People v. Gonzalez ( 2017 )


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  •                                        
    2017 IL App (3d) 160183
    Opinion filed February 22, 2017
    _____________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    2017
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                     )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
    ILLINOIS,                                      )      of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
    )      Will County, Illinois.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                     )
    )      Appeal No. 3-16-0183
    v.                                      )      Circuit No. 13-CF-777
    )
    JUAN M. GONZALEZ,                              )      Honorable
    )      Sarah F. Jones,
    Defendant-Appellant.                    )      Judge, Presiding.
    _____________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    _____________________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    ¶1          Defendant, Juan M. Gonzalez, appeals from the denial of his motion to reconsider
    sentence, arguing that a new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) certificate needed to be filed
    and new postplea proceedings held, as the filed certificate was not compliant with the amended
    rule. We vacate the trial court’s decision on the motion to reconsider sentence and remand for
    new postplea proceedings.
    ¶2                                                FACTS
    ¶3          Defendant entered a blind guilty plea to two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault
    of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)). The factual basis established that, on March
    17, 2013, defendant was 42 years old and was consuming alcohol at a friend’s house. The victim,
    E.L., was the four-year-old daughter of the friend. Defendant decided to leave to buy more
    alcohol and E.L. went with him. Defendant stopped at his house to use the restroom. While at his
    house, defendant put his penis and mouth on E.L.’s vagina. The judge accepted the plea.
    ¶4          Defendant was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served
    consecutively. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. Defendant
    appealed. This court remanded the matter for strict compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d).
    People v. Gonzalez, No. 3-13-0919 (June 19, 2015) (dispositional order).
    ¶5          On remand, a new motion to reconsider and Rule 604(d) certificate were filed on
    September 23, 2015. The Rule 604(d) certificate stated counsel had:
    “1. Consulted with the defendant in person to ascertain defendant’s
    contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty;
    2. Examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of
    guilty;
    3. Made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate
    presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”
    A hearing on the motion was held on April 8, 2015, and the court denied the motion to
    reconsider.
    2
    ¶6                                                ANALYSIS
    ¶7           On appeal, defendant argues that counsel has failed to strictly comply with the
    certification requirements of Rule 604(d) and requests that we remand the case for new postplea
    proceedings. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) governs the procedures to be
    followed where a defendant wishes to appeal after pleading guilty. On September 23, 2015—the
    date defense counsel filed the motion to reconsider sentence and certificate—Rule 604(d) read,
    in pertinent part:
    “The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the
    attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain
    defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea of guilty,
    has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty,
    and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation
    of any defects in those proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff.
    Dec. 11, 2014).
    ¶8           Prior to the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Rule 604(d) was amended. Therefore, on
    the date of the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Rule 604(d) read:
    “The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the
    attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means,
    or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the
    entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of
    proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing
    hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate
    3
    presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.
    604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
    In other words, at the time the motion to reconsider was heard, Rule 604(d) required the
    attorney’s certificate to aver that the attorney had examined the report of proceedings from both
    the plea of guilty and the sentencing hearing. At the time the motion was filed, Rule 604(d) only
    required the certificate to state that the attorney had examined the report of proceedings from the
    plea of guilty. The certificate the defense attorney filed only averred that she had reviewed the
    report of proceedings from the guilty plea, not from the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the
    defense attorney’s certificate complied with the version of Rule 604(d) in place at the time the
    motion was filed, but not at the time the motion was heard and ruled upon.
    ¶9            Defendant argues that “[b]y making the amended version of the rule ‘eff[ective]
    immediately’ on March 8, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated its intent that the amended
    version of the rule apply immediately to all cases pending disposition in the circuit court.” That
    is to say the amended version of Rule 604(d), defendant states, should be applied retroactively.
    ¶ 10          It is well-settled that statutory amendments may be applied retroactively where they are
    procedural in nature and do not impair a vested right. E.g., Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 
    223 Ill. 2d 318
    , 331 (2006) (“[Statutory amendments] that are procedural may be applied
    retroactively, while those that are substantive may not.”); see also People ex rel. Madigan v.
    Petco Petroleum Corp., 
    363 Ill. App. 3d 613
    , 621 (2006) (finding the supreme court’s
    retroactivity framework “applies equally to supreme court rules”). “Generally, a procedural
    change in the law prescribes a method of enforcing rights or involves pleadings, evidence and
    practice.” Schweickert v. AG Services of America, Inc., 
    355 Ill. App. 3d 439
    , 442 (2005).
    4
    ¶ 11          As stated above, the Rule 604(d) amendment at issue here added that the attorney had to
    aver that he or she had examined the report of proceedings from the sentencing hearing. The
    amendment was clearly procedural, as it dictated the practices to be followed by defense
    attorneys in filing their Rule 604(d) certificate. Moreover, far from impairing a vested right, the
    amendment actually served to expand the protections afforded to defendants challenging their
    sentences by requiring counsel to examine the report of proceedings from the sentencing hearing.
    Accordingly, we find that the amended Rule 604(d), effective March 8, 2016, may be applied
    retroactively.
    ¶ 12          Furthermore, we find that the amended Rule 604(d) should be applied retroactively. Our
    supreme court has held that in determining whether a statutory amendment should apply
    retroactively, courts should consider whether such application would have “inequitable
    consequences.” 
    Novak, 223 Ill. 2d at 331
    . Here, applying the amendment retroactively would not
    have inequitable consequences, but would provide more protection to defendant without
    requiring too much work on the part of the attorney.
    ¶ 13          Because we find that the Rule 604(d) amendment applies retroactively, we next turn to
    the question of whether remand is necessary. Rule 604(d) demands strict compliance with each
    of the elements of the certification requirement. People v. Janes, 
    158 Ill. 2d 27
    , 33 (1994). The
    remedy for failing to strictly comply with the requirements is remand to the trial court for new
    postplea proceedings. 
    Id. (“[T]he remedy
    for failure to strictly comply with each of the
    provisions of Rule 604(d) is a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to
    withdraw guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.”).
    ¶ 14          Our recent decision in People v. Evans, 
    2017 IL App (3d) 160019
    , is particularly
    applicable in this case. In Evans, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence, but did
    5
    not file a Rule 604(d) certificate because the version of Rule 604(d) in effect at the time only
    required such a certificate “ ‘[i]f a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty is to be filed.’ ” 
    Id. ¶ 14
    (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015)). On appeal, we agreed with the defendant that
    the rule should be applied retroactively, thus requiring remand for defense counsel to file a Rule
    604(d) certificate. 
    Id. ¶ 15.
    In doing so, we noted that Rule 604(d) is a procedural law, could be
    applied retroactively, and, in fact, should be applied retroactively as equity favored more
    protection for the defendant. 
    Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
    Further, we stated that remand was required because
    counsel did not strictly comply with the rule, as he did not certify that he had examined the
    report of proceedings from the sentencing hearing. 
    Id. ¶ 21.
    ¶ 15          Here, as in Evans, defense counsel asserted in her Rule 604(d) certificate that she had
    examined the report of proceedings of the guilty plea. Defense counsel did not certify that she
    had examined the report of proceedings of the sentencing hearing. Because Rule 604(d) requires
    counsel to certify that she has examined the transcript of the sentencing hearing, counsel in the
    present case failed to strictly comply with the rule. See People v. Steinmetz, 
    110 Ill. App. 3d 439
    ,
    442 (1982). Therefore, remand is necessary for new postplea proceedings and strict compliance
    with the rule.
    ¶ 16          In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s argument that remand is not required.
    Specifically, the State argues, like it did in Evans, that under People v. Shirley, 
    181 Ill. 2d 359
    (1998), remand is unnecessary because defendant has already been afforded a full and fair
    opportunity to present his postplea motion. In Evans, we rejected the State’s reliance on Shirley
    for this proposition. Evans, 
    2017 IL App (3d) 160019
    , ¶¶ 22-28. In doing so, we noted that
    “[t]his court has expressly held that Shirley does not stand for the blanket proposition that a
    matter may only be remanded one time for compliance with Rule 604(d).” 
    Id. ¶ 24
    (citing People
    6
    v. Hagerstrom, 
    2016 IL App (3d) 140559
    , ¶¶ 10-13). Instead, Shirley stands for the proposition
    that multiple remands for compliance with Rule 604(d) are not necessary where a defendant
    received a full and fair hearing. 
    Id. We held
    that, unlike in Shirley, where the only issue was the
    timeliness of the filing of an otherwise compliant 604(d) certificate, the defendant in Evans had
    not received a full and fair hearing, and, therefore, remand for strict compliance with Rule 604(d)
    was required. 
    Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
    ¶ 17          Here, counsel has not averred that she examined the transcript of the sentencing hearing,
    which provided the basis of defendant’s motion. See 
    Steinmetz, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 442
    (“[T]he
    concern [of Rule 604(d)] has to be that an attorney make a subsequent thorough and
    dispassionate review of the record to assure that the defendant’s rights were safeguarded. To
    assume from the mere fact of continuous representation a knowledge of the record trammels on
    that policy. It ignores not only the reality that a vast amount of time often separates hearings but
    also that defense attorneys often represent numerous defendants with cases far too complex to
    commit to memory.”). Because defendant has not received a full and fair hearing on his postplea
    motion, we are compelled to again remand the matter to the trial court for new postplea
    proceedings in compliance with Rule 604(d).
    ¶ 18          Lastly, defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. As we remand for new postplea
    proceedings, we do not reach this issue.
    ¶ 19                                              CONCLUSION
    ¶ 20          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated and remanded with
    instructions.
    ¶ 21          Vacated and remanded with instructions.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3-16-0183

Filed Date: 2/22/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2017