In re Robin C. ( 2009 )

No. 3-08-0690
_________________________________________________________________
Filed November 20, 2009
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2009
In re ROBIN C., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
a Person Found Subject to ) Peoria County, Illinois,
Involuntary Admission and )
Authorized Involuntary )
Treatment )
)
(The People of the State )
of Illinois, ) No. 08-MH-106
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
Robin C., ) Honorable
) Katherine Gorman,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Respondent Robin C. appeals from judgments entered by the
trial court involuntarily committing her to a mental health
facility and authorizing the facility’s staff to administer
psychotropic medication to her against her will. On appeal, she
argues that the trial court’s order should be reversed because the
State failed to (1) file a complete dispositional report as
required by section 3-810 of the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West
2006)), (2) demonstrate that involuntary commitment was the least
restrictive environment and (3) establish that she lacked the
capacity to make a reasoned decision to take or refuse medication.
Respondent also maintains that the statutes under which she was
committed are unconstitutional. We reverse.
On July 26, 2008, officers delivered respondent to Memorial
Medical Center in Springfield following an incident at her aunt’s
house. A social worker completed a petition for involuntary
admission. The petition alleged that respondent knocked on her
aunt’s door and pushed her way into the house, threatening to slap
her mother. Respondent was transported to Peoria Methodist Medical
Center with the petition that same day.
At Methodist Medical Center, Dr. Simone Turner personally
examined respondent and attached a certificate to the petition
stating that she was a person with a mental illness who was
"reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct which may
include threatening behavior or conduct that places that person or
another individual in reasonable expectation of harm." On July 27,
2008, psychiatrist Thena Poteat completed a second certificate,
stating that she had also examined respondent and believed that
respondent suffered from a mental illness. Dr. Poteat asserted
that because of her illness, respondent was "reasonably expected to
inflict serious physical harm on [herself] or another in the near
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future." In conjunction with the petition for commitment, Dr.
Poteat filed a petition for authority to administer involuntary
medication.
Separate hearings were conducted on July 30, 2008. Dr. Poteat
was the only witness to testify. At the commitment hearing, Dr.
Poteat stated that she had been treating respondent since her
arrival at Methodist Medical Center on July 26. She had examined
respondent three or four times and believed that she suffered from
schizophrenia. She first interviewed respondent on July 27, 2008.
During that session, respondent asked to sign a voluntary
application for commitment. Dr. Poteat refused to allow her to
sign the application because respondent admitted that she would
"turn right around and sign a request for discharge." Respondent
then got up and started to leave the room. As she approached the
door, she quickly turned around and "got very close" to Dr. Poteat.
She asked Poteat what hospital she was in and where the hospital
was located. Dr. Poteat testified that respondent’s conduct was
"intimidating and threatening," and she was afraid respondent might
do something violent.
Respondent also refused to sign a release for her records from
Memorial Hospital in Springfield. However, the hospital did
forward her records in the interest of her care. Based on
information she obtained from the commitment petition and the
medical records, Dr. Poteat testified that respondent had a history
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of severe psychotic illness, which included making violent threats.
On July 26, she was taken to Springfield Memorial Hospital after
she pushed her way into her aunt’s house and threatened to slap her
mother. The previous day, she was walking down the yellow line in
the street. Springfield police officers had to remove her from the
middle of traffic. Past records also reported allegations of
frightening children and teachers at a school in 2006 and
threatening people at a public library in 2007.
In Dr. Poteat’s opinion, respondent was suffering from
schizophrenia, paranoid-type and did not recognize the need for
treatment. When respondent first arrived at the hospital, she
refused oral medication. The staff was required to give her
injections for safety reasons. Dr. Poteat believed that respondent
needed medication. At the time of the hearing, respondent was
voluntarily taking psychotropic medication. However, Dr. Poteat
believed respondent agreed to take the medication not because she
recognized the need for treatment but because she thought it would
help her efforts to seek discharge. Dr. Poteat wanted to change
respondent’s medications, but respondent would not discuss the
matter with her.
When asked about respondent’s treatment, Dr. Poteat testified
"I would like to have her be able to go back to McFarland Hospital
where they have a history of working with her and the staff there
know[s] her. She’s been hospitalized there in the past and
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potentially could be there for a longer--could potentially be
treated there." Based on her examination of respondent, Dr. Poteat
believed that respondent’s condition had not improved sufficiently
to allow her release into any placement less restrictive placement
than a mental health hospital.
On cross-examination, Dr. Poteat stated that most of her
information about respondent had been from medical records because
respondent had not been receptive to her efforts to engage in
conversation. Respondent was 45 years old at the time of the
hearing. Dr. Poteat had no idea how long she had been suffering
from her mental illness. Respondent’s records revealed that she
had previously functioned at a high level, serving in the military
and receiving an associate’s degree. Dr. Poteat was unsure how
severe respondent’s current episode was compared to previous
hospitalizations.
The trial court concluded that the State proved by clear and
convincing evidence the elements necessary to support its petition.
The court found Robin C. subject to involuntary admission and
ordered her hospitalized in a Department of Human Services facility
for 90 days. See 405 ILCS 5/3-813 (West 2006).
Immediately following the commitment hearing, the trial court
conducted an involuntary medication hearing. Dr. Poteat stated
that respondent had engaged in threatening and disruptive behavior
and that some of the threatening behavior had been directed toward
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her. Respondent suffered from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and
had been repeatedly hospitalized since 2005.
As an outpatient, respondent refused to stay on her
medications. Respondent had taken Risperadal in the past with some
success. She was less aggressive during her current
hospitalization when she was given Zyprexa. Dr. Poteat listed
several medications on the petition, including Zyprexa, Risperadal,
Risperadal Contra, Haldol, Haldol Deconate, and Cogentin. She
listed all six so that she could change respondent’s prescription
if one of the medications had an unwanted side effect. Dr. Poteat
testified that respondent exhibited a deterioration in her ability
to function and lacked the capacity to make informed decisions
about her medication. In Dr. Poteat’s opinion, respondent lacked
the capacity to consent to psychotropic medication "due to her lack
of insight."
The trial court granted the petition for involuntary
medication and approved the listed medications to be administered
by Dr. Poteat for a period of 90 days. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)
(5) (West 2006).
ANALYSIS
I. Mootness
Initially, the State argues that this appeal is moot because
the trial court’s order had a duration of 90 days and 90 days have
since passed. In this case, respondent could only be held
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involuntarily and forced to take psychotropic medication against
her will if a new set of petitions were filed. See In re Barbara
H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998). As a general rule, a reviewing court
will not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions or
consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of
how the issue is decided. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393(2002). However, we will consider otherwise moot issues that fall
within two established exceptions to the mootness doctrine that
apply in this case: (1) the "public interest" exception; and (2)
the "capable of repetition yet evading judicial review" exception.
See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345 (2009).
The first exception, public interest, allows a court to
consider an otherwise moot case when (1) the question presented is
of a public nature, (2) there is a need for an authoritative
determination for the future guidance of public officers, and (3)
there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question. Alfred
H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 355. Here, the substantive issue on appeal
involves the State’s compliance with section 3-810 of the Mental
Health Code. The question presented is of a public nature and our
determination will guide the State in filing future dispositional
reports. See In re Andrew B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 337 (2008)
(procedures court must follow to authorize involuntary commitment
and medication involve substantial public concern). In addition,
the resolution of this issue will contribute to the efficient
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operation of our judicial system. See In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d
225 (1991) (resolving statutorily required notice in involuntary
commitment cases). Moreover, whether the State has fulfilled the
requirements of section 3-810 will likely recur in future
involuntary commitment cases. Thus, the public interest exception
applies to this case.
The issue raised by respondent is also capable of repetition
yet avoiding judicial review. This exception to the mootness
doctrine allows review of the issue if (1) the challenged action is
of a duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
party would be subject to the same action again. Barbara H., 183
Ill. 2d at 491. There is no question that this action is too short
in duration to be fully litigated in an appeal. There is also a
reasonable expectation that respondent would be subject to the same
action again. The record indicates that respondent has been
involuntarily committed on prior occasions. She suffers from
schizophrenia and she will likely confront involuntary commitment
in the future. Although the facts surrounding a new commitment
petition may be slightly different, section 3-810 must still be
applied. Thus, the resolution of the statutory compliance issue in
this case would have some bearing on a subsequent case involving
respondent. See In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247 (1989) (applied
exception noting that it was sufficient that same statutory
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provision will most likely be applied in future cases involving the
same party).
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the "public
interest" exception and the "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception apply. Accordingly, we will review respondent’s
argument on the merits.
II. Compliance with Section 3-810
Respondent argues that the trial court’s order should be
reversed because the State failed to file a complete dispositional
report as required under section 3-810 of the Mental Health Code.
Section 3-810 provides:
"Before any disposition is determined, the facility
director or such other person as the court may direct
shall prepare a written report including information on
the appropriateness and availability of alternative
treatment settings, a social investigation of the
respondent, a preliminary treatment plan, and any other
information which the court may order. The treatment
plan shall describe the respondent’s problems and needs,
the treatment goals, the proposed treatment methods, and
a projected timetable for their attainment. If the
respondent is found subject to involuntary admission, the
court shall consider the report in determining an
appropriate disposition." 405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2006).
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The purpose of the report is to provide trial courts with the
information necessary for determining whether an individual is
subject to involuntary commitment. A dispositional report helps to
protect against unreasonable commitments and to ensure adequate
treatment for the mentally ill. In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126,
133 (1992).
Here, the State admits that the dispositional report lacked a
social investigation report and a report on possible alternative
placements. Nevertheless, the State argues that, in the absence of
an objection by respondent, Dr. Poteat’s oral testimony was
sufficient to satisfy the statute. We disagree.
In In re Robinson, our supreme court held:
"Where a respondent fails to object to the absence
of a predispositional report, strict compliance with
section 3-810 is required only when the legislative
intent cannot otherwise be achieved. [Citation.] Under
these circumstances, we believe that oral testimony
containing the information required by the statute can be
an adequate substitute for the presentation of a formal,
written report." 151 Ill. 2d at 134.
However, we have repeatedly recognized that, in the context of
section 3-810, cursory testimony is not an adequate substitute for
a treatment plan or a written discussion of treatment alternatives
incorporated in a formal report. In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d
10251 (2008); In re Daniel M., 387 Ill. App. 3d 418 (2008); In re
Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221 (1994). "The State satisfies the
requirements of section 3-810 absent a formal written report only
when the testimony provides the specific information required by
the language of the statute." Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d at 270.
The State’s failure to meet the requirements of section 3-810
results in error which is neither harmless nor forfeited. Alaka
W., 379 Ill. App. 3d at 269.
In this case, the testimony the State elicited at the
commitment hearing did not provide the specific information
required under section 3-810. Dr. Poteat testified that no less
restrictive course of treatment was available for respondent other
than hospitalization in a mental health facility. This testimony
was conclusory and unsupported by a factual basis. Dr. Poteat
stated that she "would like" respondent to be placed in a mental
hospital equipped to handle her condition, but she did not explain
what other alternative treatments may be available and why she
believed those alternatives were inappropriate. Further, Dr.
Poteat did not identify the projected timetables for the treatment
goals set forth in the treatment plan. Thus, her testimony did not
provide the court with the information necessary to balance the
interests at hand and adequately consider an appropriate
disposition. The State’s failure to file a complete dispositional
report or present testimony that otherwise satisfied the statutory
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requirements, mandates reversal of the trial court’s order. See
Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d at 271.
III. Constitutional Claims
Respondent also claims that section 1-119.1(1) and section
104.5 of the Mental Health Code violate due process as guaranteed
by the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const., amends. V,
XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2.
In People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), the Illinois
Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule that cases should
be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching
constitutional issues only as a last resort:
"Constitutional issues should be addressed only if
necessary to decide a case. People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d
464 (2006), quoting People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State of
Illinois, 162 Ill.2d 117 (1994). As noted in E.H., this
court has gone so far as to add a requirement to our
rules that courts include a written statement that the
decision cannot rest upon an alternate, nonconstitutional
basis before deciding a case on constitutional grounds.
In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 178, citing 210 Ill. 2d R.
18(c)(4) (eff. September 1, 2006)." Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d
at 244.
Here, we have reversed on statutory grounds. We therefore
decline to address the constitutional issues raised on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is
reversed.
Reversed.
HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.
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