Monson v. County of Grundy ( 2009 )


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  •                                No. 3-09-0101
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    Filed October 15, 2009
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    A.D., 2009
    ELTON MONSON, Superintendent  )    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    of the Veterans Assistance    )    of the 13th Judicial Circuit
    Commission of Grundy County,  )    Grundy County, Illinois
    Illinois,                     )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,     )
    )    No. 07-MR-16
    v.                       )
    )
    THE COUNTY OF GRUNDY,         )
    ILLINOIS, a Local Government )
    Body,                         )    Honorable
    )    Robert C. Marsaglia,
    Defendant-Appellee.      )    Judge, Presiding,
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
    _________________________________________________________________
    Plaintiff,    Elton   Monson,      Superintendent   of   the    Veterans
    Assistance Commission of Grundy County, Illinois (VACGC), filed a
    mandamus action against defendant, County of Grundy, to require
    defendant    to   pay   vouchers    he   submitted   on   behalf     of   VACGC.
    Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.
    We affirm.
    VACGC was formed in 1999 and became recognized by defendant as
    a local governmental unit in 2002. Plaintiff, Elton Monson, is the
    superintendent of VACGC.        In early 2005, defendant requested a
    proposed budget from VACGC for fiscal year 2006, which runs from
    December 1, 2005, to November 30, 2006.              Plaintiff submitted a
    proposed budget of $208,750, which was a 20% increase from the
    prior fiscal year.      When defendant requested that VACGC decrease
    its proposed budget, VACGC’s chairman, James Sterba, responded that
    its submitted budget "stands as is."
    On November 8, 2005, defendant approved the county’s fiscal
    year 2006 budget, which included a budget of $119,999 for VACGC.
    VACGC depleted its approved budget in October 2006.               On November
    28, 2006,    VACGC    submitted   bills    and   claims   to    defendant   for
    repayment.   In   a   letter   dated   December    11,    2006,    the   county
    administrator, Alfred Bourdelais, explained that claims submitted
    by VACGC on November 28, 2006, were denied, in part, because "no
    funds are available."
    On April 11, 2007, plaintiff filed a petition for order of
    mandamus against defendant seeking to require defendant, pursuant
    to section 2 of the Military Veterans Assistance Act (Act) (330
    ILCS 45/2 (West 2006)), to pay bills, claims and vouchers submitted
    by VACGC to defendant during fiscal year 2006.            The unpaid bills,
    claims and vouchers submitted by VACGC totaled $23,302.70 and
    consisted of attorney fees, vehicle insurance, mileage, drivers’
    wages, phone cards, office supplies, advertising, court filing
    fees, and clerk wages.
    Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, in part, that
    plaintiff’s mandamus action was barred by laches.              Attached to the
    motion to dismiss was an affidavit from Bourdelais, which stated in
    part:
    "4. Following approval of the FY 06 budget including
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    the revised Veterans Assistance Commission budget, the
    Veterans Assistance Commission of Grundy County never
    objected in writing to the County of Grundy regarding the
    approved budget.
    5. After December 1, 2005, the Veterans Assistance
    Commission of Grundy County never asked the county of
    Grundy to increase its FY 06 budget or any individual
    line item thereof, even though they were informed that a
    written request would be needed to increase the budget."
    The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that
    "there are no disputed facts" and that laches applies.
    Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate judgment and/or
    order a rehearing because his attorney failed to provide certain
    affidavits to the court.       Attached to the motion were affidavits
    from plaintiff, as well as the chairman and vice-chairman of VACGC,
    asserting that they (1) "never received any VACGC FY2006 Budget
    modification proposal from anyone from the Grundy County Board or
    County Administrator, Alfred Bourdelais"; (2) "did not know that
    the VACGC FY2006 Budget figures submitted would be changed by the
    Grundy   County   Board   or   by   the   County   Administrator,   Alfred
    Bourdelais"; (3) "never knew that any of the VACGC FY2006 Budget
    figures were changed by the Grundy County Board or by the County
    Administrator, Alfred Bourdelais"; and (4) "never received any
    notification from the Grundy County Board or County Administrator,
    Alfred Bourdelais, that a written request would be needed to
    increase the budget."
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    The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and allowed a
    rehearing.    Following the rehearing, the trial court found that a
    "factual dispute does exist" over when plaintiff became aware that
    an   amount   less   than   VACGC’s   proposed     budget    was   approved   by
    defendant for fiscal year 2006.        Nevertheless, the court dismissed
    plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that it was "brought too late."
    ANALYSIS
    Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in applying the
    doctrine of laches to defeat his mandamus action brought under the
    Act because he filed the action only four months after defendant
    notified him that VACGC’s budget was depleted.              Defendant responds
    that laches applies because plaintiff did not file his action until
    after fiscal year 2006 was over.
    The Act was created to provide needed assistance to honorably
    discharged veterans, their families, and the families of deceased
    veterans.     330 ILCS 45/2 (West 2006).            The Act authorizes the
    organization of veterans assistance commissions (VACs), consisting
    of one delegate and one alternate from each post, camp, unit,
    chapter and ship of each legally recognized military veterans
    organization within the county.            330 ILCS 45/9 (West 2006).         The
    executive     powers   of    each     VAC    are   vested     in   an   elected
    superintendent.      330 ILCS 45/10 (West 2006).
    Section 2 of the Act mandates that upon the recommendation of
    the VAC, "the county board shall provide such sums of money as may
    be just and necessary" to assist veterans and their families.                 330
    ILCS 45/2 (West 2006).        A VAC superintendent may seek a writ of
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    mandamus when the county board fails to appropriate just and
    necessary amounts for veterans’ benefits.                          330 ILCS 45/2 (West
    2006).      The procedure for requesting and receiving veterans’
    benefits is as follows:
    "Initially the VAC initially makes a recommendation of an
    amount that it believes to be appropriate under the law.
    The county board then acts upon that recommendation,
    either      to    approve        or   disapprove        the   recommendation.
    [Citation.]           If     the        board         approves    the     VAC’s
    recommendation, the matter is resolved.                          If the board
    disapproves the recommendation, the VAC then has two
    options:         it   may   submit      a       new   recommendation      for   a
    different amount or the superintendent may seek judicial
    relief for mandamus. After listening to the views of the
    parties, the circuit court may issue a writ of mandamus
    for either the amount sought by the VAC or a different
    amount." Veterans Assistance Comm’n v. County Board, 
    274 Ill. App. 3d 32
    , 37, 
    654 N.E.2d 219
    , 223 (1995).
    The doctrine of laches is grounded on the principle that
    courts are reluctant to come to the aid of a party who knowingly
    slept on rights to the detriment of the other party.                         In re Estate
    of Beckhart, 
    371 Ill. App. 3d 1165
    , 1170, 
    864 N.E.2d 1002
    , 1007
    (2007).     In order to apply, the defense of laches requires a
    showing that (1) a party has exhibited an unreasonable delay in
    asserting    a   claim;         and    (2)   the      opposing     party     has   suffered
    prejudice as a result of the delay. 
    Beckhart, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 5
    
    1170, 864 N.E.2d at 1007
    .      The general rule is that a delay of six
    months or longer is per se unreasonable.          See Bill v. Board of
    Education of Cicero School District 99, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d 47
    , 55,
    
    812 N.E.2d 604
    , 611 (2004). The laches doctrine applies to actions
    at law, including petitions for mandamus.         Washington v. Walker,
    
    391 Ill. App. 3d 459
    , 463, 
    908 N.E.2d 1066
    , 1070 (2009); 
    Bill, 351 Ill. App. at 57-58
    , 812 N.E.2d at 612-13.
    When    a   plaintiff   files   a   complaint   challenging   budget
    decisions for a fiscal year that has ended, laches applies because
    the   plaintiff’s    unreasonable     delay   prejudices   the   budgeting
    authority. See Pace v. Regional Transportation Authority, 346 Ill.
    App. 3d 125, 144, 
    803 N.E.2d 13
    , 29 (2003).       In Pace, the plaintiff
    filed a complaint on January 11, 2002, challenging budget decisions
    that the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) made from 1996 to
    2002.   The 2002 fiscal year began on January 1, 2002, and RTA
    rejected Pace’s proposed 2002 budget on December 28, 2001.            The
    court concluded:
    "Pace filed its complaint *** shortly after the 2002
    fiscal year started and shortly after the RTA made the
    challenged budget decisions. Because Pace sued promptly,
    laches does not apply to the 2002 budget decisions.
    Laches does apply, however, to Pace’s request for a
    monetary award representing subsidies that Pace alleges
    it should have received in the years 1996 through 2001.
    When Pace filed its complaint, these budget years had
    concluded, and, presumably, the funds at issue were no
    6
    longer available.         It would be highly prejudicial to
    require RTA to pay these 'back subsidies’ long after
    these funds have become a part of the RTA’s budget
    history.     Therefore, we conclude that Pace                  may not
    recover 'back subsidies’ for the years 1996 through
    2001."   
    Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 144
    , 803 N.E.2d at 29-
    30.
    Even though Pace filed its complaint just 11 days after Fiscal Year
    2001 ended, the court found that laches prohibited Pace from
    challenging RCA’s 2001 budget decisions.
    Here, we find that plaintiff’s unjustified delay in bringing
    the action prejudiced defendant.              Defendant made its final fiscal
    year 2006 budget decisions on November 8, 2005.                   Plaintiff filed
    his   mandamus action on April 11, 2007, more than 17 months after
    defendant approved the fiscal year 2006 budget and over 4 months
    after fiscal year 2006 ended.             In his mandamus action, plaintiff
    sought to require defendant to provide additional funds to VACGC
    after VACGC had expended its entire fiscal year 2006 budget.
    However,    the   funds      plaintiff    was        requesting   were   no   longer
    available.     To require defendant to pay VACGC’s claims after its
    budget was exhausted and after fiscal year 2006 came to a close
    would be "highly prejudicial." See 
    Pace, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 144
    ,
    803 N.E.2d at 29-30.
    Plaintiff argues that laches should not apply because he
    alleges that      he   did   not   know       that    defendant   reduced     VACGC’s
    proposed budget for fiscal year 2006 until after the fiscal year
    7
    ended.     We reject this contention.       A VAC seeking appropriations
    under section 2 of the Military Veterans Assistance Act must make
    itself aware of county board decisions and respond accordingly.
    See Veterans Assistance 
    Comm’n, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 37
    , 654 N.E.2d
    at 223.    Here, VACGC made no effort to ascertain its own budget for
    fiscal year 2006 or its remaining balance at any time during the
    year even though that information was public and readily available.
    See 55 ILCS 5/6-1006 (West 2006) (county treasurer and county clerk
    required to keep accounting of each fund).          Instead, plaintiff sat
    idly by and submitted claims until he was notified that he had
    exceeded VACGC’s budget.      We will not reward plaintiff for his own
    nonfeasance.     See Demos v. Ferris-Shell Oil Co., 
    317 Ill. App. 3d 41
    , 51, 
    740 N.E.2d 9
    , 17 (2000) ("’nonfeasance’ is the omission of
    an act which a person ought to do"), citing Black’s Law Dictionary
    1054 (6th ed. 1990).        We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of
    plaintiff’s complaint.
    CONCLUSION
    The    judgment   of   the   circuit   court   of   Grundy   County   is
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
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