Lyons v. DCFS ( 2006 )


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  •                                No. 3--06--0027
    _________________________________________________________________
    Filed November 2, 2006.
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    A.D., 2006
    DON LYONS,                      )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
    )     of the Tenth Judicial Circuit
    Plaintiff-Appellee,       )     Peoria County, Illinois
    )
    v.                        )     No. 05--MR--168
    )
    ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF          )
    CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, )       Honorable
    )     John Barra
    Defendant-Appellant.      )     Judge Presiding.
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:
    _________________________________________________________________
    Defendant, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), denied
    plaintiff Don Lyons' request to expunge an indicated report of child abuse. Plaintiff filed an
    action for administrative review in the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the DCFS
    decision. We affirm the circuit court.
    BACKGROUND
    In the fall of 2004, plaintiff was hired as a teacher=s assistant at the Trewyn School
    Day Treatment Center for emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children. Plaintiff had
    previously worked as a teacher=s assistant at other schools in Peoria for six years.
    On the morning of October 27, 2004, K.C., a 10-year-old student, approached
    plaintiff in the cafeteria and spoke disrespectfully to him. When plaintiff told K.C. to
    apologize, K.C. began cursing.        Plaintiff looked around the cafeteria for behavioral
    attendants, who are primarily responsible for disciplining children at Trewyn. Seeing no
    behavioral attendants, plaintiff personally escorted K.C. out of the cafeteria and into the
    classroom portion of the school.
    Plaintiff decided that K.C. needed a Atime-out,@ so he led K.C. to a room commonly
    known as the Acubby.@ The cubby is a small room with two student desks and a teacher=s
    desk. It is commonly used for time-outs. Next to the cubby is a designated time-out room,
    which has padded walls and no furniture.
    In the cubby, plaintiff instructed K.C. to stand in the corner for his time-out. K.C.
    refused to do so and sat down at one of the student desks. Plaintiff told K.C. that he had to
    stand up and led him back to the corner. Again, K.C. walked to a student desk and sat
    down. Plaintiff attempted to physically place K.C. back in the corner, but K.C. began flailing
    his arms. Plaintiff thought that K.C. might injure himself, so he Atook K.C. to the floor.@ After
    holding him there for a few seconds, plaintiff and K.C. stood up.
    When plaintiff and K.C. were standing, Jane Kresl, K.C.=s former teacher, came to
    the cubby and asked if everything was alright. Plaintiff said everything was fine and asked
    for an incident report form. Kresl gave him a form and noticed what looked like a rug burn
    on K.C.=s head. Plaintiff told her that K.C. hit his head when he was restraining him. A few
    minutes later, K.C.=s current teacher, Sheila Steward, saw plaintiff and K.C. in the cubby
    and noticed a bump on K.C.=s forehead. Stewart took K.C. to the bathroom to wash his
    face and then took him to the principal=s office.
    The principal, Lucille Melchert-Shay, took pictures of the bump on K.C.=s head. She
    told plaintiff to call K.C.=s guardian, Valerie Edwards, and explain what happened. Plaintiff
    2
    spoke to Edwards in the afternoon when K.C. was on his way home from school. When
    K.C. arrived home, Edwards saw the bump on his head and took him to the emergency
    room. Emergency room personnel performed a head CT, which was normal. K.C. was
    given Motrin and told to take Ibuprofin or Tylenol as needed. The discharge instructions
    stated that K.C. could expect Aheadaches, some nausea, dizziness.@ The police were
    called and decided not to press charges against plaintiff.
    DCFS investigated the incident. As a result of its investigation, DCFS concluded
    that plaintiff had abused K.C. and entered an indicated finding against him for placing a cut,
    bruise or welt on K.C. Plaintiff appealed the finding and requested that the record be
    expunged.
    A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). At the hearing,
    K.C.=s current teacher testified that K.C. was very small and fragile for his age and was not
    physically abusive to others. However, K.C.=s teacher from the prior year described him as
    Avery, very aggressive.@ He had been suspended for 45 days the prior year for kicking a
    teacher=s assistant.
    K.C. did not testify at the hearing, but the ALJ considered the statements he made
    about the incident to the DCFS investigator, principal and teachers. According to K.C.=s
    statements, he had done nothing wrong when plaintiff grabbed him by the collar and
    removed him from the cafeteria. A student standing next to K.C. in the cafeteria told the
    DCFS investigator that K.C. had cursed at plaintiff, causing plaintiff to remove him from the
    cafeteria. K.C. also gave several different accounts of what happened in the cubby. On
    one occasion, he stated that plaintiff pushed his head into the floor. In all of his other
    statements, he said that his head bumped the floor when plaintiff was restraining him.
    3
    At the hearing, plaintiff explained that he took K.C. to the cubby instead of the
    designated time-out room because he thought that some paperwork had to be completed in
    order to take a student to the time-out room. The principal of Trewyn testified that time-out
    reports are completed when a student is taken from class to the time-out room.
    Following the hearing, the ALJ recommended that the Director of DCFS deny
    plaintiff=s request to expunge the indicated report. Specifically, the ALJ concluded, in part,
    that (1) K.C. was not a danger to himself or others when plaintiff took him to the ground; (2)
    plaintiff=s fear that K.C. might hurt himself by flailing his arms was caused by plaintiff not
    taking him to the designated time-out room; and (3) K.C. was credible with respect to how
    he received the injury to his forehead. 1 Although the ALJ specifically noted that plaintiff
    had a very good history of performing his job, he concluded that there was sufficient
    evidence to support an indicated finding against plaintiff.
    The DCFS Director adopted the ALJ=s findings of fact and conclusions of law and
    denied plaintiff=s request for expungement. Plaintiff sought judicial review. The trial court
    reversed the Director=s decision, finding that it was Aagainst the manifest weight of the
    evidence and contrary to law.@
    ANALYSIS
    A child is abused when a person responsible for the child=s welfare:
    1
    We are bewildered by the ALJ=s credibility finding since K.C. was not present at
    the hearing for the ALJ to observe. See City of Chicago v. Old Colony Partners, L.P.,
    
    364 Ill. App. 3d 806
    , 
    847 N.E.2d 565
     (2006) (credibility determinations are left to judges
    who are able to measure a witness in person and observe his demeanor).
    4
    Aa. inflicts, causes to be inflicted or allows to be inflicted upon such
    child physical injury, by other than
    accidental means, which causes death, disfigurement, impairment of
    physical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function;
    b. creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such child by other
    than accidental means which would be likely to cause death,
    disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or
    impairment of any bodily function; [or]
    ***
    e. inflicts excessive corporal punishment.@ 325 ILCS 5/3(a),(b),(e)
    (West 2004).
    The regulations promulgated by DCFS list the specific incidents of harm which must
    be alleged in a report of abuse. 89 Ill. Adm. Code ' 300 app. B (2000). Cuts, bruises and
    welts are listed as one type of harm. 89 Ill. Adm. Code ' 300 app. B (2000). However,
    A[n]ot every cut, bruise, or welt constitutes an allegation of harm.@ 89 Ill. Adm. Code ' 300
    app. B (2000). A number of factors should be considered when determining whether an
    injury which resulted in cuts, bruises or welts constitutes an allegation of harm:
    A-   the child's age (children aged 6 and under are at a much greater risk of
    harm).
    - child's medical condition, behavioral, mental, or emotional problems,
    developmental disability, or physical handicap, particularly as they relate
    to the child's ability to seek help.
    5
    - pattern or chronicity of similar incidents.
    - severity of the cuts, bruises, welts, or
    abrasions (size,
    number, depth,
    extent of
    discoloration).
    - location of the cuts, bruises, welts, or abrasions.
    - whether an instrument was used on the child.
    - previous history of indicated abuse or neglect.@
    89 Ill. Adm. Code Sec. 300, Appendix B.
    An educator bruising a child does not automatically justify a finding of abuse. See
    Korunka v. Department of Children and Family Services, 
    259 Ill. App. 3d 527
    , 
    631 N.E.2d 759
     (1994) (bruises on student=s neck and shoulder did not amount to abuse); Briggs v.
    State, 
    323 Ill. App. 3d 612
    , 
    752 N.E.2d 1206
     (2001) (marks on student=s neck did not
    amount to abuse).
    We will reverse an indicated finding of abuse if it is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence. Korunka, 
    259 Ill. App. 3d at 531
    , 
    631 N.E.2d at 761
    . To find an agency=s
    decision against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must determine, after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency, that no rational trier of fact
    could have agreed with the agency=s decision. Briggs, 
    323 Ill. App. 3d at 618
    , 
    752 N.E.2d at 1211
    .
    Here, the evidence showed that a teacher=s assistant with no prior indicated reports
    6
    or history of violence caused an aggressive and behaviorally disturbed 10-year-old student
    to suffer a bump on his head while taking him to the floor for the student=s own safety.       A
    review of the factors promulgated by DCFS reveals that plaintiff=s actions did not amount to
    abuse: (1) though small for his age, K.C. was an aggressive 10-year-old child, who was not
    at a Agreater risk of harm"; (2) despite his behavioral problems, there was no evidence that
    K.C. could not seek help when necessary; (3) plaintiff had no history of involvement in
    similar incidents; (4) K.C. suffered one small isolated abrasion or bump on his forehead; (5)
    plaintiff did not use an instrument to physically harm K.C.; and (6) plaintiff had never before
    been indicated for abuse or neglect. Thus, the decision of DCFS to indicate plaintiff for
    abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    The agency=s finding of abuse was based extensively on its conclusion that plaintiff
    should have taken K.C. to the designated time-out room instead of the cubby. However,
    the testimony established that the cubby was often used for time-outs. As a new staff
    member at Trewyn, plaintiff was unsure about the procedures necessary for the time-out
    room, so he opted to use the cubby instead. Even if plaintiff=s decision to take K.C. to the
    cubby was not the correct one, it does not follow that he was guilty of abuse. See Korunka,
    
    259 Ill. App. 3d at 532
    , 
    631 N.E.2d at 762
    .
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    SCHMIDT, PJ., specially concurring and CARTER, J., concurring.
    PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring:
    7
    _________________________________________________________________
    I concur, but write separately to point out that I believe the finding by DCFS that the
    child was injured "by other than accidental means" was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence. Therefore, DCFS did not even meet the threshold requirement for an indication
    of abuse.
    The statute clearly provides that a child is abused when a person responsible for the
    child's welfare injures a child "other than by accidental means ***." 325 ILCS 5/3(a), (b)
    (West 2004). It seems obvious that the injury to K.C. occurred accidentally as plaintiff was
    attempting to subdue the child. DCFS argues that the injury was not accidental because
    the plaintiff was intentionally trying to subdue the child. I find that argument to be
    equivalent to arguing that any motorist involved in an automobile crash is guilty of
    intentional conduct because he or she intentionally drove the car.
    8