Midwest Palliative Hospice and Care Center v. Beard , 430 Ill. Dec. 178 ( 2019 )

Digitally signed by
Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest to
Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2019.06.03
11:56:22 -05'00'
Midwest Palliative Hospice & Care Center v. Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 181321Appellate Court MIDWEST PALLIATIVE HOSPICE AND CARE CENTER,
Caption Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONSTANCE BEARD, as Director of
Revenue, and THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. First District, First Division
Docket No. 1-18-1321
Filed February 25, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 17-L-50714; the
Review Hon. Daniel J. Kubasiak, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Circuit court judgment affirmed. Department of Revenue
determination affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Wynne, Jennifer C. Waryjas, and Douglas A. Wick, of
Appeal Jones Day, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin,
Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel), for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pierce and Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case concerns the property tax status of an inpatient hospice care center. The hospice
care center filed an application for tax-exempt status on the basis that it is a charitable
institution. The Illinois Department of Revenue denied a property tax exemption to the care
center, finding that it failed to meet its burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the property was being put to an exclusively charitable use. The hospice care center filed a
complaint for administrative review. On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed the
Department of Revenue’s determination. The care center appeals, and we affirm the circuit
court’s judgment and affirm the Department of Revenue’s decision to deny the application for
an exemption.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Plaintiff Midwest Palliative Hospice and Care Center (Midwest) operates a large
end-of-life care facility in Glenview, Illinois. In 2008, Midwest operated a palliative care
center on a 4.1-acre parcel of property in order to provide palliative care for patients and
provide services to their families. The property was designated as tax exempt after the
Department of Revenue entered into an agreement with Midwest granting it a 91.9% charitable
property tax exemption for the property.
¶4 In 2011, Midwest began the construction of an inpatient hospice center pavilion on the
same property as the palliative care center. Midwest previously offered in-home hospice care
but sought to offer inpatient care because, among other reasons, it saw a need for providing
end-of-life care for patients who could not be adequately cared for in their homes. In the
hospice care pavilion, Midwest provides terminally ill patients with the interconnected
network of professionals needed to provide proper end-of-life care.
¶5 Midwest filed an application for a charitable property tax exemption for the 2013 tax year
for the property that houses both the palliative care center and the hospice care pavilion. The
defendant in this case, the Department of Revenue, found that, while the palliative care center
remained property-tax exempt, the hospice care pavilion was not. Accordingly, the
Department of Revenue denied Midwest’s application for a charitable property tax exemption.
The matter proceeded to an administrative hearing.
¶6 At the administrative hearing before the Department of Revenue, Midwest produced
evidence about its endeavors with the aim of convincing the administrative law judge that it
was entitled to a charitable property tax exemption. The parties entered into certain stipulations
and, according to the administrative law judge, “the only issue [was] whether the Pavilion was
used for charitable purposes in 2013.” Several witnesses testified at the hearing and exhibits
were introduced about Midwest’s mission and its financial and operational endeavors.
¶7 For income tax purposes, Midwest is classified as a 501(c)(3) organization (26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2012)). Midwest’s bylaws provide that its purposes are “exclusively charitable,”
and its articles of incorporation provide that its earnings cannot benefit any person. The articles
-2-
of incorporation further provide that Midwest cannot discriminate against protected classes in
conducting its operations and that it must admit patients that meet the applicable admission
criteria without regard to the prospective patient’s ability to pay, meaning that it does not turn
away patients that lack insurance or government program coverage.
¶8 As part of its mission, Midwest provides adult bereavement services, counseling and
support services to children, and a camp for grieving children and teenagers. Midwest trains
volunteers to provide vigil support and companionship to families and patients, and its
volunteers provide comfort services and goods for suffering patients. Midwest also trains
medical students, free of charge, in providing hospice services, which it claims helps to supply
appropriately trained physicians for palliative and hospice patients in the Chicagoland area.
¶9 To further its position that the hospice pavilion should be a property-tax-exempt charitable
institution, Midwest pointed out at the administrative hearing that its hospice care pavilion is
on the same plot of land as the tax-exempt palliative care center, is owned by the same entity,
and operates under the same charitable principles. The patient population is essentially the
same with the only real difference between the two divisions being that the care is delivered at
a different space on the property depending on the phase of care called for by the patient’s
status. The intake procedures and financial operations of the two divisions are the same.
¶ 10 In a 32-page recommendation, the administrative law judge explained his conclusion that
“Midwest has not demonstrated, by the presentation of testimony or through exhibits and
argument, sufficient evidence to warrant an exemption of the Marshak pavilion from 2013 real
estate taxes.” The administrative law judge examined the guidelines that are generally used in
Illinois to determine whether the “exclusive charitable use” exemption applies (see generally
Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149 (1968)) and found that Midwest had not
demonstrated an entitlement to the tax exemption. The administrative law judge’s
recommendation was adopted by the Department of Revenue. Midwest filed for administrative
review in the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed the Department of Revenue’s
decision. Midwest now appeals to this court.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 The issue in the case is whether Midwest qualifies for a property tax exemption. Resolving
the exemption issue in this case requires a consideration of the Illinois Constitution, the
Property Tax Code, and Illinois Supreme Court case law. An entity that seeks a charitable
property tax exemption must demonstrate that its property is both owned by a charitable
institution and put to an exclusively charitable use. In this case, there is no dispute that
Midwest is a charitable institution; the question is whether the property at issue, the hospice
care pavilion, was being used for a charitable purpose in 2013.
¶ 13 Under article IX of the Illinois Constitution, all real property is subject to taxation. Eden
Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273, 285 (2004). Property taxes
accrue on all property unless the particular property is exempted from taxation by the
legislature. Id. The Illinois Constitution sets forth the criteria under which the General
Assembly is permitted to grant property tax exemptions. “The General Assembly by law may
exempt from taxation only the property of the State, units of local government and school
districts and property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for
school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. Thus, the
General Assembly is limited by the constitution in its power to grant property tax exemptions,
-3-
and when a party seeks a charitable use exemption, the property must be “used exclusively for
*** charitable purposes.” Id.; Comprehensive Training & Development Corp. v. County of
Jackson, 261 Ill. App. 3d 37, 39-40 (1994).
¶ 14 In the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)), the General Assembly
has granted a property tax exemption to properties that are used for charitable purposes. Id.§ 15-65. The Property Tax Code exempts property from taxation when the property is
“actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or
otherwise used with a view to profit.” Id. The charitable exemption applies to property used by
nonprofit health care providers so long as the property is used for charitable purposes in
accordance with the Property Tax Code. See Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 4; 35 ILCS
200/15-86 (West 2016).
¶ 15 In Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d at 156-57, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth what has become the
accepted framework for deciding whether property can be considered to be used exclusively
for charitable purposes and therefore exempt from taxation under section 15-65 of the Property
Tax Code. In Korzen, the supreme court identified the distinctive characteristics of a charitable
institution, and Illinois courts have used those criteria as a guide to determine whether a piece
of property and the party seeking the property tax exemption meet the statutory requirements
to be entitled to the exemption.
“(1) [The organization] is set up for the benefit of an indeterminate number of persons;
(2) it has no capital, capital stock or shareholders and earns no profits or dividends;
(3) it derives its funds primarily from public and private charity and holds those funds
in trust for the objectives and purposes expressed in its charter; (4) it dispenses charity
to all who need and apply for it, does not provide gain or profit in a private sense to any
person connected with it, and does not appear to place obstacles of any character in the
way of those who need and would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it
dispenses; (5) the property is actually and factually used exclusively for the charitable
purpose, regardless of any intent expressed in the organization’s charter or bylaws; and
(6) charity use is the primary purpose for which the property is used and not a
secondary or incidental purpose.” Riverside Medical Center v. Department of Revenue,
342 Ill. App. 3d 603, 607 (2003) (citing Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d at 156-157).
¶ 16 There is some dispute between the parties regarding what standard of review we should
apply. The matter arises out of an administrative proceeding and is governed by the
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)). Generally, when an
administrative agency’s decision involves a pure question of law, we review it de novo. Skokie
Firefighters Union, Local 3033 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 2016 IL App
(1st) 152478, ¶ 11. When reviewing purely factual findings, the agency’s findings and
conclusions are deemed to be prima facie true and correct and, thus, are reviewed under a
manifest weight of the evidence standard. Id.; see also 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016). When
an agency’s decision presents a mixed question of law and fact, it will be overturned on appeal
only if it is clearly erroneous. Village of North Riverside v. Boron, 2016 IL App (1st) 152687,
¶ 14.
¶ 17 Here, as even Midwest tacitly acknowledges, we are presented with a situation where the
administrative law judge was required to apply the law to a given set of facts. Midwest,
however, attempts to characterize its challenge to the administrative proceedings as a
challenge to the administrative law judge’s interpretation of statutory provisions with a
-4-
stipulated record and undisputed facts. Midwest also argues that the matter does not invoke any
expertise on the part of the Department of Revenue that would justify affording it any
deference. Midwest, therefore, advocates for de novo review.
¶ 18 We reject Midwest’s characterization of the proceedings below. The issue before the
Department of Revenue was whether Midwest met its burden to demonstrate that it used the
hospice care pavilion exclusively for charitable purposes in 2013. That is the same issue
presented on appeal. We disagree with Midwest’s characterization of the issue as purely a legal
one. The case involves reviewing the parties’ submissions, assessing the import of the facts
submitted, putting the facts through a multipart legal test, and deciding a fact-intensive
question—whether the property is being used for charitable purposes and whether such use is
exclusive.
¶ 19 The administrative law judge was tasked with making a decision that turns on facts:
whether this particular institution and this particular property have the requisite factual basis to
qualify for a statutory property tax exemption. The legal precepts must then be applied to the
facts established at the administrative hearing, so we review the Department of Revenue’s
decision to deny a property tax exemption under the clearly erroneous standard. Whether
property is being used for an exclusively charitable purpose is a mixed question of law and
fact. Meridian Village Ass’n v. Hamer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130078, ¶ 2. We review the
Department of Revenue’s decision to deny a charitable property tax exemption under the
clearly erroneous standard. Three Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 381 Ill. App. 3d 679, 693 (2008).
¶ 20 To make its decision, the Department of Revenue, through its administrative law judge
(ALJ), assessed the Korzen factors to make a determination on whether the property was
entitled to a charitable property tax exemption. Although the ALJ found that certain of the
Korzen considerations tended to show that Midwest was operating as a charitable institution,
other factors showed much more clearly that it was being run as a business enterprise, not a
charity.
¶ 21 Midwest argues that the ALJ’s analysis is misguided in that it should have only analyzed
the sixth Korzen factor—charitable use—because the parties stipulated that the hospice care
pavilion was owned by a charitable institution. Relying on Provena Covenant Medical Center
v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 390 (2010) (superseded by statute), Midwest posits
that the first five Korzen factors concern only whether the property is owned by a charitable
institution. Thus, Midwest argues, those first five Korzen factors were taken out of dispute
when the parties agreed that Midwest is owned by a charitable institution and should not have
been considered by the ALJ.
¶ 22 We find Midwest’s argument on this point to be unpersuasive. While it is true that the ALJ
was tasked with only determining whether the property was being put to a charitable use, it
does not mean that the first five Korzen factors cannot be considered insofar as they relate to
how the property is being used. See Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 294 (affirming an ALJ’s determination
on the question of charitable use where the ALJ considered all Korzen factors to inform the
decision on charitable use). Even if the ALJ was not required to analyze all of the Korzen
factors, it is clear that his decision came down to whether the property was being put to a
charitable use—the exact question Midwest claims he was called upon to answer.
¶ 23 Moving to the merits of the ultimate issue in this case, we are called to review whether the
Department of Revenue, through its ALJ, clearly erred when it found that Midwest failed to
-5-
demonstrate that the hospice care pavilion was being used exclusively for charitable purposes
in 2013. When applying for a property tax exemption, the burden is on the party seeking the
exemption to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the property is being used for
exclusively charitable purposes. LeaderTreks, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 385 Ill. App. 3d
442, 451 (2008). When determining whether property is within the scope of an exemption, all
facts are to be construed, and all debatable questions are to be resolved, in favor of taxation. Id.
at 451-52.
¶ 24 In reviewing the financial data submitted, the ALJ observed that 0.4% of Midwest’s
operating revenue came from charitable contributions. The overwhelming majority of its
operating revenue came from “net patient services,” of which 88% of the revenue came from
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. The ALJ took note that 94% of the revenue Midwest
generated was from billing patients: exchanging medical services for payment, as a business.
The ALJ explained that, in 2013, Midwest was “not devoting a substantial portion of its
operating income to an identifiable charitable need” and, thus, he was “unable to conclude that
the revenue received by Midwest is devoted to the general purpose of charity.”
¶ 25 As for serving the public in a charitable manner, the ALJ was not persuaded. It was the
ALJ’s belief that “the evidence shows conclusively that the benefits derived from Midwest,
providing palliative and hospice care services, are derived by patients with the means to pay
for the services.” The ALJ observed that nearly all of Midwest’s operating revenue was earned
from patient care, and he extrapolated that its primary purpose was not to provide charity but to
serve paying customers. Similarly, the ALJ did not find that Midwest reduced the burdens on
the government as many charitable endeavors do. Instead, the trial court noted that 88% of
Midwest’s revenue was coming from government programs: not relieving the government of
any burdens but receiving payment from the government in exchange for providing its
services. According to the ALJ, Midwest is not giving something of value for free by providing
services gratuitously to the public. It is being paid.
¶ 26 While the ALJ took note of the community-based benefits Midwest offers, like
bereavement counseling and training medical students, it did not find the activities to be
“charitable acts sufficient to justify a property tax exemption.” Instead, the ALJ opined that
many of the “community benefits” actually served to benefit Midwest as a business, not as a
charity. Midwest submitted a financial statement stating that it provided charity care to patients
worth approximately $157,000 in 2013. However, the ALJ discounted that evidence to some
degree, noting that it was “possibly overstated” and unsupported by documentary evidence.
The ALJ stated that there was no specific testimony introduced at the hearing regarding either
the number of patients receiving charity care or the dollar amount of Midwest’s charitable
expenditures for the 2013 exemption year.
¶ 27 The ALJ also observed that, even if Midwest provided $157,000 in charitable care in 2013,
its charitable expenditures would still represent less than 1% of the net services revenue of $30
million it generated that year. And even if Midwest provided charitable services to 37 of its
hospice patients, its charitable services were still only rendered for 8% of the 470 hospice
patients it served that year. The ALJ found that, because “the disparity between the dollar
amount of Midwest’s charity care and its ‘net patient service revenue’ is so extreme [it] would
not be reasonable to conclude that the primary use of this property is to provide charity.” The
ALJ concluded that the less than 1% expenditure for charitable care on the property
-6-
“represents an incidental act of beneficence that is legally insufficient to establish that Midwest
‘exclusively’ uses the Marshak Pavilion for charitable purposes.”
¶ 28 We conclude that the Department of Revenue did not clearly err when it found that
Midwest failed to meet its burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that its
hospice pavilion was used exclusively for charitable purposes in 2013. Midwest maintains that
the hospice care pavilion “provided massive community benefits, raised large sums of
charitable contributions, and is indisputably run as a non-profit.” However, the evidence
introduced at the administrative hearing showed that almost none of Midwest’s revenue comes
from charitable contributions, and almost none of the revenue Midwest generated was
expended on providing charitable services.
¶ 29 Instead, Midwest generates revenue almost exclusively by performing services to patients
for pay. The revenue that Midwest generates gives it the opportunity to offer more services and
do more good deeds. Midwest made out the case that it is a noble institution. But just because
an institution is a nonprofit and performs good deeds does not mean that the institution is using
its real property exclusively for charitable purposes as that term is used in the Illinois
Constitution.
¶ 30 Midwest argues that the ALJ’s analysis was flawed in that it focused so heavily on the
finding that, even if Midwest provided $157,000 in charitable care in 2013, its charitable
expenditures were still less than 1% of the net services revenue of $30 million that it generated.
Midwest argues that we should reject a quantitative test for determining the charitable use of
property. See 35 ILCS 200/15-86(a)(1) (West 2016). The quantitative analysis employed by
the ALJ was just one part of his inquiry into whether the property was being used for a
charitable purpose. It is true that the use of revenue should not be the sole focus; “[t]he critical
issue is the use to which the property itself is devoted.” Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 403. The way
the revenue is used, however, is significant in informing about the way the property itself is
being used.
¶ 31 Just because an institution offering medical services is willing to provide charitable care, it
does not mean that the institution’s exclusive purpose was, in fact, to provide charity in a given
year. The ALJ observed that the evidence introduced by Midwest did not show that it was
primarily devoted to dispensing charity at its hospice care pavilion. In fact, the correspondence
between Midwest and its patients regarding the small amount of fees that Midwest did agree to
waive in 2013 showed that it ordinarily expects to be fully compensated for its services. There
was nothing identified at the administrative hearing that could suggest that the hospice care
pavilion was being run primarily as a gift to the public. See Provena Covenant Medical Center
v. Department of Revenue, 384 Ill. App. 3d 734, 744 (2008). Even the fact that Midwest used
some of its revenue for providing gratuitous services does not mean that the property was being
used exclusively or primarily for such a purpose in 2013. See People ex rel. Nordlund v.
Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d 91, 102 (1968).
¶ 32 The evidence in this case showed that Midwest almost exclusively served people that did
not need charitable care. Midwest points out that the majority of the prospective patients for
hospice care are people of advanced age that will have some type of insurance or government
program assistance to help pay for their care. Midwest contends that it should not be deemed to
be any less charitable on the basis that most of its patients can pay in some form. This
observation is well taken, but it does not advance Midwest’s position that it is using the
hospice care pavilion exclusively for charitable purposes. See Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 294; Alivio
-7-
Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 299 Ill. App. 3d 647, 651 (1998). The Department
of Revenue is not required to find that an entity that receives the maximum amount that
Medicare or Medicaid will pay for its services is serving the public altruistically such that it is
entitled to pay no property taxes. There is nothing wrong with Midwest being able to receive
payment for its services. The fact that most of its patients can pay just puts Midwest in line
with other medical service businesses—purveyors of medical services for remuneration.
¶ 33 Midwest relies heavily on the fact that the palliative care center was determined to be tax
exempt as supportive of its position that the hospice care pavilion should be tax exempt too.
Midwest argues that the Department of Revenue’s decision is inconsistent and therefore
cannot withstand review. Midwest points to the fact that the hospice care pavilion operates
under the same operational and financial policies as the palliative care center. According to
Midwest, the two divisions are essentially operated as one enterprise. The hospice care
pavilion, like its palliative care center, accepts patients on a nondiscriminatory basis. It has the
same intake procedures and the same mission. It has the same patient population. It even shares
the same property identification number as the tax-exempt palliative care center. Midwest
argues that there is no reason for treating the two divisions differently for purposes of property
taxes.
¶ 34 But Midwest also acknowledges that the two divisions are, in fact, separate. They can be
treated differently for tax purposes, as each entity seeking a tax exemption must carry its
burden to demonstrate its entitlement to an exemption. See Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 388(plaintiff was required to demonstrate an exclusive charitable use of the Provena Covenant
Medical Center complex itself). While the Department of Revenue entered into a settlement
agreement with the palliative care center, stipulating to its charitable status, there was nothing
binding the Department of Revenue to treat the hospice care pavilion in the same manner. In
fact, in the 2008 settlement agreement between Midwest and the Department of Revenue
regarding the palliative care center’s tax status, the parties agreed that “Midwest is not
precluded from seeking exemption for the Marshak Family Hospice Pavilion in subsequent
years.” They also agreed that the stipulation as to the palliative care center’s charitable status
“shall not be used as evidence of charitable status or relied upon in any manner to prove
charitable status in any other proceedings for subsequent tax periods.” It is clear that the
Department of Revenue, as was its prerogative, did not give much weight to the tax status of
the palliative care center when deciding whether the separate division, the hospice care
pavilion, qualified for a tax exemption. See id. at 388-89.
¶ 35 Although seemingly not raised before the Department of Revenue during the
administrative hearing, Midwest argued in a posthearing brief and argues here that the hospice
care pavilion might qualify for a charitable tax exemption on the basis that it is an extension of
the tax-exempt palliative care center. We have previously found that certain entities separate
but associated with a tax-exempt entity may enjoy the tax-exempt status of the other as a result
of being “reasonably necessary” to carrying out the associated entity’s charitable purpose.
Separate entities like a parking lot (Northwestern Memorial Foundation v. Johnson, 141 Ill.
App. 3d 309, 313 (1986)), a daycare center (Memorial Child Care v. Department of Revenue,
238 Ill. App. 3d 985, 986 (1992)), or even a vacant lot (Norwegian American Hospital, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 210 Ill. App. 3d 318, 322 (1991)) might meet the criteria for a
charitable use property tax exemption when they are reasonably necessary to further an
associated entity’s charitable mission.
-8-
¶ 36 In denying the relief requested in the post-hearing brief, the ALJ found that the “reasonably
necessary” argument was insufficiently developed and that “[t]here was little evidence at the
hearing as to what activities occur in the Care Center and there was even less evidence offered
as to how the activities in the [hospice care pavilion] are reasonably necessary to fulfill the
Care Center’s mission.” Here, Midwest argues that its pavilion has a stronger case for a tax
exemption than a parking lot or a daycare center because the hospice care pavilion is attached
to the palliative care center, actually provides charitable care itself, and, thus, is “reasonably
necessary to execute the mission of the tax-exempt Palliative Care Center.”
¶ 37 Midwest failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the hospice care pavilion is
reasonably necessary for carrying out the mission of the palliative care center. All along,
Midwest has urged the Department of Revenue to find that the hospice care center is used for
charitable purposes in its own right. While Midwest produced evidence tending to show that
the hospice care pavilion was helpful in carrying out Midwest’s overall mission, it never
proved that the hospice care center was reasonably necessary for such a purpose in 2013.
Midwest also agreed that it would not use the stipulated 2008 tax-exempt status of the
palliative care center in its effort to seek further tax exemptions. It cannot now seek to
piggyback an exemption for the hospice care pavilion onto its exemption for the palliative care
center after it failed to meet its burden for an exemption for the hospice care pavilion in its own
right.
¶ 38 The ALJ concluded that Midwest is run more as a business than a charity. It does good
deeds for its patients and the community, to be sure, but it is paid for its services and is run as a
business nonetheless. The evidence showed that in 2013, its services were rendered almost
exclusively to paying customers. There was indeed evidentiary support for the ALJ’s
determination that “Midwest’s charity on the property represents an incidental act of
beneficence that is legally insufficient to establish that Midwest ‘exclusively’ uses the
Marshak Pavilion for charitable purposes.” And that rather than its exclusive purpose being to
dispense charity, “Midwest’s primary purpose is providing hospice and palliative care to
patients who can pay for the care or who have insurance or access to government sources for
payment.”
¶ 39 The Department of Revenue did not clearly err by finding that Midwest failed to meet its
burden of proof of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the hospice care pavilion
was used for exclusively charitable purposes in 2013. Finding no clear error, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court and affirm the decision of the Department of Revenue denying
Midwest’s application for a property tax exemption for the Marshak Family Hospice Pavilion.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 42 Circuit court judgment affirmed. Department of Revenue determination affirmed.
-9-