In re Daniel M. ( 2008 )

No. 3--07--0893
_________________________________________________________________
Filed December 12, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
In re DANIEL M., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
a Person Asserted to be ) Rock Island County, Illinois,
Subject to Involuntary )
Admission )
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, ) No. 07--MH--14
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
Daniel M., ) Honorable
) John L. Bell,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The trial court issued an order that the respondent, Daniel
M., was subject to involuntary admission to a mental health
facility (405 ILCS 5/3--600 (West 2006)). The respondent
appeals, arguing that the trial court's order should be reversed
because the State failed: (1) to file a dispositional report as
required by section 3--810 of the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3--810 (West 2006)); and (2)
to prove that inpatient hospitalization was the least restrictive
treatment alternative. We reverse.
FACTS
On October 16, 2007, after the respondent had been brought
to Kewanee Hospital by the police, a petition and two medical
certificates seeking involuntary admission for the respondent
were filed pursuant to section 1--119 of the Code. 405 ILCS 5/1-
-119 (West 2006). The petition alleged that the respondent was:
(1) mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict harm on
himself or others in the near future because of the illness (405
ILCS 5/1--119(1) (West 2006)); and (2) mentally ill and unable to
provide for his basic physical needs (405 ILCS 5/1--119(2) (West
2006)). The petition included the following allegations: the
respondent threw a cast-iron skillet and telephone at his mother
on October 15, 2007; the respondent believed that people urinated
and defecated in his food and beverages; the respondent refused
medication because he believed people came into his house and
switched his medication; the respondent had grandiose delusions
about inventing the Ipod and writing the lyrics to popular songs
and was upset that he had not been compensated; the respondent
stated that he had been blacklisted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency; and the
respondent was expected to be a continuing threat to others if he
was not hospitalized.
On that same date, a result review report of Dr. Eric
Ritterhoff, a psychiatrist at Robert Young Mental Health Center,
was filed. The report indicated the respondent had been
hospitalized for mental illness in 1985 and 1989. It also
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indicated that Ritterhoff observed the respondent in the
emergency room at Kewanee Hospital on October 15, 2007, and
reviewed the written material the respondent produced that day.
Ritterhoff concluded that the written material described a
"severe complex delusional system of grandiosity and paranoia."
Ritterhoff stated his impression was that the respondent
suffered from "[s]chizoaffective schizophrenia bipolar type." He
described the respondent's delusions about writing lyrics for
popular songs and his paranoia about the government and his
mother. Ritterhoff further observed:
"[The respondent] is unable to talk for any extended period
of time without introducing multiple delusional observations
about me as far as being compromised and that he is needing
to tell me what to do. His judgment is severely impaired.
He has lack of insight. He feels very easily threatened and
acknowledges being threatening toward his mother but feels
justified on this based on the delusional statements already
made."
He then concluded:
"[The respondent] will be housed involuntarily on the
psychiatric unit for continued professional observation will
be made. Attempts will be made to engage him in treatment
for his mental disorder. However it is this examiner's
opinion that due to the length of his psychotic process that
the likelihood of response in the near future is almost nil
and that therefore he should be referred to the state
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facility for chronic mental health care on an involuntary
basis."
On November 27, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition. Ritterhoff testified about his observations of the
respondent on October 15, as detailed in his report. He then
testified that he had examined the respondent about 45 times
since that day.
Ritterhoff testified that the respondent suffered from
schizoaffective schizophrenia bipolar type for about 30 years.
He testified that the illness affects everything that the
respondent does. The respondent believed that he was entitled to
payment for his creative talents as a lyricist for popular bands
and that he had been sodomized several times since 1983. He
believed that the government was conspiring against him and had
fed him tainted food to alter his moods and periodically subject
him to involuntary care.
Ritterhoff stated that the respondent became aggressive,
agitated, and argumentative when someone disagreed with him. He
noted that the respondent had thrown a frying pan and a telephone
at his mother, which led to his current hospitalization, because
he thought she was a imposter who was trying to torment him by
preventing him from getting food. Ritterhoff opined that the
respondent would act on his delusions if he was not in a safe
environment and medicated.
Ritterhoff recommended that the respondent be hospitalized
at Singer Zone Mental Health Center (Singer) and that he receive
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mood stabilizing and antipsychotic medication. In response to an
inquiry as to whether he considered alternative treatments,
Ritterhoff responded:
"Whenever attempts are made to discuss with [the
respondent] what his life would be like subsequent to not
being in this institution, his responses are delusional
comments about his life. His choices are effected by his
paranoid delusions and I have not felt that he would be
appropriate for a less intense setting."
Ritterhoff concluded that the hospitalization in the Singer Zone
Mental Health Center was the least restrictive placement
alternative.
The respondent testified that he completed law school and
had a master's degree in political science. He spoke three
languages. He stated that he enlisted in the Navy after high
school and that he had tried to pursue citizenship in Sweden but
was denied citizenship because the United States government had
possibly interfered.
The respondent testified that he lobbed a frying pan and
telephone table in the general direction of his mother but that
he did not throw it at her. He threw the objects as a way of
expressing his anger. He testified that he was angry about not
eating in two or three days and was not acting on a delusion
about his mother being an imposter. The respondent noted that he
believed that imposters were possible based on things he had seen
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in movies but recognized that he may have been delusional when he
thought someone was an imposter.
The respondent testified that he had been treated for mental
illness through medication and therapy. He stated that if he
were released, his father would give him a car and money to get
an apartment.
The trial court found that the respondent was subject to
involuntary admission and ordered that he be admitted to the
Department of Human Services, Singer facility.
The respondent appeals.
ANALYSIS
Initially, the State argues that this appeal is moot because
the trial court's order had a duration of 90 days and 90 days
have since passed. We will review the merits of the appeal
pursuant to the supreme court's holding in In re Barbara H., 183
Ill. 2d 482, 492, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998) ("To apply the
mootness doctrine under these circumstances would mean that
recipients of involuntary mental health services would be left
without any legal recourse for challenging the circuit court's
orders.").
On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial
court's order should be reversed because the State failed to file
a dispositional report as required by section 3--810 of the Code
(405 ILCS 5/3--810 (West 2006)). Section 3--810 provides:
"Before disposition is determined, the facility
director or such other person as the court may direct shall
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prepare a written report including information on the
appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment
settings, a social investigation of the respondent, a
preliminary treatment plan, and any other information which
the court may order. The treatment plan shall describe the
respondent's problems and needs, the treatment goals, the
proposed treatment methods, and a projected timetable for
their attainment. If the respondent is found subject to
involuntary admission, the court shall consider the report
in determining an appropriate disposition." 405 ILCS 5/3--
810 (West 2006).
The State admits that no dispositional report was filed at
the time of the respondent's hearing. The record also reveals
that the respondent did not object to the absence of the report.
The State argues that, in the absence of an objection by the
respondent, oral testimony about the information required by
section 3--810 should be sufficient to satisfy the statute and,
therefore, the error in failing to file the report should be
deemed harmless.
In In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 884 N.E.2d 241
(2008), we addressed compliance with section 3--810 and stated,
in accord with the supreme court holding in In re Robinson, 151
Ill. 2d 126, 601 N.E.2d 712 (1992), that "[t]he State satisfies
the requirements of section 3-810 absent a formal written report
only when the testimony provides the specific information
required by the language of the statute." Alaka W., 379 Ill.
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App. 3d at 270, 884 N.E.2d at 256. We further suggested that
strict compliance with section 3--810 should be required because,
although we had repeatedly stated the need for strict compliance
with legislatively established procedural safeguards for
involuntary commitment proceedings, the caselaw indicated that
the State continued to disregard the procedural safeguards.
Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 884 N.E.2d 241. We now reiterate
the need for strict compliance with legislatively mandated
procedural safeguards to protect and balance the competing
interests of society and individuals subject to involuntary
commitment. However, we will not require strict compliance in
this case, and we will review the State's testimony to determine
whether it satisfied the requirements of section 3--810.
In this case, the oral testimony offered by the State's sole
witness, Ritterhoff, did not provide all the information required
by section 3--810. Ritterhoff provided information about the
length of the respondent's mental illness and his problems, but
he did not provide any information about the appropriateness and
availability of alternative treatment or an adequate treatment
plan. Ritterhoff summarily concluded that hospitalization was
the least restrictive treatment alternative but did not testify
as to what alternative treatments may have been available and why
they were inappropriate in this case. Ritterhoff did not discuss
treatment goals or a projected timetable for their attainment; he
just stated that the respondent should be hospitalized and
medicated. Such information was inadequate to satisfy the
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requirements of section 3--810. See Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d
251, 884 N.E.2d 241 (finding that the State did not comply with
section 3--810 where its witnesses' testimony did not address
available alternative treatment, why such treatments were
inappropriate, the treatment goals, or a timetable for attainment
of those goals). The State's failure to file a dispositional
report required by section 3--810, or to present oral testimony
containing the information required to be in the report, mandates
reversal of the trial court's order.
The respondent also argues that the trial court's order
should be reversed because the State failed to prove that
inpatient hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment
alternative.
Hospitalization may only be ordered when the State shows
that it is the least restrictive treatment alternative. Alaka
W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 884 N.E.2d 241. To satisfy this
requirement, the State must "present evidence of what, if any,
alternative treatments are available and why they are not
suitable for the respondent." In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d
at 273, 884 N.E.2d at 259.
In the present case, in response to questioning about
whether he considered alternative treatments, Ritterhoff stated
that a "less intense setting" would be inappropriate for the
respondent because of his delusions. He then summarily concluded
that hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment
alternative. However, he did not testify about any specific
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alternative treatments and why they were inappropriate. The
court cannot order hospitalization based on the respondent's
mental illness alone without evidence about other treatment
alternatives and their appropriateness. Because the State failed
to produce evidence of less restrictive treatment options, it did
not meets its burden of proof, and the trial court's order must
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court of Rock Island County.
Reversed.
SCHMIDT and CARTER, JJ., concur.
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