27 Dispositions designated by this court as opinions have consequences, both jurisprudential
and practical. In this case, the majority’s opinion has adverse practical consequences. It imposes
upon trial judges an obligation to provide specificity in directions to the guardian ad litem, which
may or not be effective, may or may not cover the factual situation at issue, and may very likely
be premature in the development of the litigation in which the guardian ad litem is acting, since
the guardian ad litem’s appointment would likely be early in the litigation and prior to
development of facts and issues. While this problem may be subject to remedy by appropriate
and timely motions of the guardian ad litem or other parties, the more serious consequence is to
the attorney who considers accepting a guardian ad litem appointment. The majority’s opinion
14
imposes upon the guardian ad litem duties and requirements, not well defined, despite the finding
of the trial court that this guardian ad litem fulfilled all of the conditions and instructions
imposed upon him. In effect, the majority has set up that future guardians ad litem be blindsided
by duties not specific or implied in the trial judge’s appointment and subsequent orders, the
effects of which are adverse. Will an experienced attorney who takes guardian ad litem
appointments be willing to continue to do so if the attorney disagrees in their professional
judgment with a request or a demand and accordingly be subject to litigation for exercising that
professional judgment and discretion in their actions in representations to the court? Will a
younger, less experienced attorney be willing to accept guardian ad litem appointments with such
a nebulous or absent delineation of supposed duties and the consequent exposure to liability
without either quasi or absolute immunity? Will the trial judge, who has determined that
appointment of a guardian ad litem is required, be able to find a sufficient number of adequately
qualified attorneys to take such appointments? Any of these consequences are adverse to the
effective administration of justice in such an important area.
¶ 28 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ disposition.
15
2018 IL App (5th) 160316NO. 5-16-0316
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
ALEXIS NICHOLS, ) Appeal from the
f/k/a Alexis Brueggeman, ) Circuit Court of
) Madison County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 13-L-1395
)
DAVID FAHRENKAMP and DAVID )
FAHRENKAMP, d/b/a Fahrenkamp Law Offices, ) Honorable
) Barbara L. Crowder,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: July 9, 2018
______________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Judy L. Cates, J.
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J., concurred
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J. dissented
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Charles W. Armbruster III, Michael T. Blotevogel, Roy C. Dripps III,
for Winterscheidt & Blotevogel, LLC, 51 Executive Plaza Court, Maryville,
Appellant IL 62062
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorney M. Joseph Hill, 511 St. Louis Street, P.O. Box 647, Edwardsville, IL
for 62025
Appellees
______________________________________________________________________________