Ruhl v. The Department of Corrections ( 2015 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
Ruhl v. Department of Corrections, 2015 IL App (3d) 130728
Appellate Court RONALD RUHL, ROBERT HERNANDEZ and DOUGLAS OAKS,
Caption Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-13-0728
Rule 23 Order filed May 8, 2015
Motion to publish
allowed June 23, 2015
Opinion filed June 23, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 12-MR-1674; the
Review Hon. Roger Rickmon, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Ronald Ruhl and Douglas E. Oaks, both of Joliet, and Robert
Appeal Hernandez, of Mt. Sterling, appellants pro se.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Ann C. Maskaleris,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee
Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs, Ronald Ruhl, Robert Hernandez and Douglas Oaks, inmates incarcerated in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the
DOC in the Will County circuit court. The complaint alleged that the DOC had been
overcharging plaintiffs for goods sold at the prison commissary in violation of section 3-7-2a
of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a (West 2008)).
¶2 The DOC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2012)), arguing that the inmates lacked
standing to enforce section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code against it.
¶3 The trial court granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss.
¶4 Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that this court’s recent decision in Jackson v. Randle, 2011 IL
App (4th) 100790, is flawed and they do, in fact, have standing to enforce the relevant statutory
provision.
¶5 We affirm.
¶6 FACTS
¶7 In August 2012, Ruhl, an inmate in the DOC’s custody incarcerated at the Stateville
Correctional Center in Joliet, filed a complaint for mandamus relief against the DOC. Ruhl
alleged that the DOC had been “illegally” overcharging him for goods sold at the prison
commissary by marking up the price of those goods beyond the percentage price caps outlined
in section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a (West 2008)). Section 3-7-2a allows
an additional charge of up to 35% for tobacco products and up to 25% for nontobacco
products. According to Ruhl, the Illinois Auditor General determined in a report that the DOC
had been exceeding the statutorily allowed maximum markup on goods sold to inmates by 9%
in its prison commissaries since November 1, 2005. He alleged that the DOC’s failure to
comply with section 3-7-2a had resulted in its “illegal procurement” of $576.62 from his
inmate trust fund account.
¶8 Ruhl’s petition further asserted that he had attempted to seek relief for the DOC’s violation
through various avenues. He initially sought relief through the prison’s grievance process,
which ultimately resulted in the Administrative Review Board finding “no merit” to his
grievance. Next, he sought “a remedy through the Illinois Court of Claims” that he alleged
resulted in a rejection over subject matter jurisdiction, with a final ruling issued on May 8,
2012. Finally, Ruhl alleged that he had “contacted several different government agencies” for
assistance in compelling the DOC to comply with section 3-7-2a, all to no avail.
¶9 As for relief, Ruhl’s petition sought a ruling that the DOC’s actions in exceeding the
allowed statutory markup on commissary items was unlawful as contrary to the language of
section 3-7-2a. He requested the court enter an order: (1) compelling the DOC to comply with
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section 3-7-2a; (2) crediting his inmate trust fund account with all “illgotten funds” since
November 1, 2005; and (3) compelling payment of all his costs and fees.
¶ 10 The DOC moved to dismiss Ruhl’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2012)). The DOC contended that inmates lacked standing to
enforce section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code. It explained that in Jackson v. Randle, 2011 IL
App (4th) 100790, the Fourth District affirmed the dismissal of an inmate’s complaint, nearly
identical to Ruhl’s, on the basis that inmates lack standing to enforce the percentage price caps
for commissary goods outlined in section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code against the DOC. Ruhl
opposed the motion to dismiss, to which the DOC responded.
¶ 11 During briefing on the DOC’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs Hernandez and Oaks, also
inmates in the DOC’s custody incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center, each filed
complaints for mandamus relief against the DOC nearly identical to the petition filed by Ruhl.
The allegations in Oaks’ and Hernandez’s complaints mirrored those in Ruhl’s with the
exception that neither Oaks nor Hernandez alleged he had pursued an action in the Court of
Claims or sought the assistance of other governmental agencies in compelling the DOC’s
compliance.
¶ 12 Oaks alleged that the DOC illegally procured more than $361 from his inmate trust fund
account, while Hernandez alleged that more than $537 had been illegally procured from his
inmate trust fund account. Both Oaks and Hernandez sought relief identical to Ruhl’s. The
DOC separately moved to dismiss Oaks’ petition for the same reasons it sought dismissal of
Ruhl’s.
¶ 13 In April of 2013, Ruhl moved to consolidate Oaks’ and Hernandez’s cases with his “as a
matter of judicial economy and convenience” because their complaints were “essentially
identical” to his. Ruhl sought consolidation to “avoid all parties submitting essentially the
same filings, arguments, etc., and the court issuing multiple rulings on this same matter.” Oaks
and Hernandez supported Ruhl’s motion to consolidate by affidavits, each averring that he was
in favor of the consolidation “for reasons of judicial economy and convenience.” On April 25,
2013, the trial court consolidated the three cases.
¶ 14 The trial court heard argument on the DOC’s motion to dismiss in June and July of 2013.
On July 25, 2013, the court stated that it had “to grant the motion to dismiss” though it did not
“necessarily agree with the rationale of the Jackson court.” The court further stated that it had
“given [its] preliminary determination” and that it would “issue a written opinion” but that the
“appeal time starts to run when I issue and sign a written order, so right now there is no 30 days
running.”
¶ 15 Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2013.
¶ 16 On December 31, 2013, the trial court entered a two-page order, noting the actions had
been consolidated and recounting the parties’ arguments. The court granted the DOC’s motion
to dismiss, reasoning that under the rationale of Jackson, section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code
did not confer upon plaintiffs the right to challenge the DOC’s policies or commissary prices.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the DOC’s motion to dismiss, where
plaintiffs did have standing to enforce section 3-7-2a and the Fourth District’s decision in
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Jackson is contrary to our supreme court’s decision in Hadley v. Illinois Department of
Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365 (2007). We disagree.
¶ 19 Section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“If a facility maintains a commissary or commissaries serving inmates, the selling
prices for all goods shall be sufficient to cover the costs of the goods and an additional
charge of up to 35% for tobacco products and up to 25% for non-tobacco products. The
amount of the additional charges for goods sold at commissaries serving inmates shall
be based upon the amount necessary to pay for the wages and benefits of commissary
employees who are employed in any commissary facilities of the Department. The
Department shall determine the additional charges upon any changes in wages and
benefits of commissary employees as negotiated in the collective bargaining
agreement. ***
Items purchased for sale at any such commissary shall be purchased, wherever
possible, at wholesale costs. If a facility maintains a commissary or commissaries as of
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly, the
Department may not contract with a private contractor or vendor to operate, manage, or
perform any portion of the commissary services. The Department may not enter into
any such contract for commissary services at a facility that opens subsequent to the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly.” 730 ILCS
5/3-7-2a (West 2008).
¶ 20 First, we note that plaintiffs brought their complaint in the form of a mandamus petition.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is granted to enforce the performance of a public
officer’s official nondiscretionary duties as a matter of right. Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner
Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 (2007). For mandamus to issue, a plaintiff must
establish material facts that demonstrate: (1) his clear right to the requested relief; (2) a clear
duty on the defendant to act; and (3) clear authority existing in the defendant to comply with an
order granting mandamus relief. Id. at 433-34. We review orders dismissing a petition for
mandamus and orders granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9)
de novo. See id. at 434; Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 359 (2009).
¶ 21 According to the State, whether plaintiffs have a clear right to the relief they request turns
on whether or not they have standing to enforce the percentage price caps for commissary
goods outlined in section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code. “Generally, the doctrine of standing is
designed to ‘preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit.’ ”
Jackson v. Randle, 2011 IL App (4th) 100790, ¶ 14 (quoting Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill.
2d 211, 221 (1999)).
¶ 22 As the State points out, both in its motion to dismiss and on appeal, the Jackson court
recently decided this exact issue. While Jackson did not seek relief through a mandamus
petition, his arguments were identical to plaintiffs’ here, i.e., the DOC overcharged him and
other inmates in violation of section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a (West
2008); Jackson, 2011 IL App (4th) 100790, ¶ 16. The Jackson court rejected this argument,
stating that section 3-7-2a “does not expressly confer standing on inmates–or anyone else, for
that matter–to enforce the cost percentages outlined therein.” Id.
¶ 23 Relying heavily on Ashley v. Snyder, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252, 1258-59 (2000), the Jackson
court went on to note that DOC regulations and the Unified Code were designed to provide
guidance to prison officials in the administration of prisons, not to create more rights for
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inmates than those that are constitutionally required. “Inmates have a constitutional right to
adequate water, shelter, food, drinking water, clothing, sanitation, and medical care, personal
safety, reasonable access to courts, and the reasonable opportunity to exercise religious
freedom.” Jackson, 2011 IL App (4th) 100790, ¶ 17 (citing Ashley, 316 Ill. App. 3d at
1258-59). Conspicuously absent from this list is an inmate’s right to commissary items at a
specific price, or commissary items generally.
¶ 24 Plaintiffs make a sweeping reference to due process, arguing that the notion that inmates do
not have standing to enforce the statute “defies the basic principles of common law and due
process.” To the extent that this constitutes a due process argument, it is easily dispelled. In
Duane v. Hardy, 2012 IL App (3d) 110845, ¶¶ 14-15, this court held that plaintiff had no
enforceable rights under section 3-7-2(c), which plaintiff argued entitled him to one hour
out-of-cell exercise daily. The court noted that “[p]rison regulations, including statutory
provisions, do not confer rights on inmates or provide a basis for an inmate’s constitutional
claims.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶¶ 25-26). Furthermore,
and relying on Jackson, 2011 IL App (4th) 100790, ¶ 17, the Duane court found that because
plaintiff was not entitled under the statute to one hour of daily exercise out of his cell, he
cannot claim a due process violation based on the DOC’s alleged failure to provide him notice
and an opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of the claimed right. Duane, 2012 IL App
(3d) 110845, ¶ 16.
¶ 25 We find no reason to deviate from the holding of Jackson. We similarly find that plaintiffs
here have no constitutionally protected rights to commissary items at a specified price, nor
does section 3-7-2a function to create one. Indeed, they have no right to a commissary at all,
where the creation and maintenance of a prison commissary falls completely within the
discretion of the DOC. See 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a (West 2012). Plaintiffs failed to establish a clear
right to the relief requested; therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing their mandamus
petition.
¶ 26 Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ claim that Jackson is contrary to our supreme court’s decision
in Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365 (2007). In Hadley, the plaintiff
took issue with the DOC’s interpretation of section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code, which
exempts an “ ‘indigent’ ” inmate from a $2 copayment for nonemergency medical and dental
treatment, providing for recoupment of such copayment against an inmate’s current or future
funds in his inmate trust account. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 372-73 (quoting 730 ILCS
5/3-6-2(f) (West 2004)). To implement the provisions of section 3-6-2(f), the DOC adopted
certain administrative rules. Id. at 373. Our supreme court concluded that the DOC’s definition
of “ ‘indigent’ ” prisoner within its administrative rules conflicted with the Unified Code. Id. at
376.
¶ 27 Hadley is thus easily distinguishable from the case at bar, where we are not confronted with
administrative rules or definitions that conflict with the Unified Code. Furthermore, the court’s
analysis was limited to the statutory interpretation issue; there was no argument or discussion
regarding standing or whether the Unified Code provided an inmate with an enforceable cause
of action. The holding of Jackson regarding section 3-7-2a is thus not contrary to our supreme
court’s decision in Hadley.
¶ 28 We, accordingly, find that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ mandamus
petition.
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¶ 29 CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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