People v. Shreffler , 2015 IL App (4th) 130718 ( 2015 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Shreffler, 2015 IL App (4th) 130718
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption STEPHEN J. SHREFFLER, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-13-0718
Filed August 4, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Piatt County, No. 12-CF-15; the
Review Hon. Richard L. Broch, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Tonya Joy Reedy
Appeal (argued), all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for
appellant.
Dana Rhoades, State’s Attorney, of Monticello (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State’s
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Harris and Holder White concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In August 2013, following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Stephen
J. Shreffler, guilty of three counts of unlawful use of weapons (UUW) in violation of section
24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii) (West 2010)).
Specifically, the State alleged, and the court found, that defendant possessed three illegal guns:
(1) two shotguns, each with an overall length less than 26 inches; and (2) one rifle with a barrel
less than 16 inches in length. The court sentenced defendant to 24 months of probation and 180
days in jail.
¶2 Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt because (1) the “overall length” of the shotguns should have been measured by the
length of a straight line between the two farthest points on the gun, instead of by the length of a
straight line parallel to the bore, and (2) a flash suppressor at the end of the rifle’s barrel should
have been included in the measurement of the rifle barrel’s length. Defendant also contends
that section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code (1) is unconstitutionally vague and (2) violates the
second amendment right to keep arms (U.S. Const., amend. II). Because we agree that the
stipulated evidence failed to prove defendant guilty of the charged offenses, we reverse his
convictions and sentence without addressing his constitutional claims.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The following pertinent facts are largely undisputed.
¶5 In March 2011, federal agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) executed a search warrant on defendant’s home in Monticello, Illinois. The
agents suspected defendant of selling firearms without a license based upon information
defendant posted on a website he maintained. During the search, ATF agents confiscated more
than 40 firearms, many of which defendant kept displayed on the walls throughout his house.
Among those guns were the two shotguns and the rifle at issue in this case. Federal authorities
declined to prosecute defendant, and the case was turned over to the local State’s Attorney.
¶6 In October 2012, the State charged defendant with violating section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the
Code in that he possessed two “Companhia Brasileria de Cartuchos 12 gauge single shot
shotgun[s],” each with an overall length of less than 26 inches. In December 2012, the State
charged defendant with violating that same statute in that he possessed a “Palmetto AR-15
rifle” with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.
¶7 At an August 2013 bench trial, the parties presented the following evidence by stipulation.
(Defendant did not stipulate that this evidence was sufficient to convict.)
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¶8 In defendant’s home, ATF special agent Dennis Fritzsche found an “AR-15 type rifle” and
“two weapons made from shotguns,” which he sent to the ATF Firearms Technology Branch in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for testing and measurement. (Fritzsche apparently characterized
the shotguns as “weapons made from shotguns” because the stocks of the guns “had been cut
down.” For purposes of this appeal, we simply refer to the guns as the “rifle” and the
“shotguns.”)
¶9 Earl Griffith of the ATF Firearms Technology Branch in Martinsburg measured the three
guns recovered from defendant’s home. He found that the rifle had a barrel length of 115/8
inches. That measurement did not include the flash suppressor at the end of the barrel. If the
flash suppressor had been included in the measurement, the barrel of the rifle would have
exceeded 16 inches. According to the stipulation, Griffith would have testified that “a screw
on, screw off flash suppressor is an attachment and is not considered part of the barrel of a rifle
and is not included in the measurement of the barrel.”
¶ 10 Pursuant to ATF regulations, Griffith measured the two shotguns along a straight line
parallel to the bore (the bore is the interior portion of the barrel through which the projectile
travels). By that measurement, Griffith found that one of defendant’s shotguns measured 251/4
inches in overall length and the other shotgun measured 253/8 inches in overall length. If
Griffith had measured a straight line from the tip of the barrel to the tip of the stock (not
parallel to the bore), both shotguns would have exceeded 26 inches in overall length. Griffith
would have testified that “the measurement methods he used for the rifle barrel and the overall
length of the two weapons made from shotguns are the generally accepted measurement
methods for ATF and the firearm industry and those methods of measurement are set forth in
[27 C.F.R. § 479.11].” The trial court admitted the following diagram into evidence as part of
the parties’ stipulation:
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¶ 11 The above diagram depicts two methods for measuring the overall length of a shotgun. The
ATF’s regulations approve of the method depicted on the right of the diagram, in which the
overall length is measured from a straight line parallel to the bore. See 27 C.F.R. § 497.11. The
method depicted on the left of the diagram (which ATF does not approve, as indicated by the
large “X” through the image) determines the overall length by measuring a straight line
between the two farthest points on the gun, which will usually be the tip of the barrel to the tip
of the stock.
¶ 12 The trial court found defendant guilty of all three counts of UUW. Later in August 2013,
the court sentenced defendant to 24 months of probation and 180 days in jail.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
because (1) the overall length of the shotguns should have been measured by the length of a
straight line between the two farthest points on the gun, instead of the length of a straight line
parallel to the bore, and (2) a flash suppressor at the end of the rifle’s barrel should have been
included in the measurement of the rifle barrel’s length. Because we agree with these
contentions, we need not address defendant’s additional claims that section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of
the Code is unconstitutionally vague and violates the second amendment right to keep arms.
¶ 16 A. The Standard of Review
¶ 17 Typically, when a defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
sustain his conviction, “a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the required
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Gonzalez, 239 Ill. 2d 471, 478,
942 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (2011). In this case, however, the facts–specifically, the physical
dimensions of defendant’s guns–are not in dispute. Instead, the only question is which of those
dimensions matter for purposes of section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code. Because this is a question
of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6, 980
N.E.2d 1107.
¶ 18 “When construing a statute, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent, best indicated by the plain and ordinary language of the statute.” Skaperdas
v. Country Casualty Insurance Co., 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15, 28 N.E.3d 747.
¶ 19 B. Section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code
¶ 20 Section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:
***
(7) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries:
***
(ii) any rifle having one or more barrels less than 16 inches in length *** or
any weapon made from a *** shotgun, whether by alteration, modification, or
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otherwise, if such a weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26
inches[.]” 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii) (West 2010).
¶ 21 C. The Shotguns
¶ 22 The State contends that the legal measure of a shotgun’s “overall length” under section
24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code is not the farthest distance between two points on the shotgun.
Instead, the State asserts that the “overall length” must be measured from a straight line
parallel to the bore of the shotgun. We reject this contention, which runs contrary to the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term “overall length.”
¶ 23 The State correctly points out that the ATF’s regulations state that the overall length of a
shotgun should be measured from a line parallel to the bore. However, as defendant also
correctly points out, the Illinois General Assembly could have provided for such a method of
measurement in the text of section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code if it deemed that method
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. It did not. “Courts may not depart from the
plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the
legislature did not express.” Skaperdas, 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15, 28 N.E.3d 747.
¶ 24 Because “overall length” is not defined in the statute, we give that term its plain and
ordinary meaning. “When the statute contains undefined terms, it is entirely appropriate to
employ a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms.” People v.
Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40, 906 N.E.2d 545, 551 (2009). “Length” is defined as “the longer or
longest dimension of an object.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 664 (10th ed.
2000). “Overall” is defined as “from one end to the other.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 826 (10th ed. 2000). The plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory terms simply
provides no support for the State’s assertion that the line of measurement must be restricted to
a line parallel with the shotgun’s bore. Instead, from one end to the other, the longer or longest
dimension of a shotgun is a straight line between the farthest two points on the gun, not
necessarily the length of a line parallel to the bore.
¶ 25 Because the undisputed evidence showed that both of defendant’s shotguns had an overall
length of more than 26 inches, as measured by a straight line between the farthest two points on
the guns, the State failed to prove defendant guilty of violating section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the
Code for possessing shotguns shorter than 26 inches in overall length. Accordingly, we reverse
defendant’s convictions.
¶ 26 D. The Rifle
¶ 27 The trial court found defendant guilty of possessing a rifle with a barrel less than 16 inches.
It is undisputed that if the measurement of the rifle barrel had included the flash suppressor that
was attached to the end of the barrel when the gun was seized from defendant’s home, the
length of the barrel would have exceeded 16 inches.
¶ 28 The State contends that the legal length of a rifle barrel under section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the
Code does not include a flash suppressor attached to the end of the barrel. Illinois law does not
specifically define the term “barrel” as used in section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code. “Barrel” is
defined as “the part of a gun that the bullets go through when the gun is fired.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/barrel (last visited
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July 1, 2015). It is undisputed that a bullet fired from defendant’s rifle would have traveled
through the flash suppressor.
¶ 29 However, the dictionary definition of “barrel” leaves some remaining ambiguity because it
defines the barrel as “part of” the gun. Should we consider a flash suppressor “part of” the gun
such that it fits within the definition of “barrel”? We conclude we should for two reasons.
¶ 30 First, “[p]ursuant to the rule of lenity, ambiguous criminal statutes will generally be
construed in the defendant’s favor.” People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 959 N.E.2d 621.
“A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Skaperdas,
2015 IL 117021, ¶ 16, 28 N.E.3d 747. Neither defendant nor the State has advanced
unreasonable interpretations of the meaning of “barrel.” However, our law dictates that the tie
should be resolved in defendant’s favor.
¶ 31 Second, the State has cited no provision of Illinois law from which this court may conclude
that a flash suppressor–which undisputedly serves a functional purpose–is not part of a gun
simply because it can be unscrewed and removed from the other parts of the gun. The General
Assembly has certainly not drawn such a distinction. Were this court to adopt that distinction
and incorporate it into section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code, our doing so would simply add
uncertainty and ambiguity to the statute. Almost every gun can be disassembled into multiple
component parts. How many parts must be unfastened and removed before the remaining parts
are no longer a gun? Most shotguns, for instance, can fire with the stock removed. Yet even the
ATF agrees that the stock is included in the “overall length” of a shotgun. It is the role of the
legislature–not this court–to resolve such philosophical questions. Until and unless the General
Assembly sees fit to promulgate more specific statutory definitions, we will construe the
statutory ambiguity in defendant’s favor.
¶ 32 The State does cite federal case law and regulations holding that a flash suppressor is not
part of the barrel of a rifle under federal law. However, because those cases and regulations do
not purport to interpret the Illinois statute at issue in this case, we are not bound to follow them.
¶ 33 Further, it is worth mentioning that the State presented no evidence that defendant ever
removed the flash suppressor at any point during his ownership of the rifle. Although the trial
court deemed the testimony irrelevant, the court allowed defendant to submit an affidavit as an
offer of proof in which defendant stated the following:
“As to the AR-15 rifle, the same was purchased in March of 1991 and was never
modified by defendant. It was in the same condition at time of seizure as it was at time
of purchase including the attached flash suppressor. Defendant truly believed and
continues to believe that the flash suppressor was an integral part of the barrel thereby
rendering a measurement of 16 inches or more to the same.”
¶ 34 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that anything at the end of a rifle barrel must be
included in the measurement for purposes of section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code. It is not as if
someone may tape a chopstick to the end of a gun and call it part of the barrel for purposes of
the statute. But in a case such as this, in which the flash suppressor is a functional component
of the gun through which the bullet passes when the gun is fired, and the State presents no
evidence that the defendant has possessed the gun without the flash suppressor attached, the
law must be construed in defendant’s favor.
¶ 35 We conclude that the attached flash suppressor in this case should have been included as
part of the “barrel” of defendant’s rifle. Accordingly, the barrel of defendant’s rifle exceeded
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16 inches in length, and his conviction under section 24-1(a)(7)(ii) of the Code must be
reversed.
¶ 36 We also note that because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain
defendant’s convictions, double jeopardy prohibits a retrial. See People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d
322, 367, 892 N.E.2d 1047, 1073 (2008) (“The State cannot retry a defendant once it has been
determined that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction.”).
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we reverse defendant’s convictions and sentences.
¶ 39 Reversed.
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