People v. Young ( 2006 )

3-05-0218
______ __________________________________
Filed February 3, 2006
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2006
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the Twenty-First Judicial
) Circuit, Iroquois County,
Plaintiff-Appellant,) Illinois
)
v. ) No. 04-CF-116
)
EDWARD C. YOUNG, ) Honorable
) Gordon L. Lustfeldt
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding
____________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:
____________________________________________________________
Defendant, Edward Young, was arrested and charged with unlawful
possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. Defendant filed a motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court granted defendant=s motion to
suppress evidence. We affirm.
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that Janaei Gails was driving from
Chicago to Carbondale. While traveling on Route 57, Gails was pulled over by
Officer Darrin Devine, who observed one or two large air fresheners hanging from
the rearview mirror. Devine first spoke to Gails, who provided an incorrect name
and date of birth. Upon searching police records, Devine discovered Gails= real
name and that her license was suspended. Gails was placed under arrest and
searched.
Devine planned to have Gails= vehicle towed from the scene and called
headquarters to bring a tow truck. He did not notify Gails or her passengers that he
ordered the tow. Prior to the vehicle being towed, Devine conducted an inventory
search of the vehicle. In the trunk, Devine found a suitcase. When he opened the
suitcase, he saw a tightly wrapped and taped package on top of clothing. Devine
asked the passengers who owned the suitcase and package. Defendant
acknowledged that they were his and admitted that the package contained
marijuana. Defendant was arrested.
After Devine arrested defendant, Kenneth Garrison, another passenger in the
vehicle, informed Devine that he had a valid drivers license. Devine cancelled the
tow and allowed Garrison to drive the vehicle from the scene.
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of cannabis
with intent to deliver. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress the
evidence found in Gails= vehicle. At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified
that Gails was a friend of a friend who was providing him a ride from Chicago to
Carbondale. Defendant had no ownership interest in the vehicle but did own the
suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle that contained marijuana.
Devine testified that it is State Police policy to tow a vehicle when there is no
valid driver. Prior to towing the vehicle, State Police policy requires that the officer
conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. According to Devine, State Police policy
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does not require an officer to investigate whether there is a valid driver before
ordering a tow and conducting an inventory search.
The trial court denied defendant=s motion to quash his arrest but granted
defendant=s motion to suppress the evidence Devine seized and the statements
defendant made to Devine. The State appealed.
Where, as here, the evidence is not in dispute, we review the propriety of a
trial court=s order of suppression de novo. People v. Centeno, 333 Ill. App. 3d 604,
776 N.E.2d 629 (2002).
1. Standing
The State argues that defendant lacks standing to object to the search.
Generally, a passenger lacks standing to challenge the search of another=s vehicle
unless the passenger has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched.
People v. Juarbe, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 743 N.E.2d 607 (2001), citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135, 99 S. Ct. 421, 426, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 395, (1978). A
person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area if: (1) the individual, by his
conduct, has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) such, an
expectation is justifiable under the circumstances. Juarbe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1050,
743 N.E.2d at 616, citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577,
2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226-27 (1979). A passenger has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his personal luggage and belongings stored in a vehicle. See People v.
Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 734 N.E.2d 216 (2000); People v. Taylor, 245 Ill. App.
3d 602, 614 N.E.2d 1272 (1993); United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928 (10th Cir.
2001).
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Here, the parties agree that defendant owned the suitcase that was inside the
trunk of Gails= vehicle. The suitcase was closed and contained defendant=s clothing
and personal items. Defendant was an invited passenger in Gail=s vehicle and was
present during the search of his suitcase. When questioned, defendant readily
claimed ownership of the suitcase. Based on these facts, defendant manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in his suitcase that was reasonable. Thus,
defendant had standing to challenge the search of his suitcase. See People v.
Manke, 181 Ill. App. 3d 374, 378, 537 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1989) ("[A] passenger in an
automobile has standing to challenge a search of property or containers in that
automobile which belong to her.").
2. Propriety of Search
The State also argues that the inventory search was proper pursuant to
Illinois State Police policy. An inventory search of a vehicle is an exception to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. People v. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135,
619 N.E.2d 744 (1993). To be valid, an inventory search must be conducted in
good faith pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures. Hundley, 156
Ill. 2d at 138, 619 N.E.2d at 745.
Devine testified that Illinois State Police policy on inventory searches is to tow
and search a vehicle if none of the occupants are licensed drivers. The State argues
that the policy did not require that Devine investigate whether there was a licensed
driver prior to searching the vehicle. However, we believe the policy must inherently
contain such a requirement.
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An inventory search is only authorized by State Police policy if there is no
licensed driver available to drive the vehicle. Logically, in order to determine if there
is a licensed driver, an officer must ask the occupants. It is unreasonable to assume
that passengers will automatically and affirmatively volunteer that they are licensed
drivers. If officers do not query other occupants of the vehicle, the policy would
have little meaning.
Devine ordered the tow and conducted an inventory search without inquiring
whether there was a licensed driver in Gails= vehicle. Since there was another
licensed driver, an inventory search was not allowed under the State Police policy.
Thus, the search was invalid, and the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence
obtained from it.
The order of the circuit court of Iroquois County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARRY and MCDADE, JJ., concurring.
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