In re: Elizabeth McN ( 2006 )

NO. 4-06-0250 Filed: 9/19/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: ELIZABETH McN., a Person Found ) Appeal from
Subject to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 06MH139
v. )
ELIZABETH McN., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) George H. Ray,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
In February 2006, a petition was filed for the emer-
gency involuntary admission of respondent, Elizabeth McN.,
alleging she had a mental illness and was reasonably expected to
inflict harm upon herself or others. The trial court conducted a
hearing and granted the petition.
On appeal, respondent argues (1) her procedural due-
process rights were violated and (2) the State failed to set
forth clear and convincing evidence warranting involuntary
admission. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 2006, Tiffany Price filed a petition for
emergency involuntary admission as to respondent pursuant to
section 3-600 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2004)). The petition alleged
respondent was mentally ill, reasonably expected to inflict
serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future,
and in need of immediate hospitalization for the prevention of
such harm.
In March 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the petition. Dr. Narasimhulu Sarma testified he has worked as a
psychiatrist for 35 years. He stated respondent came under his
care on February 28, 2006, and he had examined her about four
times since then at Memorial Medical Center. Although Dr. Sarma
found respondent "very healthy" physically, he found she lacks
insight and has "grandiose ideas about herself." Dr. Sarma
stated respondent suffered from chronic bipolar illness. When
asked his opinion based on a reasonable degree of psychiatric
certainty whether respondent's mental illness would cause her to
inflict serious harm upon herself or another, Dr. Sarma stated:
"Not upon herself. She doesn't--you know--
she might become irritable sometimes if peo-
ple don't listen to her. Other people may
become very upset with her and they may harm
her."
Thus, Dr. Sarma believed respondent would be in danger of being
harmed by others if she was discharged. The treatment plan
entered into evidence was the least-restrictive alternative. Dr.
Sarma opined that respondent would benefit from a stay in a state
institution. If she started undergoing treatment, he believed
she could be discharged in three or four weeks.
On cross-examination, Dr. Sarma testified respondent
had participated in group and recreational therapy but did not
- 2 -
take her psychotropic medications. Respondent had been "very
pleasant" to Dr. Sarma and not threatening. On redirect exami-
nation, Dr. Sarma stated he did not think the homeless shelter
would take respondent back if she was discharged because she had
"created a problem for them."
Respondent testified she had no intent to harm herself
or anyone else. She had arrived in Springfield about eight weeks
earlier and found a part-time job. A dispute occurred at the
homeless shelter where she stayed, but she did not threaten
anyone. If discharged, she would stay at a hotel or the Salva-
tion Army before taking a train to Chicago.
The trial court found respondent suffered from a mental
illness and, based on Dr. Sarma's opinion, she "could be subject
to harm from others" if not treated for her illness. The court
ordered respondent hospitalized at McFarland Mental Health Center
for 90 days. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Along with her procedural due-process argument, respon-
dent contends the State failed to set forth clear and convincing
evidence warranting her involuntary admission. We agree, and the
State concedes.
Initially, we note this case is moot. Section 3-813(a)
of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813(a) (West 2004)) provides that an
initial order for hospitalization shall not exceed 90 days.
Here, the trial court's order granting the petition for invol-
untary admission was entered on March 10, 2006. Since the 90
- 3 -
days have passed and the court's order no longer has any force or
effect, it is impossible for this court to grant any effectual
relief to any party. However, as this type of case meets the
public-interest exception of the mootness doctrine, we find
review appropriate. See In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774,
777, 838 N.E.2d 226, 230 (2005); see also In re Katz, 267 Ill.
App. 3d 692, 694, 642 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1994) (reviewing merits of
discharge petition even though the respondent had been discharged
prior to appeal).
A trial court's decision on involuntary admission is
given great deference on appeal and will not be overturned unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Nancy
A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 554, 801 N.E.2d 565, 579 (2003). A
judgment will be considered against the manifest weight of the
evidence "only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when
the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based
on evidence." In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 781, 792
N.E.2d 350, 353 (2003).
According to section 1-119(1) of the Code, a person
subject to involuntary admission includes:
"A person with mental illness and who
because of his or her illness is reasonably
expected to inflict serious physical harm
upon himself or herself or another in the
near future which may include threatening
behavior or conduct that places another indi-
- 4 -
vidual in reasonable expectation of being
harmed." 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2004).
To involuntarily commit a person to a mental-health facility,
"the State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a person is mentally ill and
that, as a result of this illness, he is
reasonably expected to inflict serious physi-
cal harm upon himself or another in the near
future, or is unable to protect himself from
serious harm. [Citations.] Proof of mental
illness alone is not sufficient to support
involuntary admission." Nancy A., 344 Ill.
App. 3d at 555, 801 N.E.2d at 579-80.
In the case sub judice, Dr. Sarma testified respondent
suffered from a mental illness. However, Dr. Sarma was not of
the opinion she would harm herself. Although she might become
irritable, Dr. Sarma believed other people might become upset
with her and may harm her. However, the State presented no
evidence that respondent had been victimized. "Such weakness [as
a member of society] does not warrant preemptive confinement
whereby potential victims would be incarcerated in the interest
of preventing criminals from preying upon them." In re Jakush,
311 Ill. App. 3d 940, 946, 725 N.E.2d 785, 790 (2000). Although
respondent's behaviors might be deemed "nonacceptable by soci-
ety," the State failed to set forth clear and convincing evidence
that respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious harm
- 5 -
upon herself or another in the near future or engage in conduct
that placed another person in reasonable anticipation of being
harmed. Mere speculation that others might harm respondent fails
to satisfy the State's burden for involuntary admission. Thus,
the trial court erred in granting the petition for involuntary
admission.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment.
Reversed.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
- 6 -