People v. Andrews ( 2007 )

No. 3--02--0569
_________________________________________________________________
Filed April 19, 2007.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
) McDonough County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 01--CM--285
)
RUSSELL E. ANDREWS, ) Honorable
) Richard H. Gambrell,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the OPINION of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The defendant, Russell E. Andrews, was charged with unlawful
possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550--4(b) (West 2000)). His
motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Following a stipulated
bench trial, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to, among
other things, one year of conditional discharge and 60 days in the
county jail. His motion for a new trial was also denied. On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress.
On September, 27, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court entered a
supervisory order instructing us to vacate our judgment and
reconsider this case in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005), and People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282 (2006). We now
reverse the defendant’s conviction.
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2001, the defendant was the only passenger in his
son's pickup truck in Macomb. His son was driving. At the
suppression hearing, Officer Jason York testified that he stopped
the vehicle for a traffic violation. Although he did not remember
the specific traffic violation, he stated that it could have been
a vehicle tag violation. York said that as he approached the
vehicle, he recognized the defendant and the defendant's son.
York asked the driver for his driver's license, which the
driver gave to him. York did not recall whether he also requested
identification from the defendant. The defendant, however,
testified that York requested identification from him. The
defendant said that he gave York a valid Illinois state
identification card.
York then returned to the squad car and ran background checks
on the defendant and his son. The officer stated that he would
have run a background check on the defendant regardless of whether
he had the defendant's identification because he knew the
defendant's name. The background check on the defendant showed an
active body attachment. York arrested the defendant based on the
body attachment and conducted a search of the defendant's person
incident to that arrest. During the search, York found cannabis on
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the defendant's person. York then also arrested the defendant for
possession of cannabis.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge
found that York had asked the defendant for his identification.
The trial judge stated that, regardless of whether York obtained
the defendant's identification, it was inevitable that York would
have run a background check on the defendant because York knew the
defendant's name. The court, therefore, denied the motion to
suppress.
Following the trial, the defendant was found guilty and was
sentenced as indicated above. Defendant filed a motion for a new
trial, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. The court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed.
ANALYSIS
The ruling of a trial court on a motion to suppress frequently
presents mixed questions of fact and law. People v. Simac, 321
Ill. App. 3d 1001 (2001). The trial court's findings of fact will
not be disturbed unless they are manifestly erroneous. Simac, 321
Ill. App. 3d 1001. Concerning questions of law, the ruling of the
trial court is subject to de novo review. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d
1001.
Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, a person has a right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV, XIV.
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In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court stated that a traffic stop is a seizure which is
subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness standards. The
temporary detention of individuals, passengers and drivers alike,
during a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of persons within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d
220 (2003). Because a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry
investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) than to
a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed
under Terry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226. A Terry
analysis involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228.
In Gonzalez, the Illinois Supreme Court set out an analytical
framework for courts to use in determining whether police
questioning during a traffic stop seizure is consistent with fourth
amendment protections. If the question is reasonably related to
the initial purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation
occurs. If the question is not, we must consider whether the law
enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
would justify the question. In the absence of a reasonable
connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable
suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the
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circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly
prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the
stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.
In this case, no issue exists concerning the lawfulness of the
initial stop. Rather, this appeal concerns the lawfulness of the
officer's conduct following the initial stop. Officer York’s
initial questioning of the driver and request for identification
was justified. Those queries were reasonably related to the
initial purpose of the encounter; the investigation of a traffic
violation. However, the background check of defendant was not
related to the initial justification for the stop. Defendant was
simply a passenger in the truck and was not implicated in the
traffic violation. Further, the background check was not supported
by any reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Officer York neither saw
nor suspected that defendant had committed any wrongdoing.
In the absence of a reasonable articulable suspicion, we must
consider whether the check impermissibly prolonged the detention or
changed the fundamental nature of the stop. The record does not
resolve clearly how long the background check prolonged the
detention. York testified that he returned to the squad car and
ran a background check on both defendant and his son at the same
time. York did not testify that the check performed on defendant
was completed before the check on the driver. The background check
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on defendant could well have lengthened the duration of the
detention if the officer had to wait for the results of the check.
Regardless of the duration of any extended detention, however,
the background check was impermissible because it changed the
fundamental nature of the traffic stop. The check converted the
stop from a routine traffic stop into an inquiry into defendant’s
past misconduct. People v. Miles, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (2003)
(officers impermissibly prolonged stop and increased
confrontational nature because questions asked of passenger were
not related to purpose of the stop). People v. Jones, 346 Ill.
App. 3d 1101 (2004).
We note that our conclusion is consistent with the United
State Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005), and the Illinois supreme court’s revised opinion in
People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282 (2006). Our case does not
involve a dog sniff, nor was the decision based on any analysis of
the issues under the Illinois constitution. The cases are further
distinguished because Caballes was the driver of the speeding car
while defendant was a passenger in a car whose driver was stopped
for a "vehicle tag violation," and, in Caballes, there was no claim
of improper extension of the time or scope of the original stop.
The State claims that even if the officer’s conduct violated
defendant’s constitutional right, the trial court properly denied
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defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence and quash the arrest by
applying the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence obtained by
an officer in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights,
which otherwise would be inadmissible, may be admitted if the
prosecution can show that the evidence inevitably would have been
discovered without reference to the officer's error. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108
(1991).
Here, there was nothing inevitable about defendant's arrest
for cannabis. Officer York never articulated a reasonable
suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a
crime. Knowing someone's name does not qualify as a reasonable
articulable suspicion. The request for identification and
background check of the defendant, a passenger, was impermissible
under Gonzalez, no matter how the officer got his name. Thus, the
defendant's seizure was unreasonable.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied the
defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we must reverse the
defendant's conviction for cannabis possession.
The order of circuit court of McDonough County denying the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and the
judgment of conviction is reversed.
Reversed.
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HOLDRIDGE, J., concurring.
JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
The majority holds that it is impermissible for a police
officer to run a warrant check on a passenger during a routine
traffic stop absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. It then professes that its holding comports to Illinois
v. Caballes and People v. Caballes. Slip op. at 6. It does not
and, therefore, I dissent.
A little history of this case seems appropriate. The original
order of this court, a 2 to 1 majority (People v. Andrews, No. 3--
02--0569 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23))
that came to the same conclusion as does the majority here, was
vacated by our supreme court in a supervisory order that directed
us to reconsider the case in light of Illinois v. Caballes and
People v. Caballes. People v. Andrews, 221 Ill. 2d 644, 853 N.E.2d
1230 (2006).
"By the logic of Caballes, checking for warrants on a
passenger changes the fundamental nature of the traffic stop only
if (1) it causes the seizure to last longer than the time
reasonably required for such a traffic stop or (2) it infringes
upon the passenger's legitimate interest in privacy." People v.
Roberson, 367 Ill App. 3d 193, 201, 854 N.E.2d 317, 324 (2006).
(Roberson contains an excellent analysis of the issues that I will
not repeat here.)
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There is no evidence in the record before us to support an
allegation that the warrant search prolonged the duration of this
traffic stop. In fact, as the majority acknowledges, there is no
evidence in the record before us indicating how long the traffic
stop lasted. Any doubts raised by the incompleteness of the record
will be resolved against the appellant. People v. Stewart, 179
Ill. 2d 556, 689 N.E.2d 1129 (1997).
Since nothing in the record indicates the duration of the stop
was expanded by Officer York's actions, our next task should be to
determine whether his actions infringed upon defendant's legitimate
interest in privacy. If it did not, under Caballes, it could not
have impermissibly changed the nature of the traffic stop.
Officers have the right to ask citizens questions, even
incriminating ones, when the officer has no reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d
530, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006). The Luedemann court acknowledged the
theory that "'police officers can approach individuals as to whom
they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially
incriminating questions'" is well settled in the law and has been
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court "'a number of times.'"
Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 549, quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 401, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991).
"[T]he law clearly provides that a police officer does not violate
the fourth amendment merely by approaching a person in public to
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ask questions if the person is willing to listen. *** [T]he police
have the right to approach citizens and ask potentially
incriminating questions." Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 549, citing
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 401, 111
S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991). Officer York was well within his rights
in asking defendant for identification. The majority concedes this
point.
"The existence of an arrest warrant is a matter of public
record." Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Department, 284 Ill. App.
3d 367, 377, 671 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (1996). "[T]he expectation
'that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities' is not the same as an interest in 'privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable.'" Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 847, 125 S. Ct.
834, 837-38 (2005), quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 122, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984). The
defendant had no legitimate privacy interest in the fact that an
outstanding writ of attachment for his arrest existed at the time
of the traffic stop.
On the other hand, the majority erroneously characterizes
Officer York's actions in running a warrant check as converting
"the stop from a routine traffic stop into an inquiry into
defendant's past misconduct." Slip op. at 5. The language and
analysis employed by the majority are strikingly similar to that
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used in People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003).
The United States Supreme Court has vacated the Harris decision and
instructed our supreme court to revisit its analysis in light of
Illinois v. Caballes. Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L.
Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).
The fact is, a warrant check is a computer check to determine
whether there are any current outstanding warrants or writs for the
individual's arrest. Justice Fitzgerald's dissent in Harris,
joined by Justices Thomas and Garman, recognized this. People v.
Harris, 207 Ill. 2d at 536 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting, joined by
Thomas and Garman, JJ.). In Illinois, police officers routinely
run warrant checks simultaneously through the Law Enforcement
Agency Data System (LEADS) and the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC). Even 25 years ago, these warrant checks took only
moments to complete.
Nothing Officer York did changed the nature of this traffic
stop from a constitutionally permissible stop to an
unconstitutional stop. It was permissible for the officer to ask
defendant questions. It was permissible for the officer to run a
warrant check. It was proper for the officer to search the
defendant's person once he lawfully arrested defendant pursuant to
the outstanding writ.
From a common sense standpoint, to require police to have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to run a
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warrant check seems somewhat silly. What is the likelihood that
police will find a warrant for a crime that a person has just
committed or is about to commit? What about the officer who
recognizes someone on the street and simply requests a warrant
check on the individual without first stopping him? Is that an
invasion of the person's constitutional rights to privacy? In the
real world, police officers do this every day. It is a practice
which leads to many arrests based on outstanding warrants and
writs. As long as the warrant check on the passenger does not
unreasonably prolong the traffic stop, I can think of no relevant
difference between the warrant check at issue here and one where
the officer runs a warrant check on someone the officer recognizes
standing on the street or passing by in a car. If the law requires
a reasonable, articulable suspicion to check public records as the
majority holds here today, both are impermissible.
Finally, although I find that no unconstitutional action was
taken by Officer York, I feel it necessary to address the
"inevitable discovery" issues raised by the State as it appears the
majority misconstrues the State's argument. The majority concludes
that since "there was nothing inevitable about the defendant's
arrest for cannabis," the inevitable discovery doctrine does not
cure what the majority incorrectly determined to be an improper
search. Slip op. at 6. The State did not argue simply that the
arrest for cannabis was inevitable but rather the warrant check was
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inevitable, given Officer York's familiarity with the defendant.
This, in turn, made defendant's arrest based upon the writ
inevitable. This was so, even though defendant argued below that
the officer's request for his identification was a fourth amendment
violation. That is, the State argued that even if the court found
the request for identification constitutionally infirm, the officer
knew defendant. The trial court made the specific finding that the
officer recognized defendant and would have run a warrant check
even without securing defendant's identification. The State's
"inevitability" argument did not address or anticipate the majority
ruling that it was the running of the warrant check, as opposed to
requesting identification, where the officer went afoul of the
fourth amendment.
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