Cortright v. Doyle ( 2008 )

SECOND DIVISION
NOVEMBER 18, 2008
1-07-1339
MARGARET CORTRIGHT, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
v. )
)
JAYNE DOYLE, CAROLYN BAILEY, and STEVEN )
MINTER, )
Defendants-Appellees ) No. 01 L 2886
)
(The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services )
and Rocco J. Claps, Director of the Department of Human )
Rights, an Agency of the State of Illinois, ) Honorable
) Martin S. Agran,
Defendants). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Margaret Cortright appeals from the circuit court’s November 21, 2006 order
dismissing with prejudice her intentional tort claims (counts I, II, and III) and reaffirming the
dismissal of her discrimination claims (counts IV, V and VI) under a previous ruling. Cortright v.
Doyle, No. 01 L 02886 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.). On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that: (1) the intentional
tort claims were not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the intentional tort claims
were not preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)); (3)
the defendants’ actions were not subject to absolute immunity; and (4) she has adequately pleaded
a claim for all of the intentional torts. For the following reasons, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Margaret Cortright suffers from a degenerative hearing condition called Meniere’s
disease and other related conditions of tinnitus and vertigo. Her symptoms include hearing loss,
ringing in the ears and dizziness—all of which are exacerbated by stress but can be controlled with
prescription medication and hearing aids. However, the prescription medication has a tendency to
cause drowsiness.
The plaintiff was an employee of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) for over 20 years until her retirement in April 2001. From 1994 until her retirement, the
plaintiff was a public service administrator at DCFS whose responsibilities included supervising 12
employees.
Defendants Jayne Doyle, Carolyn Bailey and Steven Minter (collectively the supervisors)
worked at DCFS during the relevant periods of the plaintiff’s tenure. In 1997, Doyle became the
plaintiff’s direct supervisor, and subsequently in 1998, Bailey and Minter also gained supervisory
positions and authority over the plaintiff. The supervisors were aware of the plaintiff’s medical
conditions and the side effects of her medication.
The plaintiff had consistently received “Outstanding/Exceptional” ratings on her annual
performance evaluations up until March 1998, when Doyle gave her a lesser rating of
“Accomplished/Satisfactory” despite, allegedly, that the quality of the plaintiff’s performance had
remained the same. In April 1999, Minter rated the plaintiff’s overall performance as
“Unacceptable” and did not give any particular category a rating higher than “Acceptable”—ratings
that were supposedly unprecedented in the plaintiff’s evaluations during her approximately 20 years
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of service at DCFS. The overall rating of “Unacceptable” disqualified the plaintiff from receiving
a raise at that time.
The plaintiff’s most recently amended complaint alleged that beginning in 1998, the
supervisors yelled at and demeaned the plaintiff both in private and in the presence of co-workers.
They allegedly called her “stupid” or “stupidvisor” regularly and reprimanded the plaintiff for
complaining of the perceived mistreatment. The plaintiff claimed that the supervisors falsely
reprimanded her for incompetence, inability to understand management directives and inability to
comprehend what was said at meetings. Allegedly, the supervisors set unreasonable task deadlines
and chastised the plaintiff when she failed to meet them. Bailey also allegedly threatened the
plaintiff with progressive discipline and accused her of having poor judgment. The supervisors
issued formal reprimands and an eight-day suspension to her for sleeping at meetings, which the
plaintiff denied doing. The complaint also stated that Doyle issued a memorandum to the plaintiff
threatening further discipline and possible termination for her continued unacceptable job
performance.
The stresses of these events allegedly caused emotional distress and further deterioration of
the plaintiff’s medical condition.
This case has a long and complicated procedural history. The plaintiff, acting pro se,
attempted to file a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR)
in 1998 which IDHR refused to accept. In 1999, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and
retaliation with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently
received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC.
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In January 2000, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Illinois court of claims against the
supervisors and DCFS alleging age and disability discrimination. Cortright v. Department of
Children & Family Services, No. 00 CC 2519. The court of claims dismissed the federal claims and
claims against the supervisors in their individual capacities for want of jurisdiction in its February
2001 order. To the extent the claims were based on the Illinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights
Act) (775 ILCS 5/1–101 et seq. (West 1998)) and the public official immunity defense, the court of
claims allowed the claims to stand pending further oral argument. The court of claims decided these
remaining issues in a later order dated May 10, 2001, which denied DCFS’ motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and, instead, placed the claims against DCFS under “general continuance” on the
ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted her remedies before the IDHR.
In March 2001, the plaintiff commenced this action against the supervisors in the circuit court
of Cook County alleging disability discrimination under the Human Rights Act and Americans with
Disability Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (2000)) (count I), age discrimination under
the Human Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 U.S.C.
§621 et seq. (2000)) (count II), defamation (count III), retaliatory practices (count IV) and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (count V).
The plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on May 24, 2001, added DCFS as a defendant
and a mandamus claim against the IDHR director seeking an order for the director to accept the
plaintiff’s charge of discrimination (count VI). On January 25, 2002, the circuit court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s first amended complaint without prejudice stating that
jurisdiction is proper in the court of claims. The mandamus claim (count VI) was then transferred
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to the chancery division of the circuit court for further consideration. The plaintiff filed a motion
to reconsider the dismissal of counts III and V of the first amended complaint on April 9, 2003, the
hearing for which was continued until January 5, 2004, when the circuit court found it had
jurisdiction over the supervisors. During this interim, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
on July 23, 2003, adding another mandamus claim (count VII) against the IDHR director to compel
him to accept the plaintiff’s charges of discrimination as pertaining to a worksharing agreement
between the EEOC and the IDHR.
A third amended complaint was filed on January 6, 2004, by the plaintiff in which she added
an eighth claim–interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual relationship
(count VIII)–against the supervisors and tried to point to the worksharing agreement between IDHR
and EEOC to support her mandamus claim (count VII) against the IDHR director. The circuit
court’s order on November 21, 2005, dismissed, with prejudice, claims against the supervisors based
on a lack of jurisdiction to hear the intentional tort claims.
The plaintiff attempted to address the items the court found deficient in the third amended
complaint by filing a fourth amended complaint (complaint) in March 2006. No new parties or
causes of action were added to the complaint. Instead, the plaintiff simply attached the plaintiff’s
job evaluations to the complaint and renumbered the counts.
The complaint alleged defamation (count I), IIED (count II) and interference with prospective
economic advantage and contractual relationship (count III) against Doyle, Bailey and Minter.
Disability discrimination (count IV), age discrimination (count V) and retaliation (count VI) against
DCFS were alleged. The two mandamus claims (counts VII, VIII) against the IDHR director also
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remained.
The circuit court’s final judgment on November 21, 2006, granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss the intentional tort claims against the supervisors (counts I, II, III of the complaint),
holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity and preempted by the Human Rights Act.
It reaffirmed the dismissal of the disability discrimination, age discrimination and retaliation claims
(counts IV, V and VI) under a previous ruling.
On April 17, 2007, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the claims against IDHR and
DCFS (counts VII and VIII) pursuant to settlement and that is not at issue in this appeal.
The plaintiff now appeals dismissal of counts I, II and III of the complaint.
ANALYSIS
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We review de novo the circuit court’s
November 21, 2006 decision granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)). Wolfe v. Wolf, 375 Ill. App. 3d 702, 705,
874 N.E.2d 582, 584 (2007). A section 2-619 motion for involuntary dismissal asserts affirmative
matters–such as defenses of preemption, sovereign immunity and absolute immunity, in this
case–that avoid or defeat the claim. Wolfe, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 874 N.E.2d at 584. In reviewing
a section 2-619 dismissal, we construe all pleadings and supporting documents in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party. Landheer v. Landheer, 383 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320,
891 N.E.2d. 975, 978 (2008).
We determine the following three issues: whether (1) the court below erred in dismissing the
intentional tort claims (counts I, II and III) of the complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity; (2)
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the court below erred in dismissing the intentional tort claims (counts I, II and III) of the complaint
on the basis of preemption by the Human Rights Act; and (3) the intentional tort claims (counts I,
II and III) were barred by absolute immunity.
We first address the issue of sovereign immunity. The defendants argue that sovereign
immunity applied to bar the plaintiff’s intentional tort claims from being heard in the circuit court.
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished sovereign immunity “[e]xcept as the General
Assembly may provide by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4. Pursuant to this express authority,
the legislature enacted the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, which states that the State of Illinois shall
not be made a defendant or party in any court except as provided in the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2006)) and the Court of Claims Act (705 IlLCS 505/1 et
seq (West 2006)). Hence, the Court of Claims Act provides that the court of claims has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear certain matters, including “[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases
sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private person or corporation in a civil
suit.” 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 2006).
We must examine whether an action is one against the State to determine whether it was
properly barred by sovereign immunity. Determining state action depends on the issues raised and
the relief sought in the action, rather than on whether the State is named as a party. Brandon v.
Bonell, 368 Ill. App. 3d 492, 858 N.E.2d 465 (2006); Kawaguchi v. Gainer, 361 Ill. App. 3d 229,
243, 835 N.E.2d 435, 447 (2005); Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320, 330, 807 N.E.2d 411, 418 (2004).
An action brought nominally against a State employee in his individual capacity where a judgment
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for the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability is deemed
to be a claim against the State. Brandon, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 858 N.E.2d at 479. Treating such
cases as ones against the State prevents plaintiffs from circumventing sovereign immunity by only
naming as defendants state employees in their individual capacity. Brandon, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 504,
858 N.E.2d at 479.
The supreme court has established a three-part test to determine whether an action against
state employees is actually one against the State. The test is summarized as follows: (1) there are
no allegations that an employee or agent of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through
wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed by the employee
independently of his state employment; and (3) the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily
within that employee’s normal and official functions. Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at 330, 807 N.E.2d at 418,
citing Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (1990).
Applying the three-part test, we find that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claims are ones
against the State and, thus, barred from the circuit court by sovereign immunity.
For the first prong, the plaintiff argues that the supervisors’ conduct was theirs alone and not
an act of the State. She argues that the alleged malicious conduct was enough to place the
supervisors’ actions beyond the scope of their authority so as to lose sovereign immunity protection.
In support, the plaintiff relies on Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill. 2d 302, 807 N.E.2d 461 (2004), Hoffman
v. Yack, 57 Ill. App. 3d 744, 373 N.E.2d 486 (1978), Management Ass’n of Illinois, Inc. v. Board
of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 248 Ill. App. 3d 599, 618 N.E.2d 694 (1993), and Busch
v. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d 823, 753 N.E.2d 1184 (2001).
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The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the supervisors did not act beyond the scope
of their authority through wrongful acts because supervisors routinely prepare performance
evaluations, issue discipline, criticize subordinates’ work, and set deadlines for completing tasks–all
of which constitute a significant portion of the supervisors’ job duties. They argue that malicious
conduct is outside the scope of a state employee’s authority only when there are specific facts
supporting the allegations, which they argue the plaintiff failed to provide in her complaint.
In Fritz, the plaintiff alleged civil conspiracy by four defendants to force him out of his job
and claimed he suffered mental anguish and a “derogation of his name and reputation” as a result
of the defendants’ actions. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 306, 807 N.E.2d at 464. One of the defendants, the
plaintiff alleged, contacted the police and falsely accused the plaintiff of threatening assault on the
defendant’s person and property. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 305-06, 807 N.E.2d at 464. He also alleged
intentional interference with employment and economic gains. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 306, 807 N.E.2d
at 464. The Fritz defendants moved to dismiss the claims based on protection by sovereign
immunity, which was granted by the circuit court and affirmed by the appellate court. Fritz, 209 Ill.
2d at 307-08, 807 N.E.2d at 464-65. The supreme court reversed, holding that defendant Johnston’s
alleged conduct violated a criminal law and thus, sovereign immunity did not apply. Fritz, 209 Ill.
2d at 313, 807 N.E.2d at 468. It further reasoned that unlike Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill. App. 3d
129, 679 N.E.2d 1255 (1997), which involved a lawsuit against supervisors who made “work-related
statements” within the context of their supervisory roles, the source of the duty some of the Fritz
defendants purportedly violated was a criminal statute applicable to both state and nonstate
employees. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 313-14, 807 N.E.2d at 468-69, citing Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill.
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App. 3d 129, 679 N.E.2d 1255 (1997). The supreme court further held that the defendants who did
not violate this criminal statute were still not protected by sovereign immunity because they allegedly
threatened to launch a police investigation based on those false claims, as part of the conspiracy to
force the plaintiff out of his position. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 315, 807 N.E.2d at 479.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff does not allege violations of any criminal statute. While the
plaintiff alleges that the “[d]efendants deliberately and maliciously engaged in [a] campaign of
defamatory conduct and harassment in order to, inter alia, drive [p]laintiff from her job,” we do not
find any link to the violation of a criminal statute which would remove the case from the protection
of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff also alleges that Bailey engaged in further harassment by
sending the plaintiff a posting for an alternate job for less pay. However, unlike the Fritz defendants
who threatened to launch a police investigation based on false claims made to the police, this
conduct was not alleged to have been done as a result of some violation of a criminal statute in
furtherance of a conspiracy. Therefore, we find that the facts in the case at bar are more like those
in Wozniak than in Fritz, and that the statements made by the supervisors are work-related
statements within the scope of their authority as supervisors. Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133-34,
679 N.E.2d at 1258-59 (“when a supervisor for a state department or entity is sued by an employee
for statements regarding the employee’s work-related conduct and pending personnel decisions, the
suit necessarily threatens to control the actions of the state”; holding that Conry’s conduct goes to
the core of the State’s ability to control its own affairs). The Wozniak court also held that the
relevant inquiry to determine scope of authority is “whether the supervisor would be acting within
the scope of his duties by making truthful statements of the general type alleged.” Wozniak, 288 Ill.
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App. 3d at 133-34, 679 N.E.2d at 1258. Here, if the general type of alleged statements made by the
supervisors about the plaintiff’s performance were true, the supervisors would be acting within the
scope of their authority as supervisors to evaluate and comment upon the plaintiff’s employee
performance.
The plaintiff’s reliance on Hoffman is also misplaced. In Hoffman, a tenured instructor at
a state university brought suit against his supervisor who allegedly made false accusations as to the
instructor’s professional competency, aberrational sexual conduct and lack of integrity. Hoffman,
57 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 373 N.E.2d at 488. The Hoffman court held that the suit was not against the
State because judgment for the plaintiff would not affect, control or subject the State to liability.
Hoffman, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 373 N.E.2d at 490. See also Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 679
N.E.2d at 1259 (which clarified Hoffman’s holding that “a suit was not against the state when the
defendant supervisor made personal accusations that did not relate solely to the employee’s job”).
In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleges that the supervisors falsely accused her of sleeping at
meetings, underperforming, having poor judgment and being incompetent–all accusations that
related solely to the plaintiff’s job. The plaintiff failed to plead any false personal accusations made
by the supervisors that did not relate solely to her job.
Further, the plaintiff failed to allege any specific facts to support her allegations of malice
by the supervisors which, if proven, would show malicious conduct. Management Ass’n, 248 Ill.
App. 3d at 617, 618 N.E.2d at 706. The plaintiff made conclusory statements in her complaint that
the supervisors were malicious and deliberate in allegedly harassing her with their false accusations
but failed to allege any specific facts in her complaint that showed the supervisors harbored personal
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animosity toward her or acted for any purpose other than what they perceived to be the best interests
of DCFS. Management Ass’n, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 617, 618 N.E.2d at 706, citing Nikelly v. Stubing,
204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 562 N.E.2d 360 (1990). Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the
supervisors were not acting in what they perceived to be the best interests of DCFS in evaluating the
plaintiff’s job performance and setting deadlines which the plaintiff believed were unreasonable.
Although the supervisors’ behavior, if true, is unpalatable, absent a showing of specific facts that the
supervisors acted for any purpose other than what they perceived to be the best interests of DCFS,
their actions were not beyond the scope of authority. Similarly, in Busch v. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d
823, 831, 753 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2001), the court held that sovereign immunity was inapplicable
because the Busch plaintiff had alleged that the defendants acted in violation of the law. The
plaintiff in the case at bar failed to allege the supervisors’ conduct violated any law, and thus,
sovereign immunity is not precluded. Because the plaintiff has not appealed the circuit court’s
dismissal of her age and disability discrimination claims, we will not consider the plaintiff as having
alleged any violation of law based on her employment discrimination claims.
We hold that the supervisors’ alleged conduct did not exceed the scope of their authority and
the first prong of the test is satisfied.
For the second prong, the plaintiff argues under the “source of duty test” that because
defamation, IIED and interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual relationship
are common law duties applicable to all citizens–not only state employees–these duties were owed
by the supervisors independently of their state employment. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159, 592
N.E.2d 977, 980 (1992) (“where the employee is charged with breaching a duty imposed on him
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independently of his State employment, sovereign immunity will not attach and a negligence claim
may be maintained against him in circuit court” (emphasis in original)).
The supervisors, however, contended that their responsibilities to prepare performance
evaluations for the plaintiff, discipline and criticize the plaintiff, and set deadlines for her tasks were
solely in their capacities as DCFS supervisors. Thus, any duties allegedly breached when performing
these functions in their capacities as supervisors were not owed independently of their state
employment.
In Currie, the Illinois Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity did not bar jurisdiction
in the circuit court to hear a negligence claim against a state trooper whose patrol car collided with
the plaintiff’s truck and injured the plaintiff. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 151, 592 N.E.2d at 977. Using
the source-of- duty rule, the court reasoned that the duty the trooper allegedly breached arose as a
result of his status as a driver on a public road rather than a result of his employment as state trooper.
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 161-62, 592 N.E.2d at 981. Such negligence was a breach of duties that every
driver owes to every other driver, regardless of state employment.1 Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592
N.E.2d at 981. The supreme court, however, noted an exception to sovereign immunity when the
duty is unique to state employment such that a lawsuit challenging the conduct could affect the
actions and policies of the State. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 981; see also Loman v.
Freeman, 229 Ill. 2d 104, 123, 890 N.E.2d 446, 459 (2008); Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 679
1
State-employed professionals, such as public defenders and doctors, are not protected by
sovereign immunity when they breach a professional duty owed by every member of that
profession. Brandon, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 506, 858 N.E.2d at 480, citing Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at
333, 807 N.E.2d at 419-20.
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N.E.2d at 1258; Brandon, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 506, 858 N.E.2d at 481.
The plaintiff in this case argues that because common law duties are applicable to all citizens,
the supervisors’ alleged conduct was owed independently of their state employment. The Wozniak
court rejected a similar argument by a professor who asserted that the department head of the
university had a general duty not to interfere with the contractual relationships of others. Wozniak,
288 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 679 N.E.2d at 1258. Instead, it held that to allow suit against the defendant
in his individual capacity would limit his ability to engage in lawful activity on behalf of the
university, such as communicating, allocating tasks and making personnel or employment decisions.
Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 134, 679 N.E.2d at 1259.
In her reply brief, the plaintiff here argued that Wozniak is in conflict with supreme court
precedent in Fritz because it made three critical errors. We find that the plaintiff’s arguments are
meritless because Wozniak is factually distinguishable from Fritz. As stated by the supreme court
in Fritz:
“We need not express an opinion on whether Wozniak
reached the correct result on its facts, because the case is
distinguishable. As the appellate court dissent noted in this case,
Wozniak involved a state employee in a supervisory role who merely
made ‘work-related statements’ within the context of that supervisory
role. The instant case, by contrast, involves allegedly false reports to
an independent agency–the State Police–in direct violation of
criminal law. See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998). Wozniak
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itself acknowledged that a statutory violation would change the legal
calculus ***.” Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 313, 807 N.E.2d at 468.
We reject the plaintiff’s argument that the supervisors’ conduct arose independently of their
state employment. Supervisors are hired to supervise. Their alleged conduct, no matter how
misguided, was work-related and unique to their capacity as supervisors. Their conduct included
communicating, setting deadlines, evaluating and making personnel and other employment decisions
on behalf of DCFS. A suit challenging the alleged conduct could also affect state policies and
control state actions because a judgment for the plaintiff would directly influence the supervisors’
ability as state employees to handle departmental personnel issues. Therefore, we hold that the duty
alleged to have been breached was not owed by the supervisors independently of their employment
at DCFS.
Finally, the third prong requires that we look at whether the complained-of actions involve
matters ordinarily within that employee’s normal and official functions. Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at 330,
807 N.E.2d at 418, quoting Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (1990).
The plaintiff argues that the third prong of the test is not satisfied because the supervisors were “not
performing a uniquely governmental function” because the same functions occur in private offices
and business. She relied on Currie’s holding that the trooper, at the time of the car collision, was not
performing a uniquely governmental function. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 151, 592 N.E.2d at 977.
We find that the plaintiff’s reliance on Currie for this prong of the test is inapposite. The
Currie court called into doubt whether the trooper was even responding to a dispatch call at the time
of the collision or engaged in personal business in finding that he was not performing a uniquely
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governmental function at the time of the collision. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 162, 592 N.E.2d at 981.
The defendants contend that the issue of whether a function is uniquely governmental is
relevant solely to the second prong as it relates to an exception to the source of duty rule. Currie,
148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 981. Accordingly, we only need to look at whether the actions
complained of involve matters ordinarily within the supervisors’ normal and official functions as
employees.
We hold that evaluating, disciplining, and setting assignment deadlines were all within the
normal and official functions of the supervisors as state employees. Therefore, the third prong of
the test is satisfied and the suit against the supervisors is a suit against the state.
CONCLUSION
Because we resolve the case on the basis of sovereign immunity we need not address the
additional issues of preemption by the Human Rights Act and absolute immunity. We hold that the
plaintiff’s intentional tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity and, thus, the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to hear this case.
Affirmed.
KARNEZIS, P.J., and QUINN, J., concur.
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