People v. Bohannon , 403 Ill. App. 3d 1074 ( 2010 )

NO. 5-08-0370
NOTICE
Decision filed 09/10/10. The text of
IN THE
this decision may be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
Peti tion for Rehearing or th e
disposition of the same.
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Johnson County.
)
v. ) No. 07-CM-94
)
STEVEN BOHANNON, ) Honorable
) Charles C. Cavaness,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Steven Bohannon, was charged with obstructing a peace officer under the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2006)) in the circuit court of Johnson
County. The circuit court dismissed the charge. On appeal, the State contends that the
dismissal was improper. W e affirm.
FACTS
According to reports of the Vienna police department, defendant was driving his
vehicle alone, when he was stopped at a random roadside safety checkpoint. Upon stopping,
Vienna Police Chief Jim Miller asked defendant to produce a driver's license and proof of
insurance. Defendant refused. Chief Miller and other officers asked again and defendant
again refused. Defendant was arrested after telling the officers that he would not produce
the documents and that they would have to arrest him.
Defendant was placed under arrest and charged by information with obstructing a
peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2006)). The amended information stated as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of July, 2007, in Johnson County, Illinois, the
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[d]efendant, STEVEN S. BOHANNON, committed the offense of OBSTRUCTING
A POLICE OFFICER, in violation of [section 31-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2006))], in that said [d]efendant knowingly resisted the
performance of [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller, a person known by the [d]efendant
to be a peace officer, of an authorized act within [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller's
capacity, namely the investigation of the [d]efendant's Illinois driver's license and
liability insurance coverage status, in that the [d]efendant refused to provide [Vienna
Police Chief] Jim Miller with a valid Illinois driver's license and proof of liability
insurance after [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller repeatedly asked the [d]efendant to
provide [Vienna Police Chief] Jim Miller with a valid Illinois driver's license and
proof of liability insurance coverage."
Although the narrative of the police reports indicates that defendant was issued traffic
citations for the failure to display his driver's license and proof of insurance, the record
before this court does not contain any such citations or order of disposition on any traffic
offense.
The trial court dismissed the charge of obstruction on the motion of defendant. The
court noted that the allegations did not involve issues of officer safety or refusal to exit a
vehicle. The court found that the alleged conduct more closely resembled a refusal to answer
questions of a police officer than a physical act. The court ruled that the mere refusal to
provide a driver's license and proof of insurance did not constitute obstruction of a peace
officer.
The trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider and the State appealed.
ANALYSIS
The legislature has vested law enforcement with the authority to request a driver's
license and proof of insurance. The Illinois Vehicle Code provides that a driver must carry
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a license and exhibit it when requested by a law enforcement official. 625 ILCS 5/6-112
(West 2006). This section states that a driver "shall display such license or permit if it is in
his possession upon demand made, when in uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of
authority, by a *** police officer." 625 ILCS 5/6-112 (West 2006). The Illinois Vehicle
Code further provides, "Any person who fails to comply with a request by a law enforcement
officer for display of evidence of insurance *** shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured
motor vehicle." 625 ILCS 5/3-707(b) (West 2006).
The fate of any citations under either of these provisions is unclear from the record
before this court. At issue on appeal is a charge of obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS
5/31-1 (West 2006)). On the relevant date, the Criminal Code of 1961 provided as follows:
"§31-1. Resisting or obstructing a peace officer or correctional institution
employee.
(a) A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one
known to the person to be a peace officer or correctional institution employee of any
authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor." 720
ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006).
A person violates this provision only if he engages in conduct that "resists or
obstructs" (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006)). This phrase has been the subject of much
discussion. In Raby, the Illinois Supreme Court defined the terms:
" ' "Resisting" or "resistance" means "withstanding the force or effect of" or the
"exertion of oneself to counteract or defeat". "Obstruct" means "to be or come in the
way of". These terms are alike in that they imply some physical act or exertion.
Given a reasonable and natural construction, these terms do not proscribe mere
argument with a policeman about the validity of an arrest or other police action, but
proscribe only some physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede,
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hinder, interrupt, prevent[,] or delay the performance of the officer's duties, such as
going limp, forcefully resisting arrest[,] or physically aiding a third party to avoid
arrest.' " People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 399, 240 N.E.2d 595, 599 (1968) (quoting
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 27 L. Ed. 2d 696, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971)).
See People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225, 811 N.E.2d 236, 238 (2004); People v.
Meister, 289 Ill. App. 3d 337, 341, 682 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1997); People v. Weathington, 82
Ill. 2d 183, 186, 411 N.E.2d 862, 863 (1980); People v. Gibbs, 115 Ill. App. 2d 113, 117,
253 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1969); see also City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 3, 253 N.E.2d
400, 401 (1969).
The emphasis on whether defendant's conduct was a physical act is misplaced. Raby
and its progeny reveal a concern that the phrase "resists or obstructs" is not defined so
broadly that it places citizens in jeopardy of an arrest for mere verbal disagreement. Whether
seen as more verbal or more physical, defendant's conduct undoubtedly subjected him to
arrest. The legislature resolved any ambiguity regarding the level of physicality necessary
for an arrest under the Illinois Vehicle Code by providing a definition for the word "display."
The Illinois Vehicle Code provides as follows:
"For the purposes of this section, 'display' means the manual surrender of his
license certificate into the hands of the demanding officer for his inspection thereof."
625 ILCS 5/6-112 (West 2006).
See also 625 ILCS 5/3-707 (W est 2006) (operation of uninsured motor vehicle).
The authority of law enforcement officers to request identification and defendant's
duty to comply are set forth in Illinois Vehicle Code. The question is whether, in light of
these provisions, the failure to comply also constitutes obstructing a peace officer under the
Criminal Code of 1961. This is a question of statutory construction.
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Context can clarify. This case is distinct from instances in which a lesser-included
offense for the same conduct is proscribed by another statute. See People v. Synnott, 349 Ill.
App. 3d 223, 228, 811 N.E.2d 236, 240 (2004). The broad mandate against obstructing a
peace officer in the Criminal Code of 1961 addresses varied conduct encountered by officers
performing their duty to keep the peace. In contrast, the narrower language of the Illinois
Vehicle Code is limited to traffic stops. The specific and tailored provisions of the Illinois
Vehicle Code requiring the display of the driver's license and proof of insurance dictate their
application to this vehicle stop. In the words of Justice Day: "It is a well-settled principle
of construction that specific terms covering the given subject-matter will prevail over general
language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling." Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125, 49 L. Ed. 114, 123, 24 S. Ct. 797, 803 (1904).
Fundamentally, the resolution of this appeal goes beyond deciding which statute
should be given priority. Extending the Criminal Code of 1961 to the case at hand would
not merely go beyond placing an additional level of culpability on defendant for the same
conduct. Indeed, the charges of obstructing a peace officer would be inexplicable without
the authority granted to law enforcement in the applicable provisions of the Illinois Vehicle
Code.
In other words, the State invites a circular definition. The phrase "knowingly resists
or obstructs" makes no sense in a vacuum. Any charge of obstructing a peace officer is
derivative. Defendant's conduct is given meaning only in light of the context of "the
performance by *** a peace officer *** of any authorized act within his official capacity."
720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006). This, of course, begs the question–What is the "authorized
act"?
In the case at hand, the request for the display of a license and proof of insurance was
the authorized act. Notably, the Illinois Vehicle Code criminalizes the failure to display
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proper documents. 625 ILCS 5/6-112 (West 2006); People v. Steele, 366 Ill. App. 3d 220,
223, 851 N.E.2d 920, 923 (2006). Assuming the facts presented in the police reports, we
conclude that defendant was not obstructing or resisting an investigation into whether the
laws of Illinois were violated; he was committing the actual offenses proscribed by the
Illinois Vehicle Code. See People v. Steele, 366 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223, 851 N.E.2d 920, 923
(2006); see People v. Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350, 902 N.E.2d 792, 796 (2009)
(roadside safety checks may not amount to criminal investigations). The conduct prohibited
by the Illinois Vehicle Code was the failure to display.
A charge of obstructing a peace officer must be premised on the officer's performance
of an authorized act. In this case, defendant's conduct is the exact same criminal act
prohibited by the statutes from which the premise for imposing the Criminal Code of 1961
derived. The acts alleged to be resistance and obstruction were subsumed in the provisions
of the Illinois Vehicle Code. This pyramid is an unsound structure.
The police reports suggest that defendant was objecting to the requests of law
enforcement as a matter of principle. The argument in the field continued through the halls
of the circuit court and left a trail of paper to the appellate court. If defendant reads this
court's decision as a vindication of his actions, he would be wrong. The officers were
authorized to request a license and proof of insurance and, indeed, might have been derelict
in their duties if they had failed to do so. The officers were authorized to arrest defendant
for his failure to display the documents, and their authority continued to actions incident to
the arrest, such as placing defendant in custody and towing his vehicle. Nonetheless, aside
from the actual offenses of the failure to display the requested documents, defendant did not
impede the performance of the duties of the officers. Defendant did not resist being taken
into custody, obstruct the towing of his vehicle, or provide misleading information. He
simply violated the Illinois Vehicle Code.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
WELCH, J., concurs.
JUSTICE W EXSTTEN, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the defendant's conduct sufficiently supported a
charge of obstructing a peace officer (see People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225-28,
811 N.E.2d 236, 238-41 (2004)), and I note that, sections 6-112 and 7-602 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-112, 7-602 (West 2006)) aside, police agencies are
conditionally authorized to conduct roadside checkpoints such as the one conducted in the
present case (see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333,
341, 121 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2000); People v. Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350-51, 902 N.E.2d
792, 796 (2009)). I further note that "[o]ur supreme court has repeatedly held that the State's
Attorney has a responsibility for evaluating the evidence and other pertinent factors in
determining what offense can and should properly be charged" and that "when a defendant's
act has violated more than one statute, and each statute requires different proof for
conviction, even though there may be some overlapping, the defendant may be prosecuted
under the statute which provides the greater penalty." People v. Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d
567, 577, 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (1990).
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NO. 5-08-0370
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Johnson County.
)
v. ) No. 07-CM-94
)
STEVEN BOHANNON, ) Honorable
) Charles C. Cavaness,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: September 10, 2010
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, P.J.
Honorable Thomas M . Welch, J., concurs
Honorable James M. Wexstten, J., dissenting
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Tricia Turner Shelton, State's Attorney, Johnson County Courthouse,
for Vienna, IL 62995; Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director,
Appellant David Murrell, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor,
730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Johannah B. Weber, Deputy Defender,
for John H. Gleason, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate
Appellee Defender, 117 N. Tenth Street, Suite 300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________