People v. Standley ( 2006 )

NO. 4-03-0872 Filed: 5/1/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
SHAWN R. STANDLEY, ) No. 03CF574
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Katherine M. McCarthy,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
In May 2003, the State charged defendant, Shawn R.
Standley, with two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-
11(a)(3) (West 2002)). After an August 2003 trial, a jury found
defendant guilty of home invasion. At a joint hearing in October
2003, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion and
sentenced him to 21 years' imprisonment.
Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the State's evidence
was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) the 15-year sentence enhancement mandated by Public Act 91-
404 (Pub. Act 91-404, '5, eff. January 1, 2000 (1999 Ill. Laws
5126, 5131) (codified at 720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2002))) for
violating section 12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961
(Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2002)) is unconsti-
tutional; and (3) if the sentence enhancement is unconstitu-
tional, "the judicially imposed portion of his sentence" should
be allowed to remain.
In September 2005, this court affirmed defendant's
conviction and sentence. People v. Standley, 359 Ill. App. 3d
1096, 835 N.E.2d 945 (2005). In January 2006, our supreme court
vacated our judgment and remanded the cause to our court to
reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d
481, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), and People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d
533, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005), "to determine if a different analysis
or result is required." People v. Standley, 217 Ill. 2d 622,
622, 840 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (2006). Accordingly, we again address
defendant's aforementioned arguments and again affirm the trial
court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
At around midnight on April 28, 2003, two males armed
with guns kicked in the back door of a home at 2757 North Church
Street, Decatur, Illinois, and entered the home. The home
belonged to Gary Lewis, Sharon Conaway, and their then eight-
year-old son Garrett Lewis, who were all home at the time.
During the incident, one of the men hit Gary with a gun. On May
23, 2003, the State charged both defendant and Michael Joyner
with two counts of home invasion.
In August 2003, the trial court held a jury trial on
defendant's charges. The evidence relevant to the issues on
appeal is set forth below.
Decatur police officer Lonnie Lewellyn testified he
arrived at the Church Street residence at 12:41 a.m. on August
28, 2003, in response to a report of a home invasion. There, he
spoke with Gary, Sharon, and Garrett. Gary and Sharon were able
to give descriptions of the two individuals, and Gary was also
able to provide nicknames by which he knew them. He did not
recall Gary mentioning defendant had facial hair but did recall
Gary recognized the hair, eyes, and voice of both suspects.
Officer Lewellyn did note Gary and Sharon told him that both
suspects had taken off their bandanas.
Gary testified that around 12:15 a.m., he heard several
loud booms coming from the kitchen area, which is attached to the
back porch that contains an exterior door. Gary entered the
kitchen, turned the lights on, and saw the door leading to the
porch fly open. Two men then entered the kitchen with guns
pointed at him. In court, Gary identified defendant as the first
man who entered Gary's home. When defendant entered the home, he
was wearing a bandana around his face that began right under his
eyes and covered his mouth and nose. He was also wearing a
hooded sweatshirt or jacket with the hood up.
Defendant ordered Gary to the floor, and Gary laid
stomach down on the floor. He tried to keep his head up and
observe what was taking place. After four or five demands for
money and drugs, defendant told Gary to stand up and moved Gary
to a recliner in the front room. The other man brought Garrett
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into the front room, where Sharon was already located. According
to Gary, he was in the kitchen about 7 to 10 minutes after seeing
defendant, and the kitchen lights were on the entire time.
In the front room, defendant held a gun to the center
of Gary's forehead for about 5 to 10 minutes and continued to
demand money. During that time, defendant was directly in front
of Gary and less than an arm's length away. The lights and
television were on in the front room.
At some point, defendant asked Gary for his wallet, and
Gary indicated it was in the bedroom. While still holding the
gun to Gary's head, defendant walked Gary to the bedroom. The
other man brought Sharon and Garrett into the bedroom. The
lights were also on in there. Gary opened a drawer, and defen-
dant removed the wallet. Defendant threatened to come back and
shoot Gary if he was lying about not having money or drugs.
Defendant then hit Gary across the face with a gun, knocking Gary
unconscious. The men were gone when Gary regained consciousness.
Prior to April 28, 2003, Gary had seen defendant a few
times through mutual friends. About three to four weeks before
the incident, Gary had spoken a few words to defendant at the AIW
Hall. Gary first had a notion defendant was the perpetrator when
they entered the front room. When they reached the dresser in
the bedroom, he got a good look at him because they were face-to-
face, eye-to-eye. He observed defendant had two eyebrow rings
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over one of his eyes, but he was unsure of which eye. He also
noted defendant's bandana slipped down several times during the
encounter but never got below his nose. Gary testified he was
"very certain" and "positive" that defendant was the first man to
enter his kitchen.
Gary acknowledged he had a prior felony for possession
of a controlled substance and two new charges pending against
him. He stated the State had not promised him leniency or a
reward in exchange for his testimony.
Sharon testified she got a good look at the two men
shortly after they entered the house and had not yet seen her.
One was a white male, and the other was a mixed-race male. They
were both wearing black hooded jackets and bandanas on their
faces. She could not recall if the kitchen light was on. When
the white male brought Gary into the living room, she was able to
get a closer look at the white male. The lights were on in the
living room. She identified defendant as the white male in her
home. Sharon was "very sure" and "had no doubt" it was defen-
dant. Sharon noted that during the incident, she was able to see
defendant's face from the tip of his nose to his forehead,
including the front of his hair. Defendant had two eyebrow rings
on the portion of the left eyebrow closest to the ear. She also
noted the mixed-race male took off his bandana after it had
fallen down. She further testified the lights were on in the
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bedroom as well. The closest she was to defendant was about five
feet away.
According to Sharon, the entire incident lasted 20 to
25 minutes. She too had seen defendant a couple times before the
incident and recalled Gary talking to him at the AIW Hall two or
three weeks before the incident. During the incident, she
recognized his voice. When the police officer arrived, she and
Gary told the officer the mixed-race male was known as "mixed
Mike" and the white male was "Shawn." Later, both she and Gary
picked defendant's picture out of a photograph lineup as the
white male that entered their home. Additionally, Sharon ac-
knowledged she was currently on probation.
Decatur police officer Chad Ramey testified that on May
1, 2003, he met with Gary and Sharon and conducted a photograph
lineup. He first showed the lineup to Gary, who pointed to
defendant's photograph "rather quickly." He then showed the
lineup to Sharon, who also pointed to defendant's picture "rather
quickly." According to Officer Ramey, Sharon was unable to see
Gary's identification of defendant. He did not recall any of the
people in the lineup having eyebrow rings.
On May 21, 2003, Officer Ramey met with defendant, who
had voluntarily showed up at the police department. He noticed
that defendant had four holes over his left eyebrow where it had
been pierced. He did not take a picture of defendant's eyebrow,
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and the booking photograph was too blurry to see any holes.
Robert Lewellen, defendant's grandfather, testified
that defendant had been residing at his home for 1 1/2 to 2 years
prior to April 28, 2003, but defendant was not there April 27 or
28, 2003. According to Robert, defendant never had more than one
eyebrow ring and sometimes did not wear it. Defendant also had a
mustache and some chin hair. Robert identified some pictures of
defendant, in which he had only one eyebrow ring and a mustache.
Ann Lewellen, defendant's grandmother, also testified
defendant only had one eyebrow ring and wore a mustache in April
2003. She did not see defendant on April 27 or 28, 2003. She
talked with her daughter Lori Blair on the afternoon of April 27,
2003. During the conversation, Lori indicated she could not
spend the night at Ann's home because her son and defendant would
make a mess. Ann again talked to Lori around 5 p.m. on April 28,
2003, and heard defendant's voice in the background.
Jeannine McCoy, defendant's mother, also testified
defendant had a mustache, some other facial hair, and only one
ring in his left eyebrow. On the night of April 27, 2003, she
talked on the phone with her sister Lori from around 9 or 10 p.m.
to somewhere between 11:30 p.m. and 1 a.m. During the phone
conversation, she could hear defendant's voice in the background.
Between 11:30 p.m. and 1 a.m., she heard defendant ask Lori if
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she was still talking to his mom, and Jeannine told Lori to tell
defendant "hi."
Lori testified defendant stayed at her home the entire
day of April 27, 2003, which was the day before her birthday.
Defendant and her son only left for 5- to 10-minute periods to
smoke a cigarette. That same day, she and Jeannine talked on the
phone until past midnight, and she recalled defendant telling her
to say "hi" to his mom around midnight. Lori also stated she saw
defendant after midnight and as late as 1 a.m. on April 28, 2003.
Lori's two children, Samantha Blair and Christopher Austin, also
testified defendant was at their home between 12 and 1 a.m. on
April 28, 2003.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated he
was at Lori's home during the late-night hours of April 27 and
the early morning hours of April 28, 2003. He only left the
house for five-minute periods to smoke with Christopher. He had
never been to Gary and Sharon's home and did not know them on a
personal level. He did believe they had crossed paths before.
He also had never met Joyner, his alleged codefendant, prior to
his arrest for this offense. Defendant also denied ever wearing
more than one eyebrow ring.
After hearing all the evidence, the jury found defen-
dant guilty of home invasion.
In September 2003, defendant filed a posttrial motion.
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In October 2003, the trial court held a joint hearing on defen-
dant's motion and sentencing. Both parties agreed the 15-year
sentence enhancement contained in section 12-11(c) of the Crimi-
nal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2002)) applied to defendant's
conviction. The court denied defendant's motion and sentenced
him to a total of 21 years' imprisonment. Defendant then ap-
pealed. As stated, we affirmed defendant's conviction and
sentence on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated our
judgment and remanded the cause to our court. We now reconsider
defendant's arguments as directed by our supreme court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant first asserts the State's evidence was
insufficient to prove him guilty of home invasion beyond a
reasonable doubt since he presented four alibi witnesses and the
State's eyewitness testimony was "suspect."
When considering a defendant's challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, the question for the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require the exclusion of every
possible doubt. People v. Shevock, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037,
782 N.E.2d 949, 954 (2003). Additionally, the jury had the
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responsibility to (1) determine the witnesses' credibility and
the weight given to their testimony, (2) resolve conflicts of the
evidence, and (3) draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
People v. Johnson, 353 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956, 819 N.E.2d 1233,
1235 (2004).
An identification is insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion if it is vague or doubtful. However, a single witness's
identification of the accused is sufficient if the witness viewed
the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identifica-
tion. That remains true even in the presence of contradicting
alibi testimony, provided that the witness had an adequate
opportunity to view the accused and that the in-court identifica-
tion is positive and credible. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302,
307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989). In evaluating identification
testimony, Illinois courts consider the factors set forth in
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 411, 93
S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972), which are (1) the witness's opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's
degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior
description of the criminal; (4) the witness's level of certainty
at the identification confrontation; and (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification confrontation. Slim,
127 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 537 N.E.2d at 319.
Here, we have more than one witness who identified
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defendant as the perpetrator, and the Neil factors do not weigh
in defendant's favor. Since the perpetrator was in their home
between 20 to 25 minutes, both Gary and Sharon had a lot of
opportunities to view him. Gary testified he was at an arm's
length with the man for at least 10 minutes, and at one point,
was able to look him straight in the eyes. Additionally, Gary
had met and talked to defendant on several prior occasions,
including only three weeks before the incident. Sharon said she
was within five feet of defendant. While Sharon was more focused
on the other male, Gary tried to pay close attention to defen-
dant's actions and, as stated, was able to look him straight in
the face.
As to the accuracy of their initial description of the
perpetrator, Gary recognized defendant by his voice, eyes, and
hair and was able to provide defendant's first name to Officer
Lewellyn. Their identification of defendant as one of the
perpetrators remained consistent since talking to the police
shortly after the incident. The only conflict between the
victims' initial statements to the police and their trial testi-
mony that related to defendant's description was as to whether
the men's bandanas fell down and exposed their entire face.
Further, while defendant asserted he only had one eyebrow ring,
Officer Ramey's testimony that defendant had four holes (two per
eyebrow ring) supports Gary's and Sharon's consistent assertion
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that the perpetrator had two rings.
Regarding the final two factors, both Gary and Sharon
"rather quickly" picked defendant's photograph out of a lineup,
which was conducted only three days after the incident. Gary and
Sharon also did not waver or hesitate in stating defendant was
one of the men who entered their home on April 28, 2003.
Moreover, the failure to notice facial hair is not
fatal to a positive and otherwise credible identification. Slim,
127 Ill. 2d at 310, 537 N.E.2d at 320. The case People v.
Marshall, 74 Ill. App. 2d 483, 221 N.E.2d 133 (1966), cited by
defendant in support of his argument that the identification
testimony was suspect, has been criticized and not followed. See
Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 313, 537 N.E.2d at 322. While defendant
presented an alibi defense and asserted he had only one eyebrow
ring and facial hair, the jury, as the trier of fact, had the
responsibility to resolve the conflicting testimony. See John-
son, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 819 N.E.2d at 1235.
Accordingly, we find the State's identification evi-
dence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
B. 15-Year Sentence Enhancement
Defendant also argues his 15-year sentence enhancement
for home invasion while armed with a firearm is unconstitutional
because it violates the proportionate-penalties clause of the
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Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, '11). We
disagree.
Section 12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2002)) provides as follows:
"(a) A person who is not a peace officer
acting in the line of duty commits home inva-
sion when without authority he or she know-
ingly enters the dwelling place of another
when he or she knows or has reason to know
that one or more persons is present or he or
she knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another and remains in such dwelling place
until he or she knows or has reason to know
that one or more persons is present and
* * *
(3) While armed with a firearm
uses force or threatens the immi-
nent use of force upon any person
or persons within such dwelling
place whether or not injury oc-
curs[.]"
Section 12-11(c) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West
2002)) provides:
"Home invasion in violation of subsec-
tion (a)(1), (a)(2)[,] or (a)(6) is a Class X
felony. A violation of subsection (a)(3) is
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a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court."
Prior to Sharpe, the Supreme Court of Illinois had used
three separate tests to determine whether a statute violated the
proportionate-penalties clause. See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d
503, 522, 795 N.E.2d 208, 220 (2003). The first test is whether
the penalty is "cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate
to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the
community." Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522, 795 N.E.2d at 220. The
second test is whether, when comparing similar offenses, "conduct
that creates a less serious threat to the public health and
safety is punished more severely." Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522, 795
N.E.2d at 220. The final test is whether offenses with identical
elements are given different sentences. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at
522, 795 N.E.2d at 220. In Sharpe, the supreme court abandoned
the second test, which was known as the cross-comparison test.
Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519, 839 N.E.2d at 516-17.
After the Sharpe decision, the Guevara court addressed
the defendants' argument that the 15-year sentence enhancement
for home invasion while armed with a firearm violated the
proportionate-penalties clause under the cross-comparison test
when compared to aggravated battery with a firearm. Guevara, 216
Ill. 2d at 544, 837 N.E.2d at 908. Our supreme court rejected
the defendants' argument because Sharpe prohibits a defendant
from raising a proportionate-penalties-clause challenge under the
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cross-comparison test. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 544-45, 837
N.E.2d at 908. The court further noted the defendants had not
challenged the 15-year enhancement under one of the other
proportionate-penalties-clause tests, and thus their
proportionate-penalties-clause challenge failed. Guevara, 216
Ill. 2d at 545, 837 N.E.2d at 908.
Here, like the defendants in Guevara, defendant argues
the 15-year sentence enhancement for home invasion while armed
with a firearm violates the proportionate-penalties clause under
the cross-comparison analysis when compared to aggravated battery
with a firearm. He also does not argue the 15-year enhancement
violates the proportionate-penalties clause under the other two
tests. Accordingly, defendant's proportionate-penalties-clause
argument fails.
Since we have rejected defendant's proportionate-
penalties-clause challenge to the 15-year sentence enhancement,
we need not address defendant's last argument.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.
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