People v. Burns ( 2019 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.07.02
14:40:16 -05'00'
People v. Burns, 2019 IL App (4th) 170018
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption EMERSON T. BURNS, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-17-0018
Filed May 13, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 08-CF-1805; the
Review Hon. Hugh Finson, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Aliza R. Kaliski, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Jay Scott, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David J.
Robinson, and John M. Zimmerman, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Turner specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a June 2011 bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant, Emerson T. Burns,
of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008)). In July 2011, the court
sentenced him to 50 years in prison. In December 2013, following the denial of his direct
appeal, defendant pro se filed a postconviction petition. In October 2016, the State filed a
motion to dismiss defendant’s amended postconviction petition, which the trial court granted.
¶2 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition at the second
stage of proceedings because he made a substantial showing that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by refusing to let him testify at trial. In the alternative, defendant argues
this court should remand for further proceedings because his postconviction attorneys failed to
comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶3 The State concedes that defendant’s postconviction attorneys failed to comply with Rule
651. We accept this concession and remand for further second-stage postconviction
proceedings. We also direct the trial court to provide defendant new postconviction counsel
who shall have leave to amend and to add supporting documentation, as counsel deems
necessary, in support of defendant’s claims.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In December 2008, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree murder in
connection with the death of six-month-old A.S. (born June 8, 2008). In June 2011,
defendant’s case proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial count found him guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced him to 50 years in prison. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed.
People v. Burns, 2012 IL App (4th) 110670, ¶ 23, 981 N.E.2d 503.
¶6 In December 2013, defendant pro se filed a petition for postconviction relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2012)), alleging
(1) appellate counsel was ineffective “by not raising key issues on direct appeal” and (2) the
trial court abused its discretion “by reaching a verdict by drawing a conclusion from
incompetent evidence.” In March 2014, the trial court advanced the petition to the second stage
of proceedings after the court failed to rule on the petition within 90 days as required by the
Act. Id. § 122-2.1. After permitting defendant’s initially appointed counsel to withdraw, the
trial court in December 2015 appointed new counsel to represent defendant.
¶7 In August 2016, defendant, through postconviction counsel, filed an amended petition,
alleging trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to present evidence to rebut
the State’s theory that whoever bit A.S. also killed her and (2) not allowing defendant to testify
at trial despite his request to do so. In that petition, defendant also alleged that appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance. Defendant attached his affidavit to the petition, in
which he averred as follows:
“1. I informed my trial counsel, Ms. Karen Root, right before my trial that I wanted
to testify in my own defense.
2. Ms. Root told me I ‘would get eighty years’ if I did testify and that I ‘would
probably get forty years’ if I did not testify.
3. I insisted that I wanted to testify.
4. Ms. Root stated, ‘No,’ at this second assertion that I wanted to testify.”
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The same day postconviction counsel filed defendant’s amended postconviction petition,
counsel also filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c). However, other than defendant’s
affidavit, counsel did not attach any evidence or documents to the amended petition.
¶8 After postconviction counsel left the public defender’s office, the trial court appointed new
counsel to represent defendant. Thereafter, in October 2016, the State moved to dismiss the
petition, arguing that (1) all of defendant’s claims could have been raised on direct appeal and
were therefore forfeited; (2) even if the claims were not forfeited, defendant failed to
adequately support the factual contentions in the petition by affidavit or other evidence;
(3) appellate counsel was not ineffective; and (4) defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.
Newly appointed postconviction counsel also filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶9 The trial court dismissed the petition in December 2016. In a docket entry, the trial court
concluded that (1) defendant’s claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on
direct appeal and (2) defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice regarding his ineffective-
assistance claims.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition at the second
stage of proceedings because he made a substantial showing that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by refusing to let him testify at trial. In the alternative, defendant argues
this court should remand for further proceedings because his postconviction attorneys failed to
comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶ 13 The State concedes that defendant’s postconviction attorneys failed to comply with Rule
651. We accept this concession and remand for further second-stage postconviction
proceedings. We also direct the trial court to provide defendant new postconviction counsel
who shall have leave to amend and to add supporting documentation, as counsel deems
necessary, in support of defendant’s claims.
¶ 14 A. Proceedings Under the Act
¶ 15 The Act provides a remedy for criminal defendants who were substantially deprived of
their state or federal constitutional rights in the proceedings leading to their conviction. People
v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 131, 662 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (1996). Proceedings under the Act
are collateral in nature and not an appeal from the defendant’s conviction or sentence. Id.
¶ 16 Proceedings under the Act are divided into three stages. People v. English, 2013 IL
112890, ¶ 23, 987 N.E.2d 371. At the first stage, the trial court reviews the petition to
determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2014). If the petition survives the first stage, the trial court will advance it to the second stage.
Id. § 122-2.1(b). At the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel for the defendant to
ensure the adequate presentation of the defendant’s claims. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d
458, 472, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1007 (2006). At this point, the State may file an answer or a motion
to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2014). The trial court may dismiss the petition
at the second stage if, taking all well-pleaded facts as true, the defendant fails to demonstrate a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473. To make such a
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showing, “the allegations in the petition must be supported by the record in the case or by its
accompanying affidavits.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1072
(1998). We review the trial court’s dismissal of the petition at the second stage de novo.
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473.
¶ 17 B. Reasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel
¶ 18 Defendant argues, in part, that this court should reverse and remand because both of his
postconviction attorneys failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6,
2013). Relevant to this appeal, he argues they failed to attach an affidavit specifying
defendant’s proposed testimony for his claim that trial counsel denied him his right to testify.
¶ 19 The State argues the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s petition as written.
However, citing People v. Barkes, 399 Ill. App. 3d 980, 989-90, 928 N.E.2d 102, 113 (2010),
the State concedes the case should be remanded to the trial court for further second-stage
postconviction proceedings because defendant’s postconviction attorneys failed to comply
with Rule 651(c). We accept the State’s concession.
¶ 20 The right to postconviction counsel is wholly statutory, and postconviction petitioners are
only entitled to a “reasonable level of assistance” under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West
2012); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410, 719 N.E.2d 725, 727-28 (1999). Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) provides the specific duties required of appointed counsel
in postconviction proceedings. Specifically, appointed counsel must certify that he “has
consulted with petitioner either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain
[petitioner’s] contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights,” examined the record of the
proceedings at trial and sentencing, and made any amendments to the petition that are
necessary for the adequate presentation of the petitioner’s claims. Id. If the petitioner’s claims
are based on evidence outside the record, counsel is required to attach affidavits or other
evidence to adequately present those claims. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 414; 725 ILCS 5/122-2
(West 2014) (“The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.”).
¶ 21 Although defendant attached his affidavit alleging trial counsel refused to let him testify,
both of his postconviction attorneys failed to specify the substance of defendant’s intended
testimony. There is no record that the trial court ever advised defendant of his right to testify,
and nothing in the record rebuts defendant’s allegation that trial counsel denied him that right.
Because defendant’s claim that trial counsel refused to let him testify is based on evidence
outside the record, his postconviction attorneys were required to specify what defendant’s
testimony would have been in order to adequately present his claim of ineffective
assistance—especially after the State argued in its motion to dismiss that defendant failed to
show prejudice on that basis.
¶ 22 When a defendant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s refusal to let
him testify, his failure to specify the substance of his intended testimony is not necessarily fatal
to the petition at the first stage of proceedings. See People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. App. 3d 911,
913-14, 500 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1986); People v. Piper, 272 Ill. App. 3d 843, 848-49, 651
N.E.2d 739, 743 (1995). However, several Illinois courts have held that in order to avoid
dismissal at the second stage of proceedings, a defendant is required to include the substance of
his intended testimony to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
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(1984). Barkes, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 989-90; People v. Youngblood, 389 Ill. App. 3d 209,
218-19, 906 N.E.2d 720, 728-29 (2009).
¶ 23 Because we reverse and remand on this issue alone, we need not address defendant’s
remaining claims that his attorneys failed to comply with Rule 651(c).
¶ 24 In conclusion, we note that this issue of defendant being denied his right to testify could
have been avoided entirely if the trial court had heeded this court’s suggestion in People v.
Frieberg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 840, 852, 713 N.E.2d 210, 218 (1999). In that case, we noted that
“because the decision whether to testify at trial lies ultimately with a defendant, issues
involving how that decision was made lurk—like an unexploded bomb—in every case
resulting in a conviction.” Id. We thus suggested that, to “defuse” this potentially “explosive
situation,” trial courts should do the following:
“[I]n every criminal case [the trial court should] take the few seconds needed, after the
State has rested its case in chief and before the presentation of the defense case, to
admonish the defendant personally that he alone possesses the right to choose whether
to testify on his own behalf, and that he should make that decision after consulting with
counsel. Trial courts should emphasize to the defendant that whatever trial counsel’s
advice on this point may be, counsel cannot force the defendant to testify, nor can
counsel prevent the defendant from testifying. For good measure, the court should once
again inquire of the defendant before he testifies (or the defense rests without his
testimony) to ensure that his decision about this matter was his alone and not coerced.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id.
¶ 25 We reiterate what we wrote in Frieberg and once again urge trial courts to properly inform
defendants of their right to testify so as to insulate the record from attacks—often made years
after the fact—such as the one in this case.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, remand the case for further
second-stage postconviction proceedings, and order the trial court to appoint new
postconviction counsel for defendant who shall have leave to amend and add supporting
documentation, as counsel deems necessary, in support of defendant’s claims.
¶ 28 Reversed and remanded with directions.
¶ 29 JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring:
¶ 30 I agree we should reverse and remand because defendant’s postconviction attorneys failed
to comply with Rule 651(c). However, I decline to participate in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the
majority opinion. I find the discussion in those paragraphs to be unnecessary dicta and
arguably in conflict with the views expressed by our supreme court in People v. Medina, 221
Ill. 2d 394, 407-08, 851 N.E.2d 1220, 1227-28 (2006), and People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217,
234-35, 680 N.E.2d 291, 302-03 (1997). Thus, I specially concur.
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