People v. Carter ( 1998 )


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  •                                             Fourth Division

                                                June 30, 1998

      

      

      

      

      

      

      

    No. 1-97-1564

      

    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,    ) APPEAL FROM THE  

                                           ) CIRCUIT COURT OF

             Plaintiff-Appellee,           ) COOK COUNTY.

                                           )

        v.                                 )

                                           )

    LARRY CARTER,                           ) HONORABLE

                                           ) VINCENT BENTIVENGA,

             Defendant-Appellant.          ) JUDGE PRESIDING.

      

        JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

      

        A jury found Larry Carter (Carter) guilty of three varieties

    of cocaine possession.  It turns out the charge of possession of

    a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet

    of a school is fatally defective.  Both sides agree.  That

    conviction must be reversed.

        The issue we are left with when we review the remaining

    possession charges is what to do about the State's evidence and

    comments concerning the presence of schoolchildren and prior

    police familiarity with the defendant.

        We conclude the conviction for possession of a controlled

    substance with intent to deliver should be reversed.  However, we

    affirm the conviction for possession of a controlled substance

    and remand that cause for resentencing.

    FACTS

        On August 7, 1996, a two-count information was filed against

    Larry Carter.  In count I Carter was charged with possession of a

    controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver "within

    1000 feet of the real property comprising a school."  In count

    II, Carter was charged with possession of a controlled substance

    (the same cocaine as in count I) with intent to deliver.

        The case was tried before a jury.

        Chicago police officer Steven Bocconcelli testified he was a

    tactical officer for the 23rd District.  On May 9, 1996, he was

    assigned to monitor a corner at the intersection of Ainslie and

    Kenmore Avenues.  At about 8:30 p.m. that evening Bocconcelli

    began surveillance from an alleyway located about 150 feet away

    from the intersection.  Using binoculars, the officer observed

    the activity occurring on the corner.  Officers Timothy Glen and

    Nick Spencer were positioned nearby in an unmarked police car,

    providing back-up for Officer Bocconcelli.

        Officer Bocconcelli said he saw a man wearing a green shirt

    and dark-colored jeans standing on the corner.  This man, later

    identified as defendant Larry Carter, was approached by a young

    black man.  After a brief conversation, the man handed Carter

    what appeared to be a single bill of U.S. currency.  Carter then

    reached into a plastic bag he was holding in his left hand and

    gave the man a small plastic packet.

        Shortly after the first man walked away, a second young man

    approached Carter and the same type of exchange took place.

    Officer Bocconcelli testified, based on his experience as a

    police officer, he believed Carter was selling drugs.

        Officer Bocconcelli radioed his two back-up officers to pick

    him up.  The officers drove to the alleyway.  Officer Bocconcelli

    got in the car.  All three officers drove to the corner of

    Ainslie and Kenmore.  They got out of the car.

        Officer Bocconcelli and his partners approached the

    defendant.  Bocconcelli testified:

        "As we approached Officer Glenn [sic] says, that is Larry

    Carter.  ***  As I approached, I said, Larry, I just saw you do

    two drug deals."

        Officers Glen and Spencer also testified at trial.  Officer

    Glen confirmed that he had been on duty the evening of May 9,

    1996, and assigned to act as back-up for a surveillance being

    performed by Officer Bocconcelli.  Officer Glen said he

    recognized the man "as Larry Carter" as soon as he drove up to

    the corner of Ainslie and Kenmore.  He told Officer Bocconcelli

    that the man's name was Larry Carter: "I let him know that was

    Larry Carter."  

        Officer Glen also testified that when Bocconcelli told

    Carter he was being watched, Carter dropped a plastic bag and

    took off running.  Officer Glen said he ran after Carter,

    apprehended him, and placed him under arrest.  A search incident

    to Carter's arrest revealed Carter was wearing a pager.  Carter

    also had $34 in U.S. currency, consisting of one $20 bill, one

    $10 bill and four $1 bills.

        Both Officers Glen and Spencer testified regarding the steps

    they took to inventory the items recovered from Carter, including

    the plastic bag retrieved by Officer Bocconcelli.  They said the

    plastic bag contained 13 smaller plastic packets which held a

    white, rock-like substance believed to be crack cocaine.

        It was stipulated that a forensic chemist examined the 13

    packets and the substance contained in them.  The substance in

    the packets had a total weight of .91 grams.  Three of the 13

    packets were randomly-selected for chemical testing.  The

    substance in these packets tested positive for the presence of

    cocaine.

        Two other witnesses testified in regard to the enhancement

    factor -- the principal of St. Thomas of Canterbury School and an

    investigator for the Cook County State's Attorney's office.

        The principal, Christine Boyd, testified that St. Thomas

    of Canterbury School is located at 4827 N. Kenmore and the John

    T. McCutcheon Branch School is located across the street from St.

    Thomas School.

        Principal Boyd said her school accepts students from age

    three for preschool through eighth grade.  About 272 children

    attend the school.  The school was in session on May 9, 1996.

    Using photographs showing the intersection of Ainslie and Kenmore

    and the area near the school, Principal Boyd was able to describe

    the proximity of the intersection to her school.

        On cross-examination, she said she could not identify Larry

    Carter as someone who sold drugs near the school.  On redirect

    examination, over objection, she told about the type of activity

    she would see on the street during morning hours:

        "Activity is the selling of drugs, using children

        under the ages of 12 on bicycles up and down our street

        with older people as the main sellers that station

        themselves at the corner of Ainslie and Kenmore."

        Neither Principal Boyd nor any other witness testified

    children were present in the area when the defendant was

    arrested, at about 8:30 p.m.

        Investigator Sullivan testified he measured the distance

    from 4859 N. Kenmore (a location near the intersection of Ainslie

    and Kenmore) to three area schools, including St. Thomas and

    McCutcheon.  He found all three schools were within 1,000 feet of

    4859 N. Kenmore.  A diagram he had prepared, which showed the

    schools in relation to 4859 N. Kenmore, was admitted in evidence.

        Sullivan testified he had taken the photographs which

    Principal Boyd used in her testimony.  Sullivan identified the

    photos and said they were a true and accurate depiction of the

    area near the intersection of Ainslie and Kenmore.  

        The defendant offered no evidence.

        The jury found Carter guilty of both counts in the

    information and of the lesser-included offense of possession of a

    controlled substance.  The State had offered instructions and

    verdict forms on the lesser-included offense during the

    instructions conference.  The convictions were merged and Carter

    was sentenced to a single term of five years imprisonment.

    DECISION

        1. The within 1,000 feet of a school count

        Before, during, and after trial the defense contended the

    school distance count (I) was defective for failure to allege the

    possession of cocaine took place "on any public way."  725 ILCS

    570/407(b)(2) (West 1996).

        The State acknowledged it had to prove the "public way"

    element, but denied it had to allege it.  The trial judge agreed

    with the State.  Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was

    denied.

        After this trial, we decided People v. Jones, 288 Ill. App.

    3d 293, 681 N.E.2d 537 (1997).  There, we held the "on any public

    way" element was essential to the offense and failure to allege

    it was fatal to the charge.

        Now, the State, because of Jones, agrees count I is void.

    We so hold.

        2. Comments and evidence concerning schoolchildren

        There can be no question that Larry Carter was within 1,000

    feet of a school when his activities were observed by police

    officers.  That fact never was contested by the defense.

        Larry Carter was seen by the officers at about 8:30 p.m.

    No one said a child was anywhere near Carter or a school at that

    time.

        Yet, from opening statement to rebuttal closing argument,

    the prosecution made this a case about schools and

    schoolchildren.

        In its opening statement, the prosecution said:

        "This is a very simple case, it is about a drug

        dealer and elementary school children.  It is about an

        individual who makes his trade on a street line[d] with

        elementary school children ***"

        The State's first witness was Christine Boyd, principal of

    the St. Thomas school.  On direct examination, she said 272

    children attend her school.  The children ranged from

    preschoolers three years of age to eighthgraders.  Slightly to

    the north is the McCutcheon school, which, she said, serves

    children in kindergarten through second grade.

        During direct examination, Ms. Boyd identified several State

    photographs.  People's Exhibit 1 is an eight-by-ten color photo

    of the St. Thomas school.  It shows about 15 children standing on

    the steps of the school.  Other than showing the school exists,

    an undisputed fact, the photo has no apparent probative value.

        Defense counsel did not object to admission of the photo.

    He did object to Ms. Boyd's testimony on redirect examination.

    She told of seeing drug dealers using children under 12 on

    bicycles for the selling of drugs.  She told of patrolling nearby

    streets in the early afternoon and prohibiting nighttime

    activities at the school to ensure the safety of the school

    children.

        In rebuttal closing argument the prosecution, over

    objection, elaborated:

        "Children don't get to go to their school, they

        don't get to play at their school at night, they don't

        get to have PTA meetings, they don't get to live like

        civilized citizens because of the defendant because

        people like the defendant have invaded their neighborhood."

        Again, over objection, using Ms. Boyd's testimony, the

    prosecution drew a picture of Carter that extended far beyond

    the charges against him:

        "Because individuals such as Larry Carter are out

        there selling drugs.  He, as you heard from Christine

        Boyd, and his counterpart are out there all day running

        up and down in bicycles, standing out in traffic as bold

        and as big as life, they have no respect for the law,

        they have no respect for the kids who are trying to get

        an education at this school, they have no respect for this

        Court."

        A prosecutor may dwell on the evil of crime and exhort the

    jury to fearlessly administer the law.  People v. Hairston, 46

    Ill. 2d 348, 375, 263 N.E.2d 840 (1970).  But where statements

    made in closing argument serve no purpose except to inflame the

    jury, the statements constitute error.  People v. Tiller, 94 Ill.

    2d 303, 321, 447 N.E.2d 174 (1982) (error for State's Attorney to

    characterize three murders as a holocaust, similar to the Nazi

    holocaust depicted in a television show broadcast the night

    before).

        Here, it appears to us the prosecutor's purpose was to

    inflame the passion or arouse the prejudice of the jury against

    the defendant "without shedding any light on the paramount

    question presented to the jury, to-wit, its decision."  People v.

    Lurry, 77 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114, 395 N.E.2d 1234 (1979) (error to

    make argument based on racial overtones and racial problems);

    People v. Blackman, 44 Ill. App. 3d 137, 140, 358 N.E.2d 50

    (1976) (improper appeal to juror fears for prosecutor to argue

    that jurors, if they acquit, should avoid the area of 81st and

    Western and should not let Ruth beat them back to their parked

    cars).  Also see, People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 520

    N.E.2d 86 (1988) (error to repeatedly say the jurors' decision

    would indicate whether they supported the police who were out

    protecting them).

        There was no evidence in this case that this defendant

    possessed or sold drugs anywhere in the vicinity of children.

    Nor was there any evidence that he was part of a band of drug

    dealers plying their trade in the neighborhood.  The prosecutor's

    remarks served no purpose other than inflaming the jury.  People

    v. Rogers, 187 Ill. App. 3d 126, 138, 543 N.E.2d 300 (1989)

    (error for prosecutor to say, without evidentiary support:  "I

    guess we are all supposed to hope and believe that drug dealers

    who sell drugs to grade school and high school kids are just

    pretending.").

        In People v. Watkins, 220 Ill. App. 3d 201, 210, 581 N.E.2d

    145 (1991), where the defendant was charged with possession of a

    controlled substance, we said we do not condone a prosecutor

    arguing:  "Ladies and Gentlemen, how can we ever face our

    children, how can we ever tell them to say no to drugs, if we let

    somebody like Lonnie Watkins back out on the street?"

      The argument in this case resembles the one made in People v.

    Ford, 113 Ill. App. 3d 659, 447 N.E.2d 564 (1983), where the

    defendant was charged with unlawful delivery of cannabis.  The

    prosecutor argued:

        "*** because if we're talking about sympathies and

        prejudice when we're talking about the elicit [sic]

        business of selling drugs, then I would suggest that

        the Defense look to the poor, innocent, susceptible

        children in our community who are tempted and forced by

        peer pressures ***."  Ford, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 662.

    The Court said:

        "It is clear that the prosecutor was making an

        inflammatory appeal to the fears of the jury, and such

        remarks cannot be condoned."  Ford, 113 Ill. App. 3d at

        662.

        We do not consider the prosecution's final argument remarks

    in isolation.  They were part of a theme heard and seen

    throughout the trial, not the single comment we permitted in

    People v. Peterson, 248 Ill. App. 3d 28, 618 N.E.2d 388 (1993).

        The State proved distance from the school through its

    investigator and the diagram he prepared.  Distance was an

    enhancing factor and had little or nothing to do with the

    defendant's behavior on May 9, 1996, at Ainslie and Kenmore.  See

    Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 117

    S. Ct. 644 (1997).  While the extensive comments and evidence

    concerning schools and children would represent prosecutorial

    excess in the trial of count I, they have no arguable relevance

    to count II or the lesser-included possession charge.

        The trial judge made no effort to confine schools and

    school children evidence to count I.  True, he was not asked to

    do so, but there are times when a trial judge's uninvited action

    can cure unfair prejudice.  For example, in People v. Marshall,

    165 Ill. App. 3d 968, 978, 521 N.E.2d 538 (1988), the trial judge

    sua sponte struck a prosecutor's comment that the defendant

    intended to deliver the cocaine to the neighborhood, addicts,

    children, and other members of the community.  Potential error

    was avoided.

        We do not deprecate the potential dangers of drug traffic in

    the vicinity of children.  Principal Boyd's concern for her

    students is real and justified.  Because the matter is

    emotionally charged, however, care must be taken to abide by

    principles of relevance, lest improper considerations direct the

    conduct of the jury.

        2. Police familiarity with Larry Carter

        Another theme sounded by the State was police familiarity

    with Larry Carter before the day he was arrested.

        In opening, the prosecutor said:

        "Officer Glen is going to tell you that he knows the

        defendant, he knows him by name, that is, Larry

        Carter."

        The promise was kept.  On direct examination of Officer

    Glen:

        "Q:  *** did you recognize the defendant?

        A:   Yes, I recognized him as Larry Carter.

        Q:   Had you seen the defendant previous to that day?

        A:   Yes.

                                ***

        Q:   As you approached, did you say anything to

             any of the other officers in the vehicle?

        A:   Yes.  I let them know that was Larry Carter."

        Glen had testified that his duties included "narcotics

    surveillance, gang surveillance."

        The point was made again when Officer Bocconcelli testified:

        "A:  My partners, they approached also.  As we approached,

        Officer Glenn (sic) says that is Larry Carter.

        Q:   What did you do if anything?

        A:   As I approached, I said, Larry I just saw you do two

        deals."

        The obvious inference is that Carter had been engaged in

    prior illicit drug or gang activity, an implication that has been

    criticized by our supreme court.  People v. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d

    189, 196, 432 N.E.2d 262 (1982).  Even where a prosecutor does

    not argue prior familiarity with a defendant is evidence of

    criminal conduct, the implication may be conveyed by testimony

    and "is better avoided, unless somehow relevant."  People v.

    Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 514, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986).

        We have examined the record to determine whether there was

    any relevant purpose for repeated references to a narcotics and

    gang surveillance officer knowing Larry Carter by name.  We find

    none.  

        Contrary to the State's contention, there never was an issue

    concerning whether Larry Carter was the man observed by Officer

    Bocconcelli.  Defense counsel's cross-examination of the officers

    and his final argument were directed at the police account of

    what Carter was doing, not at his presence.  In final argument

    defense counsel's only point was that there was not enough

    evidence Larry Carter passed or possessed cocaine.

        The police familiarity evidence should not have been

    admitted.

        3. The impact of the improper comments and evidence

       The State contends Carter failed to preserve for review the

    issues he now raises.  It is true that defense objections were

    hit and miss during the trial, although, as we have pointed out,

    defense counsel did periodically object to Principal Boyd's

    testimony, testimony and comments about Officer Glen's

    familiarity with Carter, and final argument concerning

    schoolchildren.  It also is true that defense counsel made no

    effort to preserve any of these errors in his post-trial motion,

    a blatant disregard of his client's interests.

        Ordinarily, failure to present an issue in a post-trial

    motion results in a procedural default.  People v. Enoch, 122

    Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988).  We are persuaded,

    however, that a plain error analysis is appropriate in this case.

    We believe the errors we have discussed, as they apply to count

    II and the lesser-included possession offense, are worrisome

    enough to invoke the plain error exception to the waiver rule.

    134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 457-

    58, 643 N.E.2d 712 (1994).  Substantial rights are affected.

    People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 650; People v. Lurry,

    77 Ill. App. 3d at 114.

        In addition, our supreme court has observed that "the waiver

    rule is a rule of administrative convenience rather than

    jurisdiction, and the goals of obtaining a just result and

    maintaining a sound body of precedent may sometimes override

    considerations of waiver."  People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541,

    545, 693 N.E.2d 373 (1998).

        Our decision to address the merits of the defendant's

    contentions requires us to examine the admissible evidence heard

    and seen by the jury, then determine whether the errors we have

    identified could have made any difference.

        There is no litmus test that allows us to scientifically

    measure the impact of impropriety on a jury.  At times, when we

    engage in a weighing process, we conclude the errors did not

    prejudice the defendant.  Reversal, then, is not required.  See

    People v. Davis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1044, 675 N.E.2d 194

    (1996).

      In other cases, confidence in the outcome is shaken.  Strong

    evidence or not, "*** a fair trial, in all its stages, is a

    fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution ***."  People

    v. Rega, 271 Ill. App. 3d 17, 24, 648 N.E.2d 130 (1995).  Our

    responsibility to provide a just result has caused us to examine

    an issue not raised by the defendant on appeal.  People v.

    Thomas, 277 Ill. App. 3d 214, 218, 660 N.E.2d 184 (1995).

        Here, all error aside, no rational jury could have found the

    defendant not guilty of the lesser-included possession charge.

    Evidence of possession was uncontradicted and unchallenged.  The

    possession conviction is affirmed.

        Whether the defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to

    distribute it is a closer question.  While one officer testified

    to seeing two exchanges, at night, from a distance of 100 to 130

    feet, through binoculars, neither of the two purported buyers was

    stopped.  Carter possessed less than a gram of cocaine.

      We conclude the entirety of improper comments and evidence

    well might have tainted the jury's deliberations on the intent to

    distribute charge.  That conviction cannot stand.

                              CONCLUSION

        We reverse the defendant's conviction under count I, which

    defectively charged him with possession of a controlled substance

    within 1,000 feet of a school.  We reverse the defendant's

    conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent

    to distribute.  We affirm the defendant's conviction for

    possession of a controlled substance and remand that cause to the

    trial court for resentencing.

        Because the simple possession conviction that stands is a

    lesser-included offense, there is no reason to remand the greater

    offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to

    distribute.

        REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED AND REMANDED IN PART.

        McNAMARA and SOUTH, JJ., concur.