People v. Norris , 428 Ill. Dec. 899 ( 2018 )

2018 IL App (3d) 170436Opinion filed December 31, 2018
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Will County, Illinois,
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-17-0436
) Circuit No. 17-DT-10
)
JOHN V. NORRIS, ) Honorable
) Rick A. Mason,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, John V. Norris, appeals following the denial of his petition to rescind his
statutory summary suspension. He raises five arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The State charged defendant with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI)
(625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)) via complaint dated January 3, 2017. Based on
defendant’s refusal to complete postarrest testing, his driver’s license was subject to a 12-month
statutory summary suspension. Defendant, who represented himself throughout the entirety of
the proceedings below, subsequently filed a petition to rescind the suspension on the grounds
that (1) the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was under
the influence of alcohol, and (2) he had not been warned that refusal to submit to testing would
result in the suspension of his driver’s license.
¶4 Following a number of agreed continuances, defendant’s petition to rescind was stricken
for want of prosecution on March 15, 2017, when he failed to appear in court. On April 4, 2017,
defendant filed a motion to reinstate his petition, averring that he had been sick on the previous
court date and that officials at Will County Adult Detention Facility had failed to inform the
court of that fact. On April 13, 2017, the court reinstated defendant’s petition, commenting:
“We’ll show the motion is reinstated, and the new 30 days starts to run from today.” The court
scheduled the hearing for May 1.
¶5 Defendant subsequently filed a “Motion to Suppress Statements (Miranda Warning).” In
the motion, defendant asserted that statements he made in the course of his traffic stop should be
suppressed on the grounds that the arresting officer never read a Miranda warning. In the
motion, defendant did not identify with any specificity the statements he sought to have
suppressed.
¶6 On April 26, the State filed a motion to continue the hearing on defendant’s petition
because the arresting officer would be unavailable on May 1. The court granted the State’s
motion over defendant’s objection and rescheduled the hearing on the petition to rescind for May
15.
¶7 A combined hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind and his motion to suppress
commenced on May 15, 2017. Defendant’s first witness was the arresting officer, Robert Mau, of
the Joliet Police Department. After a series of preliminary questions, an attempt was made to
play the video recording of the traffic stop from Mau’s squad car. The record reflects, however,
2
that apparent technical issues prevented the video from being played at that time. Defendant
agreed to suspend his questioning of Mau and instead question Officer Kristoff Petro of the Joliet
Police Department while the technical problems were being fixed, in an effort to accommodate
Petro’s schedule.
¶8 Petro testified that she was investigating a hit-and-run accident on the night in question.
In the course of her investigation, she brought the victims of the traffic accident to the area where
Mau was performing the traffic stop of defendant, in order to determine if the victim could
identify defendant. Petro testified that she could not recall whether defendant was emitting the
odor of an alcoholic beverage or stumbling because she was focused on the traffic investigation
rather than on defendant’s physical state at the time. The video from Mau’s squad car was then
played in court.
¶9 The video shows defendant’s vehicle as it drives past Mau’s squad car. Mau begins
pursuit, catching up to defendant’s vehicle at a red traffic signal, where defendant’s vehicle is
stopped. Defendant proceeds through the intersection before the signal changes to green. Mau
activates his overhead lights, at which point defendant turns onto the next available side street.
¶ 10 After Mau asks defendant to step out of his vehicle, defendant admits that he drank one
beer earlier that evening, later clarifying that he drank it approximately an hour earlier. Mau asks
defendant to recite the alphabet, beginning with the letter C and ending with the letter P. On his
first attempt, defendant recites the alphabet through the letter S before stopping. On his second
attempt, he performs the test correctly. Next, Mau asks defendant to count backwards from 83 to
67, which defendant does without mistake. Mau then asks defendant to count from one to four
and back, while touching each of his fingers to his thumb. Defendant performs the counting
correctly and appears to complete the finger-touching portion successfully.
3
¶ 11 Mau then performs the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Defendant grows
impatient with the test and accuses Mau of performing it incorrectly. After a lengthy discussion,
Mau completes the HGN test. Defendant then declines to perform the walk-and-turn test, citing
ongoing knee problems. Similarly, he states that he cannot perform the one-leg stand test,
because of chronic ear infections. Mau places defendant under arrest.
¶ 12 After the video was played, defendant resumed his questioning of Petro. Petro testified
that the victims of the car accident she was investigating positively identified defendant and his
vehicle. Defendant then expressed to the court his desire to lay a foundation for the booking
room video. He explained that the video would show Petro in close proximity to him at multiple
times, which would be relevant to her testimony concerning whether defendant was emitting the
odor of an alcoholic beverage. The court found that defendant could question Petro regarding
observations in the booking room but ruled that the playing of the video was not necessary at that
time. When the issue of the booking room video was raised again while Petro was testifying, the
court again denied defendant’s request, adding: “I am not going to stop you from playing the
video later because those issues may be important to warnings, I presume.”
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Petro testified that she informed Mau that defendant had been
positively identified in the hit-and-run accident. She did not participate in Mau’s DUI
investigation and did not focus on any odor defendant was emitting nor did she check
defendant’s eyes.
¶ 14 Mau returned to the witness stand following Petro’s testimony. Defendant asked Mau if
he read to defendant the warning to motorist at 8:11 p.m. that night while in the booking room of
the Joliet Police Department. Mau replied that he read the warning verbatim. Defendant’s direct
4
examination grew contentious as it proceeded. Shortly after Mau testified that he read the
warning verbatim, the following exchange took place:
“[DEFENDANT]: Officer Mau, at some point [did] you walk over with a
piece of paper in your hand?
[MAU]: Yes.
[DEFENDANT]: And you—is it okay to demonstrate, Judge? I am not
going to do anything crazy.
THE COURT: Well, you have a document—
[DEFENDANT]: Yes. No, I am just going to act out.
[PROSECUTOR]: Judge—
[MAU]: Step back.
THE COURT: Yeah, you are too close to the witness, so I am going to ask
you to step back. Now, if you need to approach a witness with a document—
[MAU]: I’m going to get closer to you when we get you in Federal
Court.[1]
THE COURT: All right. All Right.
[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, again—
THE COURT: I am going to allow that. Sit down, Officer. Thank you.
You cannot say things like that, Mr. Norris. You can’t threaten the witness. I am
asking you to be civil. We have had this discussion and do I need to stop
questioning at this point or can you do it respectfully?
1
Throughout the proceedings, defendant frequently referenced his efforts to sue Mau in federal
court. Based on that fact, and the court’s admonishment that defendant not threaten the witness, this
particular line of transcript appears to have been misattributed in the record to Mau.
5
[DEFENDANT]: That would be a very good idea because right now I’m
ready to do something really stupid.
THE COURT: Well, and I don’t think that’s a good idea. Okay.
[DEFENDANT]: I’m not really impressed with you.
THE COURT: Okay, no more comments or further interrupting the
proceedings at this point.
***
THE COURT: Well, I am allowing [defendant] to be cuffed because he
suggested he needed it for protection of all people. And because [defendant] says
he cannot at this time ask any more questions, I am going to stop the questions
from [defendant], but I am going to allow the State, however, the State to cross
examine.”
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Mau testified that he clocked defendant driving 55 miles per hour
in a 30 miles-per-hour zone. He pulled defendant over after defendant proceeded through a red
traffic signal. He observed that defendant had glassy eyes and was emitting the odor of an
alcoholic beverage from his breath. Defendant told Mau that he had consumed one beer that
night. Mau observed a 24-ounce can of beer, which he later learned to be unopened, on the
driver’s side floorboard. Mau testified that he eventually learned that defendant had been
positively identified as the driver in a hit-and-run accident earlier that evening. Mau testified that
defendant failed the “finger test” by failing to place his index finger to his thumb, adding: “It
wasn’t egregious, but he still missed it.” A number of cues on the HGN test indicated to Mau that
defendant had consumed alcohol.
6
¶ 16 Mau reiterated on cross-examination that he read the warning to motorist verbatim after
defendant had been transported to the Joliet Police Department. He testified that his memory was
exhausted as to the precise time at which he read the warning. The court, over defendant’s
objection, allowed the State to refresh Mau’s memory with a copy of the warning to motorist
form from the court file. Mau affirmed that he read the warning at 8:11 p.m. He testified that
defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
¶ 17 In the middle of the State’s cross-examination, defendant indicated that he had further
questions for Mau. He stated: “I didn’t get a chance to ask any of my questions.” The court
responded:
“THE COURT: You actually—you did ask questions and then you said
you can’t continue.
[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t say I didn’t want to continue. I just said I needed
a break for a minute.
THE COURT: You said you were going to do something bad and
obviously you forfeited your right to continue at that moment.”
When the State completed its cross-examination, the court allowed defendant to proceed with his
questions but made clear that it was a redirect examination. When defendant indicated that he
had 13 more pages of questions for Mau, the court suspended proceedings and scheduled a
continuance date.
¶ 18 Defendant resumed his redirect examination of Mau on May 18, 2017, but the court
eventually stopped those proceedings “until such time as [defendant] can properly behave.” The
redirect examination resumed again on June 21. Defendant again disputed the characterization of
his questions as redirect, insisting that he had never finished his direct examination of Mau.
7
¶ 19 After a series of questions to Mau, defendant requested the playing of the booking room
video. As a proffer, defendant suggested that the video would show that Mau did not, in fact,
read the warning to motorist while at the Joliet Police Department. Defendant did note, however,
that he did not actually have a copy of the video with him at the time. The State objected on the
grounds that it had not referenced the booking room video on cross-examination. In objecting,
the State also noted that the hearing was entering its eighth hour of testimony. As a proffer,
defendant asserted that the video would rebut Mau’s testimony that he read the warning to
motorist to defendant. The court denied leave to play the video but allowed defendant to proceed
via questioning.
¶ 20 During his own testimony, defendant denied speeding or being in a hit-and-run accident
on the night in question. He testified that he had a cold, the symptoms of which included itchy,
watery eyes, a fever, and a runny nose. He denied “fumbl[ing] the finger test.” He testified that
Mau did not warn him that his refusal to submit to testing would result in the suspension of his
driver’s license. Defendant also denied refusing testing, noting that he offered to go to the
hospital for a blood draw.
¶ 21 The circuit court ultimately denied defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary
suspension. The court commented that it was allowing in defendant’s admission to Mau that he
had been drinking alcohol on the night in question. The court then found Mau had reasonable
grounds to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol, Mau had read the warning
to motorist, and defendant refused the Breathalyzer test.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments: (1) the circuit court erred in
denying defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, (2) the State failed to
8
hold the hearing on defendant’s petition within the required 30-day time limit, (3) the circuit
court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements, (4) the circuit court erred
when it did not allow defendant to introduce the booking room video, and (5) the State
committed a discovery violation in that it did not tender to defendant a copy of Mau’s police
report.
¶ 24 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 25 Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West
2016)) dictates that any person driving on public highways in Illinois is deemed to have given
consent to chemical testing of blood, breath, or other bodily substance for the purpose of
determining the content of alcohol in their blood. That section also provides that the refusal to
submit to such a test, where a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person is
under the influence of alcohol, will result in the statutory summary suspension of that person’s
driver’s license. Id. § 11-501.1(c). Section 2-118.1 of the Code, in turn, provides that a person
whose driver’s license has been subject to the statutory summary suspension may request the
rescission of the suspension. Id. § 2-118.1(b).
¶ 26 The scope of a hearing on a petition to rescind statutory summary suspension is limited to
certain issues, of which only the following are relevant in the present case:
“1. Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined
in Section 11-501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the
issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket ***; and
2. Whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person
was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway while
under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both; and
9
3. Whether the person, after being advised by the officer that the privilege
to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended or revoked if the person refused to
submit to and complete the test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete the
test or tests to determine the person’s blood alcohol or drug concentration[.]” Id.
§ 2-118.1(b)(1)-(3).
¶ 27 In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory
summary suspension, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545,
561 (2008). We give great deference to the circuit court’s factual findings, including any
inferences drawn therefrom, reversing those findings only where they are contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, we review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate
decision to deny the petition. Id. at 562.
¶ 28 In the present case, there is no dispute that defendant was placed under lawful arrest. Two
of the remaining issues, whether defendant refused testing and whether Mau read the warning to
motorist, are purely factual. The circuit court found Mau more credible on those issues than
defendant and found explicitly that defendant had refused testing and that Mau had read the
warning to motorist. We defer to these findings, as they are not contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. Further, defendant argues again that he offered to go to the hospital to submit to
a blood draw. However, he cites no law that allows an arrestee dictate which manner of testing
under section 11-501.1(a).
¶ 29 We next consider whether Mau had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was
under the influence of alcohol. “In determining whether there has been ‘reasonable grounds’
under subsection (b)(2) of the statute, this court has utilized the probable cause analysis deriving
from the fourth amendment.” Id. at 560. “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to
10
the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe
that the arrestee has committed a crime.” Id. at 563. “ ‘ “The standard for determining whether
probable cause is present is probability of criminal activity, rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” ’ ” Id. at 564 (quoting People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 115
(2006), quoting People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 485 (2005)). “[P]robable cause does not even
demand a showing that the belief that the suspect has committed a crime be more likely true than
false.” Id.¶ 30 Defendant successfully completed the backwards-counting test and at least appeared on
the video to successfully complete the finger-touch test. While he initially failed the alphabet
test, he was able to successfully complete it on the second attempt. However, defendant admitted
to Mau that he had consumed alcohol that evening, and Mau was able to confirm that through the
HGN test. 2 Further, Mau testified that he observed defendant’s eyes were glassy and the odor of
an alcoholic beverage was emanating from defendant’s breath. Moreover, Mau observed
defendant driving 25 miles per hour above the posted speed limit and running a red traffic light.
He had also learned prior to making the arrest that defendant had been positively identified as the
suspect in a hit-and-run accident earlier that evening. These facts would lead a reasonably
cautious person to believe that defendant had consumed an amount of alcohol that had impaired
his driving. See People v. Rozela, 345 Ill. App. 3d 217, 226 (2003) (rejecting argument that
reasonable suspicion based upon the odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and admission to drinking is
necessarily dispelled by successful completion of field sobriety tests).
2
Defendant argues at length on appeal that Mau did not conduct the HGN test properly. By Mau’s
own testimony, however, the HGN test results merely indicated the consumption of alcohol, rather than
amount or impairment. As Mau already knew defendant had consumed alcohol because of defendant’s
admission, any alleged error in the administration of the HGN test would have been harmless.
11
¶ 31 We thus find that Mau had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was driving
while under the influence of alcohol. We defer to the circuit court’s factual findings that
defendant refused testing and that Mau read the required warning to motorist. Accordingly, we
find that the circuit court properly granted defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory summary
suspension.
¶ 32 B. 30-Day Limit
¶ 33 Section 2-118.1 of the Code mandates that a hearing on petition to rescind a statutory
summary suspension shall be held “[w]ithin 30 days after receipt of the written request.” 625
ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2016). It is well-settled that unless any delay is occasioned by the
defendant, the failure to hold the required hearing within 30 days of the request is a violation of
the right to due process, the remedy for which is the rescission of the statutory summary
suspension. People v. Puckett, 221 Ill App. 3d 594, 596-97 (1991). “[T]he time provision set
forth in section 2-118.1(b) of the *** Code is satisfied when the hearing begins within 30 days
after receipt of defendant’s written request ***.” People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill. 2d 308, 315 (2005).
¶ 34 Section 1.11 of the Statute on Statutes contains detailed instructions on how time should
be computed. It provides in whole:
“The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or
Sunday or is a holiday as defined or fixed in any statute now or hereafter in force
in this State, and then it shall also be excluded. If the day succeeding such
Saturday, Sunday or holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such
succeeding day shall also be excluded.” 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2016).
12
In People v. Ribar, 336 Ill. App. 3d 462, 463 (2003), the court found that section 1.11 of the
Statute on Statutes is applicable to statutory summary suspension hearings because that it is a
“general time-computation statute that applies to ‘any act provided by law.’ ” (quoting 5 ILCS
70/1.11 (West 2000)).
¶ 35 In the present case, defendant’s petition to rescind was reinstated on April 13, 2017. The
first day of the 30-day window, per the Statute on Statutes, was April 14, 2017. The thirtieth day,
then, was May 13, 2017. May 13, however, was a Saturday. 3 Thus, according to the Statute on
Statutes, the thirtieth day was Monday, May, 15, 2017. Defendant’s rescission hearing
commenced on that day.
¶ 36 As defendant’s hearing commenced within the prescribed 30-day time window, we reject
defendant’s argument that the State failed to comply with section 2-118.1 of the Code. We also
reject defendant’s related argument that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in moving
for a continuance. Defendant has cited no case that holds the State that cannot move to continue
a hearing to a date within the 30-day period.
¶ 37 C. Miranda
¶ 38 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements based upon Mau’s failure to read Miranda warnings. In making this argument,
defendant maintains that Mau’s questions at the scene of the traffic stop constituted a custodial
interrogation. The State counters by arguing that a Miranda violation is not grounds for
suppression of statements at a statutory summary suspension hearing. We begin by addressing
that threshold question.
3
“A reviewing court may take judicial notice of the days of the week as they correspond to dates
of the month.” People v. Gill, 2018 IL App (3d) 150594, ¶ 104 n.8.
13
¶ 39 A hearing on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension is a civil proceeding.
Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 559. Section 2-118.1(b) of the Code provides that “[t]he hearings shall
proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.” 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)
(West 2016).
¶ 40 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. The
Illinois Constitution contains the same language. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege
applied out of court as well, any time a person faces custodial interrogation, or “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” The Miranda Court held that the
prosecution may not use statements made by a defendant in this context unless those statements
were accompanied by certain procedural safeguards, or what have come to be known as the
Miranda warnings. Id. As our own supreme court observed, “[t]he purpose of the warnings is to
ensure that the accused is aware of his substantive constitutional right not to incriminate himself
and to provide him with the opportunity to exercise that right.” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335,
348 (1992).
¶ 41 The Miranda rule came to be known as a prophylactic rule, a safeguard of a person’s fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination broader than the right itself. Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”). While the rule is prophylactic, the United States
Supreme Court has made clear that a violation of Miranda is of no less constitutional magnitude
14
than a direct violation of the fifth amendment. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438-42
(2000). The enforcement mechanism behind the Miranda rule is the familiar exclusionary rule.
E.g., Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 350. In the Miranda context, our supreme court has summarized the
exclusionary rule as follows: “[A]ny statement taken from a suspect without the presence of an
attorney is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief unless the prosecution demonstrates
that the defendant was given Miranda warnings and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.¶ 42 In Wear, our supreme court wrote: “This court has never specifically ruled whether the
exclusionary rule should apply to implied-consent proceedings, and does not do so here.” Wear,
229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1. The court did note that at least one appellate court had found the rule
applicable in statutory summary suspension hearings, citing People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d
897 (1991). Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1. In Krueger, the Second District held that the arrest
requirement imposed by section 2-118.1 of the Code necessarily meant a valid and lawful arrest.
Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 904. The Krueger court, however, was careful to point out that its
ruling was not an endorsement of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. Id. at 904-05. Rather
than excluding anything from the proceedings, a finding that an arrest was unlawful would
negate one of the requirements of section 2-118.1, resulting in rescission of the statutory
summary suspension. Id. at 907 (“[W]e prefer to rest our holding here on the construction of the
statute that we have put forth rather than on the application of the exclusionary rule as such.”).
Indeed, the Wear court made a similar observation, commenting that “the use of the phrase
‘exclusionary rule’ is a misnomer in this context. A prevailing petitioner would not gain the
exclusion of anything from a rescission hearing. Rather, if the court finds ‘no reasonable
grounds’ for an arrest, then the suspension is simply rescinded.” Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1.
15
¶ 43 The Wear and Krueger courts opined that where an arrest was unlawful, resorting to the
exclusionary rule was unnecessary because the unlawful arrest alone would be grounds for
rescission. In the Miranda context, however, numerous courts have refused to suppress
statements at a statutory summary suspension hearing. In Village of Algonquin v. Tilden, 335 Ill.
App. 3d 332, 335 (2002), the circuit court did not allow the arresting officer to testify at a
statutory summary suspension hearing regarding questions he asked of the defendant, on the
grounds that he had not read defendant the Miranda warnings. The Second District rejected that
reasoning, stating:
“We need not decide [whether the defendant was in custody] because we
conclude that any noncompliance with Miranda would not require excluding
defendant’s statements in this case. We follow the Fourth and Fifth Districts of
the Illinois Appellate Court, which have held that statements made in violation of
Miranda, which would be otherwise inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, may
be considered in a proceeding to rescind a statutory summary suspension of
driving privileges. People v. Pelc, 177 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (1988); People v.
Furness, 172 Ill. App. 3d 845, 849-50 (1988).” Id. at 336.
The Tilden court, like those in Pelc and Furness, found that because a statutory summary
suspension is a civil matter intended to protect drivers on the state’s highways, rather than punish
the defendant, Miranda could not serve as grounds to suppress statements. Id. at 337; People v.
Pelc, 177 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (1988) (“[S]tatements made in violation of Miranda, which
would be inadmissible in criminal proceedings, can properly be considered to establish probable
cause for the arrest in a summary suspension proceeding.”); People v. Furness, 172 Ill. App. 3d
845, 849 (1988).
16
¶ 44 The holdings of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts comport with the United States
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding Miranda and the exclusionary rule in the civil or
noncriminal context. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976), the Court observed:
“The Court has never held, and we decline to do so now, that the requirements of [Miranda]
must be met to render pretrial statements admissible in other than criminal cases.” In that case,
the Court rejected the notion that non-Mirandized statements should be excluded from prison
disciplinary hearings because they might be used in later criminal proceedings. Id. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule beyond criminal prosecutions in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032, 1050 (1984) (deportation proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 (1976)
(federal habeas corpus proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976)
(federal tax assessment proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974)
(grand jury proceedings). Illinois courts have also declined to extend the rule to contexts beyond
criminal trials. See People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (1975) (probation revocation
proceedings); Grames v. Illinois State Police, 254 Ill. App. 3d 191, 200-02 (1993) (police
department administrative discharge proceedings); People v. Grubb, 143 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824
(1986) (court supervision revocation proceedings).
¶ 45 The United States Supreme Court has never held that there is a firm bar on the
application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. In Janis, the Court observed: “In the
complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence
from a civil proceeding, federal or state.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. The Janis Court went on to
adopt a balancing test, under which the exclusionary rule may be applied where the societal
benefits of exclusion outweigh the costs. Id. at 454. Regarding those societal benefits, the Court
17
observed that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter
future unlawful police conduct.’ ” Id. at 446 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347). The Janis
Court concluded that because the evidence in question had been excluded from the state criminal
trial and would be excluded from any federal criminal trial, its exclusion in a tax assessment
proceeding provided no additional deterrent effect. Id. at 447-48.
¶ 46 The same is true in the statutory summary suspension context. Any statements taken in
violation of Miranda would be excluded from a defendant’s criminal DUI trial. This exclusion
deters police officers from not complying with the safeguards set forth in Miranda. Further
exclusion of those statements in statutory summary suspension hearings would provide no
additional deterrence, while imposing the cost of making “concededly relevant and reliable
evidence *** unavailable” in a proceeding intended to protect the public from unsafe drivers.
See id. at 447. More fundamentally, where the exclusionary rule has been found inapplicable in
contexts with great liberty interests at stake, such as deportation or the revocation of probation, it
seems to follow a fortiori that the rule should not be applied where the temporary suspension of
a driver’s license is the ultimate cost. Accordingly, we join the Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Districts in concluding that the exclusionary rule, at least in the context of an alleged Miranda
violation, is inapplicable in statutory summary suspension hearings. It follows that the circuit
court in the present case did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. See People v.
Ringland, 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, ¶ 33 (reviewing court may affirm on any grounds in the
record).
¶ 47 D. Booking Video
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¶ 48 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in not allowing the booking room video
to be played in court. The State counters that the court was within its discretion to bar the
introduction of the video on redirect examination.
¶ 49 “Redirect examination is generally limited to an inquiry into new material elicited during
cross-examination, and ordinarily it should not cover matters which could have been brought out
during the [direct] examination.” Myers v. Arnold, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1980). The scope of
redirect examination is a matter of the circuit court’s discretion. People v. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d
426, 428 (1981). The circuit court abuses its discretion where its decision is arbitrary, fanciful,
unreasonable, or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the court. People v.
Anderson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 653, 664 (2006).
¶ 50 On direct examination of Mau, defendant asked Mau if he had read defendant the
warning to motorist while in the booking room of the Joliet Police Department. On cross-
examination, the State asked Mau the same question. By the time of defendant’s redirect
examination, Mau’s reading of the warning to motorist in the booking room was not a new issue.
The video of the booking room could have been introduced in direct examination, and the State
did not elicit on cross-examination any new information or new issues related thereto. We cannot
say that the circuit court was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable for denying defendant leave to
play the booking room video.
¶ 51 E. Discovery Violation
¶ 52 Finally, defendant contends that the State “introduced a document that Defendant did not
get in Discovery.” He contends that this caused “unfair surprise and prejudicing [sic]
Defendant.” Though defendant has not identified with any specificity the document to which he
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is referring, we assume that it is the warning to motorist form from the court file with which the
State used to refresh Mau’s memory. See supra ¶ 16.
¶ 53 That form was not introduced into evidence as defendant claims; it was merely used to
refresh Mau’s memory. Defendant has not cited any particular rule that he claims the State
violated by purportedly withholding the document. See Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677,
682 (1993) (“Bare contentions in the absence of argument or citation of authority do not merit
consideration on appeal and are deemed waived.”). Defendant is unable to show any sort of
unfair surprise or prejudice. After having his memory refreshed, Mau testified that he read
defendant the warning to motorist at 8:11 p.m. Defendant, having already asked Mau repeatedly
if he had read the warning at 8:11 p.m., could not have been surprised by that testimony.
¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 56 Affirmed.
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