In re Robinson ( 1997 )


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  •                               NO. 4-96-0728

      

                             IN THE APPELLATE COURT

      

                                   OF ILLINOIS

      

                                 FOURTH DISTRICT

      

    In the Matter of ARLETTA F. ROBINSON,   )    Appeal from

    a Person Found Subject to Involuntary   )    Circuit Court of

    Admission,                              )    Vermilion County

    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,    )    No. 96MH28

             Petitioner-Appellee,          )

             v.                            )    

    ARLETTA F. ROBINSON, a/k/a LONDA        )    Honorable

    STRICKLAND,                             )    Joseph C. Moore,

             Respondent-Appellant.         )    Judge Presiding.

      

      

      

      

                                        

             JUSTICE GREEN delivered the opinion of the court:

             On August 26, 1996, following a hearing in the circuit

    court of Vermilion County, the court entered two separate orders

    (1) finding that respondent, Arletta F. Robinson, was in need of

    involuntary admission to the Department of Mental Health and

    Developmental Disabilities at the George A. Zeller Mental Health

    Center (Zeller) (405 ILCS 5/3-700 (West 1994)), and (2) directing

    the staff at Zeller to administer psychotropic medication to her

    (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West Supp. 1995)).  Respondent appeals,

    contending (1) certain defects in the State's petitions for

    involuntary commitment and administration of psychotropic

    medication, and the single proceeding held thereon, violated her

    procedural due process rights; (2) she was denied effective

    assistance of counsel; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to

    support the court's order directing involuntary commitment and

    administration of psychotropic medication.

             We affirm in part and reverse in part.

             Respondent's procedural due process claims concern

    violations of the statutes that govern (1) proceedings on a

    petition for administration of psychotropic medication (405 ILCS

    5/2-107.1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West Supp. 1995)) and (2) proceedings on

    a petition for involuntary commitment (405 ILCS 5/3-601, 3-609

    (West 1994)).  The State concedes that all statutory violations as

    alleged by respondent have occurred but claims those errors should

    be deemed waived as respondent failed to object at the hearing, no

    prejudice had resulted, and there had been substantial compliance

    with the appropriate provisions of the Mental Health and

    Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.

    (West 1994)).  As we will discuss, we decline to apply the waiver

    doctrine to issues concerning the petition for administration of

    psychotropic medication and the hearing held on that petition.  As

    to issues concerning the petition for involuntary commitment, we

    apply the waiver doctrine.

             The statutory provisions governing petitions for

    administration of psychotropic medication at issue here state as

    follows:

                  "(1) Any person 18 years of age or older,

             including any guardian, may petition the

             circuit court for an order authorizing the

             administration of psychotropic medication to a

             recipient of services.  The petitioner shall

             deliver a copy of the petition, and notice of

             the time and place of the hearing, to the

             respondent, his or her attorney, and the

             guardian, if any, no later than 10 days prior

             to the date of the hearing.  The petition may

             include a request that the court authorize

             such testing and procedures as may be

             essential for the safe and effective

             administration of the psychotropic medication

             sought to be administered, but only where the

             petition sets forth the specific testing and

             procedures sought to be administered.

                  (2) The court shall hold a hearing within

             14 days of the filing of the petition.

             Continuances totaling not more than 14 days

             may be granted to the recipient upon a showing

             that the continuances are needed in order to

             prepare adequately for a hearing under this

             Section.  The court may, in its discretion,

             grant additional continuances if agreed to by

             all parties.  The hearing shall be separate

             from a judicial proceeding held to determine

             whether a person is subject to involuntary

             admission."  (Emphasis added.)  405 ILCS 5/2-

             107.1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West Supp. 1995).

             Here, there is no dispute that respondent did not receive

    a copy of the petition for administration of psychotropic

    medication or notice of hearing 10 days prior to the date of the

    hearing as the petition was filed on August 26, 1996, the day of

    the hearing originally set for the petition for involuntary

    commitment.  The August 26, 1996, hearing proceeded on both the

    petitions for involuntary commitment and administration of

    psychotropic medication.  Thus, respondent did not receive a

    "separate" hearing on the issue of administration of psychotropic

    medication.

             The transcript of that hearing indicated respondent's

    appointed counsel announced he was ready for trial.  Respondent

    never objected to the State's failure to serve her with a copy of

    the petition for administration of psychotropic medication or the

    notice of hearing and never objected to a single hearing held on

    the petitions for involuntary commitment and administration of

    psychotropic medication.

             The State maintains that trial counsel's failure to

    object requires the application of the waiver doctrine when the

    record establishes no prejudice occurred by any of the procedural

    errors and there was substantial compliance with the Code.  The

    State relies on a line of cases where the Supreme Court of Illinois

    has held that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with

    notice requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings did not

    require reversal where the respondent failed to object and the

    respondent had actual notice of the proceedings.  In re Splett, 143

    Ill. 2d 225, 231-32, 572 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1991); In re Nau, 153

    Ill. 2d 406, 419-20, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140-41 (1992).  In Splett, the

    respondent did not receive formal notice of hearing but was present

    at the hearing and was represented by counsel who actively

    presented a defense.

             Subsequently, the supreme court similarly held that

    strict compliance with the requirement of a written

    predispositional report (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91½, par. 3-810)

    in involuntary commitment proceedings was unnecessary where the

    respondent failed to object to the lack thereof and the purpose of

    the requirement was substantially fulfilled by oral testimony.  In

    re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 134, 601 N.E.2d 712, 717 (1992).

    Most recently, the supreme court in In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200,

    225-27, 641 N.E.2d 345, 356-57 (1994), applied Splett in holding

    that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with notice

    requirements in proceedings to administer psychotropic medication

    did not amount to a due process violation where the respondent had

    actual notice of the proceedings and ample opportunity to prepare

    a defense.

             Here, unlike Splett and its progeny, we do not believe

    the procedural defects can be deemed harmless or that respondent

    had actual notice of the petition for psychotropic medication with

    ample opportunity to prepare for a defense.  The evidence indicates

    respondent was present with her attorney at the August 26, 1996,

    hearing to proceed on the involuntary commitment petition.  Thus,

    respondent had no notice of the petition for administration of

    psychotropic medication until the day of the hearing and had no

    opportunity to prepare a defense.

             The State maintains that no prejudice occurred by the

    total lack of notice of the petition for administration of

    psychotropic medication as respondent and counsel actively

    participated in the proceedings.  However, we cannot determine from

    the record that counsel's performance indicates he had an

    opportunity to prepare for a hearing on the petition for

    administration of psychotropic medication.

             Moreover, in enacting the requirement of "separate"

    hearings for petitions for involuntary commitment and

    administration  of  psychotropic  medication  under  section

    2-107.1(a)(2) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(2) (West Supp.

    1995)), the legislature apparently intended to ensure that

    psychotropic medication petitions are not just simply appended to

    involuntary commitment petitions.  Based on the notice

    requirements, if followed, an involuntary commitment proceeding

    would have to be held within five days of filing the petition (405

    ILCS 5/3-611 (West 1994)), where administration of psychotropic

    medication proceedings could not be held any earlier than 10 days

    after filing the petition (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(1) (West Supp.

    1995)).  Thus, separate hearings would have to be held.  Here,

    where respondent had no notice of the administration of

    psychotropic medication proceedings, we do not believe the

    "separate" hearing requirement has been substantially complied with

    by the court entering separate findings on each petition.  The

    decision in In re Herbolsheimer, 272 Ill. App. 3d 140, 650 N.E.2d

    287 (1995), is not controlling here.  There, the third district

    held that a combined hearing on petitions for involuntary

    commitment and administration of psychotropic medication was not

    error.  However, the Herbolsheimer case was decided prior to the

    enactment of section 2-107.1(a)(2) of the Code expressly requiring

    separate hearings.

             Given our decision that respondent's failure to object to

    defects in the administration of psychotropic drug proceedings does

    not amount to a waiver on review, we further conclude that these

    errors require us to reverse and vacate the court's medication

    order.  This court in In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 653

    N.E.2d 977 (1995), held that the trial court erred in ordering the

    administration of psychotropic medication following a finding that

    the respondent was in need of hospitalization when no formal

    petition for the administration of medication had been filed,

    thereby depriving the respondent of proper notice.  This court

    explained that in order to proceed on a petition for administration

    of psychotropic medication, it was implicit under the former

    section 2-107.1 of the Code (see 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 1992))

    that (1) a petition be filed prior to the date of the hearing and

    (2) the trial court provide notice to respondent of the hearing.

    Absent these requirements, the trial court is without authority

    under section 2-107.1 of the Code to order the administration of

    psychotropic medication.  Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 653

    N.E.2d at 983.  The Carmody holding applies here, as the

    requirements stated in Carmody have expressly been made part of the

    notice requirement of the amended section 2-107.1(a)(1) of the Code

    (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995)) applicable here.

             As we are vacating the court's medication order, we need

    not decide whether respondent received ineffective assistance of

    counsel based on counsel's failure to object to the defects as

    discussed in the administration of psychotropic medication

    proceeding, nor do we need to address the sufficiency of the

    evidence to support such an order.

             Respondent also challenges the form of the petition for

    involuntary commitment and whether she received formal service of

    the petition with notice of hearing.  The record indicates that two

    petitions for involuntary commitment were filed.  The first

    petition was filed on August 22, 1996, by a Danville police officer

    and erroneously provided that the petition was being filed on

    grounds that respondent was a patient who continues to be subject

    to involuntary commitment pursuant to section 3-813 of the Code

    (405 ILCS 5/3-813 (West 1994)).  However, the statement in support

    of the petition indicated that respondent came to the Danville

    police station on the evening of August 20, 1996, apparently

    because she was homeless and in need of shelter.  Respondent was

    transported to United Samaritans Medical Center by the reporting

    officer, as he believed respondent was unable to care for herself

    and was a danger to herself.

             The petition provided no answer in the space for listing

    the "names and addresses of the spouse, parent, guardian, and close

    relative or, if none, known friend."  The petition also left blank

    the space provided for proof of service of the petition upon

    respondent.  Attached to the petition were two medical certificates

    establishing that respondent was examined by two psychiatrists,

    once on August 21, 1996, and again on August 22, 1996.  Those

    examinations established that respondent suffered from

    schizophrenia.

             On August 26, 1996, the day of the hearing, a second

    petition for involuntary admission was filed, that one indicating

    that admission was requested by court order pursuant to section

    3-700 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-700 (West 1994)).  As in the first

    petition, the second petition left blank the names and addresses of

    family and friends to be contacted and proof of service of the

    petition.

             Attached to the petition was a copy of the first petition

    and a handwritten notation near the proof of service portion that

    stated, "[Patient] refuse[s] to sign upon [admission] to unit.  8-

    21-96 per V. Hutchinson [R.N.]  8-23-96 Smith [R.N.]"  Also

    attached to the petition was a copy of an extensive history and

    assessment of respondent prepared by a social worker on August 22,

    1996.

             The State acknowledges that the petitions were defective

    in that (1) neither included the names and addresses of any

    relative or close friend or explained why none were listed as

    required by section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-601(b)(2)

    (West 1994)), (2) neither contained a signed proof of service

    indicating petitioner received a copy of the petition within 12

    hours after admission as required by section 3-609 of the Code (405

    ILCS 5/3-609 (West 1994)), and (3) both contained conflicting

    statutory authority under which the State was proceeding for

    involuntary admission.  Furthermore, the record does not prove that

    respondent received formal notices of hearing as required by

    section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 1994)).  The

    State contends that these issues are waived, as respondent failed

    to raise them to the trial court and no prejudice had resulted.  We

    agree with the State.

             In In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 607 N.E.2d 681

    (1993), this court declined to apply the waiver doctrine to bar

    consideration of an alleged error in a petition for involuntary

    commitment in failing to provide names and addresses of the

    respondent's family or friends or explain why none were listed as

    required by section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,

    ch. 91½, par. 3-601(b)(2)).  This court found waiver was

    inappropriate there, as the error was apparent from the face of the

    record, liberty interests were involved, and the error could be

    considered prejudicial.  Based on the supreme court's decision in

    Nau, this court expressly held that failure to strictly comply with

    the requirement of the petition to list names of relatives or

    friends or indicate a diligent attempt to do so does not always

    require reversal if it could be shown that no prejudice to the

    respondent had occurred.  Because the error there may have been

    prejudical to the respondent, the court reversed the involuntary

    commitment order.  Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 885, 607 N.E.2d at 684.

             Similarly, in In re Ellis, 284 Ill. App. 3d 691, 694, 672

    N.E.2d 893, 894-95 (1996), the Third District Appellate Court held

    it was reversible error in involuntary commitment proceedings for

    the petition to fail to list names and addresses of the

    respondent's family or friends or a statement of diligent inquiry,

    particularly where the respondent's mother had maintained contact

    with the mental health facility.

             We conclude the instant case is distinguishable from

    Adams and Ellis as here, even though no names of family or friends

    are listed on the petition or an explanation why none are listed,

    an extensive report of respondent's history was attached to the

    second petition for involuntary commitment.  This report indicated

    that respondent refused to give a personal history and had no known

    family or friends, except a sister named Ethel Reed.  Respondent

    was presently refusing to acknowledge Reed was her sister and had

    no "supportive family contact."  Reed was last known to be living

    in Danville, Illinois.  We believe that based on Splett and Nau,

    failure to strictly comply with section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code

    does not require reversal as (1) respondent failed to object to the

    alleged errors and (2) the report attached to the petition

    indicated that a diligent attempt was made to learn of respondent's

    family and friends, and respondent had no contact with Reed and

    desired no contact with her.  Thus, we do not believe the State's

    failure to contact Reed resulted in prejudice to respondent and we

    deem the issue waived for purposes of review.

             We also conclude that failure to strictly comply with the

    formal proof of service and notice of hearing requirements do not

    require reversal as the evidence shows that, as in Splett and Nau,

    respondent failed to object and had received actual notice of the

    hearing.  Respondent was present at the hearing and was represented

    by appointed counsel who actively represented her interest on the

    issue of involuntary commitment.  

             Furthermore, the record indicates that respondent was

    given a copy of the petition for involuntary commitment.

    Introduced into evidence, without objection by respondent, was a

    progress note from respondent's chart where a nurse named "CVH"

    stated that on August 21, 1996, she gave respondent a copy of the

    petition and read the petition to her.  Accordingly, although the

    proof of service was not signed, the evidence clearly shows that

    respondent had been given a copy of the petition and had actual

    notice of the hearing.  Thus, we deem this issue waived for

    purposes of appeal.

             Finally, we do not believe that error in marking the

    first petition as seeking continued hospitalization, pursuant to

    section 3-813 of the Code--when in fact the State was seeking an

    original order of commitment--requires reversal under Splett and

    Nau.  The record indicates that following the filing of the first

    petition, a hearing was set within five days on August 26, 1996.

    On that date, another petition was filed attempting to correct the

    error by indicating the petition was initiated by court order (405

    ILCS 5/3-700 (West 1994)) and attaching the first petition and

    other reports.  Apparently, respondent contends that the filing of

    the second petition would require new medical certificates and the

    setting of a new hearing date with proof of service and notice of

    hearing.

             The statement provided by the Danville police officer who

    executed the first petition clearly states that respondent was

    brought from the police station to the hospital because she was

    unable to care for herself and believed to pose a danger to

    herself.  Respondent was examined by two psychiatrists within 24

    hours of her admission.  These certificates indicated respondent

    was wandering the streets and unable to provide for her needs.

    These certificates were available to respondent's attorney.  405

    ILCS 5/3-611 (West 1994).  Clearly, even with the error in labeling

    the first petition as requesting continued hospitalization, the

    first petition established that an original order of commitment was

    being requested as respondent was unable to care for herself and

    posed a danger to herself.

             Most likely, the officer who executed the first petition

    was proceeding under article VI of the Code governing emergency

    admissions by certification.  405 ILCS 5/3-600 through 3-611 (West

    1994).  Section 3-606 of the Code allows a peace officer to

    transport a person to a mental health facility if he has reason to

    believe hospitalization is necessary to protect that person from

    harm.  405 ILCS 5/3-606 (West 1994).

             At the August 26, 1996, hearing, respondent never

    objected to the grounds for involuntary commitment cited in either

    petition.  As the first petition, in all other ways, clearly set

    forth the reasons for seeking involuntary commitment, we do not

    believe respondent was prejudiced by the error in labeling.  There

    is no dispute that the proper medical certificates were filed with

    the first petition as an emergency admission petition (405 ILCS

    5/3-602 (West 1994)) or an admission by court order (405 ILCS 5/3-

    702 (West 1994)).  Accordingly, we deem this issue waived for

    purposes of review.

             We further do not believe that respondent was denied

    effective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the alleged

    errors in the form of the involuntary commitment petitions.  As we

    have concluded that respondent was not prejudiced by these errors,

    there can be no finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under

    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.

    Ct. 2052 (1984), for failing to object.  Respondent contends that

    counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of

    the progress note indicating "CVH" provided respondent with a copy

    of the petition.  However, respondent does not indicate on what

    grounds counsel could have successfully objected to the admission

    of the document.

             Finally, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence

    to support the court's finding that respondent was a person subject

    to involuntary admission, and because of her illness, she was

    reasonably expected to inflict serious harm upon herself or another

    in the near future or was unable to care for her basic needs so as

    to guard herself from serious harm.  405 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 1994).

    The trial court's decision in involuntary commitment proceedings

    will not be reversed on appeal unless its decision is determined to

    be against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re Bennett, 251

    Ill. App. 3d 887, 888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993).

             At the hearing, Linda Erp, assistant director at

    Crosspoint Human Services, testified (1) she spoke with respondent

    on August 23, 1996, (2) she has worked with respondent

    intermittently since 1974, (3) she contacted respondent to evaluate

    alternative placements and talked to her about the court process of

    commitment, (4) respondent was unable to have a meaningful

    conversation as her responses were not in touch with reality, (5)

    respondent had refused to take her medications or see a doctor over

    the past year, (6) respondent was "undomiciled," and (7) when

    respondent was taking her medications, her condition improved.

             Dr. Inagat M. Alikan, a psychiatrist that had been

    treating respondent since August 21, 1996, testified (1) respondent

    was suffering from an undifferentiated type of schizophrenia  where

    she becomes very "suspicious, delusional, loses touch with reality,

    and [is] unable to take care of her daily needs"; (2) if respondent

    was not presently given medical care, she would be a danger to

    herself because she deludes herself into believing she is not ill

    and does not take her medication; (3) respondent in her present

    condition is unable to find a place to live and, consequently, has

    been assaulted several times; (4) respondent has no understanding

    about how to find a permanent home, food, or clothing; (5)

    respondent needs long-term hospitalization; (6) only if respondent

    takes her medication would outpatient treatment be feasible; and

    (7) respondent suffers from auditory hallucinations and talks to

    voices she hears.

             Respondent testified (1) she was living at Oaklawn Inn

    but right now she was "kidnapped" at the police station and taken

    to the hospital; (2) she pays for food and rent from a monthly

    social security check; (3) she is a Navaho Indian and cannot take

    certain medications; (4) she has her own doctor, and she is not

    supposed to take the medicine prescribed by Dr. Alikan; (5) she has

    been "fed with a needle through [her] side," but she has not found

    a doctor yet to do it; (6) she eats every day, and when she had her

    own apartment, she used to prepare some of her food herself; (7)

    when she was at the Oaklawn Inn, she bought food at the grocery

    store and sometimes she bought food already prepared; (8) she

    denied that God told her not to take her medicine; and (9) she

    talked to herself only to the extent everyone normally does.

             On cross-examination, respondent explained she was the

    boss of Scotland Yard and she is here in Danville to see her

    husband, Donnie Gaines.  On the day she was hospitalized, she was

    planning to stay all night at the Danville police station and then

    go to the Salvation Army.

             Considering all the evidence, the trial court could

    reasonably have found that based on her mental illness, respondent

    was unable to care for herself.  The evidence established

    respondent was wandering the streets, staying at temporary

    shelters, and as a result, she had been assaulted and robbed

    several times.  Respondent had difficulty explaining why she was

    staying at the police station for the night, what she was going to

    do at the Salvation Army, and where she obtained her meals.

    Clearly, respondent was delusional, and Dr. Alikan testified he

    believed respondent was suffering from auditory hallucinations.  

             In summary, we (1) reverse the court's order approving

    the administration of psychotropic medication, and (2) affirm the

    court's order directing that respondent be involuntarily committed

    at Zeller.

             For the reasons stated, we affirm in part and reverse in

    part.

             Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

             KNECHT and COOK, JJ., concur.