People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Ruckman ( 2006 )

Rule 23 order filed NO. 5-05-0132
December 13, 2005;
Motion to publish granted IN THE
February 9, 2006.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE ex rel. DIRECTOR OF ) Appeal from the
CORRECTIONS, ) Circuit Court of
) Randolph County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 04-L-41
)
LEONCE J. RUCKMAN, ) Honorable
) William A. Schuwerk, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McGLYNN delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellant, Leonce J. Ruckman (Ruckman), has been incarcerated with the Illinois
Department of Corrections since 1998. After he entered prison, Ruckman's mother died.
After her death, Ruckman purchased a MetLife annuity with a cash value of $32,178.22 with
money he received as the beneficiary of his mother's life insurance policy. After learning
that Ruckman inherited substantial assets, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. the
Director of Corrections (the State) filed a complaint against Ruckman pursuant to section 3-
7-6(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(a) (West 2004)), seeking the
reimbursement of the expenses the State had incurred as a result of Ruckman's incarceration.
In response, Ruckman filed a motion to quash, asking that the State's complaint be dismissed
since the life insurance proceeds were exempt.
On February 25, 2005, the circuit court denied Ruckman's motion to quash and
entered an order in favor of the State for $124,191.22. The circuit court specifically ordered
MetLife to pay the sum of $29,156.60 to the Illinois Department of Corrections for the cash
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value of the annuity less a personal property exemption of $2,000 pursuant to section 12-
1001(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b) (West 1996)). Ruckman
now appeals. After de novo review, we affirm. See Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 406, 811 N.E.2d 718, 721 (2004) (de novo review is appropriate
when the trial court enters a judgment on the pleadings).
Under the Unified Code of Corrections, the State has the right to seek a
reimbursement from prisoners for the cost of their incarceration.
"When the [S]tate succeeds in obtaining a judgment against a person for the
costs of his or her incarceration, the assets it can reach to satisfy that judgment are
extensive. For purposes of the statute, a committed person's assets include
'any property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or
due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or
payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's
compensation, pension benefits, or from any other source whatsoever and any
and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the
person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable
to the person.' "
People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416, 419, 830 N.E.2d 569,
570-71 (2005) (quoting 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
However, the State's ability to enforce the reimbursement scheme is subject to the
provisions of section 12-1001. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d at 423-24, 830 N.E.2d at
573. Under that statute:
"The following personal property, owned by the debtor, is exempt from
judgment, attachment, or distress for rent:
(a) The necessary wearing apparel, bible, school books, and family
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pictures of the debtor and the debtor's dependents; [and]
(b) The debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $2,000 in value, in any
other property[.]" 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a), (b) (West 1996).
Applying both statutes, we find the trial court was correct in finding that the annuity was
subject to the judgment, less $2,000 pursuant to section 12-1001(b).
On appeal, however, Ruckman argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was
only entitled to a $2,000 exemption and failing to find (a) that the annuity is exempt pursuant
to section 12-1001(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(f) (West
1996)) because it was purchased with life insurance proceeds and (b) that he was a dependent
beneficiary pursuant to section 12-1001(h)(3) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(3) (West
1996)), so that all the insurance proceeds are exempt. We disagree.
We address section 12-1001(f), which provides an exemption for the following:
"All proceeds payable because of the death of the insured and the aggregate net
cash value of any or all life insurance and endowment policies and annuity contracts
payable to a wife or husband of the insured, or to a child, parent, or other person
dependent upon the insured, whether the power to change the beneficiary is reserved
to the insured or not and whether the insured or the insured's estate is a contingent
beneficiary or not[.]" 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(f) (West 1996).
Although section 12-1001(f) provides an exemption for life insurance proceeds, it
does not apply where life insurance proceeds have been converted to another form of
propertyBsuch as Ruckman did when he purchased the annuity. See In re Bateman, 157 B.R.
635, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Jackson, 95 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
Therefore, section 12-1001(f) does not apply.
Ruckman next points to section 12-1001(h)(3), which provides an exemption for the
following:
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"The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to:
***
(3) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an
individual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor[.]" 735
ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(3) (West 1996).
In order for this exemption to apply, Ruckman must have been his mother's dependent
at the time of her death. In re Bunting, 322 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005). It is
undisputed, however, that Ruckman was incarcerated at the time of his mother's death. Thus,
Ruckman was a dependent of the State, which provided for all of Ruckman's basic
necessities. Although Ruckman's mother may have provided her son with money to purchase
extraneous items at the commissary, these items were not essential since the State provided
for all of his basic needs. Therefore, Ruckman was not his mother's dependent at the time of
her death. Accordingly, section 12-1001(h)(3) does not apply.
Last, Ruckman argues that the exemption found under section 12-1001(h)(3) applies
because he has dependents. This is not the case. Section 12-1001(h)(3) provides an
exemption for "a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an individual
of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(3)
(West 1996). Therefore, the question is whether the debtor is a dependent of the insured, not
whether the debtor has dependents. If the debtor is found to be a dependent, the life
insurance proceeds are exempt to whatever extent is necessary to support the debtor and his
dependents. Regardless, the debtor must first be found a "dependent" of the insured. That is
not the case here. Accordingly, the exemption does not apply.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the decision of the trial court that orders
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MetLife to pay the sum of $29,156.60 to the Illinois Department of Corrections for the cash
value of the annuity less a personal property exemption of $2,000 pursuant to section 12-
1001(b).
Affirmed.
CHAPMAN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.
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NO. 5-05-0132
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE ex rel. DIRECTOR OF ) Appeal from the
CORRECTIONS, ) Circuit Court of
) Randolph County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 04-L-41
)
LEONCE J. RUCKMAN, ) Honorable
) William A. Schuwerk, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Rule 23 Order Filed: December 13, 2005
Motion to Publish Granted: February 9, 2006
Opinion Filed: February 9, 2006
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Stephen P. McGlynn, J.
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J., and
Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,
Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Leeonce Ruckman, Reg. No.: B-00375, Hill Correctional Center, P.O. Box 1700,
for Galesburg, IL 61401
Appellant
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General,
for Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, 100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor,
Appellee Chicago, IL 60601
___________________________________________________________________________________