People v. Ewing ( 2007 )

NO. 4-07-0184 Filed 11/29/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Coles County
JAMES C. EWING, ) No. 07DT19
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Brian O'Brien,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In January 2007, defendant, James C. Ewing, was ar-
rested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006)). Defendant's driving privileges were
thereafter summarily suspended by the Secretary of State, pursu-
ant to sections 11-501.1(e) and 6-208.1(a)(3) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(e), 6-208(a)(3) (West 2006)).
In January 2007, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence and a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspen-
sion. Following a February 2007 hearing, the trial court granted
the motion and petition.
The State appeals, arguing the trial court erred by
granting defendant's motion to suppress because the police
officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a
Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S.
Ct. 1868 (1968)). We agree and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
At the February 2007 hearing, Officer Michael Sanders
testified he was employed by the Coles County sheriff's depart-
ment. On January 23, 2007, at approximately 12:56 p.m., Officer
Sanders overheard a dispatch from the 9-1-1 dispatch center to
the Charleston police department. When asked what he heard over
the dispatch, Officer Sanders testified:
"I believe it was that an employee of
Crestline Veterinary Clinic believed that the
defendant was intoxicated and he left in a
green pickup truck with another white male
heading eastbound possibly toward Paris,
Illinois[,] and the driver, Mr. Ewing, was
possibly intoxicated."
Officer Sanders also heard a license plate number and vehicle
description.
Officer Sanders further testified he overheard a
Charleston police officer state that he was going to try to
intercept the driver of the vehicle. Officer Sanders cut short
his lunch, got in his squad car, and headed eastbound. Officer
Sanders waited for the suspect vehicle at Harrison Street and
Route 16. Within a matter of seconds, Officer Sanders saw the
suspect vehicle. Charleston police officer Hank Pauls was in a
vehicle behind the suspect vehicle. Officer Sanders did not
notice any traffic infractions by the suspect vehicle. However,
Officer Sanders activated his overheard emergency lights and
pulled onto Route 16 traveling eastbound ahead of Lieutenant
Pauls. The driver of the vehicle, defendant, pulled over.
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Officer Sanders notified dispatch of the location.
Officer Sanders walked up to the vehicle to address
defendant. Officer Sanders did not conduct any field-sobriety
testing. No questions were asked of Officer Sanders about what
occurred after he addressed defendant.
On cross-examination, Officer Sanders further testified
that the information he had when he stopped defendant's vehicle
included the license plate number, the registered owner, the type
of vehicle, the direction and the place the vehicle was travel-
ing, and that the call was made by an employee of Crestline.
Officer Sanders knew Crestline was a veterinary clinic between
Charleston and Mattoon.
Lieutenant Pauls of the Charleston police department
testified that on January 23, 2007, he heard a dispatch to
another officer, "Officer Craig," that two intoxicated individu-
als had left Crestline and were proceeding eastbound on Route 16
in a green Chevrolet pickup truck with license plate 2377GJ. The
dispatch originated from the multijurisdictional central-dispatch
service located near the airport. Lieutenant Pauls asked the
dispatcher whether an employee of Crestline had made the phone
call. The dispatcher informed Lieutenant Pauls that, "'Yes,
indeed, an employee had called.'" Based on that dispatch,
Lieutenant Pauls attempted to locate the vehicle.
Lieutenant Pauls located the vehicle at the intersec-
tion of Lincoln Avenue (we take judicial notice of the fact that
in this area of Charleston, Route 16 is also known as Lincoln
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Avenue) and First Street heading eastbound. Lieutenant Pauls
radioed the location to dispatch. At one point, Lieutenant Pauls
was stopped at Fourth Street and Lincoln Avenue while the suspect
vehicle was stopped at Ninth Street and Lincoln Avenue. Lieuten-
ant Pauls was able to get into a position to observe the vehicle
closely at the intersection of Lincoln Avenue and Hawthorn, near
the Wal-Mart Superstore. Lieutenant Pauls confirmed then that it
was the suspect vehicle. Lieutenant Pauls did not observe the
vehicle commit any traffic infractions.
After Officer Sanders effectuated a stop of defendant's
vehicle, Officer Sanders approached the vehicle. Lieutenant
Pauls also approached the vehicle and stood at the right rear
corner of the vehicle. Defendant, the driver, made a statement
that he "could not do any field[-]sobriety testing at the scene."
On cross-examination, Lieutenant Pauls testified he
encountered a lot of traffic on Lincoln Avenue and had difficulty
catching up to the vehicle because of the traffic.
The defense rested. The State called Adam Brazzell.
Brazzell testified he was employed with Coles County 9-1-1. His
duties included receiving emergency and nonemergency calls, some
of which go to law enforcement and other emergency agencies.
Brazzell testified that on January 23, 2007, at approx-
imately 12:45 p.m., he received a call. Brazzell testified that
calls are recorded in the database. He listened to the recording
of the call before coming in to court, and it accurately depicted
the conversation he had with the caller at that time.
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After receiving the phone call, Brazzell "disseminated
that to our Charleston officers with the Charleston radio fre-
quency." When asked whether he gave the officers any information
about who placed the call, Brazzell testified he "advised them
that it was an employee of Crestline."
The State sought to admit the audiotape of the 9-1-1
call and resulting dispatch. Defendant objected, arguing that
the only relevant evidence is what the officers said was the
basis of their stop. The State argued the tape was relevant to
the question of the caller's reliability. The State also argued
that information known to the dispatcher could be imputed to the
officers. The trial court overruled the objection, subject to
reconsideration after hearing the tape.
The tape was not transcribed but is included in the
record on appeal. On the tape, a female states she is calling to
report a drunk driver. The caller stated the driver, who is in a
green Chevy 4x4 with license plates 2377GJ, is "going to be on
Route 16" heading east. The caller then states, "They are
drunk!" The caller indicated "they just [sic] actually just
left here." The 9-1-1 operator, Brazzell, asked for the caller's
identity. The caller gave her name as Melissa from Crestline.
Melissa stated "they" dropped off a dog that was "put down."
Melissa again stated, "They are drunk!" and that they did not
need to be driving. Brazzell asked Melissa whether she knew the
persons' identities. Melissa stated the driver was James Ewing
and that "they" lived in Paris or around that area. Melissa then
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stated that they were getting ready to turn onto Route 16 and
repeated that they did not need to be driving. Melissa also
repeated the car identification information.
The tape also contains the dispatch of the information
to "Lincoln 88." Brazzell reported he had just received a report
of a possible "10-55" from Crestline. Brazzell stated that the
subject came in to leave an animal there and "they were extremely
intoxicated." Brazzell stated the two male subjects were just
leaving Crestline, heading eastbound on Route 16, in a green
Chevrolet pickup. Brazzell reported the men resided in Paris and
would probably travel through Charleston. The tape contains
transmissions apparently between dispatch and various police
officers, including the inquiry Lieutenant Pauls testified he
made to confirm that the report was made by an employee of
Crestline. It is unclear from the tape whether Brazzell also
gave the license plate number.
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court
took the matter under advisement. On February 21, 2007, the
court entered the following docket entry:
"The [c]ourt finds the facts and evi-
dence in this case to be analogous to the
facts and evidence in Village of Mundelein v.
Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d 216, *** 815 N.E.2d
965 [(2004).] The citizen-informant in the
case before the court did have an indicia of
reliability due to the fact that she identi-
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fied herself and provided some details about
the [defendant's] vehicle. The information
provided by the citizen-informant was not,
however, specific enough to justify an inves-
tigatory stop. In addition, the arresting
officers did not witness any behavior by the
[defendant] to corroborate the information
provided by the citizen-informant. Based
upon the totality of the circumstances in
this case, the court finds that the arresting
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that the defendant had committed a
crime. Accordingly, the [defendant's]
[m]otion to *** [s]uppress [e]vidence and
[m]otion to [r]escind [s]tatutory [s]ummary
[s]uspension are granted."
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the State argues the police lawfully stopped
defendant because the 9-1-1 call gave the police reasonable
suspicion to believe that defendant was driving under the influ-
ence. As such, the State argues, this court should reverse the
trial court's order granting the motion to suppress evidence and
the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension.
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A. Trial Court Erred by Granting Defendant's
Motion To Suppress Evidence
1. Standard of Review
The State argues this court should reverse the trial
court's factual determinations only if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence but should review the ultimate
legal questions of whether reasonable suspicion existed and
whether the evidence should have been suppressed de novo. At
oral argument, defendant conceded the State's position is cor-
rect.
Reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to sup-
press involves mixed questions of fact and law. People v.
Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). On
review, this court gives great deference to the trial court's
factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d
at 175, 784 N.E.2d at 805. "This deferential standard of review
is grounded in the reality that the [trial] court is in a supe-
rior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts
in their testimony." People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813
N.E.2d 93, 100-01 (2004). However, we review de novo the trial
court's legal determination of whether suppression is warranted
under those facts. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 175, 784 N.E.2d at
805.
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2. Terry Stops Are Permissible Based
Upon Reliable Information From a Third Party Informant
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. The search and seizure
language found in section 6 of article I of the Illinois Consti-
tution is construed in a manner consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment. Ill.
Const. 1970, art I, §6; Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314, 673
N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996).
The temporary detention of an individual during a
vehicle stop is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. People v. Hall, 351 Ill. App. 3d 501, 503, 814 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (2004). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court
created a limited exception to the requirement that seizures be
supported by probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236-37, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983).
Under the standards set forth in Terry, an officer may briefly
detain and question individuals to investigate possible criminal
behavior if "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion" are present. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. This standard is impossible to define
with precision. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 134
L. Ed. 2d 911, 918, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996). However, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the level of suspicion
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necessary to justify a detention under the Terry standard is
"considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989).
A police officer "may initiate a Terry stop based on
information provided by a third party." People v. Shafer, 372
Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049, 868 N.E.2d 359, 362-63 (2007). However,
the information must be reliable and allow "an officer to reason-
ably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity."
People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d 719, 729, 810 N.E.2d 542, 553
(2004). That is, the "tip [must] be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate
person." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254,
261, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379 (2000).
When considering whether an informant's tip supports an
investigatory stop, courts look at the totality of the circum-
stances. People v. Nitz, 371 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751, 863 N.E.2d
817, 821 (2007). An anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, may
provide reasonable suspicion so long as the information exhibits
"'sufficient indicia of reliability.'" J.L., 529 U.S. at 270,
146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1378, quoting Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 306, 110 S. Ct.
2412, 2414 (1990).
3. This Court's Recent Decision in Shafer Found
a Terry Stop Proper Based upon a Report of a
Drunk Driver by a Third Party
The trial court decided this case based on the Second
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District decision in Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d 216, 815 N.E.2d 965.
That case involved another driver calling the police department
to report that the defendant, driving a Mercury Marquis with
registration number 3836, was driving recklessly. Minx, 352 Ill.
App. 3d at 218, 815 N.E.2d at 968. The appellate court found
that while the caller had an indica of reliability, the caller
lacked details. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 222, 815 N.E.2d at
971-72. That is, while the caller reported the defendant was
driving "recklessly," he failed to indicate what observations led
him to that conclusion. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 222, 815
N.E.2d at 971. Therefore, the appellate court found that the
officer was not justified in conducting an investigatory stop.
Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 222, 815 N.E.2d at 972.
However, this case is more analogous to this court's
recent decision in Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 868 N.E.2d 359,
decided after the trial court's decision herein. In Shafer, this
court addressed the issue of a Terry stop based on information
provided by an independent third party. A Wendy's employee
called the police to report an intoxicated person causing a
disturbance in the restaurant's drive-thru. Shafer, 372 Ill.
App. 3d at 1047, 868 N.E.2d at 361. A police officer responded
to the location and saw a car leaving the Wendy's parking lot as
he arrived. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 868 N.E.2d at 361.
The officer stopped the car shortly after it left the parking
lot. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 868 N.E.2d at 361. The
officer did not see any traffic violations before stopping the
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car. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 868 N.E.2d at 361. After
effectuating the stop, the officer had a difficult time under-
standing the defendant and noticed a strong smell of alcohol on
defendant's breath. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 868 N.E.2d
at 361. The officer arrested defendant for DUI. Shafer, 372
Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 868 N.E.2d at 361.
The trial court denied the defendant's petition to
rescind his statutory suspension, and this court affirmed.
Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, 868 N.E.2d at 367. In doing
so, this court found the telephone tip was reliable and provided
the police officer with the requisite quantum of suspicion to
justify the stop. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054-55, 868
N.E.2d at 367.
Specifically, the court concluded that "informant's
tips regarding possible incidents of drunk driving require less
rigorous corroboration than tips concerning matters presenting
less imminent danger to the public." Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at
1053, 868 N.E.2d at 366. This court first noted that the call
from a Wendy's employee was not an "anonymous" tip. Shafer, 372
Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 868 N.E.2d at 366-67. "[A]n emergency call
to police should not be viewed as an 'anonymous' tip or [be
viewed] with the skepticism applied to tips provided by confiden-
tial informants." Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 868 N.E.2d
at 367. Although this court in Shafer held that because the call
from Wendy's was to a police emergency line, that call did not
constitute an "anonymous tip" (Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054,
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868 N.E.2d at 367), we nonetheless cited with approval the
factors for evaluating whether an anonymous tip gives rise to
reasonable suspicion as articulated by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in State v. Sousa, 151 N.H. 297, 303-04, 855 A.2d 1284,
1290 (2004):
"'First, whether there is a "sufficient quan-
tity of information" such as the vehicle's
make, model, license plate number, location
and bearing, and "similar innocent details"
so that the officer may be certain that the
vehicle stopped is the one the tipster iden-
tified. [Citation.] Second, the time inter-
val between the police receiving the tip and
the police locating the suspect vehicle.
[Citation.] Third, whether the tip is based
upon contemporaneous eyewitness observations.
[Citations.] Fourth, whether the tip is
sufficiently detailed to permit the reason-
able inference that the tipster has actually
witnessed an ongoing motor vehicle offense.'"
Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 868 N.E.2d
at 363, quoting Sousa, 151 N.H. at 303-04,
855 A.2d at 1290.
After reviewing those factors, the Shafer court determined that
the tip (in addition to not being "anonymous") was also reliable.
Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 868 N.E.2d at 367. Moreover,
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this court rejected the defendant's claim that the police officer
acted solely upon conclusory and uncorroborated opinions. This
court concluded "that the telephone tip provided [the officer]
with the requisite quantum of suspicion to justify the Terry stop
of defendant's car." Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, 868
N.E.2d at 367.
4. The Terry Stop in This Case Was Proper
In this case, the trial court found the caller had an
indicia of reliability but the tip was not specific enough to
justify an investigatory stop. We agree that the caller had an
indicia of reliability but disagree that the tip lacked suffi-
cient detail.
This court must first address whether to consider only
the information conveyed to the police officers or whether
additional information given to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, but not
conveyed to the officers, can be imputed to the police officers.
The State makes no distinction between this information in its
appellant's brief.
Under the "collective- or imputed-knowledge" doctrine,
information known to all of the police officers acting in concert
can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating
the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.
People v. Fenner, 191 Ill. App. 3d 801, 806, 548 N.E.2d 147, 151
(1989); see also People v. Crowell, 94 Ill. App. 3d 48, 50, 418
N.E.2d 477, 478 (1981) (holding that "an arresting officer may
rely on the knowledge of officers who command him or work with
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him to make the arrest"). The focus is on whether the officer on
whose instructions or information the actual searching or arrest-
ing officers relied had reasonable suspicion to search or proba-
ble cause to arrest. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
231, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 613, 105 S. Ct. 675, 681 (1985). However,
if the officer initiating the stop relies on a dispatch, the
officer who directed the dispatch must have possessed sufficient
facts to establish probable cause to make the arrest. See People
v. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d 721, 724-25, 614 N.E.2d 66, 69 (1993)
(finding the arresting police officers lacked probable cause to
arrest the defendant where the record contained no evidence as to
the source of the dispatcher's information and the police officer
with knowledge did not give that information to anyone else and
was not acting in concert with the arresting officers).
The Illinois courts have yet to address whether infor-
mation known to a civilian 9-1-1 dispatcher may be imputed to the
police officers. Several federal circuits have extended the
collective-knowledge doctrine to situations involving a dispatch
by a civilian 9-1-1 operator as opposed to another police offi-
cer. See United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114,
1118 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320,
327 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216,
1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The Second Circuit, however, has disagreed, finding
that whether the knowledge may be imputed depends upon whether
the 9-1-1 operator had sufficient training to assess the informa-
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tion in terms of reasonable suspicion. See United States v.
Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the police
officer had insufficient information from which to conclude that
a stop and frisk was appropriate wherein the civilian 9-1-1
operator lacked the training to assess the information in terms
of reasonable suspicion and failed to convey sufficient informa-
tion to the police officer); see also United States v. Wehrle,
No. CR406-333, slip op. at 4 (February 14, 2007), F.3d ,
, 2007 WL 521882 (S.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that information
known to the civilian 9-1-1 dispatcher could be imputed to the
police officer where the dispatcher had specialized law-enforce-
ment training).
We conclude that the cases that hold the imputed-
knowledge doctrine includes information contained in calls to 9-
1-1 operators are more persuasive than those holding to the
contrary. However, even if we were not so persuaded, we would
still conclude that the information communicated to the police
officers provided them with sufficient information to form
reasonable suspicion. The dispatcher gave the officers the make,
model, color, and license plate of the vehicle. The dispatcher
told the officers the vehicle contained two male occupants and
would be leaving Crestline traveling east on Route 16. The
dispatcher further informed the officers that the report of a
possible drunk driver was made by an employee of Crestline and
that the individual had just left his animal at Crestline.
An informant tip received by telephone may form the
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basis of a Terry stop if the tip is reliable and the tip allows
the officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in
criminal activity. See Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 868
N.E.2d at 362-63. The factors to consider include (1) the
quantity and detail of the information such that the officer may
be certain that the vehicle stopped is the one identified by the
caller; (2) the time interval between the tip and the police
locating the vehicle; (3) whether the tip is based on contempora-
neous eyewitness observations; and (4) whether the tip has
sufficient detail to permit the reasonable inference that the
tipster actually witnessed what she described. Shafer, 372 Ill.
App. 3d at 1050, 868 N.E.2d at 363, quoting Sousa, 151 N.H. at
303-04, 855 A.2d at 1290.
Applying the factors set forth in Shafer, and given the
less-rigorous corroboration needed for informant's tips regarding
possible incidents of drunk driving, the telephone tip provided
the officers with the requisite quantum of suspicion to justify
the Terry stop.
Notably, the caller was not anonymous, as she gave her
name and from where she was calling. Moreover, calls made to a
police emergency number are considered more reliable than other
calls because the police have enough information to identify the
caller even if the caller does not give his or her name. See
Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 868 N.E.2d at 363-65 (citing
numerous cases and noting that 9-1-1 callers are not truly
anonymous because the police can now identify the caller, and the
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caller subjects himself or herself to criminal charges if he or
she makes a false report).
Moreover, the factors articulated in Shafer exist here
and support the conclusion that the tip was reliable and gave the
officers reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. First, the
caller provided sufficient details about the car, including the
make, model, color, and license plate, and the fact that the
vehicle was traveling eastbound on Route 16 with two male occu-
pants. In addition, Brazzell reported to the officers that the
vehicle was occupied by two males. This gave the officers a
sufficient basis to believe they were pulling over the car the
caller reported.
Second, the time interval between the call and when the
officers located defendant's vehicle was short. Brazzell testi-
fied the call came in at approximately 12:45 p.m. The ticket
issued by Officer Sanders contains the time 12:56 p.m. Moreover,
Officer Sanders testified that after hearing the dispatch, he got
in his squad car, headed east, and waited for the vehicle at
Harrison and Route 16. He saw the vehicle within a matter of
seconds. Lieutenant Pauls also appeared to have located defen-
dant's vehicle quickly.
Third, the tip was based on contemporaneous eyewitness
observations. Brazzell told the officers that an employee of
Crestline made the report and that the defendant was just leaving
Crestline. While the record is silent as to what defendant did
before driving off, the caller clearly made the report as she
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observed the incident. Fourth, the tip was sufficiently detailed
to permit a reasonable inference that the tipster actually
witnessed what she described. Brazzell informed the officers
that the caller, an employee of Crestline, reported that defen-
dant left his animal at Crestline and was extremely intoxicated.
A reasonable inference can be drawn that the caller, as an
employee of Crestline, would have had ample opportunity to
observe defendant as he left his animal there.
As was the case in Shafer, the record is silent as to
just what defendant did to cause the Crestline employee enough
concern to the call the police. See Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at
1054-55, 868 N.E.2d at 367. However, because of the caller's
position as an employee at Crestline, she would have been in a
position to observe defendant's speech, odor, and gait. See
Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054-55, 868 N.E.2d at 367 (proximity
between customer and employee at a drive-thru window supported
the reliability of the tipster's observations as the employee
would be in a position to observe the defendant's speech and
odor). In addition, it is reasonable to conclude that a person
can determine when another person might be intoxicated. See,
e.g., People v. Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d 305, 310, 726 N.E.2d
759, 762-63 (2000) (noting that "even a layperson is competent to
testify regarding a person's intoxication from alcohol, because
such observations are within the competence of all adults of
normal experience").
As in Shafer, an identified (or identifiable) citizen
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called a police emergency number from his or her workplace to
report that a drunk driver had just driven away. In both cases,
the citizens were sufficiently concerned about the condition of
these drivers that the citizens overcame any reluctance to call
the police, and they apparently did so out of a sense of the
danger the drunk drivers posed to the community. For these
citizens to call the police is truly extraordinary. When receiv-
ing such a call, the police may properly conclude that the
circumstances must be pretty serious (at least in the mind of the
citizen calling) for that citizen to make such a call, thus
adding to the credibility the police may give to the identified
(or identifiable) caller. Viewing the evidence in this light
would be consistent with Supreme Court of Illinois doctrine that
the central issue in determining whether a Terry stop was appro-
priate is "'whether the information, taken in its totality, and
interpreted not by technical legal rules but by factual and
practical commonsense considerations, would lead a reasonable and
prudent person to believe that the person stopped had committed
an offense.' [Citation.]" People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571,
583, 795 N.E.2d 253, 262 (2003), overruled on other grounds by
Pittman, 211 Ill. 2d at 513, 813 N.E.2d at 101.
Because the tip was reliable and provided the officers
with the requisite quantum of suspicion to justify the Terry
stop, the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence. As previously noted, the trial court did
not have the benefit of this court's decision in Shafer when it
- 20 -
addressed the issue. Instead, the trial court relied on the Minx
case. This court finds the Minx case both distinguishable from
Shafer and the instant case and in error. In particular, the
tipster in Minx reported the defendant's car was driving reck-
lessly. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 218, 815 N.E.2d at 968. While
reckless driving may be a result of a drunk driver, it may also
be a fleeting occurrence. An intoxicated driver remains impaired
as he or she continues to drive. In fact, as noted in Shafer, an
intoxicated driver presents a more imminent danger than many
other crimes--such as concealment of a handgun--and requires less
corroboration of an informant's tip. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at
1052, 868 N.E.2d at 365.
Moreover, the tipster in Minx had no personal contact
with the defendant. Here, the court could infer that because of
the close contact between the tipster and defendant, the tipster
had the opportunity to observe defendant's speech, odor, and gait
to draw the conclusion that defendant was intoxicated.
Regardless, Minx is simply wrong. Where a nonanonymous
caller reports a reckless, erratic, or drunk driver, the police
must be permitted to stop the reported vehicle without having to
question the caller about the specific details that led him or
her to call so long as the nonanonymous tip has a sufficient
indicia of reliability. Reckless and erratic drivers are likely
impaired, and such drivers present an imminent danger to other
motorists. A police officer should not have to wait to observe
such driver commit a traffic violation or obtain specific details
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supporting the caller's conclusion before stopping the reported
vehicle.
B. Trial Court Erred by Granting the Petition
To Rescind the Statutory Summary Suspension
Generally, a trial court's decision on a petition to
rescind a statutory summary suspension will not be reversed
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People
v. Kavanaugh, 362 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695, 840 N.E.2d 807, 811
(2005). However, de novo review is appropriate where, as here,
neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is ques-
tioned. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 868 N.E.2d at 366.
For the same reasons the trial court erred by granting the motion
to suppress evidence, the court also erred by granting defen-
dant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
orders granting the motion to suppress evidence and the petition
to rescind the statutory summary suspension and remand for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
STEIGMANN, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.
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