People v. Cassino , 2019 IL App (1st) 181510 ( 2019 )

2019 IL App (1st) 181510
SIXTH DIVISION
JUNE 7, 2019
No. 1-18-1510
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 13 CR 6051
)
MARK CASSINO, ) Honorable
) Carl Boyd,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Connors dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Appellant, the People of the State of Illinois (State), seeks reversal of the order of the
circuit court of Cook County granting defendant-appellee Mark Cassino’s motion to quash arrest
and suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was driving a rental car when he was pulled over by a state trooper for
speeding. During the traffic stop, the state trooper prolonged the stop while he contacted the
rental car company (Hertz), who told the trooper that defendant was not an authorized driver
under the vehicle’s rental agreement. A Hertz employee asked the trooper to recover the vehicle
for Hertz. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the squad car. The trooper then searched the
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rental vehicle and discovered narcotics. The defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
¶4 On June 29, 2017, defendant filed a “motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence” (the
motion to suppress), asserting that his “detention, search and arrest” were without reasonable
suspicion and that the search of the rental car was unlawful.
¶5 On August 9, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. The
defense called a single witness, Trooper Garet Lindroth of the Illinois State Police. Trooper
Lindroth testified that on the afternoon of defendant’s arrest, he was stationed in his police
vehicle “working a speed-enforcement detail.”
¶6 At approximately 1:38 p.m., a Ford vehicle passed him, traveling at a speed of 89 miles
per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. Trooper Lindroth pursued the vehicle and initiated a traffic
stop. At approximately 1:40 p.m., he approached the stopped vehicle, which was driven by
defendant. He informed defendant that he had been stopped for speeding. Trooper Lindroth
asked defendant “for his driver’s license and his rental agreement.” Trooper Lindroth testified
that, when he approached the vehicle, he “had already [run] the registration,” which indicated
that it was a Hertz rental car.
¶7 Defendant provided the trooper with his driver’s license and the rental agreement. At that
time, he “indicated [to Trooper Lindroth] that he was not on the rental agreement.” 1 Trooper
Lindroth did not ask defendant any questions about the rental agreement or how he came to
possess the rental car. Instead, Trooper Lindroth “went back to [his] squad car and contacted
Hertz about any third-party drivers.” He did so although there was no “general order” of the
1
There is nothing in the record identifying who was named as the lessee on the Hertz rental
agreement. Nor is there anything indicating whether the named lessee gave defendant permission to drive
the rental car.
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Illinois State Police directing officers to contact a rental company under such circumstances.
Additionally, he testified that he did not suspect that the car was stolen.
¶8 Before he contacted Hertz, Trooper Lindroth used a computer to check defendant’s
driver’s license and confirmed that the license was valid. Trooper Lindroth stated that this check
was completed in “under a minute.”
¶9 Trooper Lindroth testified that it took “a few minutes” for him to contact Hertz. He called
the company and “was connected to their emergency police side of Hertz, and provided them
with information they were asking of the vehicle, and they informed me whether or not *** they
wanted me to recover the vehicle for them.” According to Trooper Lindroth, “Hertz indicated
that [defendant] was not an authorized driver [on the rental agreement], and that they wanted the
vehicle impounded.” Trooper Lindroth acknowledged that he did not attempt to contact the
person listed as the lessee on the rental agreement. Trooper Lindroth did not ask defendant any
questions regarding the person listed on the rental agreement or how defendant came to be
driving the vehicle.
¶ 10 After speaking with Hertz, Trooper Lindroth returned to the rental car. According to his
arrest report, he returned to the vehicle at 2:05 p.m. He agreed that this was “roughly” 25
minutes after he initially stopped the vehicle. At that time, Trooper Lindroth “informed
[defendant] that Hertz wanted their car back/recovered” and that defendant “was not registered
as the permitted driver, nor was he an authorized additional driver.” He told defendant that he
would be charged with criminal trespass to the rental vehicle. Defendant was then handcuffed
and placed in the back of the squad car.
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¶ 11 Trooper Lindroth stated that he proceeded to “perform an inventory search” of the
vehicle because he planned to have the rental car towed. Trooper Lindroth acknowledged that he
never asked defendant for permission to search the vehicle and that he had no search warrant.
¶ 12 When he searched the vehicle, Trooper Lindroth opened the “center console” between the
two front seats. Inside, he found a tied black plastic bag that “contained another clear-plastic
bag” containing “packed round balls” of suspected narcotics. Trooper Lindroth placed defendant
under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. It does not appear from the record that the
trooper ever issued a speeding ticket to defendant, which was the original reason for the stop.
¶ 13 Trooper Lindroth testified on cross-examination that defendant had a valid Nevada
driver’s license. Trooper Lindroth also stated that defendant promptly acknowledged that his
name was not on the rental agreement “[b]efore he even gave [the agreement] to [Trooper
Lindroth].”
¶ 14 Trooper Lindroth agreed that he called Hertz to verify that defendant was not authorized
to drive the vehicle. Trooper Lindroth testified that a Hertz representative confirmed that
defendant was not authorized to drive the car, and told him that Hertz “wanted [Trooper
Lindroth] to seize that car and take legal custody of that car.”
¶ 15 Also on cross-examination, Trooper Lindroth was asked, “if, in fact, that had been
[defendant’s] car and you would have stopped him for a traffic violation, you would have just
g[iven] him the ticket, and he would have been free to go?” He agreed that he detained defendant
“because he did not own that vehicle, he wasn’t authorized to drive that vehicle.” However,
Trooper Lindroth acknowledged that he only learned that information after calling Hertz.
¶ 16 Trooper Lindroth stated that he searched the car because it was “our policy” to
“inventory” a vehicle before it is towed. Trooper Lindroth explained that the police “must know
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what’s in the vehicle” because “we’re liable and responsible for anything that happens to any
items or property inside that vehicle while it goes to the tow yard.” Trooper Lindroth testified
that the police tested the suspected narcotics at the scene.
¶ 17 On redirect examination, Trooper Lindroth agreed that he has previously stopped cars
that were not driven by the registered owner but in such situations he has never before called the
actual owner of the vehicle during a traffic stop. Trooper Lindroth agreed that he had not read the
rental agreement, which defendant provided to him upon being stopped. Therefore, he did not
know its guidelines for drivers other than the person who rented the vehicle. He claimed that he
called Hertz for clarification regarding who was authorized to drive the rental vehicle.
¶ 18 Trooper Lindroth agreed that “without that phone call to Hertz, [he] simply would have
given [defendant] a ticket, and he would have been on his way.” He also agreed that he had
already checked the validity of the defendant’s license before he contacted Hertz and that he did
not suspect that the vehicle was stolen.
¶ 19 No other witnesses were called at the hearing. After the court heard argument from
defense counsel and the State, it granted defendant’s motion to suppress.
¶ 20 In its ruling, the trial court identified the pertinent issue as whether “contacting Hertz ***
was related in scope to the circumstance that justified the stop in the first place.” The court found
that Trooper Lindroth “certainly exceeded the scope of the stop when he on his own accord
found it necessary to call Hertz *** when the Officer clearly stated that in a different
circumstance, if this were a private owner, a private car driven by the non-owner of the car, he
would not contact the owner of that automobile.” The court remarked that “[t]he seizure,
although it was lawful at its inception *** became unlawful because of the prolonged time in the
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delay to call Hertz for [Trooper Lindroth’s] own personal gratification.” The trial court thus
granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.
¶ 21 The State filed a motion to reconsider. In that motion, the State argued that because
defendant was not the renter and was unauthorized to drive the rental car, he lacked any
reasonable expectation of privacy; he thus lacked “standing” to challenge the search of that
vehicle. The State also argued that Trooper Lindroth’s inquiry to Hertz did not unreasonably
prolong the stop. The State cited the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), for the proposition that, during a traffic
stop, a police officer may make “ordinary inquiries incident to the stop” such as checking a
driver’s license and vehicle registration.
¶ 22 On October 20, 2017, the court reversed its earlier ruling and granted the State’s motion
to reconsider. The court first observed that in raising a fourth amendment challenge to a search, it
was defendant’s burden to prove standing by demonstrating that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the place searched. The court determined that defendant lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the rental car for two reasons. First, the court found that defendant
failed to show that his use of the car was authorized by the vehicle’s owner, Hertz. Second, the
court found that defendant “failed to show that he had been given permission to use the vehicle
by the renter of the vehicle” as there was no evidence that the renter of the vehicle had given
defendant permission to drive the car. On that basis, the court granted the State’s motion to
reconsider, thus reversing its earlier ruling which had suppressed the fruits of the search.
¶ 23 On November 17, 2017, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling granting
the State’s motion to reconsider its initial decision on the motion to suppress. Defendant’s
motion noted that the trial court had granted the State’s motion to reconsider on the basis of
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defendant’s lack of standing but its ruling had not addressed the separate issue of “the
reasonableness of the length of time it took” for Trooper Lindroth to detain defendant and
contact Hertz. Defendant’s motion cited Rodriguez for the proposition that, absent reasonable
suspicion, an officer may not make inquiries unrelated to the suspected traffic violation that
unreasonably prolong a traffic stop. The focus of defendant’s motion was that Trooper Lindroth
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify detaining defendant for 25 minutes while he contacted
Hertz.
¶ 24 Before the trial court heard argument on the defendant’s motion to reconsider, the United
States Supreme Court decided Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1531
(2018), which held that the “mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car
is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of
privacy.”
¶ 25 On June 14, 2018, the trial court heard argument on defendant’s motion to reconsider its
ruling in the State’s favor, which reversed its original ruling in defendant’s favor. Defendant’s
counsel cited Byrd in support of the proposition that defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, therefore, had standing. The State responded that Byrd’s facts were distinguishable,
and that under Byrd it remained defendant’s burden to show his “lawful possession” of the rental
car to establish his standing. The State noted that, in Byrd, there was evidence that the lessee of
the rental vehicle had given the defendant authority to use it, whereas in this case, defendant did
not present such evidence.
¶ 26 In response, defense counsel pointed out that Trooper Lindroth had never asked
defendant whether he had permission from the person who rented the vehicle from Hertz to use
the rental car. Defense counsel also argued that the trooper’s decision to call Hertz resulted in an
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improper “25-minute delay” for a speeding ticket and that such delay independently supported
granting defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court agreed.
¶ 27 In its ruling, the court recalled that, when it initially granted the motion to suppress, it
“was troubled by the 25-minute detention [by] the police officer” and believed that the delay
“exceeded the scope of the initial stop, which was basically a speeding ticket.” The court said:
“I don’t believe police officers ordinarily stop a vehicle when they
find out a person is not the driver and call the owner of the car to
ascertain whether or not the driver is a valid person. They
generally check the identification of the driver. If the license is
valid and the car has not been reported stolen, which is the case
here, they usually issue a speeding ticket, and the person goes on.
In this case, the [United States Supreme] Court in Byrd states that a
person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy. And I
believe [defendant] shares that same reasonable expectation of
privacy. And for the police to delay [defendant], call the rental
company, I didn’t understand it then. I didn’t like it then. It didn’t
pass the smell test then, and it doesn’t pass the smell test now.”
The court thus granted defendant’s motion to reconsider its ruling in favor of the State. The court
thus reversed itself once more and granted the motion to suppress.
¶ 28 The State subsequently filed a “Certificate of Substantial Impairment” stating that the
granting of the motion to suppress substantially impaired its ability to prosecute the case and thus
it would appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). On July
11, 2018, the State filed a notice of appeal.
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¶ 29 ANALYSIS
¶ 30 We first note that we have jurisdiction because the State filed a timely notice of appeal
pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1), which permits the State to appeal from an order “the substantive
effect of which results in *** suppressing evidence.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 31 On appeal, the State asserts two lines of argument to urge that the motion to suppress
should not have been granted. First, the State contends that Trooper Lindroth’s inquiries during
the traffic stop and corresponding 25-minute delay were reasonable. The State cites Rodriguez
for the proposition that during a traffic stop, an officer may make ordinary inquiries related to
safety concerns, such as checking the driver’s license, checking if a driver has outstanding
warrants, and inspecting a vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. The State argues that,
just as an officer may check registration, under the circumstances of this case, “placing the call to
Hertz was well within the mission of the stop.” The State argues that, under Rodriguez, the
“mission” of a traffic stop is to address the immediate traffic violation and to “attend to related
safety concerns.” 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The State further argues that Rodriguez
additionally supports Trooper Lindroth’s prolonged detention of defendant because, “[b]eyond
determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries
incident to” the traffic stop. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
The State suggests that Trooper Lindroth’s call to Hertz was one of these permissible “ordinary
inquiries.” The State argues that although this inquiry resulted in a delay of approximately 25
minutes, it was nonetheless objectively reasonable and within the mission of a valid traffic stop.
¶ 32 The State also makes a policy argument, suggesting that to disallow lengthy stops such as
the one in this case would impede law enforcement’s ability to ensure that a car is being
responsibly driven. The State argues that a call by police to the vehicle’s registered owner
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“cannot be unreasonable where it extends the duration of the stop comparably to a warrant or
license check.”
¶ 33 Second, apart from the reasonableness of the detention, the State urges that defendant
failed to meet his burden to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental
car. The State points out that defendant “did not present any evidence that the person who rented
the vehicle from Hertz gave him permission to drive it.”
¶ 34 The State suggests that we should be guided by People v. Bower, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1077,
1083 (1997), which held that a defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of a rental car
where defendant asked a friend to rent the vehicle for defendant’s use after the rental car
company rejected defendant’s application. The State argues that the trial court should have
followed Bower and found that defendant failed to establish any legitimate expectation of
privacy. The State posits that this conclusion is not affected by the United States Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Byrd. The State suggests that the circuit court erroneously interpreted
Byrd as holding that the driver of a rental car always has a legitimate expectation of privacy,
regardless of whether the driver is authorized to operate the car. The State emphasizes that, in
this case, defendant offered no evidence as to whether an “authorized renter” gave him
permission to drive the rental car.
¶ 35 In response, defendant argues that the facts and holding of Rodriguez are analogous to the
facts of this case. He asserts that, although Rodriguez permits an officer to conduct certain
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop,
absent reasonable suspicion. Defendant rejects the State’s contention that the inquiry to Hertz
was within the “mission of the ticket” pursuant to Rodriguez or that it was related to safety
concerns. Specifically, defendant rejects the State’s assertion that the call to Hertz was analogous
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to a call to check the validity of a driver’s license. Defendant acknowledges that a “license check
is within the mission of the traffic stop” because it is “directly related to the scope of the traffic
stop.” Defendant points out that in this case, Trooper Lindroth did check defendant’s license, and
determined that it was valid. That process was completed in under a minute. Yet, the trooper
proceeded to make the separate, lengthy inquiry to Hertz, even after ascertaining that defendant
had a valid driver’s license.
¶ 36 Defendant also points out Trooper Lindroth’s admission that when he has previously
stopped cars not driven by their registered owners, he has never contacted the owner during a
traffic stop. Defendant urges that it would be incongruous to permit such an inquiry during a
traffic stop of a rental car, but not for nonrental vehicles.
¶ 37 Defendant emphasizes that Trooper Lindroth did not testify that defendant was behaving
suspiciously. Further, Trooper Lindroth testified that he did not suspect that the rental car was
stolen. Defendant also notes that Trooper Lindroth did not ask him anything about the rental
agreement, nor did the trooper read it. Instead, Trooper Lindroth “decided to insert himself into
what amounts to a civil contract dispute between Hertz and the lessee.” Defendant asserts that
the mere fact that his name was not on the rental agreement was insufficient to justify the
trooper’s actions, which unreasonably extended his detention by prolonging what should have
been a routine traffic stop.
¶ 38 Defendant otherwise argues that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental
car, relying on Byrd. He notes that there is “no evidence in the record that the vehicle was ever
reported stolen or that [his] presence in the car was unlawful.” In response to the State’s reliance
on Bower, defendant points out that it was decided before the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Byrd. Defendant claims that Byrd now makes clear “that drivers in lawful possession
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or control of a rental vehicle maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy absent specific
circumstances not present in this case.”
¶ 39 A two-part standard of review applies when we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to quash arrest and suppress evidence. People v. Holmes, 2017 IL 120407, ¶ 9. “Great deference
is afforded to the trial court’s findings of fact, and those factual findings will be reversed only if
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. However, we review de novo the “trial
court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether the evidence should be suppressed.” Id.
¶ 40 “The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. This protection extend[s] to brief investigatory stops of persons or
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v.
Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, “whenever a police officer decides
to stop a vehicle, the stop must meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.; see also People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005) (“a vehicle stop is subject
to the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness in all the circumstances”).
¶ 41 “If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, courts will exclude evidence
gained from that violation in judicial proceedings against the person injured.” Rodriguez-
Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“[E]vidence may not be
introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably
related in scope to the justification for their initiation.”).
¶ 42 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry “established the legitimacy of an
investigatory stop ‘in situations where [the police] may lack probable cause for an arrest.’ ”
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). “When the stop is
justified by suspicion (reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is
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afoot ***, the police officer must be positioned to act instantly on reasonable suspicion that the
persons temporarily detained are armed and dangerous.” Id. Thus, Terry held that a police
officer’s “limited search of outer clothing for weapons serves to protect both the officer and the
public” and that such a patdown search was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 27, 30-31).
¶ 43 The United States Supreme Court has observed that most traffic stops “ ‘resemble, in
duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.’ ” Id. Our supreme
court has stated that since “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop
than to a formal arrest,” “courts generally analyze fourth amendment challenges to the
reasonableness of traffic stops under Terry principles.” Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 270. Our supreme
court explained:
“Pursuant to Terry, a law enforcement officer may, under
appropriate circumstances, briefly detain a person for questioning
if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or
is about to commit, a crime. [Citation.] However, the investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. at 270-71.
¶ 44 The United States Supreme Court has explained the scope of a reasonable roadside
detention as follows:
“A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled
over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure
of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains
reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends
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when the police have no further need to control the scene, and
inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. [Citation.]
An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for
the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
(Emphasis added.) Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
¶ 45 Illustrating the permissible scope of a detention, in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005), the United States Supreme Court found no fourth amendment violation where the use of
a narcotics-detection dog during a traffic stop did not prolong the traffic-related detention. In that
case, a state trooper stopped respondent’s vehicle for speeding and reported the stop by radio. Id.
at 406. A second trooper heard the radio report and headed to the scene with a narcotics-
detection dog. Id. While the first officer “was in the process of writing a warning ticket, [the
second trooper] walked his dog around respondent’s car.” Id. After the dog “alerted at the trunk,”
the officers searched it, discovered marijuana, and arrested respondent; “[t]he entire incident
lasted less than 10 minutes.” Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
“[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a
drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at 407.
¶ 46 The Caballes Court recognized that “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in
issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.” Id. The Court noted that the judges in prior state-
court proceedings “carefully reviewed the details of [the arresting officer’s] conversations with
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respondent and the precise timing of his radio transmission *** to determine whether he had
improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur.” Id. at 408. The
Court “accept[ed] the state court’s conclusion that the duration of the stop in this case was
entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Id.
¶ 47 The United States Supreme Court proceeded to hold that a dog sniff during a lawful stop
did not compromise a legitimate privacy interest and did not violate the fourth amendment. Id. at
409 (“In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while he was
lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations does
not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.”).
¶ 48 However, in the 2015 Rodriguez decision, the United States Supreme Court clarified that
a dog sniff that extends the detention of an initially legitimate traffic stop—even by a matter of
minutes—is unlawful if not supported by reasonable suspicion. 575 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. 1609.
In this appeal, the State and defendant both claim that Rodriguez supports their respective
positions, and so we review that decision in detail.
¶ 49 In Rodriguez, a K-9 police officer (Officer Struble) pulled over a vehicle at 12:06 a.m.
after it briefly veered onto the shoulder of a highway. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. There were
two men in the vehicle: the driver (Rodriguez) and one passenger (Pollman). Id. at ___, 135 S.
Ct. at 1612.
¶ 50 Officer Struble first spoke to Rodriguez, who provided his license, registration, and proof
of insurance. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. Officer Struble returned to his patrol car and ran a
“records check” on Rodriguez; he then returned to the vehicle and questioned Pollman. Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. Officer Struble then “returned again to his patrol car, where he
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completed a records check on Pollman, and called for a second officer.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1613. Struble began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
¶ 51 Officer Struble returned to the vehicle a third time to issue the written warning. Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Officer Struble had “finished explaining the
warning *** and had given back to Rodriguez and Pollman the documents obtained from them.”
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. However, Officer Struble did not let them leave at that time but
asked for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
Rodriguez “said no”; Officer Struble then instructed Rodriguez to exit the vehicle and “stand in
front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
¶ 52 After a second officer arrived, Officer Struble led his dog around the vehicle; the dog
alerted to the presence of drugs. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. “[S]even or eight minutes had
elapsed from the time [Officer] Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the
presence of drugs.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. The officers searched the vehicle and
recovered a bag of methamphetamine. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
¶ 53 In his subsequent prosecution, Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence from the
vehicle search, on the ground that Officer Struble prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog
sniff, without reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. The district court denied the
motion to suppress, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613-14. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve “whether police routinely may extend an
otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.”
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
¶ 54 The United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez instructed:
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“Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the
traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Caballes, [543
U.S. at 407] and attend to related safety concerns ***. [Citations.]
Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may
‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.
[Citations.] Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to
the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
¶ 55 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court recognized that its decisions in Johnson
and Caballes had “concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated
investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention. [Citations.]” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1614. However, Rodriguez pointed out:
“In Caballes, *** we cautioned that a traffic stop ‘can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket. [Citation.] And
we repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains
lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop.’ [Citations.] An officer, in other
words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise
lawful traffic stop. But *** he may not do so in a way that
prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
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demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1614-15.
¶ 56 Rodriguez proceeded to explain the scope of the “mission” of a traffic stop:
“Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an
officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the
traffic] stop.’ Caballes, [543 U.S. at 408]. Typically such inquiries
involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there
are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. [Citations.] These
checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:
ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly. [Citations.]” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
¶ 57 The Rodriguez Court then held that a dog sniff was not one of these ordinary inquiries:
“Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not
fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. The
Court concluded that, absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the police could not
prolong a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. In doing so, it rejected the government’s argument
that an officer “may ‘incremental[ly]’ prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer
is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration
of the stop remains reasonable.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. The Court reasoned that the
government’s argument was, in effect, “that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously,
an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.” Id. at ___, 135 S.
Ct. at 1616. The Court rejected that proposition, holding: “If an officer can complete traffic-
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based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete
[the stop’s] mission.’ [Citation.] As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic stop
‘prolonged beyond’ that point is ‘unlawful.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
¶ 58 The United States Supreme Court thus vacated the Eighth Circuit’s order affirming the
denial of the motion to suppress and remanded. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616-17 (noting that
“[t]he question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez
beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation” remained open on remand).
¶ 59 In this appeal before us, both parties claim that Rodriguez supports their respective
positions as to the propriety of Trooper Lindroth’s action in prolonging the stop in order to
contact Hertz after stopping defendant for speeding. Notably, the State does not dispute, as a
factual matter, that the duration of the stop was extended by approximately 25 minutes due to the
trooper’s decision to contact Hertz. Trooper Lindroth testified unequivocally that he had already
checked the validity of defendant’s license and would otherwise have completed the stop in
under a minute had he not elected to make an additional inquiry to Hertz. He further testified that
he did not suspect that the vehicle had been stolen.
¶ 60 Nevertheless, the State takes the position that the inquiry to Hertz was reasonable, as it
was within the “mission of the stop” pursuant to Rodriguez. The State emphasizes that, under
Rodriguez, the mission of the stop is not limited to addressing the specific traffic violation that
triggered the stop, but also “attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
The State also highlights Rodriguez’s recognition that the mission includes “ordinary inquiries”
incident to the stop and that such inquiries include checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration. The State
suggests that Trooper Lindroth’s Hertz inquiry was another one of these ordinary inquiries. That
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is, the State argues that contacting Hertz in this situation was “no different than calling a
dispatcher to check whether a driver has a valid license or an active warrant.” Thus, the State
contends that Rodriguez supports the conclusion that calling Hertz, the actual owner of the rental
car, was within the scope of the traffic stop’s mission and reasonable under the fourth
amendment.
¶ 61 We disagree. We recognize that, under Rodriguez, the “mission” of a lawful traffic stop is
not limited to addressing the precise traffic violation that precipitated the stop but also
“attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Rodriguez recognizes that
an officer may “conduct certain unrelated checks” absent reasonable suspicion if they do not
prolong the stop. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Rodriguez explained that permissible “ordinary
inquiries incident to” a traffic stop typically include “checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1615. Significantly, in describing the permissible “ordinary inquiries,” Rodriguez explained,
“These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles
on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. We do not believe, nor do we hold that pursuant to
Rodriguez, an officer is forbidden from ever contacting a vehicle’s owner following a stop. We
reiterate that any activity which prolongs the stop must be related to permissible, ordinary
inquiries as outlined in Rodriguez, if not otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion.
¶ 62 In this case, the State has not articulated a single example of how the call to Hertz falls
within the ambit of the safety checks described in Rodriguez, such as would justify prolonging
the stop. Defendant had a valid driver’s license and the car had not been reported stolen; neither
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did the trooper suspect that it had been stolen. The record does not suggest, nor did the trooper
testify, that he had uncovered any outstanding warrants for defendant when he did a routine
check before calling Hertz. In short, there was no articulated safety issue identified by Trooper
Lindroth as a basis for contacting Hertz. Therefore, we conclude that Trooper Lindroth’s inquiry
to Hertz does not fit within the categories of permissible inquiries recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in either Rodriguez or any of the cases discussed in Rodriguez. First, it is
obvious that the inquiry to Hertz had nothing to do with the traffic violation that warranted the
stop, specifically, speeding. Indeed, Trooper Lindroth testified that he could have quickly
completed the traffic stop and issued a speeding ticket to defendant. In under a minute, he had
already determined that the vehicle was a rental, that it was not reported stolen, that defendant’s
driver’s license was valid, and that there were no outstanding warrants related to defendant. We
also do not find that the inquiry can be explained away as being part of “attend[ing] to related
safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The State does not suggest that the inquiry was
necessary to protect the trooper’s safety during the stop, or to protect the public at large.
¶ 63 Similarly, we reject the State’s argument that the call to Hertz can be construed as one of
the permissible “ordinary inquiries” incident to the traffic stop, akin to a routine check of a
driver’s license, registration, or proof of insurance. We reiterate Rodriguez’s recognition that
“[t]hese checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that
vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 135 S.
Ct. at 1615. We fail to see how the trooper’s inquiry to Hertz in this case furthers the objective of
ensuring safe and responsible operation of vehicles on the road. There is nothing inherently
unsafe or irresponsible (let alone illegal) about a situation in which a rental car is driven by
someone other than the lessee identified on the rental agreement. During oral argument before
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this court, the State could not articulate a reasonable basis to suspect that such a driver is less
safe or more likely to violate traffic laws.
¶ 64 Significantly, a car rental agreement is, of course, a matter of contract, whose terms are
dictated by the parties to the contract. The contracting parties are free to agree upon the terms of
that contract. Both contracting parties have rights under the terms of the contract. Yet, Trooper
Lindroth did not contact the individual whose name appeared on the rental agreement. Further,
the trooper did not inquire of defendant whether he had the lessee’s permission to drive the car.
The mere fact that a particular individual is not specifically identified in a rental contract does
not necessarily give rise to an assumption that the person’s use of the vehicle is unauthorized.
¶ 65 In any event, even if a lessee permits another person to use a rental car without the
consent of the rental car company, it is, at most, a breach of contract. A breach of contract is not
a crime and is not inherently dangerous to the public, such as to require monitoring by police.
We thus agree with defendant’s observation that Trooper Lindroth, in this case, essentially
inserted himself into a contractual relationship between Hertz and the lessee of the vehicle.
¶ 66 Notably, the State does not suggest that, absent reasonable suspicion of a crime, an
officer may extend the detention of a nonrental vehicle during a traffic stop in order to attempt to
contact the record owner. 2 The State does not articulate why a different standard applies to the
rental vehicle in this case. It bears repeating that Trooper Lindroth indicated that he did not
suspect any criminal activity other than the speeding violation; nevertheless, he extended the
traffic stop by 25 minutes in order to contact Hertz.
¶ 67 We conclude that Trooper Lindroth’s prolongation of the stop in order to call Hertz was
not within the mission of the stop. Rather, that inquiry went beyond the original scope of the
2
Indeed, the trooper acknowledged that in prior traffic stops where the driver was not the
registered owner of the vehicle, he never attempted to contact the owner of the vehicle. When defense
counsel pressed him on this point, he said that this situation was different, but he did not articulate why.
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traffic stop, and extended the duration of the defendant’s detention. Such an extension was
unlawful, absent reasonable suspicion to support it. See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (an officer
“may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop” but “he may not
do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual”). The State does not attempt to argue that there was any
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by defendant. Nor do we find anything in Trooper
Lindroth’s testimony indicating a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by defendant beyond
the speeding violation, as would be necessary to justify prolonging the stop and an inquiry
beyond the “mission” of the traffic stop.
¶ 68 Thus, we conclude that defendant’s detention became unlawful once it was prolonged
beyond the issuance of the speeding ticket. The prolongation was solely to enable Trooper
Lindroth’s inquiry to Hertz, for reasons that were clearly unrelated to the stop. His call to Hertz
led to his decision to impound the vehicle, based on what the Hertz employee asked him to do.
However, even then, it was not suggested that a crime had been committed. Rather, it was
inferred that defendant was an unauthorized user of the vehicle, within the context of the contract
between Hertz and the renter. Defendant points out that Trooper Lindroth’s action essentially
cast him in the role of monitoring and enforcing the contract between Hertz and the renter. This
was not, and could not, be a lawful reason for prolonging the stop. That action, in turn, prompted
the search of the vehicle and the discovery of narcotics. That evidence was therefore the product
of an unlawful detention. Thus, the trial court was correct when it granted defendant’s motion to
suppress.
¶ 69 Our conclusion that Trooper Lindroth’s inquiry to Hertz went beyond the mission of
issuing the speeding ticket and was not supported by any reasonable suspicion is dispositive of
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this appeal. Because the trooper’s unlawful extension of the detention resulted in the discovery
of the narcotics evidence in question, we need not reach the separate question of whether
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle. Absent our ruling that the
detention was unreasonably prolonged, such a privacy determination would be necessary to give
defendant standing to object to the vehicle search. 3 However, we need not reach that privacy
issue because we have determined that the detention had already become unlawful before the
inventory search. Specifically, it became unlawful when Trooper Lindroth decided to go beyond
the mission of issuing the speeding ticket and prolong the stop in order to contact Hertz without
any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or other proper reason for doing so. See id. at ___,
135 S. Ct. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction
are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”). Thus, we need not decide whether
defendant would have had standing to object to the search of the rental vehicle had the preceding
detention and inquiry otherwise been permissible.
¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 71 Affirmed.
¶ 72 JUSTICE CONNORS, dissenting:
¶ 73 I respectfully dissent. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, a bifurcated
standard of review applies. “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to great deference,
and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
People v. Heritsch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 8. “A finding is against the manifest weight of
the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is
3
The State does not suggest that defendant lacked standing to challenge the trooper’s actions prior
to the vehicle search. In any case, the United States Supreme Court has held that “A person is seized by
the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of
movement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007).
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unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39. A trial court’s conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo. Heritsch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 8.
¶ 74 I believe that the trial court’s factual findings were not based on the evidence presented
and its conclusions of law were not based on a proper interpretation of the law. In People v.
Baldwin, this court recognized that the reviewing court is free to assess the facts relative to the
issue presented in the case and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief, if any,
should be granted. 388 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1031 (2009).
¶ 75 No bright-line rule exists with regard to the reasonableness of a stop’s duration. Id. at
1034. Instead, case law instructs that we should employ a “contextual, totality of the
circumstances analysis that includes consideration of the brevity of the stop and whether the
police acted diligently during the stop.” Id.
¶ 76 Moreover, diligence is a very important consideration when evaluating the totality of the
circumstances in this case. See id. The nature of the tasks subject to the officer’s reasonable
diligence is of paramount importance to the outcome of this appeal. Also, the duration of the stop
must be justified by the nature of the offense and “the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.”
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
¶ 77 To begin the analysis when dealing with a motion to suppress, the court must ask whether
the stop was justified at its inception. Baldwin, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1032 (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)). A police officer is justified in stopping and detaining a driver if the officer
observes the driver commit a traffic offense or has probable cause to believe a traffic violation
has occurred. People v. Abdur-Rahim, 2014 IL App (3d) 130558, ¶ 26. The parties do not dispute
that probable cause existed to justify the traffic stop. The arresting trooper, Trooper Lindroth,
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testified that he observed defendant’s car driving at a rate of 89 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-
hour zone at 1:38 p.m. and approached the vehicle at 1:40 p.m. Trooper Lindroth also testified he
returned to defendant’s vehicle at 2:05 p.m., roughly 25 minutes after the initial stop.
¶ 78 Depending on the mission for the stop, 25 minutes may not be a substantially long period
of time for a traffic stop. In People v. Staley, we held that an 18-minute traffic stop to issue
citations was not unreasonable based on the circumstances. 334 Ill. App. 3d 358, 367 (2002).
Also, in People v. Wofford, we held that a 17-minute stop to write a warning ticket was not
unreasonable based on the circumstances. 2012 IL App (5th) 100138, ¶¶ 30-31.
¶ 79 In the case at bar, it is pertinent to examine just what Trooper Lindroth was doing from
the time he went back to his police vehicle until he went back to defendant’s vehicle. The only
facts we know about this time frame are that the trooper made contact with Hertz, which
informed the trooper that defendant was not an authorized driver on the vehicle and requested, as
owner, that the trooper impound the vehicle. What length of time was spent on the inquiry to
Hertz? Was the trooper on hold for a period of time? Was the trooper transferred between
multiple Hertz employees during the course of the inquiry? Did the trooper take the time to read
a portion of the rental agreement to obtain information needed to relay to Hertz? Did he consult
with any fellow troopers or supervisors during this time? We know that pursuant to Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-16 (2015), an arresting officer is
allowed to attend to related safety concerns in his or her inquiries. Safety concerns typically
“involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Were any of the 25 minutes at issue here spent addressing the safety
concerns allowed by Rodriguez? It is notable in Rodriguez that the United States Supreme Court
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found that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Based on what was
presented at the hearing, I believe this court is unable to determine what the nature of the
trooper’s tasks were, or if they were reasonable.
¶ 80 Trooper Lindroth was asked general questions at the suppression hearing regarding what
transpired during the disputed 25 minutes. All that we know is that he ran the license on his
computer in less than one minute, spent a few minutes getting ahold of Hertz, and then
proceeded to discuss the situation with Hertz. Thus, the trial court did not have the basis for
conducting a contextual, totality of the circumstances-based analysis, as required by Baldwin. It
was impossible for the trial court to have been able to conclude that the officer acted diligently
during the traffic stop without knowing what he did during these 25 minutes.
¶ 81 The trial court’s August 9, 2017, ruling stated the following: “The seizure, although it
was lawful at its inception, I believe, it became unlawful because of the prolonged time in the
delay to call Hertz for this Officer’s own personal gratification. I don’t know what it was.”
(Emphasis added.) The record fails to disclose any evidence as to what tasks were conducted by
the officer for his own personal gratification. Additionally, in the court’s November 17, 2017,
ruling, when reconsidering granting the State’s motion to reconsider, the trial court granted the
motion to suppress, stating “I don’t believe police officers ordinarily stop a vehicle when they
find out a person is not the driver and call the owner of the car to ascertain whether or not the
driver is a valid person,” despite that there was no testimony at the hearing on the motion to
suppress regarding Trooper Lindroth’s experience or what a police officer “ordinarily” does in
this type of situation. Further, these factual findings of the trial court are not based on evidence
that was presented in court and are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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¶ 82 The majority concludes that Trooper Lindroth’s inquiry went beyond the mission of
issuing the speeding ticket, specifically, by contacting the vehicle’s owner. Although the
majority states that it does not believe that “an officer is forbidden from ever contacting a
vehicle’s owner following a stop” (emphasis in original) (supra ¶ 61), its analysis suggests
otherwise, given the fact that defendant voluntarily informed the trooper that he was not on the
rental agreement, which provided a solid justification for the trooper’s decision to contact Hertz.
Rodriguez states that the tolerable duration of police inquiries during a traffic stop is determined
by the seizure’s mission, which includes addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop
and attending to related safety concerns. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. As previously mentioned,
these safety concerns “involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. An officer’s actions in conjunction with his concern
for the public safety, i.e., checking whether a vehicle or its driver are appropriately insured, is
quite reasonable, I suggest, and well within the mission of a traffic stop.
¶ 83 Here, it is clear that the trooper was advised by the owners of the vehicle that defendant
was not authorized to drive and the owner requested impoundment. Only then, at this point, the
question becomes did the trooper have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This is when
the trooper advised defendant he was being charged with criminal trespass to the vehicle, which
then resulted in the impoundment and search. But, we need not determine these issues at this
time.
¶ 84 The majority’s holding, again, is based solely on the inquiry to the car’s owner as being
beyond the mission of the issuance of a speeding ticket. The majority states that it does not need
to reach the reasonable expectation of privacy issue. Supra ¶ 69. However, I believe it is
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imperative to discuss the privacy issue and Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518
(2018), since that case’s reasoning was used by the trial court in ruling on this matter.
¶ 85 Byrd’s holding expressly stated that, “the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or
control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The Court remanded two
remaining issues to the court of appeals: (1) whether probable cause justified the search in any
event and (2) whether one who intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a
fraudulent scheme for the purpose of committing a crime is no better situated than a car thief. Id.
at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1531.
¶ 86 Byrd did not establish a bright-line rule that all nonauthorized drivers have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. In People v. McCauley, this court referred to the holding in Byrd as
representing that a “driver in lawful possession and control of rental car could have reasonable
expectation of privacy in car, even if not listed as [an] authorized driver on [the] rental contract”
and remanded to the lower court to make that determination. (Emphasis in original.) 2018 IL
App (1st) 160812, ¶ 41 (citing Byrd, 584 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1527). I believe McCauley’s
description is accurate and differs from the conclusion made by the trial court in this case that
this defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, the “lawful possession”
element enumerated in Byrd is not the same as the factual scenario before this court because,
here, defendant was not in lawful possession of the car per the information received from Hertz,
the car’s owner.
¶ 87 Regarding the majority’s comments as to standing, we are instructed by our supreme
court’s statement in People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 521 (2004), that, “As did the United States
Supreme Court, we admonish courts against analyzing a legitimate expectation of privacy issue
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under the rubric of ‘standing.’ ” As a result, I discount the State’s argument raised as to standing
and the majority’s analysis of it.
¶ 88 For the above-stated reasons, I would reverse the order of the circuit court granting
defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and remand for further proceedings to
consider the reasonableness of the nature and duration of the traffic stop.
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