People v. Paige ( 2008 )

No. 3--07--0869
_________________________________________________________________
Filed October 6, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 07--DT--1626
)
BRIAN PAIGE, ) Honorable
) Bennett J. Braun,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The defendant, Brian Paige, was charged with driving under the
influence of drugs, and his license was summarily suspended for
refusing or failing to submit to drug testing. 625 ILCS 5/11--
501(a)(4), 11--501.1 (West 2006). He filed a petition to rescind
the summary suspension, which the trial court granted. The State
appealed. We reverse and remand.
On September 4, 2007, the defendant filed a petition to
rescind the summary suspension of his driver's license. The
defendant cited three grounds for recision: (1) the arresting
officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he was
driving or in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of drugs; (2) he was not properly warned as provided by statute;
and (3) he did not refuse to submit to or complete the required
chemical test.
On October 16, 2006, the court held a hearing on the
defendant's petition to rescind his summary suspension. The
defendant testified that on August 31, 2007, at approximately 11:30
p.m., he encountered a roadblock on Jefferson Street in Joliet,
Illinois. At that time, the defendant was not speeding, swerving,
or changing lanes without signaling.
An Illinois state trooper waved the defendant over to a
parking lot and told him to pull up to a female officer in the
parking lot. The officer asked the defendant for his license and
proof of insurance. She then told him that she smelled marijuana
coming from his vehicle. She asked the defendant if he had
ingested any marijuana; he responded that he had not.
On cross-examination, the defendant denied smoking any
marijuana that evening. The defendant also denied telling the
officer that he had smoked some marijuana earlier that evening. The
defendant had been with other people who had smoked marijuana. The
defendant then objected to the State's question regarding events
that occurred after the defendant exited the vehicle. The
defendant stated that he was only proceeding upon the argument that
the police did not have reasonable grounds for the stop of his
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vehicle. The State withdrew the question, and the defendant
rested.
At that point, the State moved for a directed finding. The
State argued that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie
case that the stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The court
denied the motion.
The State then called Trooper Shelly Cox to testify. Cox
testified that she was assigned to a roadside safety check on
August 31, 2007. Generally during a roadside safety check, five
cars at a time are waved into the security area, which is usually
a parking lot. If no problems are detected, the drivers are
allowed to go.
On the evening in question, the safety lanes within the
parking lot were cleared of cars. The master sergeant then waved
in the next five cars proceeding down the street. A white pickup
truck was the first vehicle waved into Cox's lane. The driver,
whom Cox identified as the defendant, lowered his window. Cox
asked him for his driver's license and proof of insurance. The
defendant did not have his license. As she was speaking with him,
Cox noticed the odor of burned cannabis coming from the vehicle.
Upon questioning, the defendant admitted to Cox that he had smoked
cannabis earlier that evening. After further questioning and a pat
down conducted by another trooper, the defendant stated that he had
cannabis on his person. He removed a clear plastic bag containing
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approximately 16 grams of cannabis from the crotch area of his
jeans. The defendant was then placed under arrest.
Cox also testified that she had not directed the vehicles into
the parking lot. She could not recall whether five cars at a time
were sent into the lot on this night, but that was the usual
pattern for these kinds of safety checks. Prior to the roadside
safety check, the troopers reviewed the standard procedure for
conducting these checks. To the best of Cox's knowledge, that
procedure was followed on August 31, 2007.
After closing arguments, the court stated that the petition to
rescind did not specifically challenge the roadside safety check.
The court found Cox's testimony was credible and rebutted the
defendant's testimony that he had not smoked cannabis. The court
then requested that the parties submit caselaw regarding the
question of the roadside stop. After a subsequent hearing on that
legal question, the court granted the petition to rescind the
summary suspension because the police did not have reasonable
grounds to stop the defendant's vehicle.
On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by
denying its motion for directed finding. The State argues that the
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for recision by
failing to put forward any evidence that the roadside safety check
was invalid. The defendant has not filed an appellee brief, but we
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elect to decide the case under First Capital Mortgage Corp. v.
Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976).
A hearing on a petition to rescind a summary suspension is a
civil proceeding, at which the defendant bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case for recision. People v. Marsala,
376 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 877 N.E.2d 1167 (2007). A defendant "makes
out a prima facie case if he puts on some evidence on every element
essential to his cause of action." People v. Tibbetts, 351 Ill.
App. 3d 921, 927, 815 N.E.2d 409, 414 (2004). If the defendant
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to
produce evidence justifying the suspension. Marsala, 376 Ill. App.
3d 1046, 877 N.E.2d 1167. "A defendant's failure to establish a
prima facie case warrants a directed finding in favor of the
State." Marsala, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 1048, 877 N.E.2d at 1170. We
will not disturb a trial court's finding that a prima facie case
has been made unless it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Marsala, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 877 N.E.2d 1167.
In addition to the statutory grounds for rescinding a summary
suspension (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1 (West 2006)), a suspension may be
rescinded where the stop of the defendant's vehicle was improper.
People v. Crocker, 267 Ill. App. 3d 343, 641 N.E.2d 1237 (1994).
In this case, the defendant claimed that his summary suspension
should be rescinded because he was not driving in such a manner as
to justify an investigative stop of his vehicle. As the State
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argued below and on appeal, however, the defendant was stopped
pursuant to a roadside safety check. While a roadblock is
considered a seizure, it is not a per se violation of the fourth
amendment. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880
(1985). In addition, police need not form an individualized
suspicion that a driver is violating a law before stopping that
driver in a roadblock. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880.
"[T]he question of whether a roadblock violates the fourth
amendment is essentially one of reasonableness." Bartley, 109 Ill.
2d at 280, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
The defendant testified that he was not speeding, swerving or
breaking any other traffic laws when he encountered the roadblock.
He was waved into a parking lot and told to proceed toward a police
officer who asked for his license and proof of insurance. The
officer told the defendant that she smelled marijuana coming from
the vehicle. This evidence does not establish a prima facie case
that the roadblock was unreasonable. In fact, this testimony does
not establish anything other than the fact that the defendant was
stopped at a roadblock. As the Illinois supreme court has found,
a roadblock is not per se unreasonable. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273,
486 N.E.2d 880. In order to successfully establish a prima facie
case for recision, the defendant needed to show some evidence that
the roadblock was not reasonable. The defendant did not produce
any such evidence here. Thus, we find that the court's decision
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denying the State's motion for a directed finding was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
The judgment of the Will County circuit court is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, JJ., concurring.
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