Color Communications, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board , 288 Ill. App. 3d 527 ( 1997 )


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  •                                NO. 4-96-0657

      

                              IN THE APPELLATE COURT

      

                                    OF ILLINOIS

      

                                  FOURTH DISTRICT

      

    COLOR COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,              )  Administrative

             Petitioner,                    )  Review of the

             v.                             )  Illinois Pollution

    THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD and )  Control Board

    THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION    )  No. 96-125

    AGENCY,                                  )  

             Respondents.                   )  

    _______________________________________________________________

      

             PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of

    the court:

             Petitioner, Color Communications, Inc. (CCI), appeals

    from an order of respondent Illinois Pollution Control Board

    (Board), which affirmed an administrative decision by respondent

    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency), denying sepa-

    rate "Clean Air Act Permit Program" (CAAPP) permits for CCI's two

    Chicago plants.  Color Communications, Inc. v. Illinois Environ-

    mental Protection Agency, Ill. Pollution Control Bd. Op. 96-125,

    at 17 (July 18, 1996).  CCI contends that the Board erred by

    determining that CCI's two Chicago plants constituted a single

    source for the purposes of the CAAPP.  We agree and reverse and

    remand.

                                 I.  BACKGROUND

             CCI produces color systems, samples, color boards, and

    color marketing systems for paint, automotive, and other indus-

    tries.  It has manufacturing facilities in Chicago and other

    domestic and foreign locations.  Its two Chicago facilities are

    located at 4000 West Fillmore Street (hereafter the 4000 plant)

    and 4242 West Fillmore Street (hereafter the 4242 plant).  These

    two facilities are separated by more than a full city block.

    Another company, Ribbon Webbing Corporation (Ribbon), which is

    wholly unconnected to CCI, owns a manufacturing plant and offices

    in the city block between CCI's two plants.  

             The 4242 plant houses color-mixing operations and

    paint-coating lines and produces coated substrates, including

    paper and plastic.  This plant sends color bases and colorants it

    produces to other CCI facilities, including the 4000 plant and

    plants in New York and New Zealand.  The 4000 plant houses

    printing and assembly operations and warehousing and shipping

    functions.  More than half of the printing and assembly of color

    boards at the 4000 plant involves the use of coated substrates

    provided by the 4242 plant.  However, many of the 4000 plant's

    printing activities involve materials obtained from customers and

    third-party vendors, not materials produced at the 4242 plant.

             Because the two plants perform different operations and

    use different raw materials, their pollutant-emitting activities

    are classified differently under the Standard Industrial Classi-

    fication (SIC) Manual.  The first two digits of the code desig-

    nate the major industrial grouping to which each plant belongs.

    The 4000 plant's pollutant-emitting activities are classified as

    group 2759 (27 is the SIC code for "commercial printing not

    elsewhere classified").  The activities at the 4242 plant are

    classified as group 2672 (26 is the SIC code for "paper coating

    not elsewhere classified").  The CCI plants have had these SIC

    classifications for at least five years.  The Agency does not

    question the appropriateness of the different SIC codes assigned

    to the two plants.

             The 1990 amendments to the federal Clean Air Act (CAA)

    (42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1988)) required states to establish

    permitting programs for air pollution sources.  Clean Air Act

    Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2404

    (1990).  The CAAPP (see 415 ILCS 5/39.5 (West 1994)) establishes

    permitting requirements for certain sources of air pollutants

    regulated pursuant to the CAA.  The Agency administers the CAAPP.

    CCI's Chicago plants are subject to the CAAPP because they are

    located in a severe nonattainment area and each has the potential

    to emit 25 or more tons per year of volatile organic material.

    See 415 ILCS 5/39.5(2)(a), (2)(c)(iii)(A) (West 1994).  The 4242

    plant emits more than 25 tons per year of volatile organic

    material, and the 4000 plant emits approximately 10 tons per year

    of volatile organic material.  

             The Agency issued an air operating permit to the 4242

    plant in 1979 and renewed the permit in 1983, 1988, and 1994.  In

    1989, CCI acquired the 4000 plant (from a company with which CCI

    was not associated in any way), and in 1994, the Agency issued an

    air operating permit for that plant.  In 1995, the Agency issued

    a joint construction and operating permit for certain additional

    emission units at the 4000 plant.  Each of these permits treated

    the two plants as separate, independent facilities.

             In September 1995, CCI submitted separate CAAPP appli-

    cations to the Agency for CCI's two Chicago plants.  In November

    1995, the Agency issued a "Notice of Incompleteness"--a form of

    permit denial--advising CCI that the two plants must be consid-

    ered one "source" for purposes of CAAPP permits.  The notice

    stated:

             "The Agency has previously learned that oper-

             ations at both of CCI's locations include

             pollutant[-]emitting activities that belong

             to the same industrial grouping, are located

             on one or more contiguous or adjacent proper-

             ties[,] and are under common control.  Be-

             cause the locations together constitute a

             single CAAPP source, CCI cannot seek recogni-

             tion for each of its locations of operation

             as a separate CAAPP source."

    The Agency then informed CCI that it must submit only one CAAPP

    application that treated both plants as a single "source."

             CCI appealed the Agency's decision to the Board,

    arguing that the two plants constituted separate, independent

    sources pursuant to the CAAPP.  In July 1996, the Board affirmed

    the Agency's decision (with two Board members dissenting), agree-

    ing that the two plants constituted the same "source" under the

    CAAPP.  

                                  II.  ANALYSIS

             CCI appeals, arguing that the Board's decision con-

    flicts with applicable state and federal statutes and regula-

    tions.  Specifically, CCI contends that the Board erred by

    concluding that the two plants constitute a single source when

    statutes and regulations require separate permits for sources of

    emissions that (1) did not belong to the same industrial grouping

    because they are classified by different SIC codes, and (2) are

    located on properties that are neither contiguous nor adjacent.

                             A.  Standard of Review

             Section 3-110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

    5/3-110 (West 1994)) governs review of final administrative deci-

    sions, providing in part that, in an action for review, "[t]he

    hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law

    and fact presented by the entire record before the court."  In a

    case involving the legal effect of undisputed facts, as here, the

    issue is a matter of law, and we review it de novo.  Denton v.

    Civil Service Comm'n, 277 Ill. App. 3d 770, 773, 661 N.E.2d 520,

    524 (1996).  

             The primary rule in statutory construction is to give

    effect to legislative intent.  First of America Bank, Rockford,

    N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 181, 651 N.E.2d 1105, 1112

    (1995).  Ordinarily, the statutory language provides the best

    indicator of legislative intent, and where that language is plain

    and unambiguous, courts must give it effect without considering

    other indicia of legislative intent.  First of America, 166 Ill.

    2d at 181, 651 N.E.2d at 1112.  

             Generally, courts give a great deal of deference to an

    agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with

    administering.  City of Decatur v. American Federation of State,

    County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 361,

    522 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (1988); Denton, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 774,

    661 N.E.2d at 524.  However, an agency's interpretation is not

    binding and will be rejected if erroneous.  City of Decatur, 122

    Ill. 2d at 361, 522 N.E.2d at 1222.

                          B.  Description of the CAAPP

             The CAAPP provides that any major source of air pollu-

    tion must apply for a CAAPP permit.  415 ILCS 5/39.5(2)(a)(i)

    (West 1994).  Section 39.5(1) of the Environmental Protection Act

    (Act) defines "source" as follows:

                  "'Source' means any stationary source

             (or any group of stationary sources that are

             located on one or more contiguous or adjacent

             properties, and are under common control of

             the same person or persons ***) belonging to

             a single major industrial grouping.  For the

             purposes of defining 'source,' a stationary

             source or group of stationary sources shall

             be considered part of a single industrial

             grouping if all of the pollutant[-]emitting

             activities at such source or group of sources

             on contiguous or adjacent property belong to

             the same Major Group (i.e., all have the same

             two-digit code) as described in the Standard

             Industrial Classification Manual, 1987."

             (Emphasis added.)  415 ILCS 5/39.5(1) (West

             1994).

    Thus, for the two plants in this case to be considered a single

    source, they must (1) be under common control by the same entity;

    (2) be on contiguous or adjacent property; and (3) belong to a

    single major industrial grouping.  Sources belong to a single

    major industrial grouping when they have the same two-digit SIC

    code.  No party disputes that CCI owns and operates both plants.

                                C.  The SIC Codes

             CCI contends that the Board erred by concluding that

    the two plants constituted a single source even though they were

    classified under different two-digit SIC codes.  We agree.

             The Board does not dispute that the two plants have

    different SIC codes, nor does it contend that the codes should be

    changed.  Nevertheless, the Board concluded that the plants

    should be treated as a single "source" despite the fact that

    their individual operations have different SIC codes because the

    4242 plant "supports" the 4000 plant by providing raw materials.

    The Board explained this conclusion as follows:

                  "The Board finds it proper under

             [s]ection 39.5 of the Act to apply the sup-

             port[-]facility concept when determining

             whether two or more facilities are within the

             same major industrial grouping.  ***  [T]his

             conclusion is supported by the fact that the

             CAAPP's definition of 'source' shares the

             language[] and history[] of the federal defi-

             nition.  Additionally, *** in order to avoid

             imposing contradictory obligations upon the

             Agency, the support[-]facility analysis must

             be included ***."

             The Board's decision relies on the fact that (1)

    federal law allegedly incorporates the support-facility concept

    into the federal definition of "major source"; and (2) Illinois

    law parallels federal law and section 39.5(3)(a) of the Act ex-

    pressly requires that the CAAPP must be consistent with federal

    law, providing as follows:  "The Agency shall issue CAAPP permits

    under this [s]ection consistent with the [CAA] and regulations

    promulgated thereunder and this Act and regulations promulgated

    thereunder."  415 ILCS 5/39.5(3)(a) (West 1994).

             The Board contends that federal law incorporates the

    support-facility concept into its definition of "major source"

    based on (1) language found in the preamble to a proposed federal

    regulation, which preamble was never adopted (45 Fed. Reg. 52,676

    (1980) (preamble to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration

    regulations); and (2) the testimony of Ronald Van Mersbergen, a

    national air permitting expert, who testified that the federal

    Environmental Protection Agency employs the support-facility

    concept when determining whether two facilities fall under a

    single major industrial grouping.

             In this case the plain language of the statute, as set

    forth above, clearly requires that if several stationary sources

    have the same two-digit SIC code, they must be considered to

    belong to a single major industrial grouping.  Accordingly, an

    industrial grouping is defined by SIC codes.  A plain reading of

    this statute is that if several stationary sources do not have

    the same two-digit SIC code, they do not belong to the same

    industrial grouping.

             Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, as this one

    is, a court is not at liberty to depart from its plain language

    and meaning by reading into it limitations or conditions that the

    legislature did not express.  Solich v. George & Anna Portes

    Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83,

    630 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1994).  By relying on the support-facility

    concept, the Board improperly looked beyond the unambiguous

    language of the statute to determine whether the two plants

    belonged to a single industrial grouping.  Accordingly, the Board

    erred in concluding the plants constituted a single "source" for

    CAAPP purposes.

                                III.  CONCLUSION

             Because we hold that the two plants do not belong to a

    a single major industrial grouping, we need not resolve whether

    they are "adjacent" within the meaning of the statute.

             For the reasons stated, we reverse the Board's decision

    and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

             Reversed and remanded.

             GARMAN and COOK, JJ., concur.

             

      

Document Info

Docket Number: 4-96-0657

Citation Numbers: 288 Ill. App. 3d 527, 680 N.E.2d 516

Judges: Steigmann

Filed Date: 5/28/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024